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Abstract 
The Global Positioning Service (GPS) is already being used for certain aviation applications. In 
many cases GPS is augmented with Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) which 
provides an integrity check on the positioning solution given. These combined systems must 
achieve allowable levels of safety before they can be accepted for any flight. Because of the 
stringent requirement placed on safety, assessment of the safety levels can only be achieved 
through analytical hazard analysis, a key element of which is identifying failure modes, the 
corresponding probabilities and the resultant effects on operational performance. This 
process is referred to as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The FMEA process 
followed in this thesis focuses on the assessment of Non-Precision Approaches (NPA) 
although many of the techniques may be extended to more stringent aviation applications. 
Previous assessments of GPS safety in this regard have contained a number of shortcomings, 
most notably a limited capture and characterisation of failures, insufficient sampling of space-
time geometry and an inefficient or inaccurate determination of the Required Navigation 
Performance (RNP) parameters. This thesis proposes a novel framework for characterising all 
failures as a probability function of the measurement error magnitude that goes beyond the 
current GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS) Performance Standard (PS) model. To 
complete this model, a data analysis of the broadcast orbit errors is performed. The 
weaknesses of current grid-based performance assessment techniques, including insufficient 
sampling of space-time points, are avoided by assessing over a specific flight track. The 
addition of deterministic models based on accelerated search procedures and a high-
efficiency integration scheme enables a realistic determination of the RNP parameters 
quickly, accurately and reliably avoiding the need for Monte Carlo simulations. 
The innovations employed are also capable of improving the integrity prediction function of 
on-board receiver algorithms. For the more stringent APV operations, traditional protection 
levels are compared to a new ideal value. This highlights the limitations in traditional methods 
and shows improved RAIM availability may be achieved with the new approach in a variety of 
applications. Over the UK an increase in availability of approximately 40% for APV-I 
operations using current single-frequency measurements is presented and of approximately 
10% for APV-I I operations using forthcoming dual-frequency measurements. Results are also 
presented for the combined GPS and Galileo constellation and protection against multiple 
failures. This thesis fills the major gaps in previous performance assessment methods and 
paves the way for innovative integrity algorithms using the new techniques developed. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Navigation is an integral part of life. This is no truer than in air transportation systems which 
rely on it to function correctly. This chapter presents the background to air transportation and 
the necessary technical elements needed to introduce the research topic. The research 
objectives are identified before the chapter ends with a structural outline of this thesis. 
1.1 Background 
The current trend in global air travel is one of growth with demand expected to double in the 
next 20 years. In the US and Europe demand is expected to have a sustained 4-5% increase 
per year over the same period (Airbus, 2006). However, inefficiency within the industry 
results in the growth not being matched by capacity. This inefficiency was estimated to cost 
over 4 billion Euros (SESAR, 2006) and has been primarily attributed to sub-optimal route 
design and Air Traffic Control (ATC) productivity. As well as leading to a financial cost, 
inefficiency places an unnecessary burden on the environment through excessive fuel usage. 
A key focus of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) (ICAO, 2005) is to improve 
aviation efficiency and hence increase capacity in order to meet demand whilst ensuring 
safety and protecting against environmental damage. Safety is the primary concern of ICAO 
and any proposed changes to improve other performance measures must safeguard current 
safety levels (ICAO, 2002). 
Ultimately, the research presented in this thesis should aim to either achieve, or provide the 
potential to achieve, an improvement in these key performance metrics: capacity, efficiency 
and safety as well as the additional indicators expressed in ICAO's vision (ICAO, 2005). 
Capacity may be improved through better route planning and the removal of bottlenecks in 
the terminal area. Furthermore, if safety can be preserved, higher capacity may be achieved 
through improved navigation performance which enables smaller separation distances and 
lower landing minima. Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) have been identified as the 
technology to meet such challenges including enhancement of safety (FAA, 2008). 
Furthermore, efficiency may be increased through the cost reduction associated with GNSS, 
since at present the traditional systems (VOR, DME, ILS, MLS) require an extensive and costly 
maintenance programme. In addition, the benefits of using a single primary system for the 
majority of operations or even gate-to-gate, with a comparatively low upkeep cost, are far-
reaching from a financial point of view. The role of GNSS as the single primary system is a 
feasible objective for air navigation but presents a number of technical challenges to ensure 
performance is reached, particularly in the case of safety. In order to maintain the safety 
levels required for air navigation; separation distances, obstacle clearance heights and 
decision heights are intended to provide a buffer to account for failures. For navigation, the 
relevant performance requirements are specified in terms of four key parameters; accuracy, 
integrity, continuity and availability (iCAO, 2006). Safety may be bettered by the use of a 
more accurate navigation system which is able to detect failures and inform the user in 
sufficient time with a greater degree of confidence {integrityf and yet provide a more 
seamless service to the user (continuity^. By achieving each of these of these requirements, 
the system is said to be available^. As is discussed below, this may be obtained through new 
technology, better navigation algorithm design, on-board integrity monitoring and lastly an 
improved performance assessment tool which is the primary objective of this thesis. 
1.1.1 Satellite Navigation 
The international aviation community has identified (EUROCAE, 2005; FAA, 2008) GNSS as one 
of the recommended technologies which can help the industry meet the new strain on 
capacity whilst reaching the targets placed on safety and the environment (ICAO, 2002). The 
use of advanced avionics coupled with satellites, computers and data links should remove the 
necessity for expensive ground based navigation systems traditionally used to meet the 
demands of the air navigation community. The expected gains of using such a system are 
likely to be better accuracy, superior safety and improved efficiency. In fact, GNSS provides 
the perfect partner to the Area Navigation (RNAV) concept which permits users to operate 
aircraft on any desired flight path within the coverage of available navigation aids. Due to 
GNSS providing a 3D position relative to the earth's geoid (WGS-84), RNAV combined with 
GNSS is more natural than when using distance references and angular deviations to known 
ground locations. This natural relationship is in greater evidence whilst operating a modern 
^ More extensive definitions are given in Cliapter 2 
GPS receiver, where the usability available to pilots through clear presentation of various 
navigation parameters is greatly enhanced. The benefits of RNAV are clear, greater flexibility 
for users leading to efficiency gains, greater airspace capacity and with improved navigation 
systems, a reduced safety risk. 
So how does GNSS enable an improvement of system accuracy, safety and efficiency? In 1990, 
signal accuracy was degraded by Selective Availability (SA) employed by the U.S Department 
of Defence as a means to limit civilian accuracy and ensure military system superiority 
(Tolman et al, 1990). However, the switching off of SA and improvements in the fields of 
ionospheric modelling, atomic clock design as well as an improved monitoring network have 
reduced the single frequency signal measurement noise standard deviation from 33m to less 
than 10m (Kovach, 2000). Additionally, the introduction of Wide Area Differential GPS 
Systems (WADGPS) which provide range corrections can improve measurement accuracy 
further to the order of l -2m. Accuracy in most applications of GNSS is known to exceed that 
of the traditional systems and is well within the required performance level (Hwang and 
Brown, 2005) but the critical element relating to safety is the ability to detect failures known 
as integrity. 
1.1.2 Integrity Monitoring and Prediction 
Reference stations located at known positions around the globe may be used in combination 
with satellite orbit and clock data to check the quality of measurements on the ground 
(system level integrity). Alternatively, the availability of multiple satellites, beyond the 
number needed to guarantee a navigation solution, provides redundancy which may be used 
to check the quality of measurements on-board an aircraft (user level integrity). An integrity 
measure is then formed which quantifies the current navigation system safety risk. Currently 
system level integrity monitoring may be provided by Satellite or Ground Based 
Augmentation Systems (SBAS/GBAS), but the proposed Galileo system shall possess an inbuilt 
integrity channel (Galileo Integrity Channel - GIC) in partnership with a novel integrity 
monitoring algorithm to provide a more reliable global integrity service. 
User level integrity is commonly provided by Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(RAIM) which utilises measurements observed by the GPS receiver. RAIM may incorporate 
other measurements from additional systems such as inertial navigation and barometric 
sensors, then known as Aircraft Based Augmentation Systems (ABAS). Given a positioning 
solution, RAIM functions by firstly checking the conditions exist to perform failure detection 
with sufficient confidence and then performing a statistical test to determine the presence of 
any failure. Fundamentally the first stage uses the geometrical locations of satellites and 
current estimates of measurement noise variance to determine the detection power of the 
test. The failure detection test then compares either the measurements, their residuals or 
subset positioning solutions to ascertain the presence or absence of a significant failure. A 
significant failure is defined as one which results in an unacceptable position error whose 
magnitude is specified in the performance requirements of ICAO (2006). Detection of a failure 
may then lead to exclusion of the outlying measurement or an alert being issued to the user. 
RAIM algorithms have been developed along two main threads, snapshot which use 
measurements from the current epoch only and sequential which usually involve the use of a 
Kalman filter and previous measurements to predict the state at the current epoch. There is 
naturally some overlap in the notions and concepts employed and both methods may be used 
to compute protection levels. Protection levels are related to the first stage of RAIM 
algorithms described above, whereby the algorithm determines if the power of the test is 
sufficient. The protection level is the largest position error which may result without the 
required integrity risk being exceeded. Therefore, a lower protection level represents better 
integrity performance. In both sequential and snapshot approaches, it is necessary to make 
assumptions when deriving the protection levels. Predicted integrity is therefore unable to 
match true performance. These assumptions then may lead to protection levels which pose 
an integrity risk by not protecting the user at the required level or which unnecessarily reduce 
availability of the system (Brown and Chin, 1998). More sophisticated algorithm design has 
the potential to reduce the assumptions and to more realistically model true behaviour 
thereby protecting integrity and increasing availability. This thesis presents work under this 
hypothesis for the snapshot algorithm, though it may be feasible to extend the ideas into the 
sequential domain. 
1.1.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
If navigation integrity can be provided without compromising the continuity of service or 
availability then significant gains can be made through the application of GNSS to aviation. In 
the case of en-route and to some degree Non-Precision Approach (NPA), this initial 
implementation has been achieved. However, potential integrity risks still exist for NPA and 
optimised operational performance is only possible through an extensive analytical study of 
the navigation system. It is of operational benefit to notify users in real time whether 
performance requirements are being met or to determine the times and locations when 
performance drops below acceptable levels. Furthermore, a broad study of the impacts of 
failure presents the possibility to improve user algorithms and extend the viability of certain 
GNSS aviation applications. 
The Required Navigation Performance (RNP) for civil aviation (ICAO, 2006) which must be 
achieved by GNSS is specified by the four key parameters listed above; accuracy, integrity, 
continuity and availability. Integrity, which accounts for failures is closely related to the safety 
of the navigation system and is paramount for the safety critical applications of civil aviation. 
To enable the integration of GPS or GNSS into safety critical applications such as aviation, a 
thorough hazard analysis is required. The high-percentile requirements specified for integrity 
and continuity in Annex 10 (ICAO, 2006) warrant that this assessment can only be determined 
through analytic techniques. This involves identifying possible failure modes, their probability 
of occurrence, the measurement error and consequent risk. This process is commonly 
referred to as Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). This thesis describes this process, 
which as well as assessing the failures and there effects, maintains the link between the RNP 
parameters and the operational environment. 
The primary difficulty in assessing the GNSS based navigation system lies in the lack of real 
data. The relative lifetime of a GPS satellite in comparison to other engineering systems is 
short and the number of test cases few. Furthermore, as the system performance varies with 
the satellite constellation user positions the output of the system is highly dependent on 
these dynamics and the number of variables involved further limits the usefulness of real 
data. GPS is complex and as such a variety of failure modes exist. Failures though are not just 
limited to those within the space segment. The ground control segment is also culpable to 
introducing failures and variable ionospheric and tropospheric conditions can adversely affect 
measurements. Positioning performance can depend on aircraft position, attitude, dynamics 
and thus time, as well as the type of receiver and the GPS navigation algorithm. This 
complexity coupled with the lack of attainable data ensures the need for an offline analytical 
simulation of performance in order to determine in a comprehensive and reliable manner the 
performance parameters of the system. 
So what is lacking in the current performance assessment methods that fail to capture this 
complexity of the system? There is the need for a credible end-to-end process; linking 
navigation system performance to actual flight operations (Feng et al, 2006b). This thesis 
describes the methodology employed to remain as close to the real operations as possible 
when simulating performance. Furthermore, there is potential for improvement in the 
capture and characterisation of failure modes. Previous methods have also been shown to 
insufficiently sample the space-time geometries through the occurrence of undetected RAIM 
holes (Feng et al, 2006a). At the technical level, the computation of integrity, the most 
complex of the RNP parameters has either been time-consuming through the use of 
numerical methods or inaccurate and unreliable when approximations are used (Ober, 1997). 
This thesis addresses each of the gaps in the FMEA process to enable a fast, accurate and 
validated performance assessment. At present, the system is focused on assessing NPA under 
the assumption of the baseline snapshot RAIM algorithms. This class of algorithm forms part 
of the ICAO recommended approach for NPA operations and as such presents the best 
starting point for the analysis. Furthermore, the transferability of the derived model, to APV is 
of interest. 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
The primary goals within the context of an FMEA process are to develop a novel approach to 
failure modes characterisation and to design a state-of-the-art software platform for the 
assessment of performance based aviation applications. In addition, the formulation, testing 
and validation of novel algorithms to improve navigation system performance in terms of the 
RNP parameters is a key objective of the research. Naturally, to facilitate this research a 
thorough literature review process must be undertaken to identify the limitations of existing 
methods and to lay the groundwork for any research developments. 
In §1.2.1-1.2.4 the objectives given above are summarised and include a number of tasks 
which must be completed to achieve the respective research aim. 
1.2.1 Identification of Existing iS/iethods and Their Limitations 
The topic of this thesis is multidisciplinary; requiring a grasp of the air navigation 
environment, satellite based positioning systems, integrity monitoring techniques and the 
mathematical, statistical and systems engineering principles which underpin them. The first 
phase of research involves gaining an understanding of the relevant specifications, 
performance standards and baseline methods in each field by a thorough literature review. 
Following this, critical analysis and preliminary tests are used to highlight any weaknesses in 
current integrity monitoring and performance assessment techniques as potential areas of 
innovation. The individual tasks relating to this objective are summarised below; 
• To acquire a full understanding of the relevant performance standards for 
international, European, UK national and US national airspace 
• To examine user level integrity algorithms with a particular focus on those which 
meet current or potential future aviation standards 
• To investigate the performance of existing navigation and integrity monitoring 
solutions 
• To identify existing performance assessment methods of GPS and its application to 
aviation 
• To assess the quality of performance assessment methods and identify their 
weaknesses 
1.2.2 Capture and Characterisation of Failure Modes 
Knowledge of failure modes which may impact on aviations is available from various sources 
(Ochieng et al, 2003). The basis for the FMEA is to collate the information contained in 
reports, journal papers, theses and existing records to build a comprehensive database of 
failures. To enable the effects of all failure modes on the system to be determined, a 
modelling framework must be devised and compared to traditional practices which don't 
account for the failures in such detail. The tasks required to meet this objective are 
summarised below: 
• To capture the multitude of GPS failure modes from available sources including 
journals, PhD theses, monitoring reports and existing databases 
• To characterise the failure modes by relevant fields such as their measurement 
effect, probability of occurrence, duration and time to repair 
• To categorise each failure mode by type 
• To derive a model for each failure type in order to assess the its impact on receiver 
algorithms and operations 
• To model empirically failure modes which are incomplete from the literature review 
• To unify the failure modes into a total failure model 
• To compare the total failure model to existing failure models within a receiver 
algorithm 
1.2.3 Development of an Enhanced Software Platform 
The need for analysis and modelling of the high-percentile requirements was highlighted in 
§1.1. To achieve this, an enhanced software platform is needed which enables an end-to-end 
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operational assessment for NPA. This requires innovative solutions to the issue of sampling 
and to the interrelated computational challenges of efficiency, accuracy and reliability. The 
tasks which make up this goal are stated below: 
To design a software platform that maintains the link to flight operations 
To incorporate any relevant models of the local geography at airports which could 
contribute affect navigation performance 
To assess the system fully, in the sense that all relevant space-time geometry is 
included 
To avoid the use of time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations to compute the RNP 
but ensure that the entire probability space is captures 
To derive deterministic models which determine the integrity risk at each space-time 
point 
To derive a means to account for all failure types and biases within the assessment 
and the extent to which they degrade the system 
To employ a testing and validation strategy to ensure the enhanced software is 
error-free 
To formulate feasible implementations of the performance assessment procedure 
within practical examples, particularly an approach validation tool and an online 
performance prediction tool 
1.2.4 Improvement to Existing Algorithms 
Many of the models used to assess the performance of GPS, RAIM and their applications are 
similar to those employed within the receiver algorithms themselves. This is particularly true 
of the RAIM process which checks that the conditions exist to perform fault detection with 
sufficient confidence. Therefore, offline developments in this regard could have potential 
added value in a real-time setting. The tasks which must be completed to explore accomplish 
this goal are stated below: 
• To understand existing RAIM algorithms and their properties 
• To utilise the results of the FMEA process as a valuable input to the design of new 
algorithms 
• To find solutions to the weaknesses of existing algorithms in order to improve the 
integrity and availability of the system 
• To test the performance of the novel algorithms to determine their benefit to the 
navigation community 
1.3 Outline 
The organisation of the thesis is as follows. Chapter Two describes the evolution of air 
navigation, highlighting the various procedures, technologies and performance indicators 
critical to this thesis. Chapter Three presents the current and proposed architectures of GNSS 
along with a description of error sources and the functional models required to make a 
measurement and thus compute a position. Chapter Four then looks at the need for integrity 
monitoring and the various techniques available. This includes a description of snapshot and 
sequential RAIM algorithms and the more recent developments in algorithm design. Chapter 
Five reviews existing GNSS performance assessment techniques and details the strategies 
employed within the research as part of an FMEA process structure. In Chapter Six, the first 
phase of research on failure modes and models is presented. This is followed by an analysis of 
algorithmic elements which determine performance in Chapter Seven including an account of 
the software architecture to which the modelling developments have been assimilated. 
Chapter Eight presents the method used to compute the integrity risk for NPA including test 
results and validation as well as introducing a derived RAIM algorithm based on this 
computation. In Chapter Nine, the extension to algorithm design is taken a step further by 
assessing RAIM algorithms based on the failure model of Chapter Six and the innovations 
described in Chapters Seven and Eight. Real data is used to validate the new technique to 
confirm no erroneous steps have been taken in its design. 
Chapter Ten presents the output of the FMEA operational evaluation for NPA. The output 
template design, results and alternative implementations are discussed. Chapter Eleven 
presents the conclusions of the research and suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 2 
THE AIR NAVIGATION ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
Navigation is an integral part of all transport operations. This is particularly true of heavier-
than-air powered flight where pilots are unable to stop for an indefinite time. Therefore, 
aircraft operators must continuously monitor their position, direction and proposed flight 
plan in order to ensure the safety and purpose of their mission are maintained. The 
complexities of this process differ between the phases of flight and this is reflected in the 
variety of aircraft procedures and specifications defined within international standards (ICAO, 
2006; RTCA, 2006). In §2.2 these procedures are introduced, including their intricacies and 
how they evolved in the context of the international air navigation community. Furthermore, 
within these procedures, the navigation process requires the use of Navigational Aids 
(Navaids) employing specific technologies and in some cases combinations. An overview of 
the current navigation technologies is given in §2.3 describing how each operates, its current 
status and historical context. 
Initially, to fly it was required merely to have the knowledge of how to operate an aircraft and 
the means to navigate to a desired position. However, the requirements placed upon aviation 
by the rise in demand for air travel, commercial pressures and military operations led to the 
need for system requirements. Hence, the air navigation system should meet the demands of 
its users including guaranteeing the quality of the navigation service in terms of safety and 
reliability. This driving force, coupled with the desire for international cooperation, sparked 
an evolution in the requirements specification concept. The performance specification 
methodology is discussed in §2.4, with a particular focus on safety which is the crux of this 
thesis. The current specifications for navigation operations and equipment are presented and 
interpreted in §2.5. 
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2.2 Air Traffic Procedures 
The task of operating and positioning an aircraft varies from taxiing to the runway, 
performing a take-off, climbing, cruising to the vicinity of the desired location, approaching 
the airport landing strip through to touching down and exiting the destination runway itself. 
This is a simplified view, but it is easy to see how the dynamics of the aircraft and the scale of 
navigation differ. Positioning during landing must naturally be far more accurate than when 
cruising at altitude over oceanic regions. Furthermore, these more stringent processes usually 
take place over much shorter time frames adding additional complexity in terms of 
monitoring the quality of service. Another factor within these procedural differences is the 
density of air traffic which is naturally greater around aerodromes. The rapid growrth in the 
demand for air travel during the second half of the twentieth century (SESAR, 2006) has 
spawned a highly congested airspace, particularly in such regions as the east coast of the 
United States (U.S) and Western Europe. The complexities brought about by this increase in 
congestion have led to the evolution of numerous air traffic procedures. 
The first dichotomy in air navigation is between visual flight and instrument flight. 
Commercial aviation began in the U.S in the 1920s using visual means only (Heppenheimer, 
1998). Visual flight is still performed but naturally when the meteorological and operation 
conditions allow within the International Civil Aviation Organisation's (ICAO) Visual Flight 
Rules (VFR) and a mitigation procedure exists including air-to-ground radio communications. 
When conditions are not amenable to navigating by the human eye additional aids must be 
provided which meet the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) formed to maintain safety and 
reliability. These aids may be Navaids, allowing the aircraft navigator to perform positioning 
and heading tasks or a surveillance and communications link to ground navigators in the form 
of Airway (or Air) Traffic Control (ATC). ATC was formed by the U.S government in order to 
protect aircraft from midair collisions (Gilbert, 1973) through the development of rules and 
regulations around runways. The major transformation in ATC occurred following the 
development of radar systems during the Second World War and enabled ATC operators to 
use surveillance techniques beyond that of the naked eye. This system essentially enables 
ground controlled navigation via surveillance and communications. With the addition of 
ground based navigation aids such as Very High Omnidirectional Ranging (VOR) systems or 
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME), the aircraft may then position itself within their range 
and navigate via VOR beacons thereby easing the workload on ATC. 
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The following subsections introduce the structure and operations of air navigation, beginning 
with the airspace structure in §2.2.1 and the area navigation concept in §2.2.2. In §2.2.3 the 
phases of flight are listed followed by the aircraft operations and procedures in §2.2.4 used to 
breakdown the air navigation process and corresponding performance. 
2.2.1 Controlled Airspace 
The ATC concept evolved into one based on regions in which air traffic controllers instruct 
aircraft to change headings to maintain safety. This development in ATC and growth in air 
travel led to a designation of airspace classes in order to define different flight rules for more 
high traffic density sectors. 
Airspace is classified into controlled and uncontrolled airspace. In uncontrolled airspace all 
pilots maintain separations from other aircraft. In controlled airspace IFR traffic is always 
separated by ATC whereas VFR traffic may be in Positively Controlled Airspace (PCA). In such 
airspace it is common for the regulator to deny entry to VFR aircraft. Any aircraft operating 
within controlled airspace requires an Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearance and must comply 
with any instructions issued. The combination of controlled airspace and IFR allows aircraft to 
fly into low visibility areas safely with known separation distances. 
Controlled airspace is formed of control zones, control areas, airways, terminal control areas 
and upper airspace. Control zones surround major airports from ground level up to at least 
2000ft. Control areas then extend from these zones up to the upper airspace at 19500ft. 
Airways or Air Traffic Services (ATS) routes connect major airports at the level of control areas 
by extending linearly. Where several large airports are in proximity such as the London 
terminal area. Terminal Control Areas (TCA) are used as encompassing control areas. Finally, 
upper airspace between 19500 and 66000ft in the UK, is controlled and used for en-route 
flight at cruising altitude (§2.2.4.2). Globally airspace is defined in a similar manner due to 
standardisation by ICAO, with regions of high traffic density containing a greater number of 
control areas and ATS routes. 
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Figure 2.1 UK Controlled Airspace 
In 1993, ICAO recommendations for a more refined classification of airspace were accepted 
by state regulators (Nolan, 1994). Currently Classes A, B, C, D, E and F are defined globally as 
controlled airspace classifications, with type G designating uncontrolled airspace. The degree 
of ATC control and stringency decreases from A to F. 
Traditionally, aircraft are operated within the Air Traffic Management (ATM) concept of using 
ground based radio-navigation aids as route waypoints. ATC houses a communication service 
and a surveillance capability as a means to navigate where necessary by radar vectoring. 
Flowever, congestion of air routes has continued to grow with demand for air travel. The 
concept of area navigation (RNAV) was developed to allow more flexible use of airspace than 
is the case of inefficient fixed airways. 
2.2.2 RNAV Operations 
RNAV is the operational concept which allows pilots and operators to define routes with 
greater efficiency, instead of flying directly between ground radio-navigation aids. A 
representation of this gain in efficiency is shown in Figure 2.2 by the shorter smoother RNAV 
path (Tarbert, 2006). Using the RNAV concept but with existing technologies, it is possible to 
derive waypoints away from the traditional airways resulting in shorter more efficient route 
plans whilst reducing congestion on the traditional point to point routes. 
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Figure 2.2 Conventional and RNAV Operations (Redrawn from Tarbert (2006)) 
Although in its purest sense, RNAV allows users to fly flexible routes, commercial aircraft 
operate almost entirely within controlled airspace and are thus usually required to maintain 
course on predefined routes, particularly near or within the terminal area. This does not 
negate the benefits to operational efficiency and still allows for controllers to manage more 
flexibly aircraft routes. However, General Aviation (GA) aircraft and some commercial aircraft 
may utilise fully the freedom to navigate custom routes within the coverage of the Navaids 
available. 
The concept of RNAV is an operational one which may in theory be applied independent of 
the choice of technology. However, the system must meet the operational requirements 
wherever the aircraft's flight plan lies. Therefore, the use of RNAV at its inception required 
sufficient coverage from ground based Navaids in order to support such flexibility. The 
potential coverage provided by space based navigation systems presented a key driver to the 
evolution of navigation under the Communication Navigation Surveillance / Air Traffic 
IVianagement (CNS/ATM) concept (Whelan, 2001). This concept was the product of the Future 
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Air Navigation System (FANS) committees wliicli assessed the potential for change through 
incorporating new technologies, procedures and policy (Solat, 1991). Not only are space 
based systems capable of providing near global coverage to allow RNAV routes but they have 
the potential to meet gate-to-gate operational requirements. Traditionally, technologies have 
been used to define procedures for each phase of flight due to the varying complexities of the 
aircraft dynamics, required performance and Navaid coverage. In the following subsections 
each of the flight phases, the corresponding procedures and accident rates are summarised. 
The accident rates are used in the analysis of safety levels in §2.4 
2.2.3 Phases of Flight 
A typical air operation involves a number of flight phases each possessing different 
characteristics. Due to the varying physical requirements during these phases as well as the 
alterations in airspace properties, the technologies (as discussed in §2.3) and performance 
requirements (as discussed in §2.4-2.5) vary greatly between operations within each phase. 
Figure 2.3 (Cassell and Smith, 1995) shows a schematic representation of a typical commercial 
aircraft operation through take-off, climb, cruise, approach and landing, including accident 
percentages attributed to each phase. 
Flight Phase Taxi Take-off Initial Climb I Cruise 1 Descent ; Initial Final Landing 
Climb ; : Approach Approach 
Accident Rate 2 . 0 % 1 4 . 3 % 1 1 . 8 % 5 . 8 % i 4 . 5 % ; 7 . 5 % ; 1 2 . 5 % 2 6 . 6 % 1 3 . 9 % 
Proportions ; 
{ % ) ± 0 . 0 5 % 
Figure 2.3 Typical Phases of Flight (Cassell and Smith, 1995) 
Prior to a flight, the flight crew must check meteorological conditions as well as other relevant 
information concerning traffic, CNS outages and aerodrome status. This information is used as 
input to the flight plan in addition to aircraft performance, navigation capabilities and the 
proposed origin, destination, departure time. Estimated Time-of-Arrival (ETA), planned route 
and the fuel on board. 
2.2.3.1 Taxiing 
Taxiing is the movement of the aircraft from the gate to the departure runway. The ground 
control section of ATC is responsible for issuing taxi instructions (Nolan, 1994). The local 
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controller then approves or denies the crossing of the runway threshold before the ground 
controller advises taxiing is complete. The aircraft is navigated via a Liquid Crystal Display 
(LCD) of the airport map using a deduced dead reckoning from the known gate position. Fatal 
accidents are rare, accounting for only 2% of the total. 
2.2.3.2 Take-off 
Take-off is the process of applying take-off power to the engines, followed by reaching 
sufficient speed to generate lift before climbing to 35 feet above the runway elevation. Take-
off may be performed manually or using an Instrument Landing System (ILS) localizer to 
derive a heading. Take-off accounts for 14.3% of fatal accidents, relatively high due to critical 
dynamics of the aircraft and high traffic density. 
2.2.3.3 Initial-Climb 
Following take-off of a commercial aircraft, the pilot is likely to switch to an auto-pilot system 
which uses Inertial Navigation System (INS) or an Automatic Heading Reference System 
(AHRS). General aviation pilots continue to use manual controls employing a standard 
departure procedure once reaching a sufficient altitude. Initial climb accounts for 11.8% of 
accidents. 
2.2.3.4 Climb 
The climb phase is defined by the comparatively high-density of air traffic and may require a 
series of complex manoeuvres. It is for these reasons and given that the aircraft is relatively 
close to the ground that means this phase is potentially more dangerous in comparison to en-
route operations. Although the climb phase is usually much shorter than the en-route cruising 
phase, the accident rate is higher at 6.8% relative to 4.5%. The general trend is for accident 
rates to fall from take-off up to cruise as traffic levels subside, the aircraft dynamics are less 
critical and changes in aircraft function are minimal. 
Navigation during departure (§2.2.4.1), the operation performed throughout the climb is 
based on the intended outward heading and barometric altitude and may be flown visually or 
through conventional navigation aids such as VOR and DME. Modern aircraft with a Flight 
Management System (FMS) fitted may feasibly use RNAV departures using conventional 
means or GPS. 
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2.2.3.5 Cruise 
After the aircraft has climbed to cruising altitude, it performs en-route operations via 
waypoints. Waypoints may be defined either by the position of Navaids over ground, 
longitude and latitude fixes over water or when using GPS or combined GPS/INS by custom 
waypoints entered in the integrated GPS receiver. Combined GPS/INS is currently the 
preferred system for commercial aviation at cruising altitude. For some purposes oceanic 
operations may differ in their status and operations but for the purposes of performance 
requirements, both oceanic and domestic en-route flight are equivalent. Fatal accidents make 
up 4.5% of the total. 
2.2.3.6 Descent 
The descent phase occurs between the en-route flight at cruise altitude and terminal arrival 
at the Initial Approach Fix (lAF) required for initiating an approach. An increase from the en-
route phase to 7.5% of accidents is noted due to increased traffic and critical aircraft 
functions. 
2.2.3.7 Initial Approach 
The phase of flight after the lAF, where the pilot commences the navigation of the aircraft to 
the Final Approach Fix (FAF), a position aligned with the runway, from where a safe controlled 
descent towards the runway can be achieved. The accident rate rises for the approach 
phases, at 12.5% for the initial approach. 
2.2.3.8 Final Approach 
The final approach begins at the FAF and continues beyond the Minimum Decision Height 
(MDH) until the pilot performs the landing manoeuvre. The MDH is the height above the 
runway at which the pilot must abort if the required visual reference to the runway is not 
obtained. It is usual that the better the landing aids, the lower the MDH. 
The final approach is usually between 4NM and 12NM of straight flight descending at a set 
rate (usually an angle of between 2.5 and 6 degrees). Final approach is the most dangerous 
flight phase of flight (26.6% of accidents) due to high traffic densities, obstacles and frequency 
and complexity of mechanical operations. 
2.2.3.9 Landing 
The final stage of flight is landing before further taxiing is performed. Landing is achieved 
through flaring or gradually raising the nose. Alignment of the aircraft to the runway is 
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determined just prior to touchdown during the decrab manoeuvre. In high winds, the aircraft 
will approach at a 'crabbed' angle. These processes may be performed by the pilot visually or 
by the autopilot coupled to the navigation and landing aids. The landing phase Is completed 
at the end of the main runway before the aircraft returns to the taxi area. Landing accounts 
for 13.9% of fatal accidents. 
2.2.3.10 Missed Approach 
If the pilot or air traffic controller deems it necessary, a missed approach may be performed 
at which point the aircraft must follow the required flight path published for the approach 
procedure being undertaken. A missed approach may be due to traffic, extreme weather 
conditions, poor visibility, misalignment with the runway or deviation from the vertical 
profile. The missed approach procedure usually consists of a climb and then a holding 
procedure formed of two straight segments and two 180 degree turns. Terminal navigation 
aids are usually used for navigation such as the ILS or terminal VOR (Nolan, 1994). 
2.2.4 Navigation Operations and Procedures 
The above representation is a useful yet simple interpretation of a typical flight. In reality 
there exist a number of different operations and procedures defined for each phase listed 
above. These operations may span multiple phases or make up only a fraction of a single 
phase. Of particular interest to this thesis is Non-Precision Approach (NPA) which contains 
both initial and final approach phases and Precision Approach with Vertical Guidance (APV). 
NPA and APV are discussed further below. 
2.2.4.1 Departure 
Departures are procedures designed to encompass the take-off and climbing phases of flight. 
Departures may be carried out visually, as a Standard Instrument Departure (SID) or radar 
departure. Aircraft commencing a SID must be issued either an initial route or heading by the 
air traffic controller. Navigation may then be provided to the pilot using terminal Navaids, 
inertial systems or from ATC. 
2.2.4.2 En-Route 
En-route operations are performed at cruising altitude, either over continental airspace or 
oceanic. Route separation distances and performance requirements are less stringent in 
oceanic and low density continental airspace (ICAO, 2006). En-route operations end either 
when VOR or Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) radio navigation aids are intercepted or when 
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entering tlie terminal area. En-Route therefore, includes the descent to the terminal area. En-
Route flight in controlled airspace generally follows predefined and published airways which 
should be followed by their centrelines. Deviation from such routes may be requested by air 
operators prior to flight or more commonly in-flight by ATC when using conventional 
navigation. Aircraft with an RNAV capability may fly flexible RNAV routes or published RNAV 
routes. 
2.2.4.3 Arrival 
As the aircraft approaches an airport, it enters the terminal area and transitions from en-
route navigation to an arrival procedure. Arrival options include flying directly to an Initial 
Approach Fix (lAF), a visual arrival. Standard Arrival Routes (STARs) or radar vectoring. ATC 
routinely uses radar vectoring to maintain separation levels, to reduce environmental noise or 
due to pilot request. Arrivals are procedures designed to transition an aircraft to the lAF and 
include corresponding holding procedures which may be required by ATC in high traffic. A 
large variety of specifications exist for terminal area procedures depending upon the 
complexity of the airspace, particularly traffic density. 
2.2.4.4 Approach 
Approaches are procedures which allow navigation from the lAF down to the MDH at which 
point the pilot must determine if a safe landing can be made or otherwise transition to a 
missed approach segment. Approach procedures may be either non-precision or precision 
approaches. 
A Non-Precision Approach (NPA) is an instrument approach which utilises lateral guidance but 
does not require vertical guidance (ICAO, 2001). Lateral guidance is provided directly by the 
radio beacon or spaced based Navaid. NPAs are conducted with less use of automated 
systems than precision approaches. However, on most modern aircraft, automatic systems 
may be left engaged until reaching the MDH, or beyond. NPAs using GPS have been approved 
in the U.S (Galotti, 1998), France and recently in the UK (CAA, 2007) following an extensive 
simulation campaign and a human factors study based on field trials (ICL, 2008). Modern on-
board GPS systems may also provide an advisory vertical navigation component which given 
their advisory nature are subject to addition conditions of use (FAA, 2008). 
Precision approaches utilise vertical guidance in addition to lateral guidance. Within this 
category, the requirements for Approach operations with Vertical guidance (APV-I / APV-II) 
are the least stringent (see §2.5) (ICAO, 2006), followed by Category I, II and III. 
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The following paragraphs introduce the common approach procedures and their applications. 
2.2.4.4.1 Lateral Navigation (LNAV) 
Lateral Navigation approaches are NPAs for use with RNAV, Wide Area Augmentation System 
(WAAS) or Required Navigation Performance (RNP) RNP0.3 systems. Horizontal deviation and 
guidance is provided to the pilot. RNAV (GPS) approaches in the U.S or RNAV (GNSS) 
approaches within Europe are instances of NPA requiring just LNAV. The LNAV NPA procedure 
is the subject of Chapters Eight and Ten of this thesis. 
2.2.4.4.2 Lateral Navigation with Vertical Guidance (LNAV/VNAV) 
LNAV/VNAV is the least stringent precision GPS approach. Typical decision heights are 
approximately 350 feet above the ground. The relevant procedures include baro-aided 
approaches (Baro-VNAV) to augment the guidance given by GPS or WAAS avionics. In Europe, 
RNP Approach (RNP APCH) procedures with Baro-VNAV are proposed by Eurocontroi (NSP, 
2006). 
2.2.4.4.3 Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance (LPV) 
A Localizer Performance with Vertical guidance (LPV) approach is a type of APV procedure 
commonly employing vertical alert limits (defined in §2.5) between 12m and 50m. LPV 
approaches have been designed for use with WAAS avionics to extend the use of GPS to 
precision approaches with vertical guidance. The lateral accuracy requirements are more 
stringent than for LNAV and LNAV/VNAV operations and are equivalent to an Instrument 
Landing System (ILS) localizer (described in §2.3). Currently LPV200 (200ft decision height) 
operations are undergoing a large-scale implementation in U.S air space and has been 
designed to provide APV integrity performance coupled with airport infrastructural 
capabilities which enable a reduction to a 200ft minimum decision height (Gibbons, 2008). 
2.2.4.4.4 Category (CAT) I/I I/I 11 Precision Approach and Landing 
Despite emerging RNAV technology, ILS is the most accurate approach Navaid currently in 
global use (depicted in §2.3). An ILS CAT I precision approach allows approaches to be made 
to 200 feet above the runway touchdown point. CAT II and CAT III approaches allow descents 
and visibility minimums that are even lower. A wide variety of precision approaches use 
combinations of other Navaids such as the microwave Landing System (MLS), radar and 
VOR/DME. The capabilities of other technological systems are listed in §2.3. 
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2.3 Air Navigation Teclinologies 
Air navigation consists of determining the position and velocity of an aircraft, resulting in a 
six-component state vector. It may also be critical to compute the time as 4D trajectory 
predictions are likely to grow in importance (Vormer et al, 2003). Navigation sensors may be 
located within the aircraft, within other aircraft, on the ground or in space. If the state vector 
is computed on-board the aircraft (or vehicle) this is known as navigation, whereas an 
external state-vector computation is known as surveillance. Guidance is the act of steering the 
aircraft towards a destination through the use of either navigation of surveillance 
technologies. 
Navigation may employ two basic techniques in order to determine the state vector, either 
positioning which does not rely on previous measurements or dead-reckoning which uses an 
initialisation of position followed by a continuous determination of measurements to update 
the position (Kayton and Fried, 1997). A third approach is to use filtering which is a 
combination of the two techniques such as in Kalman filtering (described in §3.3.3.2). 
Positioning has the advantage that it does not rely on the accuracy of previous measurements 
whereas dead-reckoning is able to provide a continuous navigation solution when perhaps a 
positioning solution is unavailable. Filtering attempts to marry these two advantages into one 
solution but some dangers of the dead-reckoning persist. 
Positioning may use three primary methods to determine the state vector; radio navigation, 
celestial navigation or mapping navigation. Radio navigation sensors use a network of 
transmitters external to the navigating aircraft. The on-board navigation unit detects 
transmissions (and in some cases transmits) in order to derive observables such as bearing, 
phase, time of arrival and time difference (Nolan, 1994). Velocity may be derived from 
Doppler shifts in transmissions or from a sequence of position measurements. Celestial 
sensors detect the elevation and azimuth of celestial bodies relative to the navigation 
coordinate frame at precise times. Finally, mapping navigation observes ground images, 
altitude profiles (i.e. barometer) or other external features. This thesis considers radio 
navigation sensors in the form of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and in particular 
the Global Positioning System (GPS). 
Historically, navigation was performed during visual flight using dead-reckoning from a 
magnetic compass and with reference to basic aeronautical charts (Nolan, 1994). The 
deviation of magnetic north from true north varies with location over the globe and in 
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addition to compass errors wliilst accelerating or turning this means that using the compass 
for dead reckoning may become inaccurate. A heading indicator is a gyroscopic instrument 
calibrated on the ground by a compass which maintains an accurate heading even under 
highly dynamic manoeuvres. 
Using a basic navigation technique such as dead-reckoning is susceptible to wind-speed errors 
but may still provide sufficient accuracy for en-route operations in GA. Naturally in 
commercial aviation and more importantly in IMC, more sophisticated technology is needed 
to navigate aircraft accurately and safely. Initial advances in on-board technology were the 
design of attitude and turn indicators based on gyroscopic principles in addition to the 
airspeed indicator and altimeter. However, in order to enable night flight with low visibility it 
was necessary that ground-to-air radio navigation aids were employed to position the aircraft. 
In §2.3.1, these technologies are described and their current status noted. This is then 
followed by a description of modern space based technologies in §2.3.2 and on-board sensors 
in §2.3.3. 
2.3.1 Ground Based Navigation Sensors 
2.3.1.1 Non-Directional Beacons (NDB) 
An NDB transmits a uniform signal in all directions from the transmitter In the frequency band 
(190-540 kHz). NDB receivers, termed Airborne Direction Finders (ADF) are connected to an 
antenna that may rotate until a 'null' position is reached which attenuates the received signal, 
thereby providing the bearing when combined with a heading. Naturally, two NDB bearings 
allow for a complete position to be determined. In rough terrain, the signal power may be 
reduced resulting in lower angular accuracy in the bearing. ADFs may also be used to find the 
ILS Initial approach point. Phasing-out of stand-alone NDBs has begun within Europe and the 
U.S (DoT, 2008; Schlueter et al, 2006). 
2.3.1.2 VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR) 
VOR operates by emitting two Very High Frequency (VHF) signals (108.10-117.90 MHz), one as 
a reference and another which has been phase modulated as a function of azimuth thereby 
allowing the receiver to determine its bearing from the VOR station. A VOR output may also 
be used to provide a lateral course deviation using a Course Deviation Indicator (CDI). Units 
used for en-route navigation are high powered (=200W) and possess a range of up to 200NM 
while those in the terminal area have a lower range (=25NM) with a lower power output. 
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Propagation errors occur due to atmospheric delays and terrain effects. The VOR system has 
a typical bearing accuracy (95%) of 1 degree. The Radio Technical Committee for Aeronautics 
(RTCA) standard requires that the entire VOR system delivers an accuracy of 3 degrees of 
error at the 95% level (RTCA, 1986). 
Phasing out of VORs in a similar vane as NDB will begin in the U.S in 2010 (DoT, 2008) until a 
minimum operational network is reached at 50% of the current level (DoT, 2005). In Europe, 
phasing out of en-route VORs will also begin in 2010 (Schlueter et al, 2006). This is primarily 
due to the introduction of GNSS based air navigation. 
2.3.1.3 Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) 
DME is a short range radio navigation technology often combined with VOR or ILS to provide 
full horizontal position information. Alternatively, distance measurements may be used from 
multiple DME stations (DME/DME). A two way pulse is transmitted from the aircraft to the 
ground station and back using a coded message to maintain identification. The time interval is 
used to compute the slant distance after correction for signal delay which may then be 
converted into a horizontal distance. Due to the system being a two-way transmission using a 
coded message, there is a limitation on the DME capacity, typically of 110 aircraft with an 
accuracy of 0.04NM. 
2.3.1.4 Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) 
TACAN is the military equivalent of combined VOR/DME which operates in the Ultra-High 
Frequency (UHF). This results in smaller equipment sizes and a reduction in signal reflection 
errors. 
2.3.1.5 Long-Range Navigation (LORAN) 
LORAN was developed primarily as a maritime navigation system and this remains its primary 
application. Before the advent of space based navigation systems, coverage over oceanic 
regions was low and required a sensor which could operate at long distances. LORAN ground 
transmitters have a range approximating lOOONM. Positioning is obtained by the difference in 
Time-Of-Arrival (TOA) between signals from a master station and slave station. Each slaved 
measurement generates a hyperbolic curve (2D) which may be intersected to determine the 
location. Range measurements are accurate to about lOOft (FAA, 2009) but coverage, station 
geometry and variations in performance of signals travelling over terrain reduce the 
achievable user accuracy. This accuracy is a function of the geometrical locations of master 
and slaves relative to the user, represented by the Dilution of Precision (DOP) (defined in 
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Chapter Three). LORAN-C, the civilian version of LORAN has traditionally been used in 
maritime and some aviation applications in the U.S and U.K. An enhanced LORAN (eLORAN) 
has been developed which incorporates improved digital technology and monitoring of signal 
quality to enable more challenging applications. The future of eLORAN is currently In doubt 
after U.S funding cuts (Nextgov, 2009) yet it is almost universally understood to be the most 
cost-effective back-up to GNSS from en-route to NPA applications (ILA, 2007) 
2.3.1.6 Instrument Landing System (ILS) 
ILS is designed to provide the pilot with an approach path that is perfectly aligned to the 
runway centreline and optimal descent profile. It includes three types of transmitter, the 
localizer which provides lateral guidance, the guide slope which provides vertical guidance 
and two or three marker beacons which confirm the distance along the final approach. The 
localizer and glide slope work by transmitting two signals at either side of the desired path 
such that the relative signal strengths allow the receiver to determine deviations from this 
path. Signal reflections from buildings could cause false courses to be calibrated. Therefore, 
these effects are carefully studied at the time of installation to avoid undue interference. 
Phasing out of ILS CAT I precision approaches is intended in both the U.S and Europe to be 
replaced by augmented space based navigation systems which improve the GNSS signals 
through corrections and monitoring (described in §2.3.3). If ground based augmentations of 
space based systems are able to provide Cat ll/lll precision approach, the decommissioning of 
ILS Cat ll/lll precision approaches will also take place (DoT, 2008). 
2.3.1.7 Microwave Landing System (MLS) 
ILS is both an expensive system and capacity limited due to the frequency limitations within a 
large terminal area consisting of a high number of ILS approaches. MLS is a similar alternative 
system in the microwave frequency band. It is less susceptible to reflections due to operating 
in the 5031-5091 MHz UHF band. MLS utilises precision DMEs in contrast to marker beacons 
and an additional (back) azimuth transmitter for missed-approaches. Range performance is 
accurate to 100ft. The proposed use of MLS differs between the U.S and Europe, with a 
planned reduction in MLS in the U.S contrasting the anticipated replacement of ILS Cat ll/lll 
with MLS Cat ll/lll. 
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2.3.2 On-Board Navigation Sensors 
2.3.2.1 Altimeter 
Altimeters are instruments which measure altitude. This may be achieved through the 
bouncing of radio waves from the ground surface, a radar altimeter or by measuring air 
pressure with a barometer. These altimeters differ in that radar altimetry depends upon the 
height of the ground above sea level whereas a barometer is calibrated on the ground at a 
known height above sea level. Radio altimeters are 95% accurate to 2% of measurement 
(Kayton and Fried, 1997). Radio altimeters are also an essential element of Ground Proximity 
Warning Systems (GPWS), informing the pilot if the aircraft is flying too low or descending too 
quickly. The improved accuracy of radar altimeters at low altitudes makes them appropriate 
for autoland systems whereas barometers are used at cruise altitudes to maintain pressure 
defined flight levels. Combination of each of the altimeters with GPS observables is desirable 
due to the weaker accuracy of stand-alone GPS in the vertical dimension (Masters et al, 
2001). 
2.3.2.2 Attitude Reference and Heading System (AHRS) 
As discussed at the beginning of §2.3, the ARMS includes vertical and directional gyroscopes 
and an azimuth angle measurement. Solid state Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) 
could provide a low cost solution in the future without the need for gyroscopes (White and 
Rios, 2002). 
2.3.2.3 Doppler Radar 
The Doppler radar uses a radar transmitter and receiver to measure the Doppler shift from 
the reflected signal and thereby determine the groundspeed and true course (receiver is able 
to determine the direction of the frequency shift). This technology was a component of early 
RNAV systems that required an accurate velocity measurement (Nolan, 1994). Integration 
with GPS via a Kalman filter allows the relatively imprecise GPS velocity measurements to be 
compensated. The system delivers an accuracy of 0.25% of measurement and an additional 
O.lKts (Kayton and Fried, 1997). 
2.3.2.4 Inertial Navigation System (INS) 
An INS is composed of at least an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) and a computer. The IMU 
measures changes in an aircraft's direction of flight using linear and angular accelerometers 
and gyroscopes. The computer may then use these observations to determine position. 
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ground speed and course by dead reckoning. Accelerometers are designed to measure the 
slightest change in speed of direction but performance degrades with time as with all dead 
reckoning systems. Nominal accuracy of INS is known to be l-2NM/hr (95%) of radial error 
(Kayton and Fried, 1997; CASA, 2002). The drawbacks of INS include its inherent error growth 
and cost. As with AHRS, low cost, low accuracy MEMS based inertial navigation systems are 
available for land applications but as yet have not reached sufficient levels of service to meet 
aviation certification specifications. The Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of INS units is 
greater than 10,000 hrs (Northrop Grumman, 2006). 
2.3.3 Space Based Navigation Sensors 
2.3.3.1 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
GNSS comprises stand-alone systems and their augmentations. Currently the U.S operated 
Global Positioning System (GPS) is the only fully operational stand-alone system available for 
use in aviation. Details of other systems including proposed constellations are provided in 
Chapter Three. GPS comprises of a minimum of 24 satellites providing near-global coverage 
with a specified accuracy of 17m (95%) horizontal and 37m (95%) vertical position accuracy 
(GPS SPS, 2008). The U.S Federal Radionavigation Plan (DoT, 2008) envisages that through 
completion of SBAS and GBAS, GPS can meet the requirements for all phases of flight. It 
remains to be seen the degree of augmentation from other on-board sensors which will be 
needed and the complexity of the GBAS architecture which can meet the most stringent Cat 
III approach levels or surface movement (Schuster and Ochieng, 2006). GNSS receivers 
position and navigate within the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84) which allows easy 
representation of position, velocity and course using RNAV avionics designed to perform 
RNAV operations. 
A complete description of GNSS is provided in Chapter Three. 
2.3.3.2 Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) 
The raw performance of stand-alone GPS is unable to meet the requirements of all phases of 
flight. Therefore, SBAS has been developed to provide differential corrections to users over a 
wide area, integrity monitoring (discussed in Chapter Four) and additional ranging signals. 
Wide area differential corrections and integrity data improve the accuracy and integrity of 
measurements. The addition of ranging signals, particularly at high elevations enables greater 
coverage and mitigates unavailability of the system from masking. 
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The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) commissioned by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) supports departure, en-route, arrival and some approach operations, 
including NPA and APV. WAAS is currently in its Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and is 
proposed to meet Final Operating Capability in 2017 (Walter etal, 2004) Recent introduction 
of LPV approaches is designed to utilise the maximum capabilities of WAAS. Future proposals 
are for WAAS to be used for more efficient en-route navigation and advanced arrival and 
departure procedures. Reference stations positioned across the U.S are used to derive the 
corrections which are then disseminated by Geostationary Earth Orbiting (GEO) satellites. 
The European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) is the European counterpart 
to WAAS developed for the tripartite of the European Space Agency (ESA), European 
Commission and Eurocontrol. EGNOS is planned to be used for APV operations within 
European airspace. 
Further details on the SBAS system architecture and integrity concept are given in §3.2.2 and 
§4.2.2. 
2.3.3.3 Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) 
GBAS is an augmentation to basic GPS provided by ground monitoring of signals. Differential 
corrections are computed and transmitted from ground stations around airports. This 
accounts for highly localised errors beyond those corrected for by SBAS which ensures much 
improved performance. It is expected that GBAS will reach (95%) accuracies of 5m 
horizontally and 3m vertically using code-phase observables (RTCA, 2004). 
Currently, the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) is under research and development 
(R&D) by the FAA. It is expected to meet the performance requirements to support Cat I 
precision approaches and in time Cat ll/lil. Other states have yet to enter an R&D phase. 
Europe appears committed to replacing MLS by ILS (Schlueter et al, 2006) at least until Galileo 
is operational at which point it may be more realistic politically to implement GBAS under a 
European owned system. 
2.3.4 Advanced Avionics 
The RNAV concept was introduced in §2.2.2. However, in order for the RNAV concept to be 
realised using traditional ground based technologies, the on-board computer must be able to 
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convert the polar coordinates (rho-theta) or other sensor information provided into a 
position. To allow the pilot to guide the aircraft the on-board system must then determine 
the necessary vector to any desired location. Course-Line Computers (CLC) were the 
forerunners of the navigation component of modern day FMSs and achieved these tasks by 
using pre-programmed or custom waypoints. Flight management systems are the central 
subsystem of modern avionics providing an integrated solution to combine information from 
communications, flight control, engine control, subsystem monitoring, collision avoidance, 
weather detection and emergency located transmitter. 
FMSs of the future will allow an automated communications link to the Air Traffic 
Management system on the ground (Kayton and Fried, 1997). This is to enable a shift from 
voice communications to less workload heavy pilot voice communications. This will 
complement an integrated avionics system with RNAV capabilities and Automatic 
Dependence Surveillance (ADS-B) including modern user interfaces. This is in sharp contrast 
to historical avionics which included subsystems containing their own sensors, analog 
computers, displays and controls. Nowadays many of these subsystems are integrated within 
the FMS. INS and other on-board self-contained aids are located in the avionics bay as shown 
in Figure 2.4. The locations of radio navigation sensors are also shown presenting a complex 
picture in terms of potential on-board signal interference. 
ILS localizer ATC transponder 
FM broadcast 
VOR/DME VHP ADF C-band SATCOM 
weather radar 
ILS marker 
beacon 
DME radar 
altimeter MLS ILS glide slope 
ILS glide slop' 
ATC transponder 
Figure 2.4 Typical Avionics placement on McDonnell Douglas Aircraft - circa: 1997 (Kayton 
and Fried, 1997) 
2.3.5 Summary of Navigation Sensors 
The main navigation sensors employed within modern aircraft have been described in §2.3.1-
2.3.4. Other more specialised and less widespread techniques exist as do many combinations 
of the sensors included. Many of the traditional systems highlighted in §2.3.1-2.3.4 and still 
employed today were developed in the post-war period to the 1960s. By the 1980s more 
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sophisticated technologies were emerging such as satellite based navigation. This 
technological change was coupled with a stress on airspace capacity due to the massive 
growth in air travel demand during that decade (CAA, 2008). The limitations of the existing Air 
Traffic Services (ATS) provision constrained growth, and improvements in safety, efficiency 
and reliability. Therefore, an evolution of the air navigation technologies began in order to 
meet this growth and satisfy performance objectives (ICAO, 2005). To enable a choice of 
navigation sensor or combination thereof the critical design trade-offs must be considered 
(Kayton and Fried, 1997). 
The first factor almost universally considered is that of cost-effectiveness. The current drive 
towards GNSS technology based solutions is based first and foremost on the potential cost-
cutting achieved by replacing VOR, NDB and eventually ILS with a GNSS architecture. Naturally 
the technology must provide the required accuracy in both position and velocity for the 
desired operation. This has also been coupled with a requirement for integrity of the 
navigation system in recent years. Another major advantage of GNSS is the geographic 
coverage provided which is dependent upon line of sight between transmitter and receiver 
for radio navigation aids operating above lOOMHz. Temporal coverage, more commonly 
termed availability is also critical to enable efficient operations during interruptions to the 
service which would require back-up. Cont/nu/ty of function is a measure of such interruptions 
and it is clearly detrimental and possibly unsafe for the navigation service to cease or be 
degraded. Although GNSS can provide high availability for some applications, other more 
stringent applications have still not met the technical demands. The aim of the research 
presented in this thesis is to help extend the applications of GNSS. 
Other navigation sensor intricacies include the autonomy provided by a technique; the extent 
to which the system uses external aids or information. For example, INS is fully autonomous 
in that it is self-contained and does not radiate signals. Systems such as on-board radar are 
self-contained but are dependent upon the surrounding environment whereas star-trackers 
and compass utilise natural radiation for deriving observables. The vast majority of radio 
navigation aids utilise artificial waves received on-board the aircraft though some also 
transmit, such as DME. Automation is important by removing the computational workload 
from the crew. Modern day systems are essentially all fully automated within RNAV capable 
FMS. However, issues still persist with the display of information (CAA, 2007) and the 
respective differences in flight procedure design between technologies. This is essentially an 
element of the guidance function provided to a pilot and is critical to safe operations. Related 
to automation is the latency of computing the state vector as a result of sensor delays. 
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outages and on-board processing. Finally, the capacity of some systems may be limited to a 
number of aircraft. Of particular note are DME stations which have only a limited bandwidth 
to provide a finite number of aircraft with the two-way ranging capability. 
To summarise the design factors, one must also consider the flexibility of sensors to provide 
services to many applications. GNSS is the first technology to have the potential for satisfying 
gate-to-gate operations with minimal architectural augmentation. Furthermore, it is the most 
cost-effective solution for many applications and provides unprecedented coverage if the 
technical hurdles to providing full availability are met. For these reasons the Future Air 
Navigation Systems (FANS) special committee formed by ICAO in 1983 to assess emerging 
technologies highlighted satellite navigation as the only potential technique to meet the 
majority of aviation applications cost-effectively and safely. 
INS provides similar benefits to GNSS for en-route navigation and has the potential for even 
cheaper components (Anderson et al, 2001) but due to its degrading performance is 
inaccurate relative to terminal area installed technologies. The trend is towards reducing the 
prominence of expensive ground-based aids as shown in Figure 2.5. It should be noted that 
the recent Federal Radionavigation Plan (DoT, 2008) does not include a roadmap as shown in 
the U.S component of Figure 2.5 redrawn from the 2005 plan. No reasons are given for this 
omission but given a relatively unchanged drive towards GNSS, it must be assumed this is 
merely to avoid optimistic predictions in changes to service provision. Political decisions may 
also play a role, given the current climate of cost-cutting and as such funding of navigation 
infrastructure is less certain. 
The growth in GNSS noted above is clear from Figure 2.5 with a steady progression towards 
more critical GNSS applications. Not included in this figure is the potential carrier-based 
ground aided surface movement solution which GNSS could provide. DME and ILS Cat ll/lll or 
MLS Cat III are currently intended to remain in full operational use whilst NDB and VOR are 
gradually reduced to a minimum service in the U.S or removed in Europe. The proposed use 
of GBAS for precision approaches is dependent on technical proof following research and 
development. 
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Figure 2.5 U.S and European Air Navigation Infrastructure Plan (DoT, 2005; Schlueter etal, 
2006) 
The central topic to this thesis will be introduced wholly in chapter four, but a note on 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is needed at this point in reference to 
Figure 2.5. RAIM developments are excluded from Figure 2.5. It currently provides integrity 
monitoring for En-Route applications and recently in some states for NPA. However, some 
studies have shown RAIM is capable of providing a back-up to SBAS for APV applications 
under certain conditions and this thesis provides further evidence that novel algorithms can 
solve some existing limitations. It is therefore an important element of the shift to from 
existing technologies to GNSS. 
2.4 Air Navigation Performance 
Navigation is one element along with Communication and Surveillance (CNS) which must 
meet the strategic objectives of the relevant bodies (ICAO and regional or national regulators) 
for Air Traffic Management (ATM). An integrated concept of CNS/ATM and its objectives were 
outlined by the second FANS (II) committee set up by ICAO in 1989. The objectives to be 
achievable over a 25 year period are (Whelan, 2001): 
• enhance communication links between aircraft and ATC 
• improve the pilot's ability to navigate safely 
• increase the air traffic controller's capacity to monitor and survey flights 
• apply more efficient and flexible air trajfic management techniques 
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In the intervening years ICAO developed the global air navigation plan {ICAO, 2007) in order 
to achieve the goals laid out by FANS II. This evolving document is intended to aid regions and 
states in the implementation of new systems relating to CNS/ATIVl. More recently ICAO has 
added a high-level definition of the ATM operational concept (ICAO, 2005), now incorporating 
the CNS elements, which presents the vision, guiding principles and performance measures 
which the development of ATM are to be built on. The vision is stated as (ICAO, 2005): 
To achieve an interoperable global ATM system, for all users during al phases of 
flight that meets agreed levels of safety, provides optimum economic operations, 
is environmentally sustainable and meets national security requirements. 
There are then essentially two drivers to the evolution of air navigation, the vision, strategies 
and policies of ICAO and the development of technologies and processes within the field of 
navigation science. The expectations of users, operators, engineers, service providers and 
regulators drive the initiatives intended to meet ICAO's global vision and help to focus 
research direction towards the more pressing issues and optimal solutions. 
The following subsections present a top-down description of how the air navigation 
environment is characterised by performance. Firstly ICAO's ATM performance expectations 
are introduced in §2.4.1 and how ICAO defines the performance hierarchy, including how this 
relates specifically to the navigation domain. The most critical measure safety is then 
discussed in §2.4.2 and the idea of Target Level of Safety (TLS) established. This most critical 
of concepts is then introduced in §2.4.3, the notion of specifying navigation requirements by 
performance rather than equipage. 
2.4.1 ATM Performance Measures 
2.4.1.1 Expectation of ATM 
The global ATM operational concept laid out in ICAO's vision describes a number of 
'expectations' or key performance indicators (ICAO, 2005) by which the global aviation 
community and its users measure successful ATM services. Within Europe, an almost identical 
performance framework has been proposed (SESAR, 2006) around these key performance 
areas (KPA). Below, the ICAO definitions of these measures (ICAO, 2005) are summarised. 
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Access/Equity A global ATM system should allow all airspace users the right to 
access ATM resources needed to meet their specific operational 
requirements. In the absence of safety, efficiency, national defence 
or other reasonable basis, ATC should maintain equity between all 
users. 
Capacity 
Cost-Effectiveness 
The global ATM system should use the totality of airspace capacity 
to meet peak user demands. Capacity must increase whilst also 
allowing efficiency, flexibility and predictability to increase without 
any adverse impact on safety. 
The ATM system should be as cost-effective as possible whilst 
balancing the other needs of users. 
Efficiency Efficiency is a measure of the operational and economic cost-
effectiveness from a single flight perspective. 
Environment The global ATM system should contribute to the protection of the 
environment by considering the impact of emissions, noise and 
other issues. 
Flexibility Better flexibility means users can modify their 4D flight trajectories 
dynamically. 
Global Interoperability The ATM system should be based on global standards and 
principles to ensure interoperability and non-discriminatory traffic 
flows. 
Participation The ATM community should participate in the planning, 
implementation and operation of the ATM system such that the 
needs of the community are met. 
Safety Safety is of the highest priority. Safety standards should be applied 
uniformly and risk mitigation practices applied throughout the 
system. 
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Security Security is the protection from intentional or unintentional acts 
which may affect aircraft, people or infrastructure. 
A number of these directly relate to the navigation element, including that of the highest 
priority - safety. An improvement in each of the expectations may be achieved by resolving a 
number of limitations with the current ATM system including: 
- disparity in ATM services and procedures, both regionally and the use of different 
navigation technologies and decision-making tools 
- reliance on congested air-ground voice communications 
- rigid airspace and route structures 
- suboptimal use of scarce resources such as capacity 
These limitations amongst others led to inefficiencies such as indirect fixed routes, excessive 
ground and en-route delays and operations at inefficient altitudes. These affect a number of 
the ATM performance expectations identified by ICAO. Fixed routes confine aircraft to narrow 
regions thereby limiting capacity, efficiency and placing aircraft at closer distances than 
necessary which increases the inherent safety risk. Delays naturally reduce efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness whilst operations at suboptimal altitudes as well as reducing efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness may also damage the environment. 
2.4.1.2 Required Total System Performance (RTSP) 
In any system it is necessary to measure performance and set targets to be met in the future. 
This allows the system to develop in order to meet the expectations of users and provides an 
appraisal that the system is working as expected. It may also locate problem areas in which 
performance may be enhanced. In §2.4.2.1 the user expectations were summarised and 
some examples of problem areas were given which could undoubtedly impact on those 
metrics. These expectations form the Required ATM System Performance (RASP) and make up 
the top level of the hierarchical performance concept (ICAO, 2005) as shown below. 
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Figure 2.6 Layered Performance Concept (redrawn from (ICAO, 2005)) 
The Required Total System Performance (RTSP) is a concept in its infancy. It will be formed of 
a set of characteristics which if met will deliver the expectations within RASP. ICAO outlines 
that the services and functions of the ATM system which contribute to RASP will be defined 
which will then be mapped to the required performance of the enabling systems such as 
navigation. Naturally, within each of these systems, there are technological standards to 
ensure the required performance is met. In order to provide a reasonable level of service, the 
required performance of navigation, communications, surveillance and other ATM system 
components must be met. These complex relationships between services and functions of the 
ATM model, their respective system component requirements and the overriding 
expectations are yet to be defined fully. Naturally, some of the expectations are already well-
understood with known dependencies, such as the impact of communications on efficiency 
(FAA, 2009), but providing a holistic picture for of each of the expectations which make up 
RASP requires further work. However, some progress has been made on the issue of safety 
which relates critically to all ATM systems, particularly Required Navigation Performance 
(RNP) and this is discussed in §2.4.2. 
In the interim, whilst continuing to develop the key indicators towards the RTSP model, ICAO 
states four principles which should be adhered to in the implementation of any changes, 
these are (ICAO, 2007): 
- acceptable levels of safety must not be adversely affected by changes to the air 
navigation environrTient 
- optimum capacity should be provided which meets current and forecast demands, 
which should be achieved collaboratively through balancing demand and capacity 
- user operating efficiency requirements should be met 
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- predictability should be Improved and with it user and service provider levels of 
confidence 
It is therefore these principles, in addition to cost-effectiveness, environmental issues and the 
remaining key performance indicators of access and equity, flexibility, global interoperability, 
participation and security outlined by ICAO are the primary measures of the benefit of the 
research presented in this thesis. The following subsection examines which of the key 
indicators are critical in evaluating advances in the navigation domain and the benefits a 
thorough Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) could bring to each of them. 
2.4.1.3 Expectations of Navigation 
Navigation should be performed with respect to a minimum safety condition. As already 
stated, safety is the highest priority of the global ATM model. In fact, technological and 
performance specifications for navigation have been designed primarily with safety in mind. 
However, it is worth noting at this stage, how each of the other elements of RASP relate to 
the navigation system and how navigation fits into the layered performance concept shown in 
Figure 2.6. The provision of safety through the navigation system is discussed in §2.4.2. These 
remaining RASP indicators are discussed below with a note on the potential impact of this 
thesis in respect to each. 
Access/Equity Access to airspace and services is achieved through active policy 
but also the technological capabilities of aircraft and service 
providers. In navigation, this could imply the need for RNAV (GNSS) 
avionics to ensure users may take full benefit of airspace. On the 
other hand, training is an important element of ensuring access 
and equity, both for pilots and operators to fully understand new 
technologies and their benefits, but also ATC officers to avoid 
unnecessary restrictions. 
Tiiis thesis should contribute to improved access by extending 
stand-alone GNSS to more stringent applications, thereby 
providing a more integrated navigation system which allows 
easier and more widespread use of airspace. Furthermore, a 
proposal for greater operator involvement in determining RNP 
compliance of GNSS through the use of enhanced software tools 
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would provide better understanding and enable greater access of 
GA. 
Capacity There is an inherent relationship between capacity, separation 
distances, navigational accuracy and safety. It is possible to 
increase capacity through more accurate navigation systems, 
thereby allowing separation distances to be reduced whilst 
preserving safety. Historically, technology has evolved in this 
manner to allow capacity to grow. However, RNAV operations are 
also able to increase capacity by making full use of airspace away 
from fixed routes. 
This thesis should contribute to capacity by improving the 
predictability of GNSS RAIM approach availability and enabling 
safe APV operations through the current stand-alone GNSS 
system. 
Cost-Effectiveness GNSS was considered a cost-effective technology due to its free-to-
air property and lack of ground infrastructure. This measure has 
therefore already had an influence on the navigation system plans 
within the U.S and Europe. The potential for technologies such as 
GNSS to meet multiple procedures at low cost is clearly cost-
effective. 
Facilities to predict performance of GNSS for aviation developed 
in this research should promote efficiency and usability which 
reduce costs. Advances in algorithms should extend the use of 
GNSS and the role of RAIM as a back-up to SBAS failure which 
reduce the need for costly additional systems. 
Efficiency Optimal navigation allows pilots to fly the shortest routes at the 
best departure and arrival times. Efficiency is also improved by 
reducing the impact of other traffic on an aircraft. This may appear 
an issue outside the realm of navigation, but more accurate, 
reliable positioning improves safety and allows more efficient 
control of airspace. 
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As above, the proposed improvement to approach procedure 
predictability and extension of GNSS to other procedures should 
allow smoother, more informed operations to take place. 
Environment Protection of the environment within aviation refers primarily to 
limiting noise and reducing emissions. These may both be achieved 
through optimal 4D trajectories which require the best possible 
navigation capability. 
This thesis should contribute to improving efficiency which 
inevitably impacts upon the environmental cost. 
Flexibility The modification of flight trajectories is dependent upon the 
navigation and particularly RNAV capability of the aircraft as well as 
the freedom for such changes within the airspace and that given by 
ATC. 
Optimised approach availability predictions which this thesis 
proposes should allow greater flexibility of flight plans. 
Global Interoperability The principles of system interoperability apply equally to the 
specific navigation procedures and equipment. 
Testing of the statistical properties of RAIM algorithms is 
presented in Chapter Five which improves understanding of RAIM 
and its capabilities. Standardisation of algorithms and testing 
procedures aids interoperability but this must only be 
implemented under a complete knowledge of system behaviour. 
Predictability Predictability is particularly pertinent to GNSS in which the 
performance of the system varies as the geometrical configuration 
of satellites changes with time. Therefore, the availability of GNSS 
approaches is dependent upon the predictability of the necessary 
conditions to perform navigation. 
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Chapter Ten presents results relating to improved performance 
prediction tools which directly relate to the predictability of NPA 
procedures. 
Security The element of security asides from the more traditional concept 
of safety which relates to navigation is that of human error 
mitigation. Shifts in the technologies used for air navigation 
present the possibility of human error causing threats. 
The potential human factors failure mode is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. The interested reader should consult (CAA, 2007; 
ATSB, 2006). 
2.4.2 Safety 
2.4.2.1 Concept Definition: Safety and Risk 
Aviation by its very nature is a dangerous business. In the airport area; refuelling, heavy 
machinery operations and jet engines running at low power all contribute to a high risk 
environment. In addition, flight operations may fall victim to catastrophic errors in the 
navigation, communications or surveillance systems as well as human errors or imperfections 
in the human-machine interface. Over the history of aviation, the successful introduction of 
technological innovations has dramatically cut global accident rates (TSBC, 2001). However, 
accidents still occur and navigation system failure remains a possibility which must be 
carefully monitored in order to achieve ever improving safety performance. 
In §2.4.1 the performance indicators which formed the RASP were introduced and ICAO's 
proposed layered performance structure outlined. In this section the thread of safety, the 
most critical measure (ICAO, 2005) is discussed by relating the high-level notion to the low-
level technical realities of the navigation system and relevance to the topic of this thesis. The 
first task is to define the notion of safety itself. 
A one hundred percent safety rate is unachievable over an extended period of operations. For 
this reason, an acceptable level must be defined which given the operational, environmental 
and technological limitations maintains the air transportation industry as viable and the 
public's perception of the authorities' policies as successful. ICAO (2006) defines safety as: 
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The state In which the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced 
to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process 
of hazard identification and risk management. 
Although a statistical measure of safety must surely account of serious accidents resulting in 
fatalities, less disastrous accidents or incidents may point to serious underlying faults or areas 
in which improvement may be achieved. Furthermore, the process of hazard identification, 
including the potential for failure is a requirement of ICAO states' safety management 
programme. This thesis contributes to this hazard identification process by analysing the 
effects of failures on stand alone GNSS navigation of aircraft. 
Acceptable levels of safety are expressed as conceptual statements on the nature of the 
safety risk. Safety performance indicators may also be defined (ICAO, 2006) which provide 
metrics to determine if the acceptable level has been met. These could include for example, 
figures for the number of fatal accidents per flight hour or the number of runway incursions 
per flight. When a performance indicator is in place it is matched with a corresponding safety 
performance target whose role is to improve safety within that operational context. 
Therefore, there may be multiple safety performance targets in operation within a state, 
airspace or operational context. In order to achieve safety performance targets, safety 
performance requirements are in place which on the basis of analysis and testing have been 
shown to contribute towards risk management. 
Safety targets and indicators are universally defined in terms of risk. Risks are expressed by an 
unsafe event (such as an accident), a corresponding likelihood that the event occurs and the 
impact or severity of that event occurring. Within aviation, it is standard to express risks in 
terms of accidents and incidents (ICAO, 2001) which are defined as follows. 
An accident \s an event during aircraft operations which results in (ICAO, 2001): 
1. a fatality of serious injury, 
2. substantial damage to the aircraft requiring major repairs, or 
3. the aircraft is missing or inaccessible 
An incident is an event during aircraft operations which is not classified as an accident but 
which could affect safety. An incident is serious if an accident nearly occurred. The ratio of 
incidents to accidents is dependent upon a number of factors. A study in 1969 into industrial 
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practices (Geller, 1998) found that the ratio of fatal accidents to serious accidents to 
accidents to incidents was approximately 1:10:30:600. However, applying these estimates to 
aviation is unwarranted, firstly due to ambiguities in the definitions of terms and secondly on 
the specific risks associated to aviation. Aviation convention (ICAO, 1994) is to apply a 1:10 
accident to incident ratio to the approach and landing phase of operations. 
2.4.2.2 Target Level of Safety (TLS) 
The key performance indicators listed above are part of a global and regional shift towards 
performance-based operations (SESAR, 2006). This is in contrast to the traditional approach 
of specifying equipment requirements, procedural definitions and policy in a highly 
specialised and fragmented manner. The proposed strategy of ICAO is to define a framework 
linking the base level technical specifications to the high level ideals. This approach will allow 
a proactive management of risk as the focus will move away from short-term patches in 
safety specifications to a more global picture. 
This shift from traditional specification to performance-based specification is no less critical 
than within the navigation system. The development of Required Navigation Performance 
(RNP), the original Performance Based Navigation (PBN) concept is provided in §2.4.3. This 
shift is intended to simplify the means to derive performance requirements and make the 
development and certification of avionics a more straightforward and quicker process. 
This section discusses the introduction of the Target Level of Safety (TLS) concept (Soekkha, 
1997) and its relation to performance requirements. The TLS is a measure of risk and is 
commonly specified in units of probability per flight hour or per movement (i.e. per 
approach). Flight hours are used in order to account for the uneven traffic levels over a 
calendar time period due to aircraft numbers and speeds during the less stringent phases of 
flight whereas for final approach and landing which are of a similar length in time, per 
movement is more appropriate. The case of NPA is an interesting one in that its requirements 
are specified in a similar manner to En-Route over the period of a flight hour. The reasoning 
behind this is unclear, though it is speculated that the variability in NPA length, aircraft speed 
and the inclusion of missed approach within the requirements definition mean that an 
approach would not be a precisely estimated length of time. 
A TLS may be generated, firstly by determining the parameter's value from accident data and 
then reducing the value by an appropriate factor suitable as a future target. Accident and 
incident data analysed in (AWOP, 1995) and then in (Cassell and Smith, 1995; Eurocontrol, 
42 
43 
2000) resulted in a total accident rate of 1.87x10"® per mission. Assuming an average flight 
time of 1.5 hours gave a TLS of 10"^  per flight hour (ICAO, 2003). This TLS may then be 
partitioned between the flight phases relating to the accident data for each phase of flight. In 
the case of the final approach phases and landing this leads to a TLS accident risk of 10 ^  per 
approach (Cassell and Smith, 1995) and Schuster (2007) derived the same figure for surface 
movement. 
Using the generic approach to TLS above, an apportioning of risk may be undertaken (AWOP, 
1995) to derive the integrity risk and continuity risk (defined in §2.5.1.1) associated with the 
Signal-ln-Space provided by the navigation system. This process attempts to relate a 
performance quantity of the navigation function with the overall performance objective in 
terms of safety. Integrity (risk) relates to the ability of the system to alert a user in the event 
of a failure and is defined in detail in §2.5.1.1.2. Starting from an estimated risk of 10"^  per 
NPA to conservatively match the risk posed by performing APV l-ll and Cat-I operations 
(AWOP, 1995; Roturier et al, 2006) a target factor of a half is used to express the expected 
improvement in performance in the future ATM domain. Further to this, a value of 6 minutes 
is used as an estimate for the length of a typical NPA. On the basis of the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) GNSS NPA trial approaches (CAA, 2007) of approximate length of 10-15NM 
with an assumed speed of 160-190 knots this choice of 6 minutes is likely to over bound the 
vast majority of approach times. As shown in Figure 2.2, this factor is included in addition to 
the accident to incident ratio before splitting the risk between continuity and integrity events. 
The existence of a pilot reduction factor is a topic of great debate and has its detractors. 
However, to place the NPA derivation in line with the precision approach derivations it is 
included here, but reduced from the 10:1 value used for Cat 1. It is usually assumed that this 
value reduces for more stringent operations which limits the pilot's ability to react to threats. 
The value of six enables a well-adjusted link between the TLS and SIS integrity risk and in light 
of the considerations for the Cat 1 pilot reduction factor, it appears the use of six is a 
conservative one. The aircraft and database integrity risks were also chosen to match those of 
the Cat I derivation and then factored for the number of approaches per hour. It is perhaps 
arguable that the number of Cat I approaches should be used here, i.e. 150s in place of 300s. 
However, the criticality of an aircraft failure and particularly a database failure (e.g. obstacle 
heights) increase towards the final stage of approach and thus use of the assumed operation 
approach length is substantiated. 
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Figure 2.7 Target Level of Safety for NPA 
To the knowledge of the author, an official derivation of the NPA integrity risk has not been 
published and the integrity risk and corresponding alert limit have evolved historically from 
containment limits and separation distances of the routes approaching the terminal area and 
in line with both technological advances and changes to other flight operation requirements. 
A proposed apportioning of risk is given in Figure 2.7 in an attempt to relate the integrity and 
continuity risks required of SIS navigation performance to an acceptable TLS. 
2.4.3 Performance Based Navigation 
Traditionally, the navigation capability of systems was enforced through the mandatory 
carriage of certain equipment (FANS, 1995). This limits flexibility and the efficient 
implementation of modern equipment, particularly satellite-based technologies (ICAO, 1999). 
Furthermore, the same operation being performed with different technologies which are 
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intended to be equivalent may not be comparable in terms of performance. To counter these 
problems, ICOA developed the Required Navigation Performance Capability (RNPC), later 
changed to Required Navigation Performance (RNP) (ICAO, 1999) which is a statement of the 
performance necessary to operate in an airspace. Since RNP was introduced, there has been 
a divergence in both the application of RNP to airspace within states and the uses of the RNP 
and RNAV designations (Lassooij, 2006). 
In the original formulation of RNP, a number of performance parameters were identified as 
relevant to the specifications definition (ICAO, 1999). However, accuracy was the only 
parameter used to quantify the RNP type. The RTCA extended this definition, known as RNP-
RNAV, to include integrity, continuity and availability (RTCA, 1998). The term 'RNP 
parameters' has been used to include these four parameters and under the proposed ICAO 
plan will do so in future (ICAO, 2008). In this thesis 'RNP parameters' will refer to accuracy, 
integrity, continuity and availability which are defined in §2.5.1.1 for GNSS applications, 
though may be applied to all technologies. 
A recent step by ICAO is the development of the Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) 
concept (ICAO, 2008), intended to reaffirm the notion of RNP whilst harmonising the many 
performance based applications. This also forms the navigation component of the drive by 
ICAO towards performance based services in place of traditional equipment carriage 
requirements. The new harmonisation will define RNP specifications as those requiring an on-
board monitoring capability to ensure the integrity of the system. RNAV specifications will 
allow operations without an on-board monitoring capability, such as existing operations using 
technologies which are monitored externally. The means and extent by which integrity of the 
various navigation technologies is provided, is discussed in the following section 
Under the PBN concept, specifications are made up of performance requirements but provide 
a choice of navigation sensors which may be used to meet the performance requirements. 
The benefit of this approach is that service providers, operators and users have greater 
flexibility in their choice of sensor, which allows them to choose the most efficient cost-
effective option. Furthermore, the advent of new technology does not require an extensive 
overhaul of requirements for a procedure, merely the validation that the new sensor meets 
the required performance for that operation and airspace. 
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2.4.4 Navigation System Monitoring 
This section has scrutinised the different guises that performance plays in air navigation, 
stressing the link between user expectations on such matters as safety and how they relate to 
the navigation systems in place. This link is becoming more defined under the ICAO mission of 
performance based operations (ICAO, 2005). However, traditionally the framework (SESAR, 
2007) for applying performance measures was less well defined and determining the quality 
and reliability of navigation systems was done on a technology by technology basis and with 
varying methodologies. These traditional approaches to monitoring the system are 
summarised below. 
2.4.4.1 Non-Direction Beacon (NDB) 
NDB is not used for stringent phases of flight. As such only a coarse deployment of field 
monitors is used (CAA, 2000) which monitor excessive decreases in power (<50% required for 
coverage), transmission failure and mal-functions of self-monitoring of the station (ICAO, 
2006). In the event of failure ATC is notified to advise users to use other navigation means or 
to implement radar vectoring. 
2.4.4.2 Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) 
DME uses self-monitoring of its transponder to detect delays exceeding 1 microsecond, 
equivalent to 150m of range accuracy. Back-up transponders are available at some stations 
(ICAO, 2006). 
2.4.4.3 VHP Omnidirectional Range (VOR) 
A monitor station in the field of view of VOR detects changes in the derived bearing greater 
than 1 degree, signal power reduction over 15% and failure of the monitor itself, information 
is relayed to a control point which automatically switches off the transmitting VOR and a 
NOTAM is issued. The monitor may potentially transmit information directly to users 
operating the required device (RTCA, 1986). 
2.4.4.4 Instrument Landing System (ILS) 
The ILS signals for both glide slope and localizer are monitored using internal sensors and filed 
monitors. A far filed monitor is used to ascertain localizer performance for Cat III ILS. In the 
event a failure is detected, the system may cease to broadcast the signal, remove 
identification from the signals or revert to a lower category of approach. Verification of the 
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ground monitor with in-flight measurements is performed to ensure no decorrelation 
between ground and air has occurred. 
2.4.4.5 Microwave Landing System (MLS) 
MLS monitors signals in a similar manner to ILS using filed monitors to perform an automated 
integrity check every 614 milliseconds. A manual end-to-end test is performed approximately 
twice per year to ensure biases or correlations have not been introduced to the system. 
2.4.4.6 Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
No real time monitoring of GPS is provided for SPS users by its operators the GPS Wing (DoD, 
2008). Monitoring may then be performed using an external network or on-board the aircraft 
using Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM). These two techniques are described 
in detail in Chapter Four. 
2.5 Air Navigation Requirements Specification 
2.5.1 Performance Requirements 
A basis for air navigation performance requirements has been developed in §2.4, albeit the 
actual values have evolved historically through comparison to other phases of flight and 
technological implementations. Following the introduction of the RNP-RNAV parameters by 
the RTCA (RTCA, 1998; EUROCAE, 1998), these four parameters have become industry 
practice to use them to measure the navigation system performance. A unique facet of GNSS 
is that different elements of the navigation system are under different organisational control 
and assigning liability is a problematic issue. This is partly the reason why performance 
requirements for GNSS-based navigation are stated as Signal-ln-Space (SIS) requirements and 
do not refer to RNP or RNP-RNAV parameters. The effects of errors at the receiver level are 
not accounted for in the ICAO SIS requirements (ICAO, 2006) but instead the equipment 
manufacture and testing standards which apply (FAA, 1996; RTCA, 2006) cover the effects 
following signal transmission. The nominal signal path errors such as ionospheric delay and 
tropospheric delay are modelled by the receiver but abnormal events remain a grey area in 
terms of where responsibility lies. ICAO states that such effects as the ionosphere, 
troposphere, multipath and receiver noise do not contribute to the SIS accuracy 
requirements. However, the concept of SIS integrity is complex, particularly when integrity is 
provided by an SBAS or GBAS at system level and the overriding importance of the ionosphere 
in differential GPS (DGPS) and monitoring. 
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The following section provides definitions for the four SIS performance parameters for GNSS-
based air navigation (ICAO, 2006) and discusses their relevance and the contributing factors 
which determine the values. 
2.5.1.1 Definitions 
2.5.1.1.1 Accuracy 
"GNSS position error is the dijference between the estimated position and 
the actual position. For an estimated position at a specific location, the 
probability should be at least 95 per cent that the position error is within 
the accuracy requirement."(\CAO, 2006) 
Accuracy is therefore the most intuitive measure of the quality of the positioning element of 
the navigation function. It describes the relationship between the true location of the aircraft 
and the position the navigation system functions have displayed to the pilot. An accuracy 
value may equally be given at a percentile different to 95 per cent, but it is chosen as a 
reasonable value for the application and given the more safety relevant parameter of 
integrity it makes sense that the accuracy requirement is generally met with greater ease. 
An important comment regarding the performance requirement for accuracy is that the 95 
per cent is applicable to each location and not an averaged performance over a given time 
period. This is of particular relevance to GPS or GNSS due to the time-variant properties of the 
relative geometry between user and satellite constellation, unlike traditional systems such as 
VOR or ILS. The dynamic nature of the constellation causes a change in the observation matrix 
and thus affects the map from measurement range error variance to the position error 
variance (c.f. §3.3.3). This in effect suggests that to assess the performance of a GNSS offline 
in terms of accuracy, the testing of the worst-case location is sufficient to determine accuracy 
performance. On-board, accuracy may be estimated, assuming no inherent failures are 
present which have remained undetected, using the measurement error residuals and a 
geometrical factor which accounts for the linear transformation between the measurement 
and position vectors (assuming a linear model). 
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2.5.1.1.2 Integrity 
"Integrity Is a measure of the trust that can be placed In the correctness of 
the Information supplied to the total system. Integrity Includes the ability 
of a system to provide timely and valid warnings to the user (alerts) when 
the system must not be used for the intended operation." (ICAO, 2006) 
Integrity is therefore, the parameter which is able to quantify the concept of safety. There is 
no safety Msk borne of the navigation system if the positioning solution is close to the true 
solution. From this statement one could argue that good accuracy protects against safety risk, 
which in a sense it does, but the crucial question is what occurs in the 5 percent of samples in 
which the accuracy is not satisfied. The pilot requires a degree of assurance to match the 
target levels of safety expected of the system and the aviation industry as a whole. Integrity is 
able to provide such an assurance by meeting a prescribed level of confidence that no gross 
failures are present which have not been detected. So although conceptually it is a measure, 
practically it is a binary function, because the degree of integrity has been determined for an 
operation and the system's algorithms must merely determine if such a level of performance 
is reached. 
In order to determine if the system is performing at an acceptable level, an alert level is 
defined within the requirements as the maximum acceptable position error which may 
remain undetected by the integrity monitoring algorithm. Beyond this level, the probability of 
an inherent undetected error causing a gross position deviation must be below the integrity 
risk assigned to that phases of flight or flight operation. The notion of 'undetected' here must 
also be clarified, due to the highly dynamic nature of the system, when a failure occurs it 
must be detected in good time and the user must be notified without an unreasonable time 
period elapsing which could result in an accident. Therefore, integrity is defined by three 
parameters, the integrity risk or probability that a failure remains undetected or is detected 
in insufficient time, the alert limit which is the maximum allowable position error which may 
occur without a failure being detected and the time to alert which is the maximum time 
allowable between the onset of a failure and the warning being presented to the user. A 
more safety critical operation is generally reflected in the requirements in terms of a lower 
and thus more stringent alert limit, smaller integrity risk and a reduced Time-To-Alert (TTA). 
Integrity is both a requirement of the system but also something which must be implemented 
as a function of the system. This can be achieved either at system level, through performance 
monitoring via a ground network and/or on board at user level. A system level integrity 
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monitoring networl< uses reference stations positioned to near-optimally cover a region and 
minimise the spatial decorrelation between signal errors which are not local to the user. This 
may be used to the advantage of reducing errors through differencing and thereby improving 
accuracy but also estimates of the error variances and integrity for the worst user location 
(c.f. Chapter Four for a detailed description of integrity monitoring techniques). At the user 
level, if more measurements are available than are necessary to merely obtain a positioning 
solution, then this redundancy may be used to perform a statistical test which determines the 
presence of a gross failure. 
2.5.1.1.3 Continuity 
"Continuity of Service of a system is the capability of the system to 
perform its function without unscheduled interruptions during the 
intended operation." (ICAO, 2006) 
Continuity is an important concept because it relates to the proportion of operations which 
may be completed without a break in service (due to the navigation system) occurring. If 
continuity is compromised, the aircraft may be required to perform a missed approach 
and/or utilise other navigation technologies to complete the operation. A missed approach 
and re-routing is inefficient and detrimental to the environment but an interruption to the 
service and switch to other modes clearly presents a greater workload to the pilot and also a 
safety risk. 
Continuity is provided when both the accuracy requirement is met and integrity functions are 
available and in the absence of alerts. Any alert, either due to insufficient availability of 
functions, false alerts or a detected failure result in continuity being lost. Theoretically, 
continuity is computed from the estimated proportion of POPs (Periods of Operation) which 
fulfil the definition. A POP is defined either as a single approach or in the case of En-Route 
flight, a period of one hour. 
2.5.1.1.4 Availability 
"The availability of GNSS is characterized by the proportion of time the 
system is to be used for navigation during which reliable navigation 
information is presented to the crew, autopilot or other system managing 
the flight of the aircraft." (ICAO, 2006) 
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Availability differs from continuity in that it is not computed per operation and includes 
integrity failures undetected during actual operations. It is therefore a system parameter 
which is impossible to measure in a perfect theoretical sense, without a truth position and an 
infinite sample size. The availability performance of the system must be attained through 
design, modelling and analysis. Due to the repeatable geometrical configuration of GNSS, it is 
generally possible to predict the availability of the system for a particular operation, although 
does not precisely represent system availability but the on-board algorithmic availability. It is 
this availability which is referred to in the performance requirements table in ICAO Annex 10 
(ICAO, 2006). 
2.5.1.2 Requirements Specifications 
The previous subsection defined the four parameters used to measure the performance of 
GNSS for air navigation. The ICAO specifications for these parameters are presented and 
discussed in this section. The GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS) performance 
specifications are listed and discussed in Chapter Three. 
2.5.1.2.1 ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
ICAO has defined and quantified the SIS parameters required for navigation of aircraft using 
GNSS technology. The choice of these parameters is a consequence of the extension of the 
original RNP accuracy parameter (ICAO, 1999) to the RNP-RNAV parameters introduced by 
the RTCA (2000). These parameters are then defined as SIS parameters, in order to separate 
the legal responsibility for system errors between the navigation service provision from 
NAVSTAR and receiver performance specified in a different set of requirements (RTCA, 2006). 
The four SIS parameters of accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability must be met for the 
applicable phase of flight, as shown below in Table 2.1. The specifications for have been 
adopted or derived from traditional ground based systems. 
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Type of operation Accuracy Accuracy 
Horizontal Vertical 95% 
95% 
Integrity Time-to-
alert 
Continuity Availability 
En-Route 3.7km IM/A 
(2.0NM) 
1-1x10'/h 5 min l - l x l 0 " 7 h to 
1-1x10 7h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
En-Route, 
Terminal 
0.74km N/A 
(0.4NM) 
l-lxio'/h 15s l - l x l 0 7 h to 
l - l x l 0 " 7 h 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Initial approach. 
Intermediate 
approach. Non-
precision approach 
(NPA), Departure 
220.0m N/A l - l x l 0 " 7 h 10s l - l x l 0 7 h to 
1-lxlO'Vh 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Approach 
operations with 
vertical guidance 
(APV-I) 
16.0m 20.0m 1-2x107 
approach 
10s 1-8x10''in 
any 15s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Approach 
operations with 
vertical guidance 
(APV-II) 
16.0m 8.0m 1-2x10"'/ 
approach 
6s 1-8x10" in 
any 15s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Category 1 
precision approach 
16.0m 6.0m to 4.0m 1-2x10'"/ 
approach 
6s 1-8x10"' in 
any 15s 
0.99 to 
0.99999 
Table 2.1SIS Performance Requirements (ICAO, 2006) 
Type of operation Horizontal Alert 
Limit 
Vertical Alert 
Limit 
En-Route 
(Oceanic/Continental 
low-density) 
7.4 km 
(4NM) 
N/A 
En-Route (Continental) 3.7 km 
(2NM) 
N/A 
En-Route, 
Terminal 
1.85 km 
( INM) 
N/A 
Initial approach. Intermediate 
approach. Non-precision approach 
(NPA), Departure 
556m 
(0.3 NM) 
N/A 
Approach operations with vertical 
guidance (APV-I) 
40 m 50m 
Approach operations with vertical 
guidance (APV-II) 
40 m 20m 
Category 1 precision approach 40 m 15.0m to 10.0m 
Table 2.2 SIS Performance Requirements Alert Limits (ICAO, 2006) 
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Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show performance requirements from the least stringent En-Route 
Oceanic operation down to Category I precision approach. ICAO have not as yet accepted 
Category II and Category III precision approaches for GNSS applications, in part due to the 
difference of opinion on how to derive the requirements between the RTCA and EUROCAE, 
the two major technical advisory bodies. 
The accuracy requirements naturally increase as the operations become more demanding and 
of greater risk. For approaches requiring vertical guidance this tightening of the position error 
bounds occurs in the vertical dimension which is far more safety critical at that stage of 
operations. The time-to-alert decreases in these cases due to the relatively short period in 
which a navigation error can lead to an accident. Of interest in this table is the role of the 
continuity risk and availability parameter ranges. These ranges are intended to reflect the 
variation in airspace complexity, availability of alternative Navaids, environment and air traffic 
conditions and allow operators to determine a reasonable value within the range to fit the 
status at the time. Although high level guidance in terms of setting a value within the range 
provided by (ICAO, 2006), it is difficult to see how this could lead to a quantifiable process and 
remains a grey area in terms of standardisation. The responsibility for determination of which 
values in a given range should be applied is not stated, but due the major pointers being air 
traffic density, weather conditions, alternative Navaids it seems reasonable that ATC 
authorities would be required to quantify the parameters. In the case of oceanic En-Route 
availability, the higher values are suitable for cases when GNSS is the only navigation system 
available. 
In Table 2.2, the integrity alert limits are given and once again the vertical limits become more 
relevant for approaches with vertical guidance. The horizontal requirements for En-Route to 
NPA equate to the RNP containment values, i.e. RNP4, RNPl and RNP0.3, although for specific 
operations in RNP defined airspace, more stringent containment levels may be employed in 
addition to extra functional requirements such as on-board performance monitoring. In fact 
some specific operations may not be easily characterised, for example the U.S FAA's 
LNAV/VNAV approach which utilises vertical guidance but is considered a non-precision 
approach by the HPL requirement of 0.3NM. 
2.5.1.3 Receiver Requirements 
Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) have the responsibility to ensure the requirements 
defined in §2.5.1 are met. However, as well as the operational requirements described above, 
a number of further technical requirements are imposed for equipment manufacture. 
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GNSS Airborne receivers have improved significantly since the onset of the GPS constellation. 
At present, simple hand held receivers are available as well as panel-mounted, aviation 
specialised receivers and FMS integrated systems. The first equipment standard for GPS 
(GNSS) receivers was the TSO-C129a (FAA, 1996) standard for airborne supplemental 
navigation. At present GPS equipment may be used for certain IFR operations if they meet 
FAATSO-C129a, TSO-C145b orTSO-C146b (FAA, 2002), or later accepted revisions. 
In §2,4.2.2 it was also noted that RTCA documents including DO-229D specify the operational 
and on-board receiver algorithmic functionality required for GNSS based navigation. This 
functionality includes the provision of RAIM mechanisms and specifies the need for a Failure 
Detection and Exclusion (FDE) RAIM capability (§4.3.1.2). The algorithm is required to 
generate a protection level based on a weighted FDE algorithm but which type of protection 
level is not specified. In addition to the integrity requirements specified by ICAO, the RTCA 
also require that the FDE RAIM algorithm meet a probability of missed alert of less than 10"^  
for each geometry both through missed detections and wrong exclusions. The probability of 
false alert is set at 3.33e-7 per sample. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the air navigation environment which is the operational setting 
for the research presented in this thesis. The approach taken has been to look at how this 
environment is changing and what is driving such change. The drivers identified to be behind 
the current evolution in air navigation are, international policy (ICAO, 2005) and procedures, 
technological innovation particularly the shift towards satellite based systems and the 
development of PBN. 
Of particular note is the key measure of performance for aviation, safety (i.e. integrity) but 
also other crucial attributes such as capacity and efficiency. It was necessary to highlight the 
link between these high-level ideals and the constraints placed on the navigation system. This 
link places in context the benefits that the research presented in this thesis may bring. An 
integrity monitoring algorithm which can not only guarantee safety but also bring greater 
availability of the navigation system represents a tangible improvement to efficiency and 
capacity to operators. Furthermore, the development of an improved performance 
assessment capability could provide a flexible and accurate operational evaluation to be used 
in real-time or to validate an approach for a type of operation. 
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This thesis is concerned with three primary topics; aviation, satellite navigation and integrity 
monitoring. This chapter covered aviation and in the following two chapters Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are introduced followed by a review of integrity 
monitoring. 
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Chapter 3 
GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
3.1 Introduction 
Satellite based positioning has brought navigation to the mass market. In all walks of life, 
applications are being established at a rapid rate which inherently utilise a GPS receiver to aid 
their function. Aviation is a domain in which some of the more demanding and dynamic 
safety-critical applications are found which has continued to drive the design and 
modernisation of GPS. However, the process of change is a more cautious one within aviation 
due to its safety critical nature. In order to meet the challenge of extending GNSS to more 
stringent applications, a full understanding of the GNSS architecture, proposed modernisation 
plans and receiver processing techniques is needed. 
This chapter introduces GMSS for the purposes of aviation and begins in §3.2 with a synopsis 
of the architecture of GPS, the primary exponent of GNSS and its respective space, control 
and user segments. Descriptions of the satellite and ground based augmentations are 
provided due to their importance in global and regional air navigation plans (DoT, 2008). The 
modernisation programmes and new global systems such as Galileo are briefly introduced 
and the value of signal structure changes highlighted. 
In §3.3 the fundamentals are given on how GPS functions by introducing the concept of a 
Time-Of-Arrival (TOA) navigation system in the context of GPS. The critical elements of the 
GPS model are then presented; the reference system and satellite orbits followed by a 
derivation of the GPS observables. A review of the GPS measurement error sources is 
included in §3.3.2 to facilitate a study of their effects in later chapters. Finally §3.3.3 
concludes with an illustration of the basic approaches in deriving a positioning solution. 
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3.2 GNSS Architecture 
3.2.1 Global Positioning System (GPS) 
GPS is tfie only fully operational Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). Initially formed 
primarily as a military system, civilian use quickly became widespread and progressive 
measures have been taken to improve the quality of service to civilian users, firstly through 
the presidential directive (The White House, 2000) to switch off Selective-Availability (SA)^  
and recently through the joint Department of Defence (DoD)/Department of Transport (DoT) 
task force. The system allows an accurate, continuous and globally available capability to 
compute the six component state vector of position and velocity. The satellite constellation 
reached Full Operational Capability (FOC) of 24 nominal satellites arranged in 6 orbital planes 
in 1995. 
In depth technical descriptions of GPS may be found in GPS-JPO (2004) and DoD (2008) whilst 
Kaplan (2006) , Hoffman-Wellenhof et al (1997) and Kleusberg and Teunissen (1998) give 
excellent backgrounds to GPS and their scientific applications. 
GPS consists of three segments, described in further detail in §3.2.1.1: 
• The space segment composed of the active satellite constellation 
• The control segment including the facilities for orbit determination, orbit prediction, 
time keeping, system control and monitoring 
• The user segment which includes the service definitions, all global civilian and 
military users, their receiver equipment and technology standards 
Since FOC was reached, a number of improvements have been made both to the ground 
segment and operational satellites employed. Better quality clocks and improved on-board 
integrity checking have reduced the effective Signal-ln-Space (SIS) errors, as has better orbit 
prediction and modelling of the navigation data elements (Warren and Racquet, 2003). This 
has had the impact of reducing the User Equivalent Range Error from 33m (with SA) to around 
5m (Kovach, 2000). 
' Selective Availability is an intended degradation of the signal to reduce accuracy to unclassified users. 
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3.2.1.1 GPS Segment Description 
3.2.1.1.1 Space Segment 
The space segment is made up of a constellation of Medium Earth Orbit (IVIEO) satellites 
which transmit continuous ranging signals and data messages synchronised to an on-board 
atomic time standard. The constellation is formed of six orbital planes inclined at 55 degrees, 
in which a minimum of four satellites or Space Vehicles (SVs) orbit the earth approximately 
twice per day within near circular orbits at an altitude of 20,200km (radius of 26,560km). Due 
to the progressive improvement to the satellite payload, a number of different SVs make up 
the constellation (at the time of writing there are 12 Block 11 A, 12 Block MR and 7 Block IIR-M). 
A schematic diagram of a generic GPS satellite payload is shown in Figure 3.1 below. 
Crosslink 
subsystem 
Frequency 
Synthesizer 
L-band 
subsystem 
Atomic Frequency 
Standards 
TT&C 
subsystem 
Navigation Data Unit 
(NDU) 
Figure 3.1 Satellite Navigation Payload (Kaplan, 2006) 
Considering Figure 3.1, it is seen that the high-level structure is relatively simple whilst the 
complex technical achievements specific to GPS lie in the L-band subsystem and frequency 
synthesis. The link between satellite and ground control is via a communications antenna 
connected to the Tracking, Telemetry and Control (TT&C) unit as shown in the figure. This 
enables regular updates to the navigation data to be made and any necessary manoeuvres to 
be performed. The basis for many of the payload functions are multiple Atomic Frequency 
Standards (ASF) which are phase-locked to a frequency synthesizer generating a 10.23 MHz 
reference. This serves as a timing reference for the Navigation Data Unit (NDU) and L-band 
subsystem which must generate their respective codes within precise timing boundaries as 
described in §3.3.1.4. The L-band subsystem continuously generates the coded signals and 
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transmits them towards earth from the L-band antenna. The crosslink subsystem also shown 
is a means for satellites to communicate between each other in the absence of ground 
communications (Blocks ilR, IIR-M and future Block IIP SVs) and thus enable prolonged and 
improved performance in extreme failure cases (GPS JPO, 2004). 
The L-band subsystem of each SV currently emits two carrier frequencies known as LI and L2 
at 154/0 (1575.42 MHz • 19.05 cm) and 120/o (1127.60 MHz • 24.45 cm) respectively where 
fo = 1.023 MHz. The LI frequency is modulated by two Pseudo-Random Noise (PRN) coded 
signals from which the ranges are obtained and the navigation message from which satellite 
ephemeris and clock data is retrieved. These two codes are known as Coarse Acquisition (C/A 
code) with a chip rate of fo, repeated every millisecond (i.e. 1023bits) and Precise (P-code) 
with a chip rate of lO/o repeated over a GPS week. The navigation data message is modulated 
at 50bps and contains SV ephemeris, SV clock parameters, ionospheric parameters and SV 
health status. The L2 frequency is not modulated with the C/A code on current satellite 
blocks. The P-code is currently restricted to military users in possession of an encryption key 
which is required to generate the replica code on board the receiver and as such civilian users 
are nominally constrained to the LI (C/A) signal. Advanced techniques have been developed 
for some scientific applications which are able to take partial benefit of the L2 frequency but 
certification of such an architecture does not meet aviation's strict requirements on reliability 
and as such these techniques are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
As part of the modernisation programme a number of changes to GPS signal generation and 
structure are proposed. These are addressed at a high level in §3.2.1.1.2. 
3.2.1.1.2 Control Segment 
The ground Control Segment (CS) is responsible for monitoring, and commanding and 
controlling of the GPS satellite constellation. It achieves this by processing the downlink L-
band signals, generating the navigation data, updating the navigation messages and resolving 
satellite anomalies. The CS comprises of the Master Control Station (MCS), six L-band monitor 
stations and four ground antennas. The primary functions are performed at the MCS located 
at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado Springs or in the event of a prolonged MCS outage at 
the Back-up Master Control Station (BMCS) in Gaithersburg, Maryland (Kaplan, 2006). An 
overview of the CS elements and their functions is shown in Table 3.1. 
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Master Control Station 
Schriever Air Force Base (MCS), Navigation data message generation 
Gaithersburg, Maryland (BMCS) Navigation data upload operations required to meet 
operational standards 
Constellation time synchronization steering 
Satellite maintenance and housekeeping 
Satellite health and anomaly resolution 
Management of Standard Positioning Service (SPS) 
Performance 
Monitor Stations 
Colorado Springs, Hawaii, Cape Navigation signal tracking 
Canaveral, Ascension Islands, Diego Near real-time range measurement data upload to MCS 
Garcia, Kwajalein Support for near continuous monitoring of constellation 
performance 
Atmospheric data collection 
Navigation data collection 
Stable time reference generation 
Ground Antennas 
Diego Garcia, Kwajalein, Cape SV command transmissions 
Canaveral, Ascension SV navigation upload transmissions 
Collection of SV telemetry 
Interface between SVs and MCS 
Table 3.1 GPS Ground Control Segment 
The GPS satellites and their orbit configurations are designed to maintain highly predictable 
paths. However, due to solar pressures, inaccurate gravitational tide modelling and 
temperature affected mass anomalies, the satellites deviate from their planned orbital 
courses (Montenbruck and Gill, 2005). Due to this effect, it is essential that the CS achieves 
accurate orbit determination and prediction. In order to realise this, the observed ranges 
(carrier and code) are transmitted from the monitor stations to the MCS along with telemetry, 
space and earth environment data and received navigation data. The MCS runs a Kalman filter 
to estimate satellite ephemeris and clock correction parameters using the range data 
provided. The ephemerides are a set of parameters which may be used to accurately calculate 
the position of a satellite at a particular point in time (Hoffman-Wellenhof et al, 2001). Using 
these most recent estimates for the satellite positions and the reference trajectory computed 
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from accurate force models, the positions of satellites for a specific duration of time during 
which the navigation data message is valid are computed. The processed ephemeris and clock 
data are then uploaded to the satellites and rechecked with the broadcast data message 
received at the monitoring stations. 
Of equal importance to the generation of accurate satellite orbital parameters are the clock 
correction parameters for each satellite. The accuracy of GPS is driven fundamentally by the 
existence of and conformance to an absolute time scale. This time scale is derived at the MCS 
using an ensemble of all the SV and MS time scales (Brown, 1991). However, in order for the 
user to accurately determine the true time of transmission (c.f. §3.3.1.4) the relationship 
between SV time and GPs time must be known. Therefore, the MCS uses the Kalman filter to 
maintain estimates of satellite clock bias, drift and drift rate to enable clock corrections 
obtained from the navigation message to be utilised by users. Additionally, UTC parameters 
are provided which relate the current GPS time with the UTC time scale for use in timing 
applications. 
3.2.1.1.3 User segment 
The user segment encompasses all manner of applications most of which make use of the 
Standard Positioning Service (SPS) provided by GPS as opposed to the restricted Precise 
Positioning Service (PPS) intended for military users. The two services each provide 
guarantees (DoD, 2008) as to the minimum level of performance which may be expected. In 
this thesis, the focus will be on the SPS as it applies to aviation. The SPS assumes the use of 
the LI frequency through decoding of the C/A code as the P-code on the L2 frequency is 
encrypted. The SPS Performance Standard (PS) (DoD, 2008) does not account for signal 
distortions encountered along the signal path or within the user GPS receiver. 
The quality of service may be expressed either at the Signal-ln-Space (SIS) level which relate 
to the transmitted signals, at the received signals level or at the positioning and timing 
solution level. The accuracy of the ranging signal may therefore, be expressed in terms of the 
following: 
" User Range Error (URE) - the difference between the measured pseudorange (c.f. 
§3.3.1.4) and expected pseudorange derived from the true user position and 
navigation message data. A SIS URE includes residual orbit, satellite clock and group 
delay errors. 
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- User Range Accuracy (URA) is the 1-sigma value for the satellite's expected SIS URE 
performance. A corresponding URA index is contained within the navigation 
message. 
• User Equivalent Range Error (UERE) includes all signal path errors including SIS, single 
frequency ionosphere model, troposphere model and multipath (DoD, 2008). 
The performance of the SPS SIS is specified in terms of URE (DoD, 2008) and the GPS SIS 
equivalents of the RNP parameters defined in §2.5.1. Table 3.2 summarises the SPS 
Performance Standard (PS) for the SIS (DoD, 2008). 
Coverage 
100% global coverage (using time-filtered solutions) 
Accuracy Global Average URE (unless stated) 
7.8m (95%) average Age-Of-Data (AOD) 
6.0m (95%) zero AOD 
12.8 (95%) worst case AOD 
30.0m (99.94%) 
30.0m (99.79%) worst location 
338.0m (95%) extended operations up to 14 days 
Integrity No excessive URE 
1.0 -10"^ per hour (URE > 4.42 x URA) 
10 second time-to-alert 
Worst Case delay of six hours 
Continuity No unscheduled SV SIS outage 
0.9998 per hour (average over 24 SVs slots) 
Problem Reporting SIS Outages 
Scheduled Outages informed at least 48 hours before 
Unscheduled Outages informed as soon as possible 
Availability SV SIS proportion of normal operation 
0.957 that each of 24 SV (in predefined slot) is healthy 
0.98 that 21 of 24 baseline SVs are broadcasting a healthy SIS 
0.99999 that 20 of 24 baseline SVs (in predefined slots) are 
broadcasting a healthy SIS 
Table 3.2 SPS SIS Performance Standards 
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The SPS specifications (DoD, 2008) summarised in Table 3.2 represent an evolution of the 
previous SPS PS editions (DoD, 2001) in line w/ith aviation performance parameter definitions. 
Naturally, tighter and more detailed bounds on the system accuracy are provided. One 
notable difference is the inclusion of a Time-To-Alert (TTA) parameter within the newly 
organised SPS integrity standard. Previously, SV range error failures were assured to occur 
rarely at an equivalent probability to those stated in the current version. However, in the 
current version, a caveat is in place which states that failures lasting less than 10 seconds are 
not included within the integrity guarantee. This could realistically have an impact on 
potential aviation applications with required alert times less than 10 seconds. For example, 
on-board integrity monitoring techniques (c.f. Chapter Four) which rely upon estimates of 
satellite failure probabilities could not be relied upon for APV-II operations without further 
analysis on the impact of this caveat. This is because integrity risks for failures lasting 6-10 
seconds would not be bounded at the same integrity level as those lasting more than 10 
seconds. 
In addition to the SIS performance provided by the PS, measures of the expected user 
positioning and timing performance are listed. In addition to the quality of a Positioning, 
Navigation and Timing (PNT) solution is affected by the geometry of the participating 
satellites relative to the user location. This relationship is expressed by the Dilution of 
Precision (DOP). A high DOP indicates a poor transference of error from the range domain to 
the positioning domain and so results in a relatively inaccurate solution, likewise a low DOP 
leads to an accurate solution. Well spaced satellites provide a good DOP whereas clustered 
satellites contribute to poor DOP. The DOP matrix may be derived (c.f. §3.3.3.1.2) from 
knowledge of the satellite positions and is related to the covariance matrix of the position 
solution error (Hoffman-Wellenhof et al, 2001). Various functions or projections of the DOP 
matrix may be used to generate the necessary DOP relating to the solution subspace. The 
most common examples of these are listed in Table 3.3. 
GDOP Geometric DOP refers to geometric positioning 4D space-time 
PDOP Position DOP for the 3D position solution 
HDOP Horizontal DOP projection of the PDOP to the user's local horizontal frame 
VDOP Vertical DOP projection of the PDOP to the user's local vertical axis 
TDOP Time DOP is the DOP of the time component of the solution 
Table 3.3 Types of Dilution of Precision for GPS PNT Solution 
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The accuracy of the position solution may be modelled as a function of the DOP and the 
precision of the range measurements. The accuracies provided within the GPS SPS PS utilise 
the SIS range measurement accuracy to derive the user accuracy standards shown in Table 
3.4. These values are therefore, not indicative of true user performance as they omit 
modelling of the signal path deformations and user receiver errors. Furthermore, although 
on-board satellite checks take place, the SPS does not currently possess an internal near real-
time integrity monitoring capability to protect users within safety critical applications. It is 
clear from Table 3.4 that GPS performs better in the horizontal subspace than the vertical. 
This is unfortunate in terms of air navigation as the approach and landing phases of flight 
crucially depend on precision vertical guidance. 
PDOP Availability PDOP < 6 
0.98 (global average) 
0.88 (worst user location) 
Positioning Accuracy Availability 95% accuracy 
0.99 (17m horizontal, global average) 
0.99 (37m horizontal, global average) 
0.90 (17m horizontal, worst user location) 
0.90 (37m horizontal, worst user location) 
Positioning Accuracy Quality 95% accuracy 
9m (horizontal, global average) 
15m (vertical, global average) 
17m (horizontal, worst user location) 
37m (vertical, worst user location) 
Table 3.4 SPS Accuracy Standards (DoD, 2008) 
3.2.1.2 GPS Modernisation 
Modernisation of GPS has progressed since the system reached FOC and will continue for the 
foreseeable future. The motivation for modernisation lies in the potential benefits available 
to improving the SPS for civilian users, particularly from the enhanced ionospheric error 
mitigation provided by signals on multiple carrier frequencies. Furthermore, potential 
competition from other GNSS has necessitated that GPS be modernised to maintain its 
position as the primary satellite navigation infrastructure. Technological advances in security 
have allowed the US government to advance the civilian role whilst maintaining the crucial 
military role of GPS (Barker et al, 2000). 
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The most significant proposed change to GPS is the addition of two new civil signals, denoted 
L2C and L5. The L2C signal will use a code similar to the C/A code currently used on LI and is 
available on Block IIR-M satellites for non Safety-of-Life (SoL) applications at the L2 frequency 
(1127.60 MHz); the L5 signal lies in the Aeronautical Radio Navigation Service (ARNS) band at 
1176.45MHz and is intended for SoL applications. The L5 signal was initially planned to be 
available on the next generation Block IIP ("F" for Follow-on) satellites, however, the 
capability has been included on the most recent Block IIR-M satellite for the purposes of 
signal broadcast testing which began in April 2009 (FAA, 2009b). These additional signals 
allow users to correct for ionospheric delays by making dual frequency measurements. 
Additional signals also increase the receiver's robustness to interference by providing 
bandwidth redundancy. Aviation should benefit significantly from the use of a dual L1/L5 
solution both of which are protected primary services in their respective frequency bands. 
The new frequencies are planned to be available for FOC by 2018 (FAA, 2009b). The next 
generation signal bands are shown in §3.2.4 on GNSS-II. 
3.2.2 Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) 
Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) operate on a regional scale consisting of a 
space segment of nominally Geostationary Earth Orbiting (GEO) satellites and a ground 
segment of monitoring stations and uplink antennas. The satellites provide users with the 
following services: 
" Additional ranging capability through the transmission of GPS-like signals to improve 
availability 
• Integrity information broadcast as required for civil aviation and other SoL 
applications 
• Wide Area Differential (WAD) corrections to enhance the accuracy of stand-alone 
GPS 
SBAS operate by gathering data at widely dispersed reference stations which are then 
forwarded to a central master station for processing. These data are subsequently used to 
derive integrity and differential corrections for each monitored satellite and uplinked to the 
SBAS space segment together with the SBAS navigation message. The corrections are 
subdivided into three types; fast corrections, slow corrections and ionospheric corrections. 
Fast corrections account for quickly changing errors such as satellite clock error and are 
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formatted as range corrections to be directly applied to the raw ranges at the receiver. Slow 
corrections account for slowly varying errors such as erroneous satellite positions caused by 
degradation in the computed ephemeris over time. Ionospheric corrections are provided in 
terms of signal delays over an assumed lattice surface covering the service region and an 
estimate of the accuracy of these delays. The standardised SBAS integrity concept is discussed 
in §4.2.2. 
The first SBAS to reach FOC is the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) established by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the U.S. This system has enabled ILS Cat I lookalike 
approaches to be defined - Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance (LPV) which provide 
precision guidance down to a decision height of 200 feet. Other systems under development 
are the Indian GPS-aided Geo Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) system, the Japanese Quasi-
Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) which will employ an innovative quasi-geostationary elliptical 
orbit structure and the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) currently 
at Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and expected to reach FOC by the end of 2010 (GSA, 
2008). EGNOS will provide two levels of service, the highest of which meets a 7.7m horizontal 
and vertical system error accuracy requirement (95%) (Levy etal, 2006). 
Although SBAS have enabled the extension of GPS in aviation to meet the first echelon of 
precision approach, the potential of localised errors remains which may only be accounted for 
through on-board integrity monitoring. For this reason the integrity monitoring algorithms 
developed in this thesis are intended either as an extra stage of safety redundancy or may be 
considered as a potential back-up to an SBAS provided service. 
3.2.3 Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS) 
The concept of GBAS has been designed to support precision approaches of all categories and 
perhaps surface movement (Schuster et al, 2007). A ground reference station is installed local 
to the intended operations area of a particular application (e.g. near an airport). The Local 
Area Augmentation System (LAAS), a GBAS is currently under development by the FAA and is 
intended to meet all phases of flight within the coverage area of an airport (Eldredge, 2007). 
The system operates by processing carrier-smoothed code-phase observables (RTCA, 2001) 
gathered at multiple reference receivers within the LAAS ground facility (LGF). The corrections 
and correction rates are then broadcast to airborne GBAS receivers. Furthermore integrity 
information is provided in a number of categories; signal quality monitor, data quality 
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monitor, measurement quality monitor, a consistency check between the reference receivers 
and a sigma monitor to check the error characteristics. 
3.2.4 GNSS-II Developments 
GNSS-II is the second generation of systems that will independently provide full civilian 
satellite navigation services. This concept was initiated by the definition (GALILEO, 2003) of 
the European Galileo positioning system presented in §3.2.4.1 below. A vision for the long-
term plan for GPS was then developed; the GPS-III programme (§3.2.4.2) whilst continuing 
the commitment of ongoing modernisation of GPS-II. The development of the Chinese 
Compass and evolution of the Russian GLONASS systems are also expected to meet the needs 
of GNSS-II users (Polischuk, 2002). 
GNSS-II systems will provide unprecedented accuracy and integrity monitoring performance 
necessary for civil navigation. These systems will consist of two signals for civil use (such as 
the LI C/A and L2C GPS signals) and one for system integrity (such as the L5 GPS signal). The 
LI and L5 (or equivalent) signals will lie in protected frequency domains suitable for SoL. 
3.2.4.1 GALILEO 
The GALILEO system was envisioned following the decision by the European Union to pursue 
a global navigation system available for civilian use independent of GPS. Originally planned to 
be funded by a public-private partnership, problems with this proposal have meant that a 
multi-billion euro agreement for full public financial support had to be reached. This was 
achieved in 2007 (Reuters, 2007). 
GALILEO will provide multiple levels of service: 
• An open service available free for use to all users 
• A commercial service which will provide high accuracy positioning and additional 
data 
• A safety-of-life service intended for safety critical users such as those in aviation 
• The public regulated service (PRS) to be made available to government authorized 
users which will require data encryption and added robustness to interference, 
jamming or spoofing 
• A search and rescue support service 
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The anticipated performances of these services have been stated in the GALILEO mission high 
level definition (GALILEO, 2003) and are outlined in Table 3.5. The SoL service which is 
inevitably focused on aviation should provide a level of performance to meet stringent 
precision approach operations, notably with a six second time-to-alert. Furthermore, a 
guaranteed certified service is envisaged which is of benefit to civil aviation. 
Galileo Global Open Service Commercial Safety of Life Public 
Services Service Regulated 
Service 
Signals Used E5a, E5b, LI E5a, E5b, E6c, E5a, E5b, LI LI, E6p 
LI 
Positioning single frequency single frequency dual frequency single 
Accuracy (95%) 15-24m (H) 15-24m (H) 4m (H) frequency 
(Horizontal 2Drms) 35m (V) 35m (V) 8m (V) 15-24m (H) 
dual frequency dual frequency 35m (V) 
4m (H) 4m (H) dual 
8 m (V) 8m (V) frequency 
6.5m (H) 
12m (V) 
Integrity N/A N/A 12m (H) 20m (H) 
20m (V) 35 m (V) 
6 seconds 10 seconds 
3.5xl0"7l50s 3.5X10"7I50S 
Continuity TBD TBD 10"Vl5 s 10"Vl5s 
Service Availability 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Access Free Open Controlled Authentication Controlled 
Access Access of of integrity Access of 
ranging codes information in ranging codes 
and navigation the navigation and 
data message data message navigation 
data message 
Certification None Guarantee of Guarantee of Guarantee of 
Service possible Service Service 
Envisaged Envisaged 
Table 3.5 Expected Performance of Galileo Services 
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Galileo will broadcast a variety of signals resulting in a more complex picture of frequency 
bands in the future GNSS-II setting. These are displayed in Figure 3.2 along with the proposed 
structure for GPS and GLONASS (c.f. §3.2.4.3). The Aeronautical Radio Navigation Service 
(ARNS) bands are protected frequency bands for worldwide use by authorised systems. This 
guarantees a continuity of service enabling certification of safety critical applications (Markey, 
1998). The Radio Navigation Satellite Service (RNSS) bands do not have the same restrictions 
of ARNS bands and may be shared with other primary services such as radar which could lead 
to interference. 
ARNS , ARNS 
M M ' 
# / / / # # / 
mm Galileo Frequency Bands 
H GPS Frequency Bands 
y GLONASS Frequency Bands 
Figure 3.2 Proposed GNSS-II Frequency Bands 
The signal structure has been designed to aid interoperability with GPS through the use of 
common carrier frequencies (LI, L5/E5a) and CDMA transmission. The GALILEO Integrity 
Channel will be disseminated on the E5b and LI data channels. As noted above, the addition 
of integrity information to GPS has been made possible through augmentation by space and 
satellite based systems. GALILEO in the spirit of the next generation GNSS-II systems, will 
incorporate integrity information within the GALILEO infrastructure itself to provide a self 
contained civilian SoL capability. Details of the GALILEO integrity concept and transmitted 
parameters are found in §4.2.4. 
3.2.4.2 GPS-III 
The GPS-III programme has the objective to preserve and build on the success of GPS through 
the development of an improved architecture according to the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD) (Lee et al, 2001). In a similar vein to Galileo, GPS-III should facilitate 
69 
70 
additional mission capabilities such as search and rescue. Furthermore, the GPS-III security 
infrastructure is a key element to the proposals in order to provide the flexibility to meet a 
combined civilian and military need. 
3.2.4.3 GLONASS 
GLONASS is the Russian equivalent to GPS. It was designed to be both a military and civilian 
system but has not been kept at full capacity for a number of years. Replenishment of the 
system is ongoing and is currently planned up to 2011 (Inside GNSS, 2008). A number of 
design changes are to be incorporated in order to facilitate interoperability at the user level. 
These will include the addition of CDMA signals to the existing Frequency Division Multiple 
Access (FDMA) format centred on the LI and L5 frequencies. GLONASS integrity and wide-
area differential corrections are intended for transmission on these new signals. The planned 
changes will be incorporated into the next-generation GLONASS-K satellites. Moreover, the 
GLONASS ground network will also be extended beyond Russian borders in order to improve 
the orbit modelling. The anticipated GLONASS constellation will consist initially of 21 
operational satellites and 3 active spares in 3 orbital planes. Each of these circular orbits is 
found at 19,100km from the earth's surface at an inclination of 64.8 degrees around which 
GLONASS satellites orbit in 11 hours and 15 minutes. 
3.2.4.4 Compass 
The Chinese Beidou system was an SBAS to both GPS and GLONASS and the predecessor to 
the Compass (or Beidou-ll) system. The new system will be a stand-alone system consisting of 
30 MEO satellites and 5 geostationary satellites. The ranging signals will be based on the same 
techniques as GPS and Galileo, employing CDMA within overlapping frequency bands. 
3.2.4.5 Interoperability of GNSS 
Interoperability of GNSS is of interest to users at many levels. Combined systems could 
provide a greatly enhanced quality of service but also possess the potential for novel technical 
challenges and sources of error. Furthermore, the cost of combined receivers is likely to be, at 
least at first, considerably higher. 
The rationale for multiple GNSS is firstly that national or regional sovereignty has the benefit 
of bringing a level of service guarantee, liability and hence aids certification of safety and 
mission critical applications. Secondly, in challenging environments, such as urban canyons, 
additional satellites are able to improve the coverage over a single system. 
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In order to reap the benefits of multiple systems, they must first be compatible, in the sense 
that they do not interfere with one another and degrade performance. Secondly to use the 
systems within a combined solution they must be interoperable, which would enable the 
integration of measurements of solutions to the profit of user performance. The key areas for 
compatibility and interoperability are the signal structure, message format, spatial reference 
frame and time reference system. Signal structure definitions must minimise cross-correlation 
of the codes which would interfere with tracking and precision correlation (Ganguly et al, 
2001). Common data message formats aid receiver manufacturers to simplify designs. The 
Galileo Terrestrial Reference Frame (GTRF) is expected to be well-aligned to the international 
Terrestrial Reference frame (ITRF) and WGS84. In any case, a transformation between the two 
sets of coordinates should be relatively simple. However, the temporal offset poses a greater 
problem (Moudrak et al, 2004). The GPS-Galileo Time Offset (GGTO) will be broadcast by GPS 
and Galileo satellites within the navigation message, though it is unclear whether estimation 
of this parameter will be needed if the dissemination of the GGTO does not meet 
expectations on performance (Piriz etal, 2007). 
3.3 Functional Models of GPS 
In the previous section, the GPS architecture was introduced along with the proposed GPS 
modernisation plan and development of other navigation systems. In this section, focus 
moves to the microscopic by providing a brief overview of how GPS operates, in order to lay 
the foundations for a study of the system failures (Chapter Six) and the mathematical 
formulation of how errors impact on the positioning solution (Chapter Four). 
In §3.3.1 the rudimentary techniques required to successfully implement a satellite-based 
Time-Of-Arrival (TOA) navigation service are considered. Potential sources of measurement 
errors are then considered in §3.3.2. In §3.3.3 a treatise of user positioning techniques is 
made with the focus on aviation users and the methods applied within this thesis. 
3.3.1 GPS Fundamentals 
3.3.1.1 Time of Arrival (TOA) Position Determination 
GPS operates using the Time-Of-Arrival (TOA) ranging mechanism. TOA involves measuring 
the time it takes for a signal to travel from an emitter to the receiver, known as lateration. 
Multiple emitters (multilateration) are needed to solve for a position, otherwise the solution 
is under-determined. The emitters must be at accurately known reference stations and 
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operate to an accurate time standard. The signal propagation time may be derived, which in 
addition to knowledge of the propagation velocity, is used to compute a range from the 
reference station. Multiple ranges from multiple reference stations allow a user receiver to 
determine its position. 
The TOA concept is critically dependent upon the existence of an absolute time frame and a 
known signal transmission protocol which gives the user knowledge of the signal transmission 
time. The required precision in the time reference is dependent upon the signal propagation 
velocity and magnitude of the ranges. In order to use radio navigation waves as opposed to 
an alternative waveform, the time reference frame requires accuracies which only atomic 
clocks can currently provide. Ground based TOA radio navigation systems are also feasible but 
do not enable the global coverage provided by line-of-sight to orbiting satellite transmitters. 
From these drivers the technical motivation for satellite navigation was summoned. 
A satellite-based positioning system must transmit a radio signal at times controlled by on-
board atomic clocks. The satellite-to-user ranges may then be determined from the difference 
in the time reference frame (GPS time) of the transmitted signal (code phase) and the 
received signal (code phase) at the user. The product of this propagation time and the speed 
of light yields the range. The details of this process are found below in §3.3.1.4. 
3.3.1.2 Spatial Reference System 
The importance of a precise timing system has been emphasised above, but the accuracy of 
any position determination also crucially depends upon the quality of the reference system in 
which the user position is defined and those of the transmitters (satellites). In fact a reference 
system must be chosen in which both the user and transmitter may be represented easily. 
Typically Cartesian coordinates are used within a chosen reference system whose origin lies 
at the Earth's centre. Two primary such systems exist. Earth Centred Inertial (EC!) system or a 
rotating system. The inertial system enables the satellite positions and velocities to be 
conveniently calculated from their orbits as the satellites themselves obey the laws of motion 
and gravitation in this system. 
Naturally from the user point of view it is preferable to be defined within a reference frame 
which relates to objects in the local vicinity. The Earth-Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF) coordinate 
system enables this as it rotates at the same rate as the Earth. In this system it is simple to 
compute longitudes, latitude and height of the user. The xy-plane is defined to coincide with 
the equatorial plane with the x-axis pointing towards zero degrees of longitude and the y-axis 
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pointing towards ninety degrees of longitude. The z-axis lies in the direction of geographical 
north. 
In many applications it may be of benefit to express the user position in terms of geodetic 
coordinates (longitude, latitude, height). This is particularly true of aviation (and maritime). 
These coordinates are defined relative to a reference ellipsoid, the longitude being the angle 
from the x axis in the equatorial plane and the latitude the angle between the equatorial 
plane the local normal vector as shown in Figure 3.3. Height is naturally the distance along 
this local normal vector from the point of intersection with the ellipsoid. 
north 
latitude 
Figure 3.3 Geodetic Latitude 
Transformations between ECEF Cartesian coordinates and the ellipsoidal coordinates of 
longitude, latitude and height rely on a physical model which for GPS is chosen to be the 
World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84). WGS84 is formed of a reference ellipsoid which 
approximates the earth's surface and a detailed model of the earth's gravitational 
irregularities. Furthermore to determine the local height above sea-level a geoid model must 
be used which is a database of local deviations. This is because historically heights were 
measured in the direction perpendicular to the local surface of constant geopotential i.e. how 
a plumb line falls. 
3.3.1.3 Satellite Orbits 
Once a reference system has been established, the task of positioning the satellites such that 
they may be used as reference transmitters is formed. The orbit trajectories may be derived 
from Newton's laws which are extended from those applicable to point masses to a more 
general model which accounts for the Earth's uneven non-spherical distribution of mass. If 
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the true distribution of mass may be represented by a gravitational potential V, then the 
acceleration of a rigid body of assumed point mass is expressed as follows (Kaplan, 2006): 
^ = VV + ap (3.1) 
where the geopotential model V at a distance r may be represented by a spherical harmonic 
series, 
1+ Z Z l - I "im (sin/)(CimCOSma + S,^sinma) 1=2 m=0 ^ 
(3.2) 
and Bp contains the effects of perturbing forces such as third body gravitation (e.g. Sun, 
Moon), solar radiation pressures, outgassing and orbit manoeuvres. The parameters a and j' 
are the geographic longitude and latitude for an ellipsoidal earth with semi-major axis a. The 
coefficients Pim, and are contained within the WGS84 geopotential model up to 360*'' 
degree and order, though GPS only uses the terms up to degree and order 12. 
In the presence of perturbing forces, the canonical solutions to the two-body orbit 
determination problem will deviate slightly from the true satellite path (Montenbruck and 
Gill, 2005). A reference time is needed by users at which the solutions will be exact and from 
which the accuracy of the predicted orbit is likely to deteriorate. The GPS ephemeris message 
includes the reference time, the Keplerian orbital elements which characterise the simplified 
two-body solution in the absence of ap and correction parameters which incorporate these 
forces and additional spherical harmonics. The reference time of applicability is included to 
locate the point of convergence of the perturbed and Keplerian trajectories. The GPS receiver 
is then able to compute the satellite position vector at an epoch in the window of validity as is 
now shown. 
The most basic Keplerian elements are those which define the shape of the ellipse, the semi-
major axis a and eccentricity e. Knowledge of the time at which the satellite passes its perigee 
tp reduces the problem over the satellite elliptical orbit to a unique one (given the angular 
direction). These parameters are shown in Figure 3.4 along with the true anomaly v and 
eccentric anomaly E. The GPS formulation, instead of using the parameter tp uses the mean 
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anomaly M which is linearly related to the time difference as follows (Hoffman-Wellenhof et 
al, 2001): 
(3.3) 
where Mq is the mean anomaly at time to and may be defined by introducing the time of 
perigee into equation 3.3. 
(3.4) 
The relationship between the true anomaly and mean anomaly is formed using the eccentric 
anomaly also shown in Figure 3.4 and by the following equations. 
E=2arctan / — t a n f - v (1+e 12 
M=E-esinE 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
t = r 
Figure 3.4 Elliptical Orbit 
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Thus far, the Keplerian elements introduced have defined the position of a satellite over its 
elliptical orbit or within its orbital plane. However, the orientation of this ellipse within space 
remains ambiguous and in order to place it within an ECEF or EC! frame further parameters 
are required. In order to define this orientation three Keplerian elements are needed; the 
orbit inclination /, the longitude of the ascending node Q and the argument of perigee a . The 
inclination (as can been seen from Figure 3.4) is the angle between the orbital plane and the 
equatorial plane of the reference frame. The longitude of ascending node represents the 
angle between the x-axis and the point at which the satellite crosses the equatorial plane. 
Satellite constellations such as GPS and the proposed Galileo are designed to optimise service 
coverage by spacing the orbital planes evenly in their ascending nodes. The third parameter 
defines the location of the perigee from the ascending node in the orbital plane. 
perigee 
equatorial plane 
ascending node 
Figure 3.5 Keplerian Elements defining the orbit orientation 
The designed Keplerian elements of GPS are shown in Table 3.6. The actual values for each 
GPS satellite's orbit vary from these through natural perturbations. 
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Semi-Major axis 26,560m 
Eccentricity <0.02 
Orbital Period 43,080s ( l lhours 58minutes) 
Inclination 55° 
Table 3.6 Keplerian Design Elements 
The GPS ephemeris data transmitted to users includes the six parameters introduced above, 
the time of applicability and nine additional correction parameters which account for the 
perturbations in inclination angle, orbit radius and argument of latitude, true anomaly and 
argument of perigee. The computation algorithm for determining the satellite position in 
ECEF coordinates is as follows (GPS-JPO, 2004); 
a = ( V a f 
tk = t - t o 
M,^  = M + n(tk) 
-esinEk 
sinv, 
COSVu = 
Vl-e^sinEk 
'' 1 -ecosEk 
cosEk-e 
1 -ecosE|( 
<K=\ +w 
5 4 =C,,s in(2(^) + C,,cos(2(^) 
H = C „ 8 i n N ) + C^cos(2^) 
S'k =C| ,6 in (2^ ) + C„cos(2^) 
"k = (4 + 5 ^ 
"k =a( l -ecosEj+6r | , 
di ' 
'k ='o + lJ^| tk+5ik 
^k ~ ^ 0 "^e)tk " 
semi-major axis (3.7) 
corrected mean motion (3.8) 
time from ephemeris epoch (3.9) 
mean anomaly (3.10) 
eccentric anomaly (iterative) (3.11) 
true anomaly (3.12) 
true anomaly (3.13) 
argument of latitude (3.14) 
argument of latitude correction (3.15) 
radius correction (3.16) 
inclination correction (3.17) 
corrected argument of latitude (3.18) 
corrected radius (3.19) 
corrected inclination (3.20) 
corrected longitude of node (3.21) 
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Xp =l|,C0SUk orbital plane x position (3.22) 
Yp ='"kSinUk orbital plane y position (3.23) 
XECEF =XpCOsn^ -ypCosi^ sinn^ ECEF X position (3.24) 
VECEF =XpSinq +ypC0sikC0s0k ECEF y position (3.25) 
E^CEF ~yp '^'^ 'k ECEF z position (3.26) 
3.3.1.4 Range Equation 
The previous subsection has laid the groundwork that allows the user to know the position of 
satellites at an epoch tk- This section looks at how the basic measurements are made which 
with an estimate of the satellite position enables ranging. GPS signal broadcasting uses 
Pseudo-Random Noise (PRN) codes which are modulated onto the LI, L2 and L5 carrier 
frequencies by a Binary Phase Shift Key (BPSK). The codes have a deterministic and 
predictable pattern which allows the user receiver to replicate the code using the necessary 
parameters from the GPS user interface document (GPS JPO, 2004). At present for most 
civilian applications, the Coarse/Acquisition (C/A) code is used whose properties are listed in 
Table 3.7 below. 
Period 1ms 
Length 1023 
Chipping Rate 1.023Mchip/s 
Range of One Chip 293m 
Correlation Accuracy <1% (<3m) 
Table 3.7 C/A Code Characteristics 
In order derive the satellite to user range; the receiver must generate the same PRN code as 
received from the satellite. If this process begins at exactly the same time (in absolute GPS 
time) as the satellite code generation their will be an offset between the received signal code 
phase and the replicated code phase which corresponds to the propagation time of the signal 
(At) as demonstrated in Figure 3.6. In order to determine the magnitude of this offset, the 
receiver electronics sequentially shifts the replicated signal until it cross correlates perfectly 
with the received signal. This is complicated somewhat by the Doppler Effect on the signal 
which dictates that the receiver must also search for the precise carrier frequency to 
maximise correlation. Although the range corresponding to one chip is 300m, an upper bound 
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on the nominal accuracy of cross-correlation is less than 1% of the chip length which equates 
to less than 3m. Modern receivers can achieve correlations accurate to 0.1% of a chip 
equivalent to 0.3m (Kaplan, 2006). 
Satellite Generated 
Code 
Satellite Code arriving 
at Receiver 
Receiver Generated 
Replica 
Delayed Receiver 
Generated Replica 
At 
K— 
t l 
- • 
I 
•t2 
Figure 3.6 Relationship of Satellite and Receiver Generated Codes 
Given the precise determination of replica code delay which is a measure of propagation 
time, the range from user to satellite may be determined through multiplication by the speed 
of light. Importantly, the time of transmission may be computed by subtracting the 
propagation time from the time of reception and correcting for clock errors. This is crucial for 
a precise estimate of the satellite position at the time of signal transmission. 
GPS works on the principle of an absolute time frame. However, in reality both the highly-
accurate atomic clocks on-board the satellites and the less accurate oscillators within GPS 
receivers are not synchronised precisely to GPS time. The clock bias within the receiver is the 
most substantial but is common to each of the range measurements. For these reasons the 
receiver clock bias is estimated as an additional unknown within the state vector as is 
described in §3.3.3. The satellite clock behaves much better than the receiver clock but as 
GPS time is derived as an ensemble solution of all satellite and monitor station atomic clocks 
there remain residual errors between the on-board SV time and the system-wide GPS time. In 
order to overcome this, clock correction parameters are computed at the MCS using a Kalman 
filter (El-Rabbany, 2002). These corrections are uploaded to the satellite at least once per day 
and contain clock bias, clock drift, frequency drift and relativistic corrections (Kaplan, 2006). 
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It should be noted that the above discussion has ignored the potential ambiguity in the C/A 
code period. As the C/A code repeats every 1ms, the receiver must synchronise the replica 
code generation to the correct code period otherwise a gross error will be present. The 
ambiguity is resolved through the use of the Z-count and XI count. The Z-count is contained 
within the navigation message and increments every 1.5 seconds before rolling-over at the 
beginning of the GPS week. The XI count is kept by the receiver to pinpoint the correct C/A 
code period and is reset to zero at each Z-count change (GPS-JPO, 2004). 
The precise and unambiguous determination of the signal transmission time is thus the first 
step towards GPS positioning. The positioning algorithms utilise range parameters derived 
from these temporal observables called pseudoranges which differ from the true geometric 
range due to the clock errors and signal path delays described above. The described method 
above utilises the fundamental code-phase observable to obtain a pseudorange as follows 
(Hoffman-Wellenhof etal, 2001; Kaplan, 2006): 
tprop = (tarr + ) (3.27) 
tpmp=tg.. .y -6t::Lk+6t:;Lc e-zs) 
P =C (tgeo +6tde|ay "Kilk+Klock) (3-29) 
P =rgeo + C ( 6tde|ay-6t=fock +6t35ck) (3-30) 
where: 
tprop = propagation time 
tggo = geometric range time equivalent 
5tjg|gy = signal path delays (details found in §3.3.2) 
^^ ciock - receiver clock bias 
^^ dock ~ satellite clock correction 
••geo (= ctgeo) = geometric range 
p = pseudorange 
c = speed of light 
Although the accuracy provided by the C/A code pseudoranges is sufficient for many 
applications, more precise measurements may be derived from the signal by measuring the 
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carrier phase. The receiver counts the number of carrier phase wavelengths and measures a 
final fractional phase at the measurement epoch. There is however an ambiguity in the 
number of cycles because the count begins once the signal is acquired. The carrier-phase 
observable (p may be expressed as follows: 
1> =7 rgeo + N + fStcLk + fSt 'ck + (3-31) 
where: 
•geo ~ geometric range time equivalent 
6tjg|3y = signal path delays (details found in 3.3.2) 
^^ dock ~ receiver clock bias 
^^ dock ~ satellite clock correction 
r = geometric range 
f = signal carrier frequency 
c = speed of light 
N = integer ambiguity 
The integer ambiguity N refers to the first epoch at which observations are made and remains 
constant unless the cycle count is lost (cycle slip). The carrier-phase observable therefore 
effectively relates to the change in distance to a satellite. Differencing techniques are needed 
in many applications to make full benefit of the carrier phase observables. A single-difference 
observable may be created by differencing two carrier phase equations of the form 3.31. This 
has the result of cancelling the satellite clock and more importantly reformulating the integer 
ambiguity as a function of the change in geometrical configuration and not an immeasurable 
initial value. Details on carrier-phase differencing techniques are available in (Leick, 2004). 
3.3.2 Measurement Errors 
The formulation of the raw GPS observables in §3.3.2 noted the existence of satellite clock 
and ephemeris errors as well as the delays to the signal along its path (Martin, 1978). 
However, errors and noise are inherent in all of the processes which take place before a 
measurement may be obtained. These errors may be categorised as either nominal or 
exceptional (failures). The likelihood and effects of failures is covered in Chapter Six. In this 
subsection the nominal errors which occur naturally and frequently are considered. 
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Depending upon the application and level of sophistication within the user segment these 
errors may either be corrected or tolerated for their relatively insignificant impact on the 
required performance. Nominal errors occur in the generation of the satellite ephemeris and 
clock parameters, through to measurement delays along the signal path and within the user 
receiver itself. The subsections below discuss each of the errors and their magnitudes 
followed by a summary of the error budget applicable to modern day GPS-based air 
navigation. 
3.3.2.1 Satellite Clock Error 
As discussed in deriving the range equation, there exists an error between the absolute GPS 
time frame and the on-board atomic time frame. The clock correction applied using 
parameters contained within the navigation message is the following second order 
polynomial (DoD, 2008); 
C c k + (3.32) 
where: 
' f . = clock bias 
= clock drift 
= frequency drift 
toe = clock data reference time 
t = current time epoch 
= relativistic correction 
The satellite clock corrections are computed using a predicted curve-fit and as such residual 
errors remain. These are typically of less than Im at zero Age Of Data (AOD) rising to l -4m 
after 24 hours (Dieter et al, 2003). The mean nominal clock performance is approximately 1.1 
at 1-sigma. Improvements in clock performance are expected throughout future GPS 
modernisation and these error values are thus likely to be significantly reduced (Hein, 2007) 
3.3.2.2 Ephemeris Error 
The ephemeris data are computed using a curve fit such that at the time of upload to the 
satellite the best fit is obtained. Naturally there exists a residual error between the predicted 
and actual satellite trajectories which is of the order of l -6m (Warren and Racquet, 2002) 
though larger errors do occur (c.f. Chapter Seven). Although this residual error is relatively 
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large, the projection of the error onto the line of sight vector usually reduces the error 
significantly. This is the result of the fact that the measurements which are used to compute 
the ephemeris are also made along similar Line-Of-Sight (LOS) vectors (Taylor and Barnes, 
2005). Given that the age of data is known, a more accurate measure of expected ephemeris 
error as a function of AOD could be formulated. 
3.3.2.3 Satellite Hardware Biases 
The signals transmitted by GPS satellites include both inter-frequency and inter-code biases. 
Inter-frequency biases for dual-frequency users a re negligible as they are dealt with in the 
clock correction. However, for single frequency users such as those in aviation using LI, the 
group delay parameter included within the navigation data message. Civilian users employing 
the LI C/A code must also account for the inter-code bias between the C/A and P code signals 
as the broadcast satellite clock parameters are derived from P-code observables. 
3.3.2.4 Relativistic Effects 
Einstein's special and general theories of relativity both have an impact on GPS 
measurements. Special relativity applies when the transmitter (i.e. satellite) is moving with 
respect to the receiver which is always the case for GPS signalling. General relativistic effects 
are also of importance, as the satellite is located at a different gravitational potential to the 
user. Due to these effects the satellite clock is corrected to 10.22999999543IVIHz such that it 
will appear as 10.23MHz to users at sea-level. 
Due to the slight eccentricity of the GPS orbits, a satellite's velocity and gravitational potential 
both vary periodically with time. For example, at the perigee, the satellite is at a lower 
gravitational potential and at a higher speed which cause the satellite clock to run slower up 
to a maximum of 70ns (Seeber, 2003). The receiver must apply the following correction: 
At^ g, =KeVasinE|^ (3.33) 
where 
K = 14.442807633x10"" sm"^ ^^  
e = eccentricity 
a = semi-major axis 
E|^  = eccentric anomaly 
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A further relativistic effect lies in the earth's rotation during the time of propagation when 
computations are made in the ECEF reference frame. This is known as the Sagnac Effect. The 
solution to this problem is either to work in the ECl frame or to apply a correction by freezing 
the ECEF frame at the time of transmission obtained as a raw measurement in the generation 
of a pseudorange. A rotation is then applied to acquire satellite coordinates in the inertial 
frame, the equation of which must be solved iteratively. 
3.3.2.5 Ionospheric Effects 
The range equations derived in §3.3.1.4 include the constant for the speed of light in a 
vacuum. However, the path a GPS signal follows is not within a true vacuum and passes 
through both the ionosphere at 50-1000km from Earth which contains numerous free 
electrons, and the troposphere made up of refracting water molecules. Each of these 
influence electromagnetic wave propagation which contributes to degradations and delays of 
the signal. The tropospheric delay is dealt with in §3.3.2.6 whilst the Ionospheric effects are 
considered below. 
Due to the dispersive nature of the ionosphere, the GPS signal information in the form of the 
PRN code and navigation data is delayed whilst the carrier phase is advanced by an equal 
magnitude (Hoffman-Wellenhof et al, 2001). This effect is dependent upon the signal 
frequency and the electron content along the signal path. The electron content is in turn 
dependent upon a number of factors including the time-of-day, user location, satellite 
elevation, season, magnetic activity and sun spot activity as well as a stochastic element. The 
frequency dependency of the Ionospheric delay allows dual-frequency receivers to essentially 
cancel the induced error through a linear combination of the signals. However, currently 
aviation applications utilise only the single protected civilian signal available and must apply 
the single frequency ionospheric correction included within the navigation data message. 
The single-frequency Ionospheric correction is based on a model of the ionosphere which 
assumes half daily-cosine behaviour and reduces the Ionospheric error by about a half. Eight 
coefficients for the correction are transmitted within the navigation message and are derived 
from global measurements which account for changes in latitude, longitude, time of day, 
season and solar flux (Bent et al, 1972). The receiver must then apply a mapping from the 
modelled vertical delay to the slant delay at the known satellite elevation. Typical residual 
Ionospheric delays under the single frequency model are 7m at the 1-sigma level (DoD, 2008). 
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3.3.2.6 Tropospheric Delay 
The troposphere is the low part of the atmosphere and does not disperse signals at the 
frequencies at which GPS operates - the phase and group velocities are delayed equally. The 
delay to the signal varies with respect to the pressure, humidity and temperature along the 
signal path and is usually split into wet and dry components (Saastamoinen, 1972). The dry 
part contributes to the majority of the delay but may be more accurately determined. There 
are a number of models available, the most common being those of Saastamoinen (1972) and 
Hopfield (1969). 
3.3.2.7 Multipath 
The basic premise of a LOS positioning system is that the signal travels directly between 
transmitter and receiver. However, signals may reach the receiver antenna via multiple 
reflected paths. This results in a superposition of waves being processed by the receiver 
instead of simply the direct signal. If the receiver tracks the direct path this has little effect on 
performance for multipath delays which are large. Multipath signals with short delays 
(typically less than 1.5 C/A code chips), however, can distort the correlation function and the 
phase of the received signal which introduces errors in the pseudoranges and the position, 
velocity and time solutions. A secondary effect of multipath is when the direct signal is 
obscured by infrastructure, foliage or terrain. In these cases, the power of a reflected signal 
may be sufficient to distort the received signal or even be tracked as the primary signal. The 
magnitude of multipath errors depends on the type of ranging signal used. The LI C/A code 
has a maximal theoretical error of tens of metres (El-Rabbany, 2002) but is understood to be 
nominally less than 3m (Sauer, 2003). 
3.3.2.8 Interference 
GNSS is vulnerable to Radio Frequency (RF) interference, both unintentional and intentional 
in the form of jamming or spoofing. Interference may be classified as wide-band or narrow-
band relative to the bandwidth of the intended GNSS signal. A Continuous Wave (CW) signal 
consists of a single frequency and is theoretically of zero bandwidth. 
Unintentional interference is to be expected from other systems transmitting within the L-
band. The LI frequency band is designated for satellite navigation and as such does not share 
the primary allocation with other services and should suffer less from interference. However 
being a single frequency signal over a relatively narrow bandwidth means a susceptibility 
remains. The L2 frequency on the other hand shares the allocation with a number of radar 
services and is therefore more likely to be subjected to interference. 
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3.3.2.9 Receiver Effects 
It is well-l<nown that the thermal noise within the receiver tracking loops contributes a further 
source of pseudorange measurement error. Modern receivers have typical 1-sigma values for 
noise of 0.1m (Kaplan, 2006). 
The GNSS signals also succumb to a delay between the signal arrival at the antenna offset 
position and the point at which the measurements are taken. These values are usually 
calibrated by manufacturers though in any event, for positioning solutions will be cancelled 
out within the receiver clock bias. Inter-channel or inter-code biases may also be present but 
are negligible for any applications other than precise point positioning (Johnson and Zuagg, 
2001). 
3.3.2.10 Summary of Measurement Errors and Budgets 
The above discussion has highlighted all of the significant GPS measurement error sources 
and the expected magnitudes. Knowledge of the pseudorange error distribution is critical in 
determining the positioning accuracy and integrity of the system as shown in §3.3.3 and 
Chapter Four. More severe and rarer errors do occur and these are categorised in Chapter 
Seven due to their impact on Integrity. However, it is only nominal measurement errors which 
determine the accuracy of the system as it is defined on the basis of a nominal operational 
state. In §3.2.1.1.3 the definition of UERE was given which is used to quantify the total 
measurement errors perceived by the user. It is commonly assumed that the resulting 
pseudorange error follows a Gaussian distribution. This may be attributed to either Gaussian-
like individual errors or the hypothesis of the Central Limit Theorem which states that 
numerous errors will appear Gaussian when summed. The individual errors may be summed 
in a root-summed-square manner under the assumption that each error is an independent 
random variable which may be expected. The breakdown of the total measurement error 
varies between single and dual frequency receivers. A typical UERE budget for a single 
frequency C/A receiver is shown in Table 3.8. 
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Error Type la Error (m) 
Broadcast Clock 1.1 
LI P(Y) - LI C/A Group Delay 0.3 
Broadcast Ephemeris 0.8 
Ionospheric Delay 7.0 
Tropospheric Delay 0.2 
Receiver Noise 0.1 
Multipath 0.2 
Total(RSS) 7.1 
Table 3.8 GPS Typical UERE Budget (Kaplan, 2006) 
3.3.3 Position and Time Solution 
In §3.3.1 the elementary process of forming a user-to-satellite range measurement was 
formulated. The task remains to process these ranges and derive an estimate of the user 
position. In order to calculate the user position, it is necessary to make at least four 
pseudorange measurements as there exist four unknowns, three position dimensions and the 
common receiver clock bias. The range equation derived for the code-phase observable will 
be used here as it is both the simplest and the most widely used within aviation receivers. 
Carrier-phase positioning for aviation applications has been proposed (Paielli etal, 1993) but 
require advanced differencing techniques of which the integrity is not guaranteed (Feng et al, 
2009). In ECEF Cartesian coordinates the following vector equation relates the user-to-
satellite geometric range to the user and satellite positions (u & s), also shown in Figure 3.7. 
r=||s-u|| (3.34) 
The geometric range was expressed as a function of the pseudorange in equation 3.34. The 
satellite clock error is computed within the receiver and will be considered to be corrected 
and known. Residual satellite clock errors, ephemeris errors and signal path delays will be 
modelled as stochastic errors in the pseudorange measurement. The pseudoranges are 
therefore a function of the receiver clock bias and the true geometric range as expressed in 
the observation equation below: 
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P,= pi-U +Ctu for each satellite i (3.35) 
where tu is the receiver clock error defined in equation 3.30. 
The system of pseudorange equations is usually solved either by a linear estimator following 
linearization or a Kalman filter, though nonlinear techniques have also been derived which 
are beyond the scope of this thesis; details are available in Ober (1999). In Chapter Four, 
integrity monitoring schemes based on the two positioning algorithms are developed. This 
thesis is primarily concerned with snapshot integrity monitoring which relates to the linear 
estimation process described below in §3.3.3.1. The Kalman filter approach is also given in 
§3.3.3.2 for completeness. 
Satellite 
Figure 3.7 Satellite Range 
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3.3.3.1 Linear Estimation 
It is sliown below that it is possible to approximate the relationship between the set of range 
measurements and the position solution (state vector) by a linear system which simplifies the 
analysis of errors and the derivation of statistics which quantify performance namely the RNP 
parameters introduced in Chapter Two. The Least Squares (LS) estimator is then introduced 
along with associated quality measures which are critical in determining the accuracy and 
integrity of the system. The Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimate is stated and discussed 
along with more specialised techniques. 
3.3.3.1.1 Linearization 
A single pseudorange may be expressed as: 
Pi='\ /(><i-><u)'+(yryu)'+(zi-zj ' +ct, (3.36) 
Pi=f(xu'Yu'Z,,tJ (3.37) 
In the form above f is a nonlinear function of the position variables. In order to express the 
pseudoranges as a linear function of the variables, f may expanded in a Taylor series about an 
estimated position , y ^ , , t^ ^) (Leick, 2004). 
f (x, + Ax,, y , + Ay,, z, + Az,, t , + At J = f (x, , y , , z „ t J 
3 f ( x „ , y „ z „ t J 3 f ( x „ y „ z „ t J 
3z. 4 " 
The nonlinear terms in equation 3.38 above are discarded and the partial derivatives are 
computed explicitly which leads to: 
Pi =Pi - ^ A X u - +cAt, (3.39) 
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where fj is the geometric range of the estimate. This equation may be further simplified as 
follows, introducing the direction cosine coefficients, a: 
^Pi =3%,^ +aY,AYu+aziAZu-cAtu (3.40) 
where: 
APi =Pi-Pi 
Sxi =-
ayi -
V i - V u 
For each of a set of n satellites in view of the user, the linear equation 3.40 may be attained. 
The linearised system is thus now composed of n linear equations with four unknowns 
Ay^j, AZy, Aty) . Consider initially the case of four satellites being visible to the user; the 
equations may be expressed in matrix form as follows: 
Ap= HAx (3.41) 
6Pi 3x1 3yl azi l " "Ax, " 
where Ap = APz H = 
3*2 3:2 1 
Ax = 
Aps 9x3 3y3 3z3 1 
_AP4_ 3x4 3y4 3:4 1 -cAt^ 
Equation 3.41 has the unique solution: 
Ax=H"^Ap (3.42) 
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3.3.3.1.2 Least Squares Estimation 
In the case that the number of satellites exceeds four, the receiver could feasibly select the 
four satellites which provide the best OOP or some other metric and apply equation 3.42. 
However, a more accurate solution is usually found by the Least Squares (LS) estimator which 
provides the statistically most probable solution under the model assumptions. First, let the 
linear system 3.41 be reformulated in a parameter estimation setting by representing the 
state vector offset Ax by a 4-vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, made up of the 
three spatial dimensions and the common receiver clock bias, x = (xi,x2,x2,x,), the 
pseudorange measurement offset Ap by an n-vector of measurements z = (zj,z2....z^) and 
introduce the measurement error vector e = (e^,e2....£„). 
z= Hx + e (3.43) 
Under the least squares principle, if the measurement errors E follow a Gaussian 
distribution, one may derive a best estimate of position by minimising the sum square error 
between the observed measurements and the expected measurements also known as the 
residuals r. 
*Ls = min llz - Hxf = min llrlP (3.44) 
By differentiation w.r.t the position estimate and setting the result to zero, the following 
result is obtained: 
*LS - H z = Az (3.45) 
which assumes that the inverse matrix exists. This assumption merely relies on the satellites 
being on different lines of sight. The position estimate is known as the Least Squares (LS) 
estimate as it minimises the square of the residual errors. 
Expressing the measurement vector error as the difference of the ideal error free 
measurements and the observed measurements E= - z^ ^^ ^ and the position 
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estimation error as the difference between the true position and the estimated position 
(offset) e= - X, one obtains an equivalent relation to equation 3.45: 
e= (H^H) ^ H^e = Ae (3.46) 
In the absence of a known measurement bias due to failure, e is generally assumed to follow 
a Gaussian distribution of zero mean and covarianceZ^. It follows from error propagation in 
linear systems (Koch, 1988) that the position errors are also Gaussian distributed with zero 
mean and covarianceZ.: 
Z , = A ^ A (3.47) 
In the most simplistic model of the measurement errors received at the user (User Equivalent 
Range Error c.f. §3.2.1.1.3), the satellite measurements are assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed, thus: 
'nxn'^UERE (3.48) 
Z =(H"H)-'o' UERE (3.49) 
It is possible now to mathematically define the OOP terms given in §3.2.1.1.3 by expanding 
the covariance of e and the DOP matrix (H^H)"^  for the GPS case of estimated 
parameters (x,y,z,ct); 
yx 
x y 
zy 
xct 
y^z °yct 
•'cty " c t z 
zct 
"ct y 
(3.50) 
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^ d . d x y d x z d x c t ^ 
d y x d y d y z d y c t 
d z x d z y d . d z c t 
^ d # x d c t y d c t z d c t y 
(3.51) 
The DOPs were defined as the geometrical factors which transfer measurement errors to 
errors in the state vector. In the absence of explicit error information which would give 
substance to the cross correlations, the DOPs may be derived from the diagonal elements of 
equation 3.51. 
GDOP= 
J + a ' + a ' 
•'UERE 
PDOP= 4 
- = ^ d , + d y + d , + d r t 
: ^ ^ x + d y + d ; 
(3.52) 
(3.53) 
HDOP= 
+ o.. 
d x + d y 
•'UERE 
VDOP=-
'UERE 
T D O P = - ^ = ^ 
(3.54) 
(3.55) 
(3.56) 
3.3.3.1.3 Weighted Least Squares (WLS) 
The LS estimator was derived on the assumption that the Gaussian errors of each satellite 
measurement were independent and of identical variances. Consider the case whereby they 
remain independent but are of difference variances perhaps due to a particular error source 
being a function of satellite elevation. Equation 3.44 is then expressed as: 
x^i^=:mJn(z-Hx)^ (z-Hx) = minr^Z"V (3.57) 
Once again differentiating w.r.t the position estimate and setting to zero yields the WLS 
solution: 
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XwLs - (H^WH)"' H^WZ = A„z (3.58) 
where the weighting matrix W is defined as the inverse of the measurement covariance 
W = z;' (3.59) 
The function which is minimised in equation 3.57 is known as the residual sum of squares or 
sum-squared error (SSE) and is a critical quantity in the theory of least squares and 
particularly the application of integrity monitoring (c.f. Chapter Four). The SSE may be used to 
compute the a posteriori variance of unit weight: 
r^Wr 
Oo= (3.60) 
n - 4 
which has an expected value of 1 when equation 3.59 holds. This value is known to follow a 
Chi-Square distribution (Leick, 2004) which forms the basis of much of the statistical testing 
inherent in integrity monitoring. 
3.3.3.1.4 Other Estimation Techniques 
The least squares approaches described above along with Kalman filtering described in the 
following section are the most widely used positioning methods for GPS applications. The 
major advantage of ordinary LS is the mathematical simplicity it espouses and the statistical 
results which follow (Leick, 2004, Koch, 1988). One property critical to the research presented 
in Chapter Eight is the independence of the two random variables; the parameter estimation 
error and the SSE. The WLS estimation generates the same independence, only when using 
optimal weights. The major advantage in WLS is that it is able to account for variation in the 
expected measurement errors between low and high elevation satellites. It is therefore the 
favoured approach within snapshot positioning, navigation and integrity monitoring 
algorithms for aviation. 
In addition to the two simplest LS formulations given above, there are a number of variations. 
Sequential adjustment is the most extensively used of these which updates an estimation 
based on an original set of measurements with a new measurement batch. This process may 
be repeated any number of times through an update of the solution. The nuances of the 
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particular application determine the preferred rate and batch size of sequential adjustment 
when measurements are being received frequently. However, this approach is only applicable 
to a static positioning problem as the true parameters (state vector) must be time invariant. 
In the dynamic case i.e. air navigation, either traditional LS or WLS may be used or a Kalman 
filter which augments the notion of sequential LS with a dynamic model. 
As well as the class of least squares estimators introduced thus far, there exists a library of 
innovative estimators intended to provide some advantages over the traditional approaches. 
One of most popular methods is robust estimation (Press et al, 1992). Robustness is the 
resistance of the estimation to the impact of outliers. In elementary statistics, for example, 
the mean is not a robust estimator as outliers can significantly affect its value, whereas the 
median is robust as outliers have no effect on its value. Similarly, the ordinary LS estimator is 
not robust as it is essentially an overdetermined mean. A robust estimator, however, may be 
formed by removing or down-weighting measurements with large residual errors associated 
to them. For this reason, robust estimators may present a successful solution to many 
problems, but those with complex down-weighting functions only allow mathematically 
simple results to be obtained in the limit case (i.e. number of measurements is large) (Huber, 
1981; Hampel et al, 2005). In satellite navigation it is common to have relatively few 
measurements and as such monitoring of the accuracy and integrity of the system using these 
estimators is at present challenging. Furthermore, it may not always be advisable to down-
weight outliers but to remove them entirely and this may be performed by a Failure Detection 
and Exclusion (FDE) integrity monitoring algorithm (c.f. §4.3.1.2). Details are available of 
potential air navigation applications in Ober (1999). 
3.3.3.2 Kalman Filtering 
In the previous section the estimated parameters of position and the receiver clock bias were 
assessed using the measurements at a particular epoch only. The notion of sequential 
adjustment was briefly summarised which allows measurements received at different epochs 
to be used to derive a solution. However, the estimated parameter remained time invariant 
and as such the technique is unsuitable for dynamic applications. In the following treatment 
the estimated parameters are allowed to vary with time. In this dynamic case, a model is 
needed which accounts for the movement of the aircraft (or any other object). Although the 
aircraft moves continuously and hence does its associated estimated solution, the estimated 
parameters are determined only at particular discrete epochs. The dynamic model is 
therefore assumed to take the following form, which predicts the parameters on the basis of 
the previous epochs, k and k-1 (Leick, 2004); 
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Xk=DkiXki+Uk (3.61) 
where: 
Xk is the predicted state vector at epoch k (i.e. on the basis of the dynamic model) 
Xk is the estimated state vector at epoch k (i.e. on the basis of measurements 
received at epoch k and the dynamic model) 
D|, is the transition matrix 
Uk is the system process noise and is distributed as u,, ~ N(0,Z„) 
The transition matrix may be obtained be expanding the differential formulation of the 
continuous dynamics in terms of the aircraft velocity (or instantaneous rate of change of the 
estimated parameters) and truncating after the linear term (Hoffman-Wellenhof eto/, 2001). 
As with the least squares formulation, the measurements and position x^ at epoch k may be 
related by a linear model: 
Zk =H,x, +E, (3.62) 
with e,~N(0,Z.j . 
To formulate the Kalman filter algorithm, the covariance matrix of the estimated parameters 
Z. must be propagated to the next epoch. Propagation of Gaussian errors through equation 
3.61 gives the following relation for the predicted position error covariance Z- (also known 
as the cofactor matrix within the literature) as a function of the estimated covariance of the 
previous epoch Z, _ (Leick, 2004): 
Z;.=Dk.&_DI_,+ Z._ (3.63) 
The Kalman filter update is then applied in order to derive the estimated parameters at the 
current epoch k on the basis of new measurements z :^ 
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x,=X^-K,(Z,-H,X^) (3.64) 
where K is the Kalman gain matrix and is computed from: 
+ (3.65) 
The advantage of the Kalman filter approach is that an accurate dynamic model can greatly 
improve the accuracy of the solution and reduce the prevalence of noise in the solution 
(Hoffman-Wellenhof et al, 2001). Furthermore, the integration of inertial sensors within a GPS 
solution naturally fits a Kalman filter approach and as such aviation widely uses integrated 
INS/GPS navigation and integrity monitoring solutions (Brenner, 1988). A potential 
disadvantage of Kalman filters is that systematic ramp errors may be absorbed within the 
filter thus introducing an undetectable bias within the position estimate. 
The above presentation of the Kalman filter is simplest form it takes. However, a number of 
extensions have been devised to account for a non-linear system model, unknown 
measurement noise variance and non-Gaussian measurement distributions. A non-linear 
version of the Kalman filter is called the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF). In the EKF, the 
matrix is replaced by a non-linear function and an alternative to the transition matrix is 
derived from a non-linear function. However, the error propagation and update are linearised 
within the EKF. The Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) takes a further step by updating the 
system and measurement noise covariance matrices by a nonlinear propagation. 
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Chapter 4 
INTEGRITY MONITORING OF GNSS 
4.1 Relevance of Integrity 
In Chapter Two the metrics used to measure the performance of the air navigation system 
were described, both at the highest level of user expectations and the more specific 
subsystem level of Required Navigation Performance (RNP). Safety was identified as the most 
critical high-level indicator and its relationship to integrity was established. Integrity is the 
element of RNP which best ensures the navigation function remains as risk free as possible. It 
is provided by monitoring the navigation system to detect and inform of any malfunction. The 
discussion on Performance Based Navigation (PBN) in Chapter Two also highlighted the need 
for on-board monitoring to meet the needs of RNP systems (ICAO, 2007). Traditional 
navigation systems such as NDBs used field monitors (ICAO, 2004) to determine if 
malfunctions have occurred. However, this information is used to operate the navigation 
system and not for dissemination to users. However, the introduction of GNSS has been met 
with the need for better control over the quality of navigation information being provided to 
aircraft. This is in part due to the evolution of the PBN concept but is also a matter of the 
technological ownership and liability of the navigation service. Therefore GNSS requires an 
integrity monitoring capability to be available to the user (pilot/FMS) so that they may 
operate in the knowledge that the navigation system meets the required standards. This level 
of autonomy is akin to that provided by the introduction of RNAV; users may now fly flexible 
routes with the freedom that they are safe. 
Chapter Two quantified the link between safety and integrity. In this chapter the challenge is 
to quantify integrity itself, to lay the foundations on how it is measured and thus guaranteed 
to meet the specified requirements from the user and system points of view. So how does 
integrity differ from accuracy, another of the RNP parameters? Accuracy is a measure of the 
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quality of the navigation system during nominal operation. Integrity goes beyond this 
definition by quantifying the impact of rare failure events in all states of operation as shown 
in Figure 4.1. 
accuracy 
requirement 
e.g. 95% 
__Z A 
alert limit P accuracy I ^'^rt limit 
e.g. 2o 
Figure 4.1 Accuracy and Integrity 
Integrity is the most safety critical parameter as it deals with gross errors which present an 
immediate and present danger to operational safety. It is defined in terms of an alert limit as 
shown in Figure 4.1 which if exceeded could endanger the safety of the operation. Accuracy 
on the other hand accounts for nominal performance at the 95% level. Degradations in 
accuracy may not be instantaneously to the detriment of safety but over a longer period 
could represent an operational risk. It is well known that for GNSS, the accuracy requirements 
are far more easily met than the integrity counterparts (Hwang and Brown, 2005). Therefore, 
the ability of the navigation system to meet the integrity requirement is the primary factor in 
determining the availability of the system. 
Integrity risk which quantifies integrity (ICAO, 2006) is made up of two key elements; the 
probability of failure and the probability that the monitoring function does not detect a 
failure when one occurs. Failures may occur singularly or in multiples though this is 
considered rare. In fact, a key assumption of many traditional GPS integrity algorithms is that 
only one satellite may fail at any given time. This remains true for most types of failure (c.f. 
Chapter Six) as occurrences on individual satellites are independent of one another. The 
probability of a joint failure in this case is usually well below the required integrity risk. The 
axioms for this assumption are questioned in the presence of high ionospheric activity or 
multipath and under the more stringent precision approach performance requirements 
(Angus, 2006). This thesis shall continue to use this assumption whilst assessing Non-Precision 
Approach (NPA) for which such errors are immaterial to integrity. The detection of a failure is 
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performed using a statistical test on the basis of the expected distribution of errors in the 
system. This notion was introduced in §3.3.3.1.3. 
Integrity monitoring must therefore, be able to detect a failure, potentially exclude or 
mitigate the impact of the erroneous measurement from the user's solution and provide a 
measure of the integrity provided in the form of a protection level. It may be carried out at 
two levels; the system level (external) or the sensor level (internal) which as depicted in 
Figure 4.2 and described in § 4.2 and §4.3. 
The GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS) is not currently monitored in real time (DoD, 2008) 
and is only able to guarantee integrity at the level of 10'^  per hour per satellite. For this 
reason an external or internal integrity monitoring provision is needed to meet the needs of 
aviation users. In the case of external integrity monitoring a number of augmentations to the 
basic system have been or are currently being built. Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems 
(SBAS) such as the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) and the Wide 
Area Augmentation system (WAAS) were introduced in Chapters Two and Three and their 
integrity concept for aviation Is described in §4.2.2. The U.S Ground Based Augmentation 
System (GBAS), the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) is also under development by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the integrity element is covered in §4.2.3. A 
number of other commercial and military monitoring networks have been deployed or are 
under development, most notably the JPL Real-Time (RT) network. The proposed European 
Galileo system will have an inbuilt integrity function, the Galileo Integrity Channel (GIC) which 
is described in §4.2.4. 
GNSS Integrity 
System Level Sensor Level 
Other 
RT Network 
INS/GPS 
Figure 4.2 GNSS Integrity Monitoring 
Internal integrity monitoring is achieved by Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) 
and its variations. RAIM refers to an on-board algorithm which uses only satellite signals 
observed by the receiver to determine integrity. Alternatively, additional sensors may be 
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integrated within the integrity monitoring function, most commonly from Inertial Navigation 
Sensors (INS) or a barometer. This is known as Aircraft Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(AAIM) which is also shown in addition to RAIM in Figure 4.2. These techniques are the main 
topic of research covered in this thesis and a review of current algorithms is given in §4.3. The 
chapter conclusions are listed in §4.4. 
4.2 System Level Integrity Monitoring 
4.2.1 GPS Integrity Provision 
The present GPS SPS has a limited integrity provision whose performance requirements are 
derived historically and on the assumption of an ad hoc approach to correct space and control 
segment failures as soon as possible. A failure event on Satellite Vehicle Number (SVN) 22 in 
2001 caused two hours of incorrect information to be broadcast and in response a proposed 
evolution of the GPS system integrity monitoring infrastructure was proposed (Langer et al, 
2002). This included the introduction of an additional monitoring network beyond the legacy 
six ground monitors described in §3.2.1.1.2. Current developments include the use of the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) real-time network to aid PPS users. The GPS III evolutionary plan 
for the operational control segment proposes continual tracking and telemetry from the 
constellation as well as near real-time data from external monitoring networks (Luba et al, 
2003). This data will enable the near real-time detection of gross errors thereby leading to 
user notification and repair in a much shorter timeframe. 
In addition to the improved ground monitoring proposed, internal anomaly detection on-
board the modernised satellite vehicles will aid the initiative to enhance GPS integrity 
(InsideGNSS, 2007). Current satellites are able to detect some navigation data errors and 
certain types of clock failure. Navigation data errors may occur due to data corruption. Such 
data corruption occurs more easily in the space environment due to the electronic 
vulnerability to heavy ion cosmic rays. These energetic particles can ionise silicon material 
thereby altering the data structure of the memory devices. The effect may simply be a bit hit 
in which one bit of data is switched to the alternative value. However, this particular event 
has been significantly reduced in recent years through Electrically-Alterable Read-Only 
Memory (EAROM) that is toughened against such events (CAA, 2003). In addition, the satellite 
performs a number of resets to ensure that such events do not persist for more than a few 
seconds. In fact in the recent Block ll-R satellites this functionality differs in the sense that 
resets are managed by a monitor to avoid the unnecessary periodic resets in earlier models. 
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Block ll-R satellites have a number of additional checking mechanisms and functionalities 
designed into the Total Navigation Payload (TNP) (Barker and Huser, 1998). 
4.2.2 SBAS 
The ICAO has identified three ways of monitoring the integrity of GNSS systems; GBAS, ABAS 
(or RAIM) or SBAS (ICAO, 2006). The SBAS integrity concept was standardised through the 
meeting of the ICAO GNSS Panel (GNSSP) in June 2000. Thus, although the system 
architectures and internal processing algorithms of EGNOS and WAAS may vary, the user 
processing algorithms and types of disseminated information are the same. The SBAS 
integrity service should protect users from failures of GPS and the GEO signals. Errors within 
the differential corrections provided by SBAS must also be protected against. 
As defined in §2.5.1.2.2, integrity is lost when the navigation system error exceeds the alert 
limit, either in the horizontal or vertical domain without a timely warning to the user being 
issued. This situation is known as Hazardous Misleading Information (HMI). The user is of 
course unable to compute the navigation system error and hence, the SBAS must provide 
alternative parameters to the user to enable them to determine if the integrity requirements 
are met. These parameters are computed at the Central Processing Facility (CPF) using the 
received measurements at the monitoring stations. The final stage of the integrity algorithm 
is processed within the receiver using the local geometrical factors. The parameters provided 
by the SBAS may be used to compute the metrics; Horizontal Protection level (HPL) and 
Vertical Protection level (VPL) which are then compared to the Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) 
and Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) respectively to determine compliance. The PL (HPL or VPL) may 
be interpreted as the maximum allowable error which may occur within the integrity risk 
defined in the system. 
In order for the user to compute their protection levels, the ICAO SBAS concept requires the 
elaboration of two parameters. The ground segment must provide estimates of User 
Differential Range Error (UDRE) standard deviation which essentially is a measure of the 
differential range quality without atmospheric or receiver errors. It is also required to provide 
the User Ionospheric Range Error (UIRE) standard deviation which models the LI 
measurement quality following the ionospheric differential corrections provided in the SBAS 
message. Both EGNOS and WAAS use a method based on the broadcast Grid Ionospheric 
Vertical Error (GIVE) (Leitinger et al, 1999). Other potential errors which may affect user 
integrity in nominal conditions are included at the receiver processing step. These are the 
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multipath element due to the aircraft and receiver whose variances, given in (ICAO, 2006), 
sum to al, and the residual error v a r i a n c e o f the tropospheric correction model applied 
within the receiver. All of these errors are assumed to be independent zero mean normal 
distributions such that the total residual pseudorange error may characterised by a zero mean 
normal distribution of variance computed as: 
o f " ®i,UIRE '^l.tropo ( 4 . 1 ) 
where aj,,, is a complex function of 0^ ^^ ^ (ICAO, 2006). 
The relationship between the total residual error variance defined in equation 4.1 and the 
XPLs may be derived by transforming from the measurement domain to the position domain 
using and applying a scale factor to equate to the integrity requirement. The transformation 
to the vertical position domain is performed as follows: 
(4.2) 
1=1 
where A„is defined in equation 3.58 (RTCA, 2006) and expresses the impact of an error in 
the range measurement on a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) position solution. The horizontal 
position variance is defined similarly. In order to use the parameters received to derive the 
corresponding VPL which protects the user sufficiently, it must be scaled to the relevant 
performance requirement of the operation being performed, which are provided in (ICAO, 
2006). 
(4.3) 
In order to compute the k factor for the operation, the integrity risk (IR,^) must be 
transformed to a per sample format to enable interpretation at the instantaneous epoch at 
which the VPL is required. Assuming a fixed number of independent samples (n^ ) per time 
period allows the algorithm to compute an integrity risk per sample ( ) . 
IR»amp=IRr.q /rilnd (4-4) 
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There have been a number of suggestions for the value of n,^j. The ICAO method assumes 360 
seconds which is based on the ionosphere decorrelation time. In the case of the vertical 
position error the k factor can be computed using the inverse cdf of the normal distribution to 
give the multiple of standard deviations which equates to as shown in Figure 4.3. 
k„ =Normalcdf"^(lR„ (4.5) 
P(Missed Detection) 
/ 
Figure 4.3 Evaluation of k 
In addition to the parameters which enable the computation of HPL and VPL, the SBAS 
algorithms may also distribute "do not use" flags within the message to advise users to 
exclude satellites from their positioning solution. 
4.2.3 GBAS 
The U.S implementation of GBAS, the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) was introduced 
in §2.3.3.3 and §3.2.3. It comprises of a LAAS Ground Facility (LGF) connected to four LAAS 
GPS reference receivers (FAA, 2007). This determines errors in the GPS provided position and 
a VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) unit then sends the corrections and integrity information to 
aircraft on a approach and landing. 
The GBAS provision for computation of protection levels by users is similar to that of SBAS. 
The LGF determines the variance of the residual ionospheric errors pseudorange 
corrections and the residual tropospheric component An equivalent total 
residual error variance follows as with equation 4.1; 
i^,pr_gnd ®I,UIRE '^ l.alr '^ l.tropo (4.6) 
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The major difference then lies in the separation of errors into vertical and lateral directions. 
This is because the GBAS technology is intended for approach and landing operations which 
are defined in terms of a glide slope and as "ILS look-alike" procedures. The two components 
of horizontal deviations are split into across-track, known as lateral and along track which is 
incorporated into the vertical error. 
+ AwL.«^,xtan(glidepath angle) (4.7) 
(4-8) 
Under the normal measurement error assumption and scaling of error probabilities by the 
factor k„ as in the case of SB AS, the protection levels are as follows (ICAO, 2006): 
xcf (4.9) 
(4.10) 
However, the above formulation is only valid for the fault-free case (Ho). In order to account 
for potential latent failures in the mechanisms which generate the pseudo-range corrections, 
protection levels for the faulty measurement condition are also computed. 
VPLh - max 
- max 
^Ivert.glidepath W 
N 
1=1 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
where B,, are the broadcast differences between differential corrections obtained using all 
reference receivers and those obtained excluding the reference. The total residual error 
variance is also corrected slightly as the number of measurements used in deriving the 
pseudorange corrections differs from the fault-free case. 
4.2.4 Galileo integrity Concept (GiC) 
The performance requirements specified for the Galileo Safety-of-Life (SoL) service have been 
designed to be an order of magnitude more demanding in terms of availability than the 
current SBAS (Oehler et al, 2004) as shown in Table 4.1. 
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Requirement Galileo EGNOS 
Integrity Risk 2x10"' in every 150s 2x10"' in every 150s 
Continuity Risk 8x10 ^ in every 15s 8x10"^ in every 150s 
Availability 99.5% 99% 
Time to Alert 5.2s 6s 
HAL/VAL 12m / 20m 20m / 20m 
Table 4.1 Safety of Life Performance Requirements 
Integrity determination for Galileo will be achieved through the Galileo Sensor Stations (GSS) 
by determining the actual position of the Galileo SVs. The maximum range error (Signal-ln-
Space-Error, SISE) may then be estimated. It is assumed that the SISE distribution may also be 
predicted and over-bounded by an unbiased Gaussian distribution with a minimum standard 
deviation Signal-ln-Space Accuracy (SISA). Furthermore, the distribution of the SISE estimates 
is also then assumed to be an unbiased Gaussian with a standard deviation called the Signal-
ln-Space Monitoring Accuracy (SISMA) (Falcone et at, 2005). These relations are shown in 
Figure 4.4. 
The SISA is essentially a measurement quality metric equivalent to the GPS LIRA and will be 
broadcast by the SVs to enable the usual navigation function. However, the SISMA is a 
measure of the monitoring quality and thus relates to integrity. The integrity functionality 
shall provide the SISMA and an integrity flag in the event an SV's signal should not be used. 
The integrity flag element of the GIC is determined by comparing the estimate of SISE to a 
threshold which is determined from the Worst User Location (WUL) geometry and 
performance requirements in terms of a false alert rate (Feng and Ochieng, 2006d). 
Naturally, the better the distribution and design of the GSS networic the better the estimation 
of the SV clock and ephemeris and thus estimates of the SISE will be smaller. The design goal 
for a fully functional Galileo ground segment is a SISMA of 0.7m and 1.3m in the case of a 
single GSS outage. 
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SISE - predicted SISE 
Figure 4.4 Illustration of SISA and SISMA (Oehler et al, 2004) 
0 
SISE - estimated SISE 
The user integrity function within Galileo differs from the protection level based method of 
ICAO's SBAS concept. Instead users will compute the integrity risk at the alert limits under the 
following assumptions: 
• The fault-free mode is characterised by SISED N(0, SISA) 
" Normal operation implies that faulty satellites will be flagged as "Do Not Use" 
• For a single fault (i.e. "Do Not Use" flag is not issued for a faulty satellite but a latent 
failure exists) then SISE ~ N(SISE estimate, SISMA) 
• SISE estimate is unknown to the user so must be pessimistically estimated by the 
threshold T, = Kp .^^ SISAf+ SISMAf where Kp__ relates to the false alert probability 
derived from the continuity requirements 
The result is notationally complex and is available in (Oehler et al, 2004). The fault free mode 
is simply derived as an error function (or x^-cdf for the horizontal term) on the basis of the 
above assumption. Similarly shifted error functions (or non-central x^-cdfs) are used in the 
case of a failure with position biases set as the projected threshold defined above. 
4.3 Sensor Level Integrity Monitoring 
The integrity algorithms defined in §4.2 provide warnings and integrity metrics to the user to 
enable safe navigation. However, it may be the case that an external monitoring service is 
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unavailable either in a region without SBAS coverage or through an SBAS outage. In this case, 
an autonomous system is needed which can provide integrity on-board the aircraft. 
Furthermore, highly localised errors or other latent errors in the system can feasibly impact 
performance at the user receiver which are not captured in the external monitoring network. 
These two potential scenarios highlight the need for RAIM (or AAIM). Throughout the 
remaining sections of this thesis the term RAIM shall be used to represent all such sensor 
level measurement checking. 
RAIM operates by using redundancy in the measurements observed to perform a statistical 
test based consistency check for the presence of failures. It must ensure within a given 
probability that gross errors which would impact on the position solution sufficiently to cause 
HMI are not present. When a failure is detected, attempts can be made to identify and 
exclude the failed measurement and operate with the remaining signals. This process is 
known as Failure Detection and Exclusion (FDE) or just Failure Detection (FD) in the absence 
of an exclusion capability. In addition to the FDE function, RAIM also includes an internal 
computation of the detection power of the statistical test which performs the consistency 
check. This is known as geometry screening (Chin et al, 1993) or integrity prediction (Ober, 
2003) when no actual measurements are used in the process and generates a protection level 
to be compared to the alert limit as with the SBAS or GBAS concepts. Therefore, this process 
depends on the intended flight operation. The baseline FD RAIM structure is shown in Figure 
4.5 (Ober, 2003). 
Insufficient IntuRdlv 
Measurements 
Geometry 
Error Models 
XPL < XAL Nominal Opernt ion 
Test Statistic > T 
XPL>XAL 
Test Statistic < T 
Failure Detected 
Position Solution 
Estimate Errors 
Compute XPL 
Figure 4.5 Basic FD RAIM Integrity Monitoring Algorithm 
As RAIM inherently involves a consistency check, a total of five measurements must be 
present in order for the algorithm to be available. Further factors which determine RAIM 
performance are: 
• Number of redundant measurements 
• Geometry of the available satellites 
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• Required probability of missed detection (relating to integrity risl<) 
• Required false alert rate (relating to continuity risl<j 
• Magnitude of an acceptable error (alert limit) 
• Error models assumed 
• The quality of measurements used (Ochieng et al, 2002; Young and McGraw, 2003) 
The effects of these factors are discussed in the relevant sections describing specific 
algorithms below. 
RAIM algorithms may be classified into two groups, reflecting the two positioning methods 
described in §3.3.3.1 and §3.3.3.2. These are, snapshot, involving only measurements 
received at the current epoch and sequential using both current and historical 
measurements. This thesis is concerned primarily with snapshot methods which are the 
baseline RAIM technique for NPA and APV aviation operations (ICAO, 2006; RTCA, 2004). The 
two approaches are described in §4.3.1 and §4.3.2, focusing on the FDE element. In §4.3.3 a 
treatment of integrity prediction is provided and further motivation is discussed as to the 
necessity of this function and the structure of the RAIM algorithm. Improved integrity 
prediction algorithms are at the crux of the research presented in this thesis. Finally §4.3.4 
looks at various alternative approaches to RAIM which don't fit in the scope of the other 
subsections. These include the use of differential measurements, carrier-phase 
measurements and clock-coasting. 
4.3.1 Snapshot RAIM 
In this section a review is made of the baseline snapshot FD RAIM method (ICAO, 2006; Brown 
and Chin, 1997) as well as other more contemporary specialised snapshot methods. The 
baseline approach may be seen as a number of algorithms which are essentially equivalent in 
analytical terms (Brown, 1992; Kelly, 2001; Young and McGraw, 2003) and only differ slightly 
in the choice of test statistic, threshold determination and interpretation. These techniques 
include the range and position comparison by Lee (1986), the parity space and rotated parity 
space methods of Sturza (1988) and Brenner (1990), the least squares residuals method by 
Parkinson and Axelrad (1988) and solution separation method of Brenner (1995). A 
formulation of the baseline FD RAIM is given in §4.3.1.1 with the most relevant methods and 
their differences identified. 
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The exclusion mechanisms of FDE RAIM are less well understood. The two most popular 
approaches of Van Grass (1993) and Brown and Sturza (1990) were shown to be equivalent in 
(Brown et al, 1994). A description of nuances of these exclusion functions is given in §4.3.1.2, 
though many of the complexities associated with exclusion are a concern of the requirements 
specification and their relation to the integrity prediction process depicted in §4.3.3. 
The final subsection on snapshot algorithms covers the class of Bayesian integrity monitoring 
techniques (Blanch et al, 2008; Pervan, 1998). It should be noted that these methods do not 
preclude the use of the Least Squares (LS) or Weighted Least Squares (WLS) positioning 
solution and as such fall outside the standardised RAIM approach specified by ICAO (2006). 
Although, benefits may be observed in terms of the integrity level provided, the function of 
integrity prediction is more complex (Ober, 2003). 
4.3.1.1 RAIM Detection Function 
The following subsections begin by a generic formulation of the statistical test which checks 
for the presence of errors. The test statistic and distribution of the (weighted) least squares 
residuals, parity space method and solution separation method are then described. Following 
this a discussion of the threshold computation is given and statements of the statistical tests 
are finalised. 
4.3.1.1.1 Formulation of the Statistical Test 
Recall from equation 3.43 that the relation between the GPS measurements z and the user 
position X may be sufficiently well described by an over-determined linear model: 
z= Hx + e (4.13) 
In §3.3.3.1.2 the variance of the measurement error vector e was given as yet the mean of 
this random vector was assumed to be zero in the absence of a failure. Allowing now the 
possibility of a failure-induced bias, let the mean error vector be denoted by n^such that 
e~N(n^,Z^). Under the assumption that no multiple failures may occur simultaneously, the 
system may be in one of two states; the fault free state or the single fault case. The fault free 
case may be characterised by a zero mean error vector whereas the single failure 
condition may be expressed by some nonzero bias B, on the failing satellite i, 
=(0...0,B.,0... O). 
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To determine whicli current state the system currently lies; a statistical test may be executed. 
The choice is between two hypotheses: 
Null Hypothesis Hq: p ^ = 0 (4.14) 
Alternative Hypothesis H^ |i^ = (0...0,B|,0... o) (4.15) 
A statistical test requires three elements; a test statistic, the corresponding statistical model 
and a detection threshold. The test statistic is an observed quantity which may be computed 
from the received measurements which should represent the unknown failure or resultant 
position error as best as possible. The quantity chosen will be stochastic and have a 
corresponding distribution. The statistical model which may be used to represent this 
distribution will likely follow from the linear model and Gaussian error assumption. However, 
as will be seen below, computation of the necessary cumulative probability density required 
to set the threshold may not be straightforward. Therefore, a test statistic which is easily 
evaluated is preferable. Typically the threshold is chosen on the basis of satisfying a given 
probability of false alert i.e. warning the user a failure has occurred when no position error is 
present. However, it is also feasible to set the threshold on the basis of probability of missed 
detection or a more flexible optimised value (Feng et al, 2006). 
4.3.1.1.2 Least Squares Residuals Method 
The well-known LS residual test statistic was proposed by Parkinson and Axelrad (1988) using 
the condition in equation 3.44: 
SSE = r^r (or SSE = ) (4.16) 
n - 4 
The residuals may be determined from the measurements via the following equation: 
r = z-Hx^ =(^l-H(H^H)'^H^jz=Sz (4.17) 
which defines the idempotent matrix S (Lo etal, 2007). 
When unequal error variances are assumed and a WLS position solution is employed, the test 
statistic formed by the SSE is generalised to (Walter and Enge, 1995): 
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T / w r , 
SSE = r wr (or SSE = ) (4.18) 
n - 4 
where n is the number of satellite measurements used in the solution. The bracketed 
expression is equivalent and as expressed by equation 3.60 represents the variance of unit 
weight. It is well known that the SSE follows a non-central chi-squared distribution with n-4 
degrees of freedom (Leva, 1996). 
SSE-^;^^, (4.19) 
where the non-centrality parameter is expressed as the function of the bias 
defined in equation 4.15. This satisfies the condition of being easily evaluated. Alternatively, 
the individual residual vector components may be statistically tested but such differences are 
small (Kelly, 2001). Computation of a viable threshold is given in §4.3.1.1.5. 
4.3.1.1.3 Parity Space Method 
The parity space method is derived from a transformation of the measurement vector into 
the parity domain, a space of dimension n-4. The resulting parity vector possesses the same 
error information and is of the same magnitude as the residuals vector r. To elucidate this 
statement consider the following linear transformation of the measurement vector: 
X L S 
z = Mz (4.20) 
. P . 
P 
The upper partition clearly refers to the least squares position estimate (3.45) and is of rank 4. 
The lower partition which yields the parity vector p is the result of applying the matrix 
operator P of size (n-4) x n. As the least squares operator is of rank 4, it is always possible to 
find a matrix P which spans the null space of H and is therefore of rank n-4 (Sturza, 1988). The 
matrix M is of full rank n. Furthermore, it is also possible to restrict P to be orthogonal with 
rows of unit length (Brown, 1992) which form a basis of the parity domain. The following 
properties of P and p may then be derived: 
1. if n = 0 then E[p] = 0 
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2. if Jig 0 then E[p] = PHg i.e. the columns of P define the lines of failure biases 
Cov[p] = Zp =OuERE'n-4 equatlop 3.48 holds 
3. p p = r r 
4. PH = 0 if equation 3.48 holds i.e. p and x are uncorrelated 
5. P^P = S where S is defined in 4.17 
The minor difference between the parity method of Sturza (1988) and Brenner (1988) is that 
Brenner rotates the parity domain such that a basis vector lies in the same direction as one of 
the satellite bias lines (property 2). 
At this point it is worth noting in the case that the measurement error variances are non-
uniform i.e. Zg is not a multiple of the identity, the parity vector may be derived from the 
normalised linear equation 4.9 to obtain Zp =1 .^4 when the optimal weights are defined as 
follows (Hwang and Brown, 2006); 
w^w = W=Zg^ (4.21) 
Given that property 4 is true, the squared magnitude of the parity vector is also known to 
follow a chi-squared distribution: 
4.3.1.1.4 Solution Separation Method 
The previous two subsections have analysed the two common measurement (parity) domain 
methods in use. However, it is also possible to derive a test statistic in the position domain 
through the solution separation method. The difference in position solution found by 
removing one satellite from the all-in-view solution is used to compute the test statistic as 
follows: 
8 , = ( x , - x L ) % ( x , - x L ) (4.23) 
It is shown in Young and McGraw, (2003) that this test statistic is equivalent to the maximum 
residual or maximum parity component which are discussed in §4.3.1.1.5. This method has 
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been employed in various altered forms, notably for use in multi-constellation RAIM designs 
(Lee and Braff, 2006) and incorporating inertial measurements (Brenner, 1991; Young and 
iVIcGraw, 2003; Hwang and Brown, 2007). 
4.3.1.1.5 Detection Power, Type I and Type II Errors 
From the point of view of the user, the detection function has two possible output states; no 
alert (Ho true) and alert (Ho false). However, it is possible that the outcome is flawed. From 
the point of view of the system, the following conditions may arise: 
Correct Acceptance 
The null hypothesis is accepted when it is true. 
Correct Rejection 
The null hypothesis is rejected when it is false. 
Type I Error 
A type I error is the incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis when it is true (Figure 4.6). The 
probability of a type I error (a) is known as the probability of false alert. In terms of the 
navigation function a false alert may be defined as the indication of a failure to the user when 
a positioning failure has not occurred. 
Type II Error 
A type II error is the acceptance of the null hypothesis when it is false (Figure 4.6). The 
probability of a Type II error is known as the probability of missed detection (P). A missed 
detection occurs when a positioning failure is present without a user being notified, also 
known as hazardous misleading information. The detection power of a statistical test is the 
probability that it does not make a type II error (1- P). In certified navigation systems, the 
integrity risk indicates the required detection power after transformation to a per sample 
probability basis (c.f. §4.3.3). 
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Figure 4.6 Statistical Test Error Types 
4.3.1.1.6 Test Statistic Choice and Threshold Selection 
The threshold for detection is usually set in order to match the type I error rate a to a given 
operational requirement. For the baseline WIS methods described above, the test statistic 
derived is known to follow a chi-square distribution. In this case, the detection threshold (T) 
may be derived from the inverse of the distribution function: 
= ( z L . ) (4.24) 
An alternative test statistic may be formed as a function of the least squares residuals, the 
maximum residual approach ||r||^  which is the largest of the absolute values of all the elements 
in the residual vector (Ober, 1997). It was shown in Kelly (2001) that this is a slightly more 
powerful test than the chi-square approach but requires more complexity in computing the 
threshold and minimal detectable bias (c.f. §4.3.3). In the case of a weighted system, the 
maximum normalised residual is used ||wr)|^  (Young and McGraw, 2003). The results of Kelly 
(2001) confirm that there exists little scope for further advances in the detection of all failures 
in a RAIIVl algorithm using the optimal WLS estimator. Specific monitors for ramp errors 
(Bhatti, 2007) or biases of limited size (Ene, 2007) could provide a better (and hence earlier) 
detection of errors. However, for applications of snapshot RAIIVl, all failures must be 
accounted for in an autonomous manner. 
4.3.1.2 RAIM Exclusion Function 
§4.3.2.1 detailed the baseline least squares residuals approach to fault detection. Once a 
failure occurs and is detected, it is beneficial to the user if the navigation function may 
continue without loss of integrity. This may be achieved either through determining that the 
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impact of tine failure is not sufficient to cause a position failure, mitigating the impact of the 
failed measurement by down-weighting or by excluding the measurement entirely from the 
solution. The first method is the basis of the Horizontal Uncertainty Limit (HUL) which is 
discussed in §4.3.3 on integrity prediction. The second technique is essentially the application 
of robust estimation techniques which as noted in Chapter Three is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The major downfall of these methods is the generated complexity in showing 
compliance with the requirements (Ober, 1999). The final technique, excluding a failed 
satellite measurement is covered in this subsection. 
Failure exclusion mechanisms may attempt to isolate or identify the failure measurement 
(Brenner, 1990) known as Failure Detection and Isolation (FDI) or more generally may allow a 
subset of the measurements to be excluded (Van Grass and Farrell, 1993), known as Failure 
Detection and Exclusion (FDE). These two schemes are formulated below. 
4.3.1.2.1 Failure Detection and Exclusion (FDE) 
Traditionally, due to limitations in the number of channels in a GPS or combined 
GPS/GLONASS receiver, users were only able to compute their position using a limited 
number of measurements and likewise the RAIM functions only had access to these 
measurements. Modern aviation receivers are able to track using the all-in-view principle 
(Grewal et al, 2002) which impacts on the design of the baseline FDE method. The historical 
FDE baseline algorithm is as follows (Van Grass and Farrell, 1993; Van Grass, 1996): 
• The best set of six satellites is chosen on the basis of the smallest protection level 
(c.f. §4.3.3) 
• Detection occurs when the maximum residual or Sum-Squared residual Error (SSE) 
exceeds the threshold 
• If detection occurs, the algorithm searches for another set of six satellites that will 
satisfy the no detection criterion 
' This search is made in ascending order of the protection radii of the available subsets 
• When a satisfactory subset is found, this is used subsequently for both navigation 
and RAIM until another detection occurs 
It is suggested that an updated all-in-view version of this method is used today (Ober, 2006; 
Van Dyke, 2002; O'Keefe, 2002; WG62, 2003; Lee, 2004). This FDE algorithm is as follows: 
• The positioning solution is derived from n satellites-in-view 
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• Detection occurs when the maximum residual or SSE exceeds the threshold 
• If detection occurs, the algorithm searches for a subset of n-1 satellites that will 
satisfy the no detection criterion 
• If a single fault has occurred, it is likely that the only subset satisfying the condition 
will not contain the failed measurement (solution separation concept) 
• In the event that multiple subsets meet the condition, the subset with the lowest 
test statistic is chosen to minimise the probability of an incorrect exclusion (Ober, 
2003) 
• If no subset satisfies the condition, the algorithm extends to subsets of n-2 satellites 
and so on 
This method has been most widely used in RAIM availability studies (Ochieng, 2001; Van 
Dyke, 2002) but as will be shown below is essentially equivalent to the FDI method described 
below. 
4.3.1.2.2 Failure Detection and Isolation (FDI) 
The FDI method is based on the parity domain approach described in §4.3.1.1.3 but may also 
be derived from the normalised least squares residuals vector as shown in Kelly (2001). Due 
to the property of the parity matrix that its columns represent failures on a corresponding 
satellite, these columns may be depicted in the parity domain by lines known as characteristic 
bias lines as shown in Figure 4.7. If the parity vector exceeds the threshold (i.e. lies outside 
the green-shaded region), the identification of the failed measurement is performed by taking 
the dot product of the parity vector with unit vectors in the direction of the characteristic bias 
lines. 
(4.25) 
The satellite which corresponds to the largest projection of the parity vector p^^^. is 
excluded. 
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Figure 4.7 Parity Domain Projections 
4.3.1.2.3 Comparison of FDE and FDI 
Brown (1994) showed that FDE and FDI are equivalent if the same threshold is used for 
detection in each. This comparison was made for the case of six satellites in view, it is noted 
here that the test-statistics are essentially equivalent. This may be understood by analysing 
the effect of excluding a satellite from the parity domain solution. This has the effect of 
projecting the parity domain in the direction of the excluded satellite. In which case, the 
resulting parity vector is represented by its perpendicular component (shown in blue in Figure 
4.7). The smallest subset test statistic is therefore equivalent to the largest dot product 
derived in equation 4.25. Young and McGraw (2003) show this relationship in deriving 
equivalence of the solution separation method to the parity domain method. 
At present, studies on the exclusion function have primarily focused on the performance of 
the remaining subset (FDE RAIM Availability) and specifically for single failures. The scope 
exists for an in-depth study of the integrity risk posed by excluding the wrong satellite as is 
discussed in further detail in §5.4.2.1.3. 
4.3.1.3 The Bayesian Method 
The statistical testing procedures described in §4.3.1.1.1 are based on determining whether 
the null or alternative hypotheses are true. An alternative method is to estimate the a 
posteriori probabilities of a positioning failure in all states and their sum. This is known as a 
multiple hypothesis approach (Pervan, 1998) and is derived from Bayesian probability theory. 
Given the measurements, the a posteriori pdf of the unknown position may be obtained as a 
mixture of the a posteriori pdfs of the unknown position under hypotheses H, as shown in 
Figure 4.8. 
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(4.26) 
It is shown in (Ober, 2003) and (Pervan, 1998) that pdf^^ are normally distributed about the 
least squares estimator Xj with measurement / removed and propagated error covariance . 
Furthermore, the probability that the system lies in one state is as follows (Ober, 2003): 
PuC, 
Ph,|. = ^ ^ (4.27) 
where are the a priori state probabilities and c, =e ^^^'|^(2n)"'^det(zj)j ^ j^det(l^ ) j j ' . 
The subscript / signifies that the variable is computed with the i-th measurement removed 
from the solution. For a given position estimate x the total probability of positioning failure 
Ppf may then be computed by integration over the required region, defined by the alert limit 
in aviation. 
N x+AL 
j N ( x „ Z J d x (4.28) 
1=0 X-AL 
Equation 4.28 is simple to evaluate and represents a pure estimate of the integrity risk. 
Theoretically, this could be compared to the required risk and an integrity flag (alert) raised if 
exceeded. Although the Bayesian multiple hypothesis approach allows an exact and simple 
calculation of the integrity risk, a prediction of expected compliance with the requirements in 
nominal conditions is computationally intangible. One technique has been developed but this 
relies on maximum theoretical bias being assumed whilst operating in an augmented system 
environment (Blanch et al, 2008). 
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4.3.2 Sequential RAIM 
Sequential RAIM approaches may either be based on the state space of a Kalman filter 
(Brenner, 1995; Diesel and Luu, 1995) shown in §4.3.2.1 or a regression type model 
(Nikiforov, 2002) shown in §4.3.2.2. As these methods use historical measurements, 
theoretically they should be better at detecting ramp errors. 
4.3.2.1 State Space Sequential RAIM 
The Kalman filter approaches to RAIM have primarily been developed for integrated 
GPS/lnertial systems, commonly a tightly coupled of loosely coupled combination. The tightly 
coupled approach described below uses air data and the Inertial Navigation Sensor (INS) 
outputs of position velocity and attitude to be coupled with the pseudoranges obtained 
within the GPS receiver as shown in Figure 4.9. In the loosely coupled method the two 
systems are combined at the position solution level (Grewal et al, 2001) in order to provide 
errors as inputs to the state estimates. The availability of this method relies heavily on the 
GPS solution whereas in the tightly coupled system, a solution may be maintained with less 
than four measurements. However, this system is susceptible to errors in the INS (Gautier, 
2003) or slowly growing errors in the GPS measurements (Bhatti, 2007). Deep coupling is also 
possible which integrates the measurements within the receiver tracking loop. This optimises 
the oscillator control by combining the inertial measurements with the in-phase and quadra-
phase signals. 
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The two core approaches of a tightly-coupled system use a solution separation technique 
(Brenner, 1995) or the Kalman filter innovation (Diesel and King, 1995). In the solution 
separation approach a bank of n sub-filters are implemented which generate a solution 
without the /-th measurement (the MCS uses a similar yet larger scaled approach to compute 
the satellite ephemeris and clock data). These sub-filters are then compared to the full-filter 
solution which is used to correct the INS. The difference between the full and subset solutions 
is assumed to be Gaussian and the threshold for detection is derived from its inverse and a 
chosen permissible false alert rate (Brenner, 1995; Young and McGraw, 2003). 
The innovation of the Kalman filter is the vector which the Kalman gain matrix is applied to in 
order to update the predicted state vector (3.64). 
(4.29) 
It is related to the residual vector in the least squares treatment as it also expresses the 
difference between the observed measurements and the expected measurements, except 
that the expected measurements are derived from the dynamic model and not fi'om the least 
squares solution. It is thus processed in the same manner as the residual vector to derive a 
test statistic. The major difference is that the innovation covariance is defined as a function of 
two covariance matrices from two different sources of errors whereas in the least squares 
formulation, the GPS ranges measurements are the only source of error. Further details on 
the mathematical formulation may be found in Diesel and Dunn (1996). Although the 
integrated INS/GPS system is found to result in reduced noise in the position estimate issues 
remain over the certification of the filtered approach. The potential for assimilating a failure 
within the solution exists which could remain undetected to the user. 
4.3.2.2 Regression Model Sequential RAIM 
Instead of testing the least squares residuals of the current set of measurements; regression 
model based sequential methods accumulate the residuals and detect changes in the mean 
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solution (Basseville and Nikiforov, 1993). The suggested improvement in performance over 
snapshot methods of these techniques relies on the fact that the measurement residuals are 
linear functions of the measurement errors which are strongly autocorrelated (Nikiforov, 
2002). This autocorrelation cannot be used to improve the accuracy of a dynamic platform. 
However, it provides an extra condition on the behaviour of the noise and residuals. The two 
canonical examples of these methods are the cumulative SUM (CUSUM) (Basseville and 
Nikiforov, 1993) and the Generalised Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) which are based on the log-
likelihood ratio of the probability densities of the residuals (random variables) r as a function 
of a parameter 9 (which may be interpreted as a bias) which reflects the state of the system 
before and after a failure occurs (Pg (r) & p (r)): 
s(r) = l n - ^ ^ (4.30) 
P.(r) 
The expectation of this value is positive in the event of a failure and negative otherwise. In 
order to capture the cumulative effects of a failure, a moving window sum of this function 
may be defined between epochs j and k as: 
S ; = X s , (4.31) 
1=1 
In the CUSUM approach it is noted that before a failure, this statistic will decrease continually 
and as such it is more natural to define the test statistic for detection of a failure by the 
difference between this sum and its historical minimum. 
g, = S , - m , (4.32) 
=min S (4.33) 
An alert is raised whenever the CUSUM function g^  exceeds a threshold. The form of g„ may 
be derived from the consideration of the density function of the residual or parity vector, 
though in order to derive the post failure probability a tuning parameter is needed to express 
the unknown bias (Nikiforov, 2002). The GLR is derived in a similar manner but with the 
additional property of maximising over the unknown bias from a minimum value, essentially 
allowing a 'generalised' detection of all biases greater than this minimum. 
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These complex sequential algorithms enable a more efficient detection capability. However, 
the provision for computing protection levels either relies heavily on approximations (Younes 
et al, 1998) or is ignored (Clot et al, 2006) 
4.3.3 Integrity Prediction and Integrity Estimation 
In §4.3.1 and §4.3.2 the main threads of RAIM algorithm research were described in relation 
to the core elements of integrity monitoring, the detection and exclusion functions. However, 
in order to ensure compliance with aviation integrity requirements, the algorithm must also 
include a function which checks the conditions exist to perform detection with sufficient 
power or to exclude the correct satellite with sufficient confidence (ICAO, 2006; RTCA, 2006). 
As noted in §4.3.1, this process is also known as geometry screening and as RAIM is deemed 
unavailable in the event the conditions are not met it may also be called the RAIM availability 
check. In this thesis, the term integrity prediction is used. 
Theoretically, the integrity level provided may also be determined by incorporating the 
measurements as seen in the Bayesian method (§4.3.1.3) or into a protection level calculation 
(Young eto/, 1996) as is discussed below in §4.3.3.1. This may be called integrity estimation or 
just integrity monitoring (Ober, 2003). 
In reality, it is crucial to be able to predict the integrity which will be provided in advance, to 
aid the continuity of function, operational availability and allow system availability studies to 
be made. For this reason, the majority of methods have been developed which use only the 
theoretical models and satellite-to-user geometry to determine protection levels and hence 
place a bound on the integrity risk (Chin et al, 1993; Lee, 1995). Provided that the protection 
levels are computed without actual measurement data, the integrity prediction may be 
performed within the receiver, but may also be computed offline e.g. through the internet 
(Eurocontol, 2009; AIRAC, 2009). This process also relies crucially on the performance 
requirements defined in Chapter Two and how they are implemented at an algorithmic level. 
This process is discussed in §4.3.3.1. The standard protection levels employed are then 
described in §4.3.3.2. 
Considering the operational pressures described above, the scene is now set to present the 
complete FDE RAIIVI algorithm structure beyond the simple form of Figure 4.5. Figure 4.10 
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shows this structure; the variables XPL, XUL, XEL are defined in §4.3.3.2. The four stages of 
the RAIM algorithm numbered in Figure 4.10 are as follows: 
1. Establish whether the conditions exist to perform failure detection with sufficient 
power or confidence 
2. If so, using the measurements check for the presence of a failure 
3. If a failure exists, determine whether its impact is such that integrity is compromised 
for the operation 
4. If a failure has occurred, exclude the satellite(s) most likely to have failed and repeat 
using the remaining subset of measurements 
As noted in §4.3.1.1.6, the potential benefit from improving the detection function (2) of 
snapshot RAIiVI is limited. In recent years, it has been noted that the integrity prediction step 
(1) has the greatest potential for improvement (Hwang and Brown, 2006). As a result two new 
methods were introduced to improve the availability of the integrity function by additional 
sub-optimal weighting of the position estimate; the recent Novel Integrity Optimised Receiver 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring - NIORAIM (Hwang and Brown, 2007) and the Optimally 
Weighted Average Solution - OWAS (Lee, 2006). These techniques are discussed in §4.3.3.3. 
Furthermore, potential gains in RAIM availability may also be achievable through a better 
determination of the risk posed by wrong exclusion (4). 
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Figure 4.10 RAIM Algorithm Processes 
4.3.3.1 Algorithmic Requirements 
In preparation for the derivation of protection levels it is crucial to define the link between 
the navigation performance requirements defined for aircraft operation and the parameters 
used within the receiver algorithms designed to meet these requirements. The two 
parameters of relevance are the integrity and continuity risks and their relationships to the 
threshold set and protection level generated. 
Based on a false alert rate of 10"^  per hour given the RTCA Special Committee 159 (RTCA SC-
150) derived a false alert probability per sample of 3.33xl0"^for en-route to terminal 
operations in (FAA, 1988; FAA, 1994; RTCA, 2006). Performance correlation in the temporal 
domain due to correlation of the measurement error noise has the effect of limiting the 
number of independent samples over any given hour. RTCA SC-159 selected a correlation 
time constant of 2 minutes to reflect the temporal correlation of SA. It should be noted, 
however, that the current continuity risk requirement is specified in the range 10'" to 10"®. 
Furthermore, in the post-SA era, the temporal correlation properties of GPS are likely to have 
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changed. In this case, it is perhaps necessary that the RTCA and EUROCAE reassess the false 
alert rate per sample used to set the detection threshold through an analysis of the 
correlation times of the remaining major error sources. 
Recall that a loss of integrity occurs when a positioning failure is present without the user 
being warned within the Time-To-Alert. As with the continuity risk requirement expressed 
above, the integrity risk theoretically could be scaled for the time correlation constant. 
However, in the derivation of receiver requirements by the RTCA the conservative assumption 
is made to equate the integrity risk per hour to the integrity risk per sample (RTCA, 2006). 
(4.35) 
Recall from Chapter Two that a loss of integrity occurs when the position error exceeds the 
alert limit without the user being notified (within the TTA). This leads to the following 
important definitions: 
Positioning Failure 
A state in which the position solution error, the difference between the true position and 
estimated position, exceeds the applicable HALorVAL 
Missed Detection 
A state in which a positioning failure has occurred but is not detected by the FDE algorithm. 
Recall from the introduction (§4.1) that integrity risk is the product of a failure occurring, 
defined by the GPS SPS Performance Standard (PS) in the range domain and the probability 
the monitoring function fails to detect the failure. RTCA SC-159 used this principle to derive 
the required probability of missed detection PMD for the RAIM algorithm as follows (Lee, 
1996): 
"^ sample ~ ^ fail ^  M^D (4.36) 
PMD is also known as the probability of hazardous misleading information and is a type II error 
in statistical testing (c.f. §4.3.1.1.5). The original derivation of equation 4.36 (Lee, 1996) for 
en-route to terminal operations used a rate of 10"" per hour that a failed satellite is in view of 
a user which equates to a PMD of 10'\ The operational states of the integrity monitoring 
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detection function are shown in Figure 4.11. In the following two subsections, protection 
levels will be derived. These are used to determine if the power of the detection function is 
sufficient to meet the integrity requirements. If so, FD RAIM is said to be available (i.e. the 
conditions exist to execute the RAIM detection function). 
position error 
correct detection 
alert limit 
nominal operation 
missed detection / 
hazardous misleading information 
false alert 
threshold test statistic 
Figure 4.11 States of Operation 
Thus far, the discussion has omitted the exclusion functionality contained within modern day 
FDE RAIM algorithms. In order to meet the necessary integrity level in the event of failure, the 
exclusion function is subject to its own requirements, as defined by the RTCA (2006). These 
requirements are in light of possible failings in the exclusion functionality. The following 
definitions are relevant to this discussion. 
Failed Exclusion 
A failed exclusion occurs when a true satellite failure is detected but the conditions doe not 
exist to exclude a satellite with the required confidence within the TTA. 
Incorrect Exclusion 
An incorrect exclusion refers to the case when a satellite failure is detected, a satellite is 
excluded but the failed satellite remains within the solution irrespective of the resulting 
position error. 
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Wrong Exclusion 
A wrong exclusion is an incorrect exclusion which results in a positioning failure. 
Missed Alert 
Positioning failures which are not enunciated to the user within the TTA either as a result of 
missed detection or wrong exclusion. 
The RTCA (2006) specifies that for the FDE RAIM algorithm the probability of missed alert 
must be less than 10 \ Furthermore, in order to achieve exclusion, the function must be able 
to show that the correct satellite has been excluded with the required probability of 0.999 
(RTCA, 2006). The subset which remains must also meet the requirement to be available for 
detection. The FDE function is said to be available only if the probability of a failed exclusion is 
less than 10'^, though this condition is only intended to enable algorithmic testing whereas in 
operational reality, navigation may continue. In fact in order to facilitate offline testing, it is 
possible to compute a Horizontal (or Vertical) Exclusion Limit (HEL/VEL) based on the HPL or 
VPL of the subset geometries. 
4.3.3.2 Standard Protection Level Methods 
The origins of the protection level function within RAIM were borne of a number of methods 
which attempted to screen out inadmissible geometries to ensure requirements were met. 
These included the HDOPmax, 5Hmax and Approximate Radial-Error Protection (ARP) bounds 
(Sturza and Brown, 1990; Sturza, 1988; Chin et al, 1992). The first is a function of the HDOP, 
defined in equation 3.54. However, the OOP is a measure of the propagation of variance 
between the range domain and position domain. It is deficient in two respects: 1) it does not 
map the impact of a failure-induced bias in the range domain to the position domain which is 
critical to integrity, 2) it does not account for the detection power of the statistical test. The 
ARP on the other hand is a function of the slope parameter which reflects the relationship 
between the position error and test statistic in the absence of noise, thus accounting for the 
two issues raised. The slope parameter is proportional to SH a^x (Brown, 1992). 
The horizontal and vertical slope parameters may be derived by evaluating the effect of a 
measurement bias on each of the position and test statistic domains. Under the single failure 
assumption, the bias is of the form = (0...0,B,,0... o) which gives using (3.45/3.58) (4.17): 
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(4.37) 
Hv=K|B , (4.38) 
(4.39) 
where and are the projections of the total position error bias \i^ and n, is the bias in the 
residuals space. The matrix A is defined by equation 3.45 (or alternatively Aw may be used 
from 3.58) and matrix S is defined by equation 4.17. The corresponding horizontal and 
vertical slope parameters are defined as the ratio of these biases (likew/ise other slopes may 
be defined in a similar manner for 3D or lateral position error): 
hsiope, (4.40) 
vslope, = - L ^ (4.41) 
In the absence of noise, the maximum position error w/hich could occur would then be the 
product of the decision threshold and the corresponding maximum slope over all satellites. 
This was the original formulation of ARP (Chin et al, 1993): 
ARP =slope^,, xT (4.42) 
This parameter could be used as a pointer to the integrity provided yet it fails to account for 
the impact of noise. Neither the ambiguity in the magnitude of bias nor the link to the 
integrity performance requirement is incorporated into this definition. To achieve this, 
consider the following three bias conditions: 
• The Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB) 
• The Minimal Hazardous Bias (MHB) 
• The Worst-Case Bias 
The MDB is defined as the smallest bias that can be detected with a minimal allowed 
probability Poetreq on a measurement / (Teunissen, 1998): 
MDB, =argmm{P„,(B,) > (4.43) 
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The MDB is a measure of the systems ability to detect outliers known as internal reliability, for 
a given confidence level (Teunissen, 1998). The external reliability is characterised by the 
extent at which the IVIDB affects the estimated parameters i.e. the position error caused, 
which will ultimately be quantified by the protection level. 
The MHB may be defined similarly in the position domain as the smallest bias which could 
cause a positioning failure given a maximum allowable probability Ppp (Ober, 1996): 
MHB, =argmm{Pp,(B,) > (4.44) 
Finally, the explicitly defined bias which results in the maximum probability of missed 
detection is known as the Worst-Case Bias (WCB). 
WCB, =argmax{P„„(B,)} (4.45) 
The WCB would be the preferred value but it may not be derived in an analytic fashion and 
requires a more complicated procedure than MHB or MDB (see Chapter Six for an analysis of 
the WCB). The use of MDB was introduced in Brown and Chin (1997). 
To apply the MDB to the problem of formulating a protection level using slope, the 
transformation between range and the parity or residuals domain must be formed: 
X = (MDB,xa) 'XS„ (4.46) 
where 0=0^5^^ in the l_S system of uniform variance or o - l if the WLS system which has been 
normalised for unequal variances by a weighting matrix W=I'^. The parameter \ is then 
defined as the MDB in the residuals or parity domain. It also defines the probability 
distribution of the SSE which is now a non-central chi-squared distribution with non-centrality 
A. This allows the \ to computed offline iteratively in the normalised chi-squared space for 
each degree of freedom, using the PFA, PMD and T. 
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This is illustrated conceptually in Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12 Pictorial view of the MDB non-centrality parameter 
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As can be seen from Figure 4.12, the iVIDB when multiplied by the slope gives a geometrical 
bound on the position error which can occur without being detected with probability 10"^ . 
This is true for all biases at or above the IVIDB. Denoted BC for Brown and Chin, the horizontal 
and vertical protection levels are then as follows (Brown and Chin, 1997); 
HPL,, =hslope„„xV\ 
VPL,^  =vslope„„ xVA 
(4.48) 
(4.49) 
The maximum slope satellites are chosen to compute the most conservative case. It is noted 
in Brown and Chin (1997) that the potential exists for the WCB to be smaller than the MDB 
such that the true protection level would exceed those predicted in equations 4.48-4.49. An 
additional buffer was added (Brown and Chin, 1997) to protect against the threat of biases 
lower than the IVIDB. These buffers are designed to accommodate noise in the position 
domain which could potentially cause lower biases to exceed the PMD- They may then be 
defined by the position error variance multiplied by a scale factor k for the required integrity 
level equivalent to that of the SBAS concept (c.f. §4.3.1). The resulting protection levels are 
given below including both the weighted and unweighted cases denoted BC+ for the Brown 
and Chin buffered solution. 
HPL,,, = hslope_ XVA +k (H'WH) ' + (h^WH) (4.50) 
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HPL,,, = hslope^3, xVA +k„a^j„.HDOP 
VPL^ = vslope_xV\ +k,^[(H^WH)" 
VPL^c, = vs lope^xVx +k,a,,„,HDOP 
(4.51) 
(4.52) 
(4.53) 
A similar yet alternative protection level also based on a multiple of the ARP was formulated 
by Walter and Enge (1995) denoted WE and replaces the \ with the threshold as follows: 
HPL^, = h s l o p e ^ , ^ x V f ( G ' W G ) " ' + (G'WG)"' 
HPLwB = hslope_,xVf +k,o,,,,HDOP 
VPl^, = v s l o p e _ x V f + k , j ^ ( G ' W G ) " 
VPL„, = v s l o p e ^ x V f +k^o^^VDOP 
(4.54) 
(4.55) 
(4.56) 
(4.57) 
The slope parameters listed above in equations 4.48-4.57 appear to be the currently used 
bounds on the basis of the recent literature (Angus, 2006). It is important to note that only 
equations 4.50-4.53 guarantee that integrity is not compromised from a theoretical point of 
view. In the case of 4.48-4.49, biases lower than the MDB have the potential to cause an 
integrity risk greater than the required level and similarly biases greater than the threshold 
for 4.54-4.57. 
In Figure 4.10 it was noted that the current measurements may be used to derive a bound on 
the position error after a failure occurs and thus maintain continuity. This is done by 
computing the Horizontal or Vertical Uncertainty Level (HUL/VUL) (Young etal, 1996). 
HUL = hslope„„x(||p|| + ^ ) + k J (G'WG)"' (4.58) 
where \ is the equivalent MDB in the residual domain defined using the current test statistic 
in place of the threshold in equation 4.47 (Lee, 1996). 
The required probability of a positioning failure under this bound must be 99.9% (RTCA, 2006) 
though this seems unreasonable since a failure is known to have occurred and should perhaps 
be set at the integrity level for the operation. 
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On the basis of the exclusion algorithms defined in §4.3.1.2 it is also possible to define the 
Horizontal Exclusion Level (HEL) (or VEL) which is the maximum error which could remain 
without being detected and excluded by the FDE functionality in accordance with the missed 
detection and failed exclusion requirements. The HEL is usually taken as the maximum HPL 
(VPL) of the n subset solutions. 
4.3.3.3 Integrity Optimisation Methods 
The availability of RAIIVI is determined through comparison of the HPL or VPL to the HAL or 
VAL respectively. These bounds are functions of the integrity requirements and it is well 
known that they are the critical determining factors for RAIIVI availability. The accuracy 
requirement is met at times when perhaps the integrity requirement is not. This realisation 
led to the notion that a sub-optimal solution may be sought which degrades the accuracy but 
improves the availability of the system by enhancing integrity. 
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Figure 4.13 Slope parameters under the WIS solution 
The downside of the traditional approach is the effect using the satellite with the greatest 
slope (Figure 4.13) in the case when this is not the failed satellite. This has the impact of 
reducing RAIIVI availability when the true integrity threat is less than is assumed. 
The NIORAIM approach (Hwang and Brown, 2005) proposes the use of sub optimal weights 
on the measurements. The weights are initialised to 1 and then adjusted using an 
optimisation algorithm based on the inverse relationship between weight and resulting 
integrity level. After a number of iterations the slopes should equalise and an integrity 
optimised solution found. Availability of this approach has been found to be greatly improved, 
yet the process is computationally intensive and results have yet to be shown on the 
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degradation in accuracy which results in applying the sub-optimal weights or on the required 
additional error bound which is needed to account for the full integrity risk in the case of 
Approach with Vertical Guidance (APV) operations. 
The Optimally Weighted Average Solution (OWAS) approach presents similar motivations to 
enhance the availability of the integrity function by degrading the accuracy solution, yet 
implements the weighting in the position domain (Lee, 2006). Similar results to NIORAIM in 
the improvement of RAIM availability have been found, reducing the number of unavailable 
case by approximately half. 
4.3.4 Special RAIM Algorithms 
The variety of RAIM algorithms extends beyond those presented thus far. The most relevant 
to air navigation have been discussed in terms of their historical significance (Sturza, 1990), 
current use (Brown, 1997), standardisation and potential benefit in the medium term (Hwang 
and Brown, 2005). In this section a brief summary is given of other techniques which have 
been used to potentially improve the performance of RAIM or extend its use into new 
domains and applications. 
Recently, the potential for slowly growing errors in Kalman filter based RAIM has led to the 
design of difference test RAIM algorithms (Feng and Ochieng, 2007; Bhatti etal, 2007). These 
methods are restricted to detecting a ramp pseudorange error and must be used together 
with the traditional RAIM algorithm. 
In high accuracy applications, the measurement observables are rarely simply pseudoranges 
but usually introduce carrier-phase measurements and differencing operations (Pervan et al, 
1998). In order for a Carrier phase RAIM (CRAIM) algorithm to operate correctly, it must 
account for cycle slips, multipath error and noise correlation. However, these methods are at 
present unreliable and lack robustness or by including these potential risks loosen the 
protection levels computed (Feng et al, 2009). These performance issues are the result of the 
ambiguity resolution process, its susceptibility to errors and the difficulty in ambiguity 
validation. 
Carrier phase smoothed code is the observable derived from mixing code observables with 
observables which use the code measurement from the previous epoch plus the carrier phase 
difference, hence removing the integer ambiguity. This technique is already employed within 
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aviation receivers to improve accuracy for en-route through to LNAV/VNAV operations (RTCA, 
2006). The role of RAIM in this technique is unchanged from the traditional RAIM algorithms, 
merely an improved measurement range error variance is employed which causes tighter 
bounds on performance. The statistical levels of confidence to utilise pure carrier phase 
measurements and associated CRAIM functionality for aviation are currently insufficient using 
modern methods. Future RAIM architectures have been assessed by the FAA within the co 
called GPS Evolutionary Architectural Study (GEAS). This study (Walter et al, 2008) highlighted 
two potential techniques which could provide a next generation RAIM capability. The notion 
of Relative RAIM (RRAIM) suggests that pseudorange-based position with assured integrity is 
provided to the user using a future GNSS-II architecture. A trajectory using carrier-phase 
observables may then be derived which given the high accuracy of carrier-phase is able to 
maintain the protection levels provided for the initial code estimate. Note that the proposal is 
not to use smoothed code, but to propagate a trajectory using the carrier-phase 
measurements, essentially 'smoothing' the protection levels. 
The example above suggests that a future integrity monitoring system may not be as easy to 
classify as suggested by Figure 4.2 in the introduction. Instead an integrated system-sensor 
process may be envisaged which uses measurements both on the ground and on-board as in 
the above example. Such a system would ensure local errors were accounted but was reliant 
on neither the external or internal capability to meet requirements. 
4.4 Summary 
The conclusions which may be drawn from this chapter are: 
• RAIM development is critical to providing a seamless integrity monitoring capability 
for global aviation, particularly for stringent applications with highly localised errors 
• Current deficiencies in RAIM are due to the availability of the integrity function and 
are the product of the system architecture, error characteristics and conservative 
assumptions employed within the protection level design 
• RAIM detection and exclusion functions have been largely standardised for the 
snapshot approach 
" Bayesian and sequential techniques have the potential for improved integrity but 
suffer from complexity in predicting performance which makes them unfeasible or 
difficult to certify for real-time applications 
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• Algorithmic requirements are based on historical derivations which may no longer be 
well-founded 
• The use of maximum slope may not always be valid and thus limits performance 
• Integrity optimised approaches (NIORAIM) have shown benefits in terms of 
availability but include new approximations and degrade accuracy 
• Future applications will look to novel ways to incorporate carrier-phase 
measurements and provide a holistic system-sensor level integrity function 
• There is considerable potential to innovate and improve the integrity prediction 
function with the potential benefit of increasing RAIM availability whilst also 
enabling a critical analysis of the traditional approaches 
In Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, a new approach to integrity prediction is proposed, which 
involves calculating an exact integrity risk under the proposed model and iterating for the 
corresponding protection level. 
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Chapter 5 
GNSS PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
The operational environment of air navigation was discussed in Chapter Two and two key 
trends identified; the use of GNSS in ever demanding applications and the drive towards 
Performance Based Navigation (PBN). In Chapter Four, the case for Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) in more demanding applications was made whilst highlighting its 
potential weaknesses. Specifically, it was shown that potential exists not only to enhance the 
use of RAIM in Non-Precision Approach (NPA) operations under the current GPS operational 
environment but also to support the more stringent Approach with Vertical Guidance (APV) 
operations. This requires innovation both in terms of performance assessment and near-real 
time integrity monitoring algorithms. The former is treated in this chapter whilst the latter is 
addressed in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
This chapter presents a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methodology to measure 
the capacity of RAIM to support NPA. It identifies the deficiencies in existing performance 
assessment methods and proposes a number of issues that the FMEA methodology must 
consider to deliver a credible performance assessment. Although not considered in detail, the 
case is made for the potential to extend the FMEA methodology to APV operations. 
In §5.2 the motivation for an analytical FMEA process is given and the basic requirements of 
an ideal performance assessment are outlined. In §5.3 the first stage of this process relating 
to GPS failure modes is presented. In §5.4 the complexities of designing a simulation platform 
capable of meeting the requirements of the operational evaluation phase are discussed. §5.5 
concludes the chapter and outlines the FMEA structure. 
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5.2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
5.2.1 The FMEA Concept and Motivation 
The system under consideration in this thesis has been identified as the current stand-alone 
GPS system monitored on-board aircraft using a RAIIVt algorithm. RAIM performance has 
traditionally been assessed at the simplistic level of RAIM availability by performing an offline 
integrity prediction as described in §4.3.3 (Van Dyke, 2001, Ochieng, 2003). The method 
proposed in this thesis is to follow an end-to-end process of identifying possible aberrations, 
characterising how they occur, their causes and effects and comprehensively determining 
their impact on the system performance. The undertaking of such a procedure is commonly 
referred to as a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and is outlined in Figure 5.1. 
DETERMINE FAILURE IMPACTS 
INDEIMTIFY SUBSYSTEMS 
IDENTIFY FAILURE MODES 
ANALYSE FAILURE IMPACTS 
FORMULATE FAILURES MODELS 
Figure 5.1 FMEA process 
To assess the performance of a system, a number of alternative approaches may be taken. A 
design review could be completed (Mueller et al, 1995) which from a theoretical standpoint 
logically ascertains the capabilities of the system. Demonstration may also be performed 
which shows the system to be functioning correctly perhaps under controlled worst-case 
conditions or following an extensive initial operations phase as was the case for the European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) (Montesfusco et al, 2006). Alternatively 
an extensive testing campaign may be implemented which looks to sample a statistically 
sufficiently number of system states and thus infer that performance meets its requirements -
or perhaps empirically quantify its capabilities. This approach was carried out by Tiemeyer 
(2002) for RAIM aviation applications within Europe. However, due to the high percentile 
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requirements for integrity and continuity of air navigation, coupled with a dynamic signal 
environment and mobile user platform; testing with real data is insufficient to meet the 
demands on statistical significance over all possible geometries. Instead, analytical techniques 
are required which contain an element of design review but also involve modelling and 
simulation to grant statistical validity. 
In the following subsection, existing analytical techniques are discussed and their key 
characteristics highlighted which must be considered when outlining an ideal FMEA process in 
§5.2.3. 
5.2.2 Existing Assessment Methods 
integrity monitoring test procedures are outlined in RTCA DO-229D (RTCA, 2006). As these 
requirements form the basis for receiver compliance, they are the most relevant to the 
question of analytic performance assessment. Two test procedures outlined in DO-229D are 
applicable; the Avaiiability Test and the Offline FDE Test. 
The availability test is a deterministic procedure designed to determine compliance with 
availability requirements such as those listed in ICAO Annex 10 (ICAO, 2006) and restated in 
Chapter Two. The method proposes the use of standard Gaussian measurement error models 
(ICAO, 2006; RTCA, 2006). The critical elements are the sampling rate and geometrical 
locations for testing which are as follows: 
• Temporal resolution of 5 minutes from 00:00:00 to 12:00:00 UTC (144 time points) 
• Spatial grid sampling 
o Points at every three degrees in latitude from 0° to 90°N 
o Points spaced equally in longitude 
360° 
longstep = y — 
360-
round 
V 
min(3° /cos(latitude),360°) 
o Total of 2353 spatial points 
Total number of sampling points 338,832 
Failure Detection (FD) and Failure Detection and Exclusion (FDE) Availability 
determined through comparison of protection levels with alert limits 
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The offline test is a Monte Carlo process designed to show the receiver unit meets detection 
and exclusion requirements. The test uses standard error models with the addition of a 5m/s 
ramp error. The test is specified to be performed at 20 geometries which provide a uniform 
range of protection levels, both for the detection and exclusion functions respectively (HPL & 
HEL). The satellite with the largest slope at the beginning of the test is chosen to apply the 
ramp error to. Randomly generated noise is also applied for a total of 1650 trials per 
geometry until detection (or exclusion for the FDE test) occurs. The number of allowable 
failure outcomes are listed in DO-229D which determines the equipment is passed or failed. 
These two tests have been defined to show that the receiver equipment performs as 
expected. Although, the sample sizes are large enough to highlight any manufacturing errors 
they do not (as discussed in §5.4.1) provide the statistical significance to prove the 
algorithm's performance level in terms of integrity. In Have (2003) a reference set of 
simulation parameters are suggested for RAIM testing. No spatial test locations are proposed 
and it is stated that the nominal time step used in such assessments is 5-15 minutes. 
However, in Galileo (2002) a time step as low as 6 seconds is applicable. Spatial and temporal 
sampling requirements are discussed in §5.4.1. 
A number of other simulated assessments of RAIM availability have been performed (Hein et 
al, 1997; Van Dyke 2001; Ochieng, 2003) which use a grid such as the one defined in DO-
229D. In recent years, online RAIM prediction tools have emerged, initially with Eurocontrol's 
AUGUR, to aid the General Aviation (GA) community to plan for RAIM outages (DPS, 1998; 
Ober et al, 1998; lATA, 2008). These tools essentially employ the same processing technique 
as the RAIM availability analysis by merely computing a protection level, but with some 
critical differences. Firstly the user may enter a location at which the analysis is performed 
and secondly, recent Notice Advisory to Navstar Users (NANUs) issued by the U.S Coast Guard 
(USCG) are included (USCG, 2009). These services crucially provide flight planning support 
with a low latency and as such are operationally relevant to users and service providers. 
However, the dynamics of the aircraft or approach trajectory are unaccounted for and no 
detailed descriptions of the RNP parameters are provided. 
The studies reviewed up to this point do not attempt to investigate the ability of the 
protection levels to meet the integrity requirements by providing the required protection nor 
the size of the safety margin they employ. Hewitson and Wang (2005) assessed the integrity 
performance in terms of internal reliability over a global grid using the Minimal Detectable 
Bias (MDB) as well as analysing the ability of the system to exclude the correct satellite using 
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residual correlation coefficients. This approach, although interesting from a GPS system 
design point of view does not relate directly to the air navigation specifications. Furthermore, 
it was noted in §4.3.3.2 that the MDB may not represent the Worst Case Bias (WCB) or that all 
but the most conservative protection levels could be susceptible to biases of a particular 
magnitude resulting in an excessive integrity threat. Some studies have looked to address this 
issue by determining integrity directly by Monte Carlo simulations. Chin (1992) employed a 
Monte Carlo technique to derive an additional bound on the Approximate Radial-Error 
Protection (ARP) level (equation 4.35), whereas in recent papers by Brown and Hwang (2005, 
2006) Monte Carlo data was used to populate a look-up table in terms of the Worst Case Bias 
(WCB). However, there is a significant error in this approach due to computational limitations 
on the resolution of the look-up table which may be derived from extensive Monte Carlo 
runs. 
As well as analysing the performance of RAIM's integrity prediction step (RAIM availability), 
some studies have looked at the effects of particular types of failure on the statistical test. 
Ramp errors of 5m/s are commonly chosen in accordance with the RTCA test summarised 
above (Bhatti et a I, 2007; Geier et al, 1995). Step detectors have also been tested with code 
pseudoranges (Clot et al, 2004) or due to cycle slips using carrier-phase observables (Ochieng 
et al, 2004). In fact, specific failure-modes have been addressed. Lee et al (2004) investigated 
the effects of multipath on integrity monitoring and in Belabbas and Gass (2005) the 
propagation of modelled tropospheric errors through a combined GPS/Galileo RAIM monitor 
was assessed. Each of these studies focuses on one or two failure models, hence neither 
accounts for a total failure model of the system nor the entire population of satellite-to-user 
geometry. A risk assessment undertaken at John Hopkins University (JHU/APL, 2001) assessed 
a number of signal aberrations due to interference, jamming and ionospheric scintillations. 
The study was conducted at fixed locations and simulated fixed times throughout the U.S and 
three external sites in the North Pacific and North Atlantic. A temporally varying procedure 
was also performed to simulate the effects over an aircraft approach procedure. Real data 
testing was used to model the failures and Monte Carlo simulations of those threats identified 
as significant for the study, were performed. It focused on Wide Area Augmentation System 
(WAAS) and the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) and as such ignored larger potential 
errors such as clock failures which can impact the RAIM function. Although this study is the 
most comprehensive of its kind to date, the failure model is specific to the SBAS/GBAS model 
and is limited in the scope of simulated locations and time step used in order to enable the 
high percentile Monte Carlo process. 
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To summarise, existing metfiods have addressed specific failures or elements of system 
performance. No method has assessed the effects of all failures nor have they determined 
performance relevant to the air navigation environment with sufficient sampling of the space-
time geometry. 
The state-of-the-art performance assessment proposed must therefore meet the following 
requirements: 
• To meet the demands of the Performance Based Navigation concept - all RNP 
parameters should be determined 
• To be relevant to the air navigation community the results should take account of 
operational procedures 
• To ensure a complete assessment is achieved the spatial and temporal sampling of 
satellite-to-user geometries is critical 
• To include the potential degradation of performance of all failures, a total failure 
model should be used 
• To accurately determine the integrity and its relationship with RAIM availability, the 
assessment should take account of the worst case biases and outages 
5.2.3 FMEA Structure 
The FMEA structure derived from the requirements in §5.2.2 is shown in Figure 5.2. In the 
first phase, to assess the totality of potential failures, each subsystem which could contribute 
to excessive range errors is examined for potential failure modes. This is followed by a unique 
characterisation of the different failure types and the specification of a total failure model. A 
simulation platform may then use as input either this model or the standard failure model 
provided by the GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS) Performance Standard (PS) (DoD, 
2008). The second phase involves the research and development of the simulation capability 
to derive all the RNP parameters and other operationally relevant information. This stage is 
crucial to ensure that the platform incorporates new techniques to deal with the limitations 
identified in §5.2.2 including sampling and modelling of the worst case integrity threat. 
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Figure 5.2 Outlined FMEA structure 
The following §5.2-5.3 address both phases and identify the proposed solutions investigated 
further in this thesis following the process identified in §5.4. 
5.3 GPS Failure Modes 
GPS is a complex system, based on data generated on earth and transmitted from space. 
There exists the potential for failure at any one of a number of stages, from the generation of 
the messages on the ground, their upload to and storage at the satellite payloads, to their 
transmission, propagation and reception at the user's receiver. The following list presents 
examples of things that can go wrong at the control, space, environment and user levels 
(Barker and Huser, 1998; Cobb et al, 1995; Walsh and Daly, 2000; Pullen et al, 2001; Bhatti 
and Ochieng, 2007). A comprehensive data base of the failure modes is provided in detail in 
Chapter Seven. 
" Control segment failures: human factors, command data errors, orbit modelling 
errors due to eclipsing, Doppler or Doppler rate errors following manoeuvres and 
erroneous clock modelling 
• Space segment failures: erroneous clock behaviour often undetected, satellite clock 
jumps, failures in frequency standards, incorrect non-standard code generation, 
corruption of navigation data potentially due to ionisation from cosmic rays, 
degraded attitude control, power fluctuation, erroneous PRN code and unstable 
signal delays 
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« Signal environment failures: intentional interference from jamming or spoofing, 
unintended interference from RF transmitters in the GPS signal bands, ionospheric 
errors from fluctuations in electron density particularly at high solar activity and 
multipath errors from nearby structures 
• User segment failures: receiver power failures, software incompatibilities, quartz 
frequency instabilities, processing algorithmic errors, human-machine interface 
problems and inadequate user (pilot) training 
Recent research has looked to exhaustively search for potential failure modes that may 
significantly affect GPS navigation performance (Van Dyke et al, 2004; Walsh and Daly, 2000; 
Bhatti and Ochieng, 2007). The ongoing Integrity Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (IFMEA) 
(Van Dyke, 2003) is the most comprehensive study to date, performed by Voipe on behalf of 
the DoD/DoT; though as yet, the failure register is not publicly available. 
The first step in collecting data from any data source is to determine the format of the data 
entries. Previous mode collections have recorded data on the following aspects of a failure 
(Walsh and Daly, 2000; Van Dyke et al, 2004; Bhatti and Ochieng, 2007): 
Segment allocation 
Proximate cause 
Characteristics 
Effect/magnitude/impact 
Potential time to detection 
Remarks 
Probability of occurrence 
The approach taken in this thesis follows similar lines and is shown in Chapter Seven. As well 
as striving to capture the wide range of failures, the characterisation of failures is a major task 
both in this FMEA process and the research community as a whole. There are a number of 
complexities associated with how a failure impacts the system. The effect generated may be 
easily interpreted as a pseudorange error such as that caused by a clock jump or may have an 
effect on the navigation system which is more difficult to quantify e.g. attitude instability 
leading to higher Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). One approach which may be taken is to classify 
failures by type. In Bhatti and Ochieng (2007) failures were split into the following categories: 
step error, ramp error/drift, random noise, random walk, oscillation and bias. In addition to 
these are failures which cause complete signal loss. Within the Wide Area Augmentation 
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System (WAAS) integrity framework (Watt et al, 2003) failures were split into step, ramp and 
ramp rate types and further compartmentalised into particular grades of ramp error. A similar 
approach was taken during the EGNOS system definition phase (Debailleux etal, 2008). 
The methodology proposed in this thesis models the failure modes to enable an interface 
with snapshot RAIM algorithms. This may be achieved by deriving a model of the 
instantaneous failure-induced bias for each possible failure. A method for deriving these 
models is described in Chapter Six for each of the failure categories identified by Bhatti 
(2006). This addresses the link between the failure mode registers populated globally, 
particularly by Voipe (Van Dyke, 2004) and the standards model specified for civilian use of 
GPS (DoD, 2008). This specification allows for a failure rate of 10 ^  per hour per satellite which 
is used to derive the algorithm performance requirement on the probability of missed 
detection (10'^). The failure model presented in Chapter Six could enable a more realistic 
derivation of the integrity risk provided by algorithms of known detection power. In addition 
to this new method, a recent analysis of orbit modelling errors is presented which compares 
ephemeris performance to that predicted by NANUs. This analysis also attempts to capture 
the probability of gross orbit errors which is currently lacking yet necessary for the total 
failure model derived. 
As stated earlier, this thesis is primarily concerned with the stand-alone GPS system, although 
an extension of the techniques to augmented systems or dual constellation (GPS + Galileo) 
may be relevant. This is particularly true of the total failure model proposed in Chapter Six as 
the availability of differential corrections greatly reduces the impact of failures in a manner 
which requires an alternative approach to modelling using error bounding (Zarraoa and 
Cosmen, 2006). One appropriate extension of the FMEA process presented in this thesis is 
therefore, to develop a model which determines the risk posed to the differential system. The 
vital failure mode requiring a better characterisation for this model would be that of high 
ionospheric effects. Research into the ionosphere has focused on the effects of high solar 
activity (Camargo et al, 2001; Kunches and Hirman, 1990; Bishop et al, 1996), the effect of 
ionospheric fronts (Gratton and Pervan, 2005; Gratton and Pervan, 2006) and their quick 
detection but has not attempted to quantify the integrity risk posed to RAIM users from these 
occurrences. This issue is of particular importance due to the impact of multiple failures on 
the system and their greater likelihood in mid-latitude regions with high ionospheric activity. 
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5.3.1 Human Factors 
The failures associated with human factors should be accounted for a holistic assessment of 
the navigation system, given the crew's role in the use of the data generated by the system. 
However, the FMEA process presented here aims to address the RNP performance 
requirements up to the point at which information is displayed to the user. Therefore, a 
human factors analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. In an auxiliary project nonetheless, 
real flight trials were employed to assess the impact of new GPS technology on the pilot 
workload, spatial perception and the learning process they undergo. The full project report 
may be obtained online from the UK CAA website (CAA, 2007). 
5.4 End-to-End Operational Evaluation 
In the previous section the first phase of the FMEA was discussed. In this section the 
architecture of the operational evaluation process is formed based on the proposed solutions 
to the shortcomings of existing simulation techniques identified in §5.2.2. In the existing 
methods discussed in §5.2.2, the probabilistic effects of nominal errors are captured using a 
Monte Carlo approach, clearly unfeasible in the case of sampling all relevant satellite-to-user 
geometries. Therefore, the need to develop a deterministic model which would greatly 
reduce the computational load was identified. Given such a model it would be possible to 
enhance the spatial and temporal resolution which (see §5.4.1 below). §5.4.2 then examines 
the challenges behind modelling the RNP parameters, most importantly integrity. Finally, the 
issue of incorporating operational factors and ensuring the results are relevant to the aviation 
community is discussed in §5.4.3. 
5.4.1 Sampling 
5.4.1.1 Spatial Sampling 
In §5.2, a number of studies were listed which utilise a grid based service volume assessment 
strategy (Ochieng, 2003; Van Dyke, 2004). This approach has a number of shortfalls. Consider 
the case of a one degree grid in both longitude and latitude. This requires a total of 64800 
sample points. If the computation is performed at each point is anything but the simplest 
calculation, this becomes excessively time-consuming. Although a deterministic model has 
been proposed, such a model would still require an unacceptable amount of computing 
power. Therefore, there is a tendency to use relatively coarse grids l ° = l l l k m ) with the 
consequence of (allowing RAIM holes to occur in between the sampled grid points (Feng et al, 
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2006). RAIM holes are areas over the earth's surface in which less than the required five 
satellites are visible to the user, as shown in Figure 5.3. Similarly, there exists a real possibility 
that regions containing users with different numbers of satellites in view may be present 
between the selected sample points. Although the average performance between 
neighbouring points may be very similar, the FiVlEA process must be operationally relevant 
and therefore include the ability to determine precisely the times of coverage outages and 
discontinuities in the RNP parameters. In addition to RAIIVI holes which are the result of a 
change in the number of visible satellites, performance varies on a continuous basis due to 
the satellite and user dynamics. Correlation of measurement errors varies both spatially and 
temporally. Therefore, sampling must be sufficient to limit the decorrelation between 
neighbouring points and thus keep the approximation error of using a finite sample space to a 
minimum. 
o « 1 i 1 < 1 (1 
RAIIVI 
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Figure 5.3 RAIM hole example 
Satellite Coverage Border 
One alternative to grid based sampling is to use a finite number of chosen locations which are 
critical to the application. This has been used for RAIM prediction studies (Ober, 1997) or 
performance testing (JHU/APL, 2001). This approach suffers from the same potential 
problems as those outlined for the grid-sampling approach, though it does allows custom 
points to be tested which may be chosen to correspond to airport locations. Another of the 
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fixed point methodologies is that of selecting the worst case user geometry (Feng, 2006a) 
which is primarily of benefit to an external monitoring service (Werner et al, 2000). This 
would account for areas of low coverage but would be too pessimistic to be used in a RAIM 
assessment as performance varies so greatly between the best and worst locations. 
Further to the drawbacks listed thus far, as the points used in these methods are static there 
is no facility to include aircraft dynamics which through banking have the potential to mask 
satellites at low elevations. Therefore, the use of dynamic approach trajectories is preferred, 
such as was employed in (JHU/APL, 2001, Bhatti, 2007). Using flight trajectories, the 
assessment is then able to determine the RNP parameters over a particular NPA. Due to 
possible variations in actual approach trajectories flown, some assumptions are needed and 
are discussed in §5.4.3. 
5.4.1.2 Temporal Sampling 
A complete FMEA process must determine the optimal approach to sampling to provide the 
most accurate and most efficient assessment platform. In many service volume assessments, 
a sample step of minutes has been used, whereas it is clear such a time step may miss vital 
critical geometries to the final RNP output. In the case of approach trajectory simulations, it is 
clear that small outages in performance of less than a minute but exceeding the Time-To-
Alert are still relevant to the results and must be captured. A temporal sampling methodology 
is therefore required which accounts for variations in performance over these periods. Using 
a fixed sample size this would imply a time step of less than ten seconds. This is one potential 
sampling strategy and has been used to generate the results presented in Chapter Ten. As a 
baseline method, a value of 6 seconds was chosen to ensure two samples are processed 
within each TTA period. However, performance has been shown to vary mostly at times when 
changes in the number of visible satellites occur (Feng et al, 2006b). In between these times it 
is feasible to dynamically sample the geometry or apply more sophisticated assessment 
techniques as discussed and analysed in Chapter Six. 
5.4.2 RNP Computation 
The computation of the RNP parameters is the core processing challenge of an end-to-end 
assessment platform. The sampling strategies have been defined in §5.4.1 on the basis that 
an efficient and accurate computation of the RNP is possible. Therefore, the challenge is to 
form a methodology which can meet this requirement. The first step is to consider the 
assessment period over which the parameter is defined. It may be that the requirement is 
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specified throughout an operation (i.e. all samples), as an average (over all samples) or with a 
given probability. The accuracy and integrity (via the alert limit) requirements are also 
specified differently in the horizontal and vertical directions for many operations. The 
research presented here on performance assessment concentrates initially on NPA where 
requirements are specified in the horizontal position component. The period of assessment 
for NPA is one hour. In Chapter Nine, vertical performance is considered for APV operations 
When analysing the navigation system it is important to be aware of which states the 
requirements are defined under. For example, accuracy is likely to be worse in the failed state 
than the fault-free state. However, the requirements are specified for accuracy in the nominal 
fault-free case as accuracy is not intended to meet the necessities of faulty operations (ICAO, 
2006); this role is performed by the compulsory integrity level. In the following subsections, 
each of the RNP parameters is discussed in view of the performance requirements and 
associated testing processes. The subsection begins with integrity, the most safety-critical 
parameter and most challenging in terms of computational complexity. 
5.4.2.1 Integrity Assessment 
Integrity is defined by three parameters, the integrity risk, the Alert Limit (AL) and the Time-
To-Alert (TTA). As this thesis is concerned with the assessment of snapshot algorithms for 
NPA the TTA is of little concern to the determination of the integrity parameter. In order to 
meet the operational requirements, an integrity event must not occur with the probability 
specified by the integrity risk. Recall from equation 4.36 that this risk may be broken down 
into the probability of satellite failure (Pfan) and the probability of missed detection (PMD) by 
the receiver algorithm. 
IR=Pfai,XP^, (5.1) 
The Pfaii is not defined relative to the air operation and a particular magnitude of positioning 
failure. Therefore, the definition of PMD must account for the AL: 
" PpFnNA (5.2) 
where Ppp^ ^^  is the combined probability of a Positioning Failure (PF) (a function of the AL) 
and No Alert (NA) being given to the user following the execution of the detection function. 
The Pfaii parameter may be defined by the standard model (DoD, 2008) as equalling 10"^  or 
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from the results of Chapter Six on failure modes. The role of the software-based assessment 
platform is to determine the PMD by investigating the behaviour of the RAIM functions. 
The resulting integrity nsk following execution of the RAIM functions is driven by the 
following variables: 
• Nominal measurement errors (noise) 
• Satellite-to-user geometry 
« Failure-induced bias and probability 
• Detection threshold 
• System model (i.e. conformity to reality) 
Of the variables listed above, the system model has been assumed on the basis of years of 
technical work and its accuracy is beyond the scope of this thesis. The detection threshold 
may be assumed to be derived from standard principles as is done by the RTCA (2006). 
Satellite-to-user geometry is accounted for in the assessment following the discussion in 
§5.4.1 whereas the nominal errors are assumed to be Gaussian. The effects of nominal errors 
on the integrity provided must therefore be determined whilst accounting for the ambiguity 
in the failure-induced bias magnitude (Ober, 2003). This is considered in §5.4.2.1.1 below. Of 
critical importance to the modelling of the integrity risk is the computational efficiency 
required. Although, the use of an approach trajectory reduces the computational burden 
significantly, there still exists the need for a deterministic model to replace the Monte Carlo 
approach. This method must also be sufficiently accurate and reliable to ascertain precisely 
the times at which integrity meets the required level. 
In §5.4.2.1.2 the relationship between the computed integrity risk at a sample and the 
operational integrity risk is discussed followed by the integrity risk posed by failures in the 
RAIM exclusion function in §5.4.2.1.3. 
5.4.2.1.1 Bias Ambiguity 
The impact of a failure is determined not only by the geometrical configuration of satellites 
and the measurement characteristics of these satellites but most importantly by the 
magnitude of the failure in question. Under the auspices of the GPS SPS failure definition 
(DoD, 2008), the magnitude of the failure bias is ambiguous (beyond 30m). Therefore, when 
predicting performance it is necessary to make an assumption as to how to deal with this 
ambiguity. One approach is to use the MDB. This bias value is defined as the smallest bias 
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which is guaranteed to be detected with a probability of 0.999 under the assumption of the 
Gaussian linear model. Therefore, any bias greater than the IVIDB is sure to be detected within 
the bounds of the requirements. Figure 5.4 shows the IVIDB in the Test Statistic (TS) domain. It 
is clear that as the bias increases beyond the IVIDB the integrity risk due to a lack of detection 
power is reduced (c.f. §4.3.1.1.5). The flaw in this approach is that biases less than the MDB, 
although likely to have reduced impact on the Position Error (PE) and its relation to the Alert 
Limit (AL) may result in a greater probability of missed detection PMD-
1^ = P((PE > AL) n (TS < T)) (5.3) 
MDBTS test 
statistic 
Figure 5.4 IVIinimal Detectable Bias 
An alternative to the MDB is to locate the WCB in terms of the resulting integrity threat. This 
may be time consuming (Chin et al, 1993), and depending on the application may not be a 
feasible choice, particularly if the integrity risk is not easily computed. Finally, the 
performance may be determined over an entire range of biases which allows for both a 
comprehensive analysis by numerical integration and the selection of a worst case. This 
technique also allows the total failure model to be used which is designed to interface with 
snapshot RAIM as discussed in §5.3 and presented in Chapters Six and Nine. 
5.4.2.1.2 Operational Integrity 
In contrast to accuracy, integrity is not specified for each and every sample but rather over an 
operation or time period (ICAO, 2006; EUROCAE, 2007). Therefore, it is feasible that the 
instantaneous integrity risk may exceed an instantaneous level derived from the 
requirements but that over the period of the operation, the average meets the required level. 
In practice, RAIM has been designed to monitor integrity on a per sample basis using a PMD 
requirement of 10'^. In assessing the performance of the system it is possible to take either 
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approach, thus generating integrity risks per sample or per operation. Each of these integrity 
values is provided in the operational assessment output template examples of which are 
shown in Chapter Ten. In the case of regularly spaced samples a simple numerical integration 
of the points may be used to obtain the mean performance. However, if a dynamic sampling 
technique is used (analysed in detail in Chapter Seven), a more Intelligent approach to 
computing the operational integrity risk would be needed. Moreover, the dynamic sampling 
must be designed to account for the worst case in order to capture true algorithmic 
performance. 
Integrity 
Risk 
IRrea 
'l^sample ^ IRn 
3Ve.IRapproach ^  '^ req 
start end 
approach approach 
Figure 5.5 Variation of integrity risk over an approach 
time 
In Figure 5.5 this difference between performance (integrity risk) specified over an operation 
(IRapproach) and a sample (IRsampie) is clear. If one assumes the segment in which the integrity 
risk exceeds the requirement is at least as long as the Time-To-Alert (TTA), then the RAIM 
algorithm will screen the geometry by alerting the pilot of an unavailable system and require 
the action to abort the approach. By specifying performance requirements over a time period 
it is natural to assume this refers to the average integrity risk. However, defending the 
position that the operation should be deemed available on the basis of the average integrity 
risk is not trivial as the impact of unsafe conditions varies over the approach. For this reason It 
is better to remain conservative, within the bounds of the current design. It is the author's 
view that this confusion could be tackled differently if failure rates were specified on an 
instantaneous basis (i.e. probability that at epoch t, satellite i is in a failed state) instead of 
over a time period. This would enable performance requirements of integrity to be defined 
naturally for each epoch. A proposed failure concept along these lines is proposed in Chapter 
Six although even using the form of the traditional failure model, it would still be feasible to 
define the rate of occurrence in this way. 
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Integrity risk on a per sample basis used for analysis is often translated from the requirements 
by a factor relating to the number of independent samples within the operational period 
(Ober, 1998). There has been considerable variation in the decorrelation time between 
samples (Ochieng et al, 2003) and this is perhaps one of the reasons why in the design of 
algorithms the required operational integrity risk is left undivided. An instantaneous failure 
model would alleviate this difficulty. 
5.4.2.1.3 Wrong Exclusion 
In the above analysis, only the detection function has been considered to fail and lead to 
Hazardous Misleading Information (HMI). However, this may be due to a Missed Detection 
(MD) in this case or additionally through the occurrence of a wrong exclusion when Failure 
Detection and Exclusion (FDE) is used as noted in §4.3.3.1. This occurs when the incorrect 
satellite is excluded and no subsequent detection takes place, thereby allowing the 
positioning failure to continue. The probability of missed alert PMA which represents the 
likelihood of HMI is then made up of the probability of missed detection PMD and probability 
of wrong exclusion PWEX: 
(5.4) 
Two exclusion methods were depicted in §4.3.1.2, the Van Grass and Farrell 'Best subset' 
algorithm (Van Grass and Farrell, 1993; Van Grass, 1996), considered the most widely used 
technique, or the parity domain closest residual technique (Sturza, 1990). Following exclusion 
of one or more satellites, the algorithm is still required to meet the integrity requirements. 
This implies that the protection level computed using the subset must remain below the alert 
limit for the applicable phase of flight. 
There is a lack of consensus on the breakdown of the integrity risk after exclusion has taken 
place. The Van Graas approach assumes the Horizontal or Vertical Exclusion Level (HEL/VEL), 
defined in §4.3.1.2, is formed using a missed detection probability of 10'^ with corresponding 
probability of failure of 10^. Ober (2006) argues that due to the knowledge of the existence of 
a failure, the subset should use a missed detection probability of 10 ^  as shown in Figure 5.6 
as the probability of failure is then 1. In fact, the Van Graas approach is utilising the fact that 
one solution will not contain the failure and this subset is likely to be chosen as the post-
exclusion navigation solution. Therefore there exists the implicit assumption that the 
exclusion function is correct in using the 10'^ value. 
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Figure 5.6 FDE RAIM Integrity Tree (Ober, 2006) 
In liglit of the various assumptions invol<ed by then exclusion mechanism, a full assessment of 
the integrity risk is needed to quantify the risk posed by the algorithm. The availability of FDE 
RAIM is also a critical issue. In recent studies (Lee, 1999; Van Dyke, 2001; Hwang and Brown, 
2005) FDE availability requires that the HEL/VEL be below the respective alert limit (HAL/VAL) 
to be considered operational. The approach to determining RAIM availability taken in these 
papers may reflect actual receiver implementation, though it could also be interpreted from 
the ICAO SARPs (2006) that such a use of exclusion level is only required in the event of a 
failure. In this thesis, FDE RAIM availability is considered using the traditional and proposed 
protection levels. Ideally, a protection level which incorporates Pwex in addition to the subset 
PMD is desirable and this is considered for further work in Chapter 11. 
5.4.2.2 Accuracy Assessment 
The accuracy specified for aviation operations by ICAO (2006) must be met for each and every 
sample. This implies that for an operation, to ensure that the level is met and deemed 
available, the assessment tool must estimate the accuracy for each epoch throughout an 
approach and select the worst case. Accuracy is specified at the 95"^ percentile of position 
error. This implies that for each space-time point, from a large number of independent 
samples 95% would lie within the accuracy value. The accuracy requirement for NPA is 220m 
in the horizontal plane with no vertical requirement. 
The accuracy of a weighted least squares solution may be estimated firstly through 
transformation of the measurement covariance into the position error (e) domain (3.47): 
Z. = (H'WH)' (5.5) 
for the geometry design matrix H and weight matrix W. 
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Secondly circular error probable tables (CEP) may be used to equate the elliptical distribution 
described by equation 5.5 into a circular value suitable for comparison to the performance 
specification as shown in Figure 5.7 (Leick, 2004). 
accuracy 
position 
covariance 
Figure 5.7 Accuracy definition and position covariance 
The accuracy may also be derived for both across and along track directions by projecting the 
position covariance along these vectors in a simple calculation. The computation of each 
accuracy type is therefore, a straightforward process which may be achieved efficiently at 
each sample point. It is well known however, that the accuracy of stand-alone GPS far 
exceeds that required for NPA (Hwang and Brown, 2006) and as such is not a critical element 
of modelling process. The suggested method for accuracy assessment by the RTCA is real data 
testing (RTCA, 2006; Cassel and Smith, 1995) due to the lower percentile requirements than 
that of integrity. A nominal estimated accuracy is of benefit for comparison between the 
operational evaluation outputs. 
5.4.2.3 Continuity Assessment 
Continuity is a concept whose definition varies depending upon the context it is placed. The 
ICAO definition of continuity for which aircraft operations must adhere is defined for the en-
route phase of flight on a per hourly basis, yet for approach operations it is defined per 
approach (ICAO, 2006). However, although clearly an approach operation, NPA is specified on 
an hourly basis. If the continuity performance measure output from the simulator is to be 
specified per hour, the length of the particular operation must of course be factored in to 
maintain operational relevance. To clarify this point, pilots and operators are concerned by 
the capability to complete a commenced approach and not in the case of NPA by the 
capability to complete an hour's flight. In which case, the value for continuity is found by 
determining the percentage of successful Periods of Operation (POP) or approaches, from the 
total POP sample population. A successful POP is performed if accuracy and integrity 
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requirements are met throughout the approach assuming they were available at the start of 
the approach. 
Continuity risk accounts for both rare fault free alerts and alerts due to the onset of a failure. 
In the purest sense, outages due to geometry screening following an unacceptable integrity 
prediction do not constitute a continuity risk as they may be predicted beforehand and are 
therefore factored into system availability, as discussed below in §5.4.2.4. However, although 
not explicitly stated in the ICAO annexes, RAIM availability outages caused by an unscheduled 
satellite outage (known as a critical satellite in this event) may be considered continuity risks 
as they represent an actual threat to pilots by necessitating an abortion of the operation and 
are by definition unpredictable. 
The assumption of a constant satellite failure rate and set threshold, go some way to fixing 
the continuity risk for the operation. If an unconventional variable threshold algorithm were 
utilised, the continuity risk would vary, whilst perhaps constraining the integrity risk. 
However, continuity risk also depends on the likelihood of failed exclusion as in the event of 
failure this determines if the operation may continue. The impact of critical satellites is also 
relevant to the analysis of continuity. The outage of a satellite which creates an unavailable 
RAIM instance is a service discontinuity and therefore critical satellites must be analysed 
through the computation of subset protection levels at all sample points. This leads to the 
estimate of continuity risk which is output from the operational evaluation. 
5.4.2.4 Availability Assessment 
The system is deemed to be available if accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements are 
met. The actual availability values provided by ICAO (2006) do not represent absolute barriers 
to the implementation of GNSS operations since due to the predictability of GNSS and RAIM 
protection levels; it is possible to restrict operations to times when the system is available. 
For RAIiVl, this naturally precludes the use of the system when the geometry is unable to 
support failure detection. In these case RAIM is unavailable the percentage of which 
determine RAIM availability. However, RAIM availability does not constitute the full system 
availability. Unpredictable (or even unknown) occurrences, such as periods of missed alert are 
strictly unavailable as reliable information is not presented to the pilot or crew. 
The literal definition of availability provided by ICAO is stated in terms of the proportion of 
time the system meets the accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements. However, in a 
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practical sense it is the author's view that the definition should also relate to the continuity 
concept of a POP. To create a clearer picture of why this is the case, consider Figure 5.8. A 
relatively short outage in comparison to the period of an approach entails that any approach 
starting before the outage occurs and which is subsequently impeded due to the outage 
would be classed unavailable. However, in the purest interpretation of the ICAO definition it 
is only the outage time period which is classed as unavailable. From the point of view of the 
new interpretation, intuitively those approaches beginning during an outage are discarded. 
outage 
unavailable approach available approach 
I 1 I 
unavailable approach 
I 1 
discarded approach 
time 
Figure 5.8 Effect of an outage on operations availability 
In light of this observation, an outage contributes the following period of unavailable time 
within an assessment period: 
(operationally) unavailable time = approach time = Atapp (5.6) 
discarded time = outage period = Atout (5.7) 
The interpretation above leads to a new formula to quantify availability. This assumes that 
outages last longer than ten seconds. Incorporating the Time-To-Alert (TTA) in to the analysis 
is avoided and is in line with the SPS PS (DoD, 2008). These are presumed to occur sufficiently 
far apart that an approach may not span a period of multiple outages. Under these 
conditions, the availability, termed operational availability is therefore: 
operational availability = — — — — — — — (5.8) 
t^otal ~ / 
where n^ ut is the number of outages over the total time (ttotai) suggested as a sidereal 
geometry day, calendar day or an alternative assessment period. Substitution of the approach 
times and outage periods in equation 5.8 May then be understood as the percentage of the 
day in which it is possible to begin and complete an approach without an outage occurring. A 
new literal definition of availability is therefore suggested, operational availability: 
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The percentage of time within a given assessment period (usually 
taken as a sidereal day) in which an approach may be commenced 
and completed without interruption. 
The above definition is intended to be a predictable quantity, based in a sense on RAIM 
availability but in an operational setting, yet it may also be extended to the question of 
system level integrity monitoring performance or other areas. Moreover, it does not include 
outage risks due to random elements, such as failure events and false alerts. An extension to 
true operational availability may therefore also be defined as the operational availability 
reduced by a factor relating to the expected percentage outage time as the consequence of 
such stochastic events. 
The methodology presented in §5.2.2 examined the benefits of using approach trajectories 
for the assessment of the system. This is essential if the proposed operational availability 
value is to be determined. Naturally it would prudent to provide statistics relating to the 
traditional definition of availability based on the proportion of available sample points. 
5.4.3 Operational Factors 
As well as capturing the behaviour of nominal GPS measurement errors, it is critical that the 
nominal behaviour of aviation operations is also accounted for within the performance 
assessment platform. The FMEA process should link the navigation system performance given 
in terms of the RNP parameters to specific flight operations. Initially this means that instead 
of assessing integrity or availability over a global grid, simulations over an aircraft trajectory 
are chosen, defined from the operation approach chart. In this case, operational factors such 
as the speed and banking of the aircraft must be incorporated and missed approaches 
considered. This is a key concept for the end-to-end process and provides the only means 
possible to accurately determine continuity, as it is defined on the basis of a POP. 
In considering the speed and profile of the approaches a nominal ground speed of 160Kts is 
used with variations during banking using standard dynamic models (Terpstra, 2000, personal 
communication, 2005). Dynamic banking of the aircraft is applied at Initial Approach Fix (lAF) 
turns and during missed approaches but minor corrections applied by the pilot on the final 
approach is considered negligible. The descent profile is deemed to be a constant gradient 
with any differences in performance only potentially occurring due to terrain masking. An 
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interface for a digital elevation model (ComputaMaps, 2006) to allow for the impact of terrain 
on the signal path is also of relevance to the operational setting and is included. In extreme 
terrain such as at Inverness, in which local geographic features may obstruct the visibility of 
satellites, the approach trajectory assessment is clearly preferable to a grid based or fixed 
location scheme. 
The advantage of the flight trajectory approach is that it may be run for a particular 
aerodrome and provide the local operators or service providers with both performance 
parameters but further information regarding the time of possible outages. This technique 
could also be applied during the approach design phase to improve GNSS performance or to 
validate the level of service provided. 
5.5 F ME A Structure 
This chapter began by outlining potential techniques to assess the use of GNSS for NPA (and 
potentially APV) operations using RAIM. It gave a theoretical overview of the research areas 
which may be improved in an ideal setting through a better understanding and more 
sophisticated approach to modelling failures and their effects. Naturally, a solution to each of 
these obstacles was sought throughout the research process and related to the PhD research 
objectives outlined in the introduction. Of particular importance is the link between 
performance requirements, the operational environment, algorithmic functionality and 
performance assessment, be it offline or in real time. This chapter has expressed these 
relationships and focused on a number of issues which pertain to a complete end-to-end 
assessment of system performance by considering the significance of each of these drivers. 
The following list summarises the goals to meet the demands of an FMEA process: 
• To capture the multitude of GPS failure modes in all segments 
• To characterise failures in a manner which interfaces with snapshot RAIM algorithms 
and is as realistic as possible whilst remaining conservative 
• To enable an operational assessment and validation tool which is capable of 
contributing to a certified hazard analysis 
• To facilitate the dissemination of operationally relevant information such as 
instances of unacceptable risk and system outages 
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• To determine the performance of the system throughout the entire space-time 
geometry and thus avoid missing critical events such as RAIM holes w/hich cause 
lapses in system performance 
• To implement an accelerated sampling strategy for computational efficiency 
• To deal with the ambiguity of the failure-induced bias by firstly assessing the use of 
the MDB, WCB or a total failure model 
• To model the complex effects of the nominal errors on the system without resorting 
to computationally expensive procedures such as Monte Carlo simulations 
• To determine a method for computing each of the RNP parameters in a fast efficient 
yet accurate way 
• To analyse the difference in performance provided by alternative protection levels 
• To assess the likelihood of incorrect and wrong exclusions and the competence of 
the current algorithms and requirements to justify their assumptions 
• To facilitate the design and testing of new algorithms where appropriate 
The structure of the FMEA process is shown in Figure 5.9. The top level involves the detailed 
capture of failure events into a failure modes database. The characterisation of failures then 
uses this database as the foundation for a failure model whose details are presented in 
Chapter Six. The simulation of the impacts of failures on the system is then enabled through 
the development of solutions to the sampling, modelling and testing issues. The results may 
be used to determine RNP compliance but a number of other applications are foreseen and 
discussed in Chapter Ten. 
In the following chapter, the first phase of capturing and then characterising the failure 
modes is presented followed by preliminary analyses of a number of the issues raised which 
are relevant to the simulation development in Chapter Seven. In Chapters Eight and Nine the 
models developed to assess integrity risk are formulated and results presented which show 
how the requirements listed above have been met and how RAIM algorithms based on these 
procedures may be employed to provide improved capabilities. In Chapter Ten, the output 
document which has been designed to accommodate the product of the operational 
evaluation is presented. Trial simulations for UK airports are also shown using the techniques 
described here and other chapters as well as further thoughts on other potential applications. 
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Figure 5.9 FMEA Structure 
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Chapter 6 
FAILURE MODES CHARACTERISATION 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Five, the two phases of research in this thesis on FMEA were identified. In the first 
phase, the objective is to capture and characterise the Global Positioning System's (GPS) 
failure modes. The second phase is concerned with looking at the effects of failures on 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) used for Non-Precision Approach (NPA) 
and Approach with Vertical Guidance (APV). This chapter covers the research work completed 
in the first phase. The second phase is addressed in Chapter Seven and covers software 
design, modelling and testing. 
This chapter begins in §6.2 by introducing the methods by which GPS manages the occurrence 
of failures. In §6.3-6.5 the ideas explored to fulfil the requirements of a complete Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are described. The first step of the FMEA involves 
analysing the navigation system with respect to its functions, interfaces, segments and 
environment (Pentti and Atte, 2002). A description of the GPS architecture and operation was 
given in Chapter Three in order to facilitate understanding of the processes which take place 
in order for a measurement to be taken. In §6.3 GPS is categorised according to function. 
Although there is little flexibility to compartmentalise GPS in a novel manner, this process is 
necessary to ensure all sources of failure are considered in the process. 
Once the system has been classified, the identification of potential failure modes within each 
subsystem may be undertaken. The gathering of these data must be done in accordance with 
a standard format to ensure comparisons can be made and a well-organised failure modes 
database may be kept. In §6.4, the data collection and storage of failure information is 
described, including the failure modes database in tabular form. 
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A discussion of the methodology for failure modelling is then proposed in §6.5 which includes 
much of the novelty in this FMEA phase. Real data analysis of orbit modelling errors is also 
described and their relation to the NAVSTAR messages which inform users of outages is 
analysed. The innovation presented in this chapter is in the most part conceptual and 
warrants a discussion of potential future applications which may be of particular relevance to 
Galileo policy. This is addressed in §6.5. 
6.2 GPS Integrity 
The current GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS) specifies a minimum level of Signal-ln-
Space (SIS) performance which is made available to civilian users (DoD, 2008). The 
specification of this performance is described by a number of parameters; the Required 
Navigation Performance (RNP) type parameters of accuracy, integrity, continuity and 
availability and a coverage specification. Integrity failures are expected to occur at a 
frequency of less than 1x10'^ per hour per satellite^. An integrity failure is defined as the SPS 
SIS User Range Error (LIRE) exceeding 4.42 times the user range accuracy (LIRA). In the GPS 
SPS 2001 standard, the maximum of 30m or 4,42 times the LIRA was used and due to its 
greater simplicity, the value of 30m is used where appropriate for comparison in §6.5. 
Integrity checking is not currently provided for the GPS SPS in real-time and the failures 
quantified by the SPS standard may last for extended periods. The first major initiative in the 
pursuit of better GPS integrity was the development of 'SATZAP' (Kovach and Conley, 1991). 
The SATZAP integrity provision was based on the VHP Omnidirectional Range (VOR) integrity 
concept which identified the six functions shown in Figure 6.1. The monitor function must 
provide independent received measurements at known locations and with the best possible 
coverage. This is supported by the monitor stations. The Master Control Station (MCS) 
performs the detect function but not in real time. Real-time checking is built-in to the GPS 
satellite navigation payload units but this only accounts for a proportion of possible failure 
modes. 
This f igure has recent ly been revised in t he GPS SPS 2008 s tandard t o m i r ro r t he Signal-ln-Space requ i rements 
specified by ICAO (2006). Previously t he rate speci f ied was 3 ma jo r service fai lures per year per conste l la t ion (DoD, 
2001). This equates t o approx imate ly 1.25x10'^ per hour per satel l i te o r 10^ per hour (Lee et al, 1996) f o r a single 
failed satel l i te- in-view o f t h e user. 
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MONITOR 
NOTIFY USER 
DETECT 
REPORT 
ACT 
REPAIR 
Figure 6.1 GPS Integrity Template (Kovach and Conley, 1991) 
The report function is also unclertal<en at tlie IVICS, including real-time reports on the 
conformity of received navigation message data to the uploaded data. The act function 
requires personnel to generate the necessary upload to switch the satellite to a Non-Standard 
Code (NSC) or flag as unhealthy. This may not currently be achieved in real-time. Delays from 
the onset of failure are specified to be less than 6 hours (DoD, 2008) and failures lasting hours 
rather than minutes have occurred (Langer et al, 2004). The nominal SATZAP response time 
should be 5 minutes (Kovach and Conley, 1991). Users are notified through Notices Advisory 
to Navstar Users (NANUs) which in aviation may be relayed by Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). 
The repair function is then executed following analysis and corrective action on the part of 
the MCS personnel. 
The desire for a better built-in GPS integrity service led to a number of improvements since 
SATZAP was implemented. Borne of the need for better all round GPS performance, the 
Legacy Accuracy Improvement Initiative (L-AII) was undertaken (Malys et al, 1997) with the 
aim to improve the MCS Kalman Filter accuracy, broadcast ephemeris and most critical to 
integrity, the ability to monitor the GPS Space Vehicles (SV). The L-AII included the addition of 
better modelling components for the forces acting on the SVs using data from the National 
Geospatial Agency (NGA) in order to achieve a 50% improvement in orbit accuracy (Warren 
and Racquet, 2001). The L-AII has also achieved a 23% improvement in User Range Error 
(LIRE) though this was partly attributed to more predictable clocks on the modern Block IIR 
SVs (Creel et al, 2007). The addition of the NGA network enabled global satellite coverage to 
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be achieved; so no SV is ever unmonitored by a ground station. Superior multi-station 
coverage allows operators to detect problems in a more timely fashion and with greater 
certainty. Although this is not reflected in the SPS Performance Standard (PS) (DoD, 2008) in 
terms of integrity, it does represent a practical improvement in reliability. The L-AII has 
assisted in the Architectural Evolution Program (AEP) whose role is to provide a much 
enhanced infrastructure of workstations, graphical user interface and internal 
communications to allow incremental MCS improvements needed for the new Block IIP and 
GPS III signals (Kaplan, 2006). The transition from the legacy system to the AEP control 
segment was completed in 2007 leading to smaller UREs from the Kalman filter (Taylor et 
al,2008). 
Whereas, GPS does not incorporate a disseminated integrity information service in its design, 
a number of external networks have been designed and implemented to monitor in real-time. 
These include systems developed primarily for aviation such as Satellite and Ground Based 
Augmentation Systems (SBAS/GBAS). The U.S Coast Guard (USCG) and U.K General Lighthouse 
Authority (GLA) maintain Differential GS (DGPS) services for mariners. On a global scale, the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) provides corrections in under 10 seconds (JPL, 2009) as part of 
its internet based DGPS commercial service. To greatly improve the latency in the detect and 
act phases of GPS monitoring, it was proposed to utilise these networks, particularly that of 
JPL (Langer et al, 2002) to ensure the integrity requirement in the SPS and PSS Performance 
Standards are met. This proposal has been formalised in the Global Dual Monitoring System 
(GDMS) whose goal is to bring real-time and/or near real-time measures of performance to 
GPS users. 
In addition to the enhancements targeted by the GDMS in terms of a monitoring capability, 
the Integrity Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (IFMEA) project (Van Dyke, 2004) has focused 
on identifying potential failures of the control and space segments, examining their likelihood 
and effects and recommending preventative actions for the future. Although, statements 
relating to public access of the IFMEA database have been made, the results are not available. 
However, these anomalies were used as part of the analysis for SBAS and the derived model is 
discussed in §6.5. Finally, the IFMEA will be used to identify modifications to the Operational 
Control System (OCS) and SVs for future GPS modernisations (Van Dyke, 2004). 
The existing approaches to GPS failure modelling such as the IFMEA and individual studies 
presented in §5.3 have not accounted for failures occurring in all segments. The potential 
exists for a total failure model framework and realisation of this framework by capturing all 
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possible failure modes. The next section outlines the occurrence of failures in each segnnent 
before the failure mode database is described. 
6.3 GPS Classification 
In §3.2 the GPS architecture was described to be made up of three segments: space, control, 
and user. Failures may occur in each of these segments which impact on the user range 
measurements. Furthermore, gross errors can occur (Knight and Finn, 1998) along the signal 
path due to ionospheric effects and multipath, although none are of the magnitude which 
pose a threat to Non-Precision Approaches (NPA)^. In the failure modes database presented 
in the following section, failures have been classified by the GPS segment in which they occur 
or as an environmental disturbance. The place in which the first failure event occurs is chosen 
e.g. navigation data errors may occur both in the generation and upload of data but also on-
board through data corruption. 
6.4 Failure Modes Database 
6.4.1 Defining the Failure Mode Entries 
The basis of an FMEA is the formation of a failure modes database which contains the 
information required to describe each failure mode and to analyse its impact on the system. 
Such information concerning the system failure modes is available from a number of sources; 
namely previous failure mode databases (RTCA, 1998; Walsh and Daly, 1995), fault 
investigation literature (Barker and Huser, 1998), signal monitoring reports (Cobb et al, 1995) 
and GNSS books. The nature of the information from each source and each failure mode may 
differ between such sources. In order to unify the various data sources, it is necessary to first 
assess which data fields the research project requires and how best this information will be 
formatted within a failure modes database. This ensures each failure mode is captured in its 
most accurate form. 
The approach taken within this thesis follows a tradition of categorising by GNSS segment, 
describing causes and precipitating factors to a failure onset and flagging each failure by type, 
such as a ramp or step error. Failure manifestations are detected by the control segment or 
4 
At an aler t l imi t o f 5 5 5 m an excessively large slope pa rameter is needed t o pro jec t er rors o f t he o rde r o f 10-30m 
beyond this value. 
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on-board the satellite in question. It is therefore necessary not only to specify the probability 
of occurrence for a failure but to characterise the detection period and how this impacts upon 
performance at the user level. 
Given the requirements described above, the data fields listed in Table 6.1 were defined to 
capture the relevant characteristics of each failure mode. 
Failure Mode ID {SPAxx,, CONxx, ENVxx, USExx} 
A n ident i f ie r consist ing of a t h r e e le t te r pref ix re la t ing 
t o t h e subsys tem/doma in {Space, Contro l , Env i ronment , User} and an in teger 
t o un ique ly ident i fy t he fa i lu re mode. 
Failure Mode Name The name o f t he fa i lu re mode , wh ich prov ides a br ie f 
descr ip t ion o f its nature . 
Segment {Space, Cont ro l , Env i ronment , User) 
Segment o r doma in in wh i ch t he fa i lu re arises. 
Description A more deta i led descr ip t ion o f the fa i lure m o d e than is 
ev ident f r o m t h e fa i lu re m o d e na me. 
Proximate Cause The reason f o r fa i lu re occurrence, usual ly one step backwards in t he system 
logic. 
Precipitating Events A descr ip t ion of o the r c i rcumstances wh i ch could lead t o a greater l ike l ihood o f 
fa i lure, e.g. high solar act iv i ty cou ld be a precursor t o an Ionospher ic 
sc int i l la t ion error . 
Probability The l ike l ihood t he fa i lu re mode occurs. Invariably g iven per SV, year , 
conste l la t ion, o rb i t , keystroke, l i fe t ime o r s tandard t i m e per iod . 
Type {OFF, STEP, RAMP, NOISE, WANDER, OTHER} 
Failure M o d e t ype t o categor ise t he stochast ic func t iona l behav iour o f t h e 
fa i led range measurement . 
STEP - A constant measu remen t bias o f f ixed magn i tude , speci f ied e i ther as a 
par t icu lar va lue o f measu remen t bias or over a range. 
RAMP - An increasing measu remen t e r ro r of constant e r ro r g rad ien t , speci f ied 
using the ramp e r ro r rate. 
NOISE - An increase in t he amb ien t noise levels o f a measurement , speci f ied in 
t e r m o f one s tandard dev ia t ion { 1 - sigma) 
WANDER - a stochast ic w a n d e r or r a n d o m wa lk o v e r t i m e in t he measu remen t 
var iable 
OTHER - an u n k n o w n o r var iable e f fec t 
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sv Outage A b inary f lag t o represent fa i lure modes wh ich may cause t h e satel l i te 
measurements t o be unavai lable t o t he user t h r o u g h loss o f lock o r o the r 
ef fects. 
Step Error The size of a s tep e r ro r if t he fa i lu re mode is of t h a t type . 
Ramp Error The rate o f r a m p er ror if t h e fa i lu re m o d e is o f t ha t t ype . 
Noise The resul tant Gaussian noise var iance. 
Wander The rate o f the mean square range e r ro r due t o a randomly w a n d e r i n g signal. 
Detection Responsibi l i ty The sub-system responsible f o r de tec t ing t h e given fa i lu re mode. This includes 
t he sate l l i te vehic le on -board checks, master con t ro l segment m o n i t o r i n g and 
user mon i to r ing . 
Undetected Probabi l i ty The probabi l i ty t he fa i lure m o d e wi l l go unde tec ted up t o t h e end o f t he 
unde tec ted per iod. 
Post-Detection Effect The resul t o f de tec t ion is given, wh i ch cou ld include user -mi t iga t ion such as 
m e a s u r e m e n t exclusion, an increase in URE o r the se t t i ng o f a SV t o unhea l thy . 
Undetected Period The t i m e per iod over wh i ch t he fa i lu re mode is nomina l ly unde tec ted . 
Potential Solut ions Comments re fer r ing t o possible so lut ions t o th is fa i lu re m o d e in t h e f u tu re . 
Remarks Fur ther commen ts re levant t o t h e fa i lu re mode model l ing. 
Source The source o f t he fa i lu re mode i n fo rma t ion . 
Table 6.1 Failure Modes Database Format 
The following sub-section provides the failure modes database used in this thesis. The 
majority of failure modes do not present a direct integrity threat as their threat as they have 
no impact on the pseudorange, i.e. loss of lock, instead resulting in a continuity outage. The 
failure modes for which an integrity threat remains are shaded in the table below, green 
signifying a lack of probabilistic information and inclusion in general orbit modelling errors 
which are covered in §6.5.3. The table presented is a summary of the complete database, 
consisting of the most relevant information to the task of failure characterisation described in 
§6.5. 
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6.4.2 The GPS Failure Modes Database 
6.4.2.1 Space Segment Failures 
Failure Fai lure M o d e N a m e Character is t ics 
Mode ID 
SPAl Clocl<Jump Descr ipt ion Clock phase or f requency j u m p due t o P-
(RTCA, 1998; Walsh code j u m p f r o m noisy e lectronics or nomina l 
and Daly, 2000) a tomic clock f requency deviat ions. 
Type S T E P / R A M P 
Magn i tude (Range, Range 0-3Om / 2.5 ms"' 
Rate) 
Probabi l i ty l .Oe -4 /hou r / sa t 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty S V / U s e r 
Unde tec ted Per iod 0 - l h r 
SPA2 M o m e n t u m D u m p Descr ipt ion Misa l igned componen ts o f angular 
(RTCA, 1998) m o m e n t u m fo l l ow ing d u m p act t o pe r tu rb 
t he satel l i te orb i t . 
Type RAMP 
IVlagnitude (Range) U n k n o w n (§6,5.3) 
Probabi l i ty U n k n o w n (§6.5.3) 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty SV, User 
Unde tec ted Per iod 120s 
SPA3 Non-Standard Code Descr ipt ion I n te rm i t t en t 6-second or 24-second per iods 
(NSC) o f non-s tandard code potent ia l ly caused by 
(Barker and Huser, satel l i te de tec t ion logic. 
1998; RTCA, 1998; 
W u , 1999) 
Type OFF 
Magn i tude N/A 
Probabi l i ty 3 0 / S V / y e a r 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Undetec ted Period N/A (always de tec ted unless codeless 
receiver) 
SPA4 NSC (FSDU) Descr ipt ion M i n u t e long periods o f NSC due t o excessive 
(RTCA, 1998) up load. May be accompan ied by SIS code 
phase e r ro r ef fects of 0 -30m. 
Type OFF 
Magn i tude N/A 
Probabi l i ty 4.1e-2 / SV/ year 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Undetec ted Period N/A (always de tec ted unless codeless 
receiver) 
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SPA5 Clock Dr i f t {A tomic Descr ip t ion Extreme d r i f t in clock phase due t o fa i lure in 
Clock Power Supply) a tomic clock's p o w e r supply . 
(GPS Suppor t , 2006; 
RTCA, 1998) 
Type RAMP 
Magn i t ude (Range rate) 54km / hr 
Probabi l i ty 6 , 6 e - 3 / S V / y e a r 
Detec t ion Responsibi l i ty Cont ro l 
Unde tec ted Per iod 0.0-4.0 hrs (de tec t ion l ikely t o occur quickly 
due t o excessive magni tude) 
SPA6 Clock Dr i f t (A tomic Descr ipt ion Dr i f t in t he clock phase due t o fa i lure in 
Clock Electronics) a tomic clock's electronics. 
(GPS Suppor t , 2006; 
RTCA, 1998) 
Type RAMP 
Magn i tude (Range rate) 10 m / hr 
Probabi l i ty l . l e - 2 / S V / y e a r 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty Cont ro l 
Unde tec ted Period 1.5-4.0 hrs 
SPA7 Clock Dr i f t (A tomic Descr ipt ion Dr i f t in t h e clock phase due t o fa i lure in 
Clock Servo a tomic clock's servo mechanism wh i ch 
Mechan ism) corrects the f requency t o t he cor rec t 
{GPS Suppor t , 2006; s tandard. 
RTCA, 1998) 
Type RAMP 
Magn i tude {Range rate) 10m / hr 
Probabi l i ty l . O e - 2 / S V / y e a r 
Detec t ion Responsibi l i ty Cont ro l 
Unde tec ted Period 1.5 - 4.0 hrs 
SPAS Clock Dr i f t (A tomic Descr ipt ion Dr i f t in clock phase due t o fa i lu re in a tom ic 
Clock Cs/Rb tube) clock's tube . 
(GPS Suppor t , 2006; 
RTCA, 1998) 
Type RAMP 
Magn i t ude (Range rate) 10m / hr 
Probabi l i ty 3 . 3 e - l / S V / y e a r 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty Cont ro l 
Undetec ted Per iod 0.0 - 4.0 hrs {mos t lil<ely t o be de tec ted in 
advance and inc luded In t e l e m e t r y - RTCA 
(1998)) 
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5PA9 Clock Dr i f t (A tomic Descr ipt ion 
Clock Oscil lator) 
(GPS Suppor t , 2006; 
RTCA, 1998) 
Type 
Magn i t ude (Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detec t ion Responsibi l i ty 
Unde tec ted Period 
Dr i f t in clock phase due t o fa i lu re in a tom ic 
clock's osci l la tor or oven 
RAMP 
2 1 0 0 0 k m / h r 
3 . 5 e - 3 / S V / y e a r 
Contro l 
0 . 0 - 4 . 0 hr 
SPAIO 
S P A l l 
Clock Dr i f t (A tomic 
Clock Tun ing 
Register) 
(GPS Suppor t , 2006; 
RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ip t ion 
Type 
Magn i t ude (Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Unde tec ted Per iod 
Clock Dr i f t (A tomic 
Clock Thermal Base 
plate) 
(GPS Suppor t , 2006; 
RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ipt ion 
Type 
Magn i t ude (Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detec t ion Responsibi l i ty 
Dr i f t in clock phase due t o fa i lu re in a tom ic 
clock's t u n i n g register 
RAMP 
2 1 6 4 m / hr 
2 . 1 e - 5 / S V / y e a r 
Cont ro l 
1.5 - 4 .0 hrs 
Dr i f t in clock phase due t o fa i lu re in a tom ic 
clock's t h e r m a l base plate sensi t ive t o 
changes in satel l i te t empe ra tu re . 
RAMP 
2.5m / hr 
U n k n o w n (RTCA, 1998) 
Cont ro l 
Undetec ted Period 1.5 - 4 .0hr 
SPA12 Clock Phase 
Random W a n d e r 
(RTCA, 1998; Walsh 
and Daly, 2000; 
RTCA, 1998; 
Ochieng et al, 2003) 
Descr ip t ion Random W a n d e r in clock phase due t o 
natural in tegra ted phase noise 
Type WANDER 
Magn i tude (Range rate - mean) 1.0m / hr 
Probabi l i ty 1.0 / SV / year 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty Cont ro l 
Undetec ted Per iod 1.5 - 4.0 hrs 
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SPA13 Clock Frequency Descr ipt ion 
Jump (RTCA 1998) 
Type 
Magn i t ude (Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Period 
Dr i f t in clock phase due t o random shi f t In 
f requency. 
RAMP 
2.0m / hr 
1 . 0 / S V / y e a r 
Cont ro l 
1.5 - 4.0 
SPAM Bit Hi t 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ipt ion 
Type 
Magn i tude 
Probabi l i ty 
Detec t ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Period 
Erroneous bi t in 50Hz Navigat ion Message 
due t o cosmic ray. 
OFF 
N/A 
U n k n o w n 
SV 
Var iable (most l ikely de tec ted by user 
receiver, po ten t ia l o rb i t or clock or data 
er ror ) 
SPA15 Electr ical ly-Alterable Descr ipt ion 
Read-Only M e m o r y 
Failure 
(Cellere, 2006; 
Barker and Huser, 
1998) 
Type 
Magn i tude 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Unde tec ted Period 
Repeat ing fa i lure due t o SV EAROM storage 
damage potent ia l ly f r o m heavy ion cosmic 
rays. 
OFF 
N/A 
U n k n o w n 
SV 
Var iable (po ten t ia l t o a l low bi t hits t o occur 
- ef fects covered in SPA16, most l ikely 
impac t on measu remen t is t h rough 
ephemer is data er ror ) 
SPA16 Misal igned 
Navigat ion 
Stream 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ipt ion 
Data 
Type 
Magn i t ude 
Probabi l i ty 
Detec t ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Period 
Words 3-10 misal igned t o sub f r a m e 
boundary most l ikely due t o a b i t h i t on t he 
f r ame f o r m a t t i n g tab le on-board t h e SV. 
OFF 
N/A 
U n k n o w n 
SV 
0.00 (de tec ted on-board , o the rw ise 
certa in ly by t he user) 
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SPA17 Synch Loss 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ipt ion 
Type 
Magn i tude (Range) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Period 
Loss of synchron isat ion be tween baseband 
and navigat ion processor 
STEP 
3000km 
3 . 0 e - 2 / S V / y e a r 
SV 
0.00 (de tec ted on -board SV, o the rw ise 
certa in ly by t he user) 
SPAIS 
SPA19 
SemHvT^or Axis 
(Ochieng et at, 
2003) 
Descr ipt ion 
Type 
Magn i tude (Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Unde tec ted Per iod 
Shif t in semi -ma jo r axis du r ing ecl ipse 
RAMP 
8 m / hr 
(1.0 / SV l i fe t ime - (RTCA, 1998)) 
or U n k n o w n 
Cont ro l 
U n k n o w n (f irst ecl ipse m o n i t o r e d by con t ro l 
segment) 
M e t e o r Impact 
Delta-V 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ipt ion 
Type 
Magn i tude (Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Period 
SV may receive a del ta-V f r o m the impac t o f 
a me teo r causing a m ino r change in orb i ta l 
t ra jec to ry 
RAMP 
O- lOm / s 
U n k n o w n 
Cont ro l 
1.5 - 4.0 hrs 
SPA20 M o d u l a t i o n 
Imper fec t ions 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ipt ion C/A and P(Y) code t r ansm i t t ed 
asynchronously due t o in terna l ha rdware 
delays 
Type STEP 
Magn i tude (Range) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detec t ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Period 
1.5-4.0m 
1.00 / SV / cont ro l ca l ibra t ion 
Cont ro l 
Variable 
SPA21 A l t i t ude Instabi l i ty Descr ipt ion 
(Lopes eta I, 2000) 
Type 
Magn i tude (Range) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Period 
Table 6.2 Space Segment Failures 
Reaction W h e e l inaccuracy f o l l o w i n g 
manoeuvre 
STEP 
0-9 Om 
U n k n o w n 
Cont ro l 
1.5 - 4.0 hrs 
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6.4.2.2 Control Segment Failures 
Failure 
Mode ID 
Fai lure M o d e N a m e Character is t ics 
CONl MCS Upload Error 
(Wrong File) 
(Barker and Huser, 
1998; Ochieng ef al, 
2003; RTCA,1998) 
Descr ipt ion 
Type 
Magn i t ude 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
MCS er roneous ly accesses i r re levant data 
w h e n bu i ld ing an up load 
OFF 
N/A 
U n k n o w n 
SV/User 
Undetec ted Per iod 
T 6 T r ' " ' ™ ' m r T J p f o a d Error 
(Missed o r delayed 
upload) 
(RTCA, 1998) 
U n k n o w n 
Descr ipt ion 
Type 
Magn i t ude (Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Per iod 
Failure t o p e r f o r m scheduled up load 
wh ich causes URE t o g row at t h e nomina l 
l inear r a m p 
RAMP 
2.00 m/s 
1 . 0 0 / y e a r 
Cont ro l 
1.5-8.0hrs 
CONS MCS Upload Error Descr ipt ion 
(Bad data) 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Type 
Magn i t ude (Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Unde tec ted Period 
Independent Kalman f i l ters diverge due t o 
biased t rack ing data 
RAMP 
0.00 - 2.00 m/s (nomina l ly smal l due t o 
a u t o m a t e d checking RTCA (1998)) 
U n k n o w n 
MCS 
0.25-24hrs 
C0N4 MCS Upload Error Descr ipt ion 
(Grossly Bad 
Reference Orbi t ) 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Type 
Magn i tude (Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Unde tec ted Per iod 
Incorrect ly updated o rb i t o r f i le 
managemen t 
RAMP 
Unknown 
9 . 1 e - 4 / S V / y e a r 
Contro l 
0.25-24.0hrs 
174 
175 
C0N5 MCS Upload Error Descr ipt ion 
(Wrong SV 
Select ion) 
(Barker and Huser, 
1998; RTCA, 1998) 
Upload may be sent to the w r o n g SV 
Type STEP 
Magn i tude (Range) =7400000m 
Probabi l i ty U n k n o w n 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty SV 
Undetec ted Period 0.00 (de tec ted by sate l l i te wh i ch swi tches 
t o NSC) 
n m r - Error Descr ipt ion Incorrect data inpu t f r o m the ear th 
(Bad Earth o r ien ta t ion and ro ta t i on data wh ich are 
Or ien ta t ion and used in SV o rb i t compu ta t i on . Potent ia l 
Rotat ion Data) human er ror o r so f tware ma in tenance 
(RTCA,1998) issue. 
Type STEP, RAMP 
Magn i t ude (Range, Range rate) 10m, 0.0056m/s 
Probabi l i ty 5.2e-8 / conste l la t ion / year 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty Contro l / D M A 
Unde tec ted Period l . S h r - 8.0hr 
C0N7 MCS Upload Error Descr ipt ion Errors in t he broadcast Ionospher ic mode l 
(Single f requency parameters due t o so f tware o r i npu t solar 
Ionospher ic m o d e l ) parameters 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Type NOISE 
Magn i tude 13.7m (Based on Tota l Electron Count 
(TEC) in a highly charged a tmosphere ) 
Probabi l i ty 2.4e-2 / data up load 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Unde tec ted Period 1 . 5 - 8 . 0 h r 
CONlh MCS Upload Error Descr ipt ion SW errors usually f o u n d du r ing tes t i ng o f 
(Misc Mission SW new release o r f o l l ow ing so f tware 
Errors) ma in tenance 
Type OTHER 
Magn i tude U n k n o w n 
Probabi l i ty U n k n o w n 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty Cont ro l 
Undetec ted Per iod 1,5-8.Ohrs 
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C0N8 
CONS 
MCS Upload Error 
(Curve Fit Errors) 
{Ochieng et al, 
2003; RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ipt ion 
Type 
Magn i tude (Range sigma) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Period 
Incorrect ly f i t navigat ion data, l umpy 
orbi ts 
NOISE 
0 .4m 
1 . 0 0 / U p l o a d 
Cont ro l 
Un l im i ted 
Opera t iona l Errors 
(Man- ln-The-Loop) 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ip t ion 
Type 
Magn i tude 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Period 
Human keyst roke e r ro r o r mistakes 
f o l l ow ing procedures 
OTHER 
U n k n o w n 
l .Oe-3 / keystroke 
Con t ro l /Opera to r 
Var iable 
CONIO Operat iona l Errors 
(Erroneous SV Flags) 
(RTCA, 1998) 
CON 11 
CON 12 
Descr ipt ion 
Type 
Magn i tude (Range, Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detec t ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Per iod 
Unhea l thy satel l i te may be set as heal thy, 
potent ia l ly t o o early f o l l o w i n g manoeuvre 
or schedu led /unschedu led outage 
STEP, RAMP 
O-lOOOm, 5 . 0 m / h r 
4 . 7 e - 6 / Conste l la t ion / y e a r 
Cont ro l /User 
1.5 - 4.0 
Operat iona l Error 
(Not f lagged 
unheal thy) 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ipt ion Unhea l thy Satel l i te may not be f lagged 
Type 
Magn i tude (Range rate) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Per iod 
RAMP 
1 2 0 m / h r 
5.0e-S / conste l la t ion / year 
Cont ro l 
1.5-24hrs 
Operat iona l Error 
(Bad TGD Value) 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Descr ipt ion 
Type 
Magn i t ude (Range) 
Probabi l i ty 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty 
Undetec ted Per iod 
Incorrect TGD value prov ided fo r single 
f requency ionospher ic m o d e l due to 
database or so f twa re main tanence er ror 
STEP 
17.9m 
1 . 0 / S V / y e a r 
Contro l 
Un l im i ted 
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C0N13 Opera t iona l Error Descr ip t ion W r o n g set t ings in MCS database may 
(Bad U cause incorrect dual f requency f lags. 
Conf igurat ion Flags) 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Type NOISE 
Magn i t ude (Range sigma) 13.7m 
Probabi l i ty 1 . 0 / S V / y e a r 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty Cont ro l /User 
Undetec ted Period Un l im i ted 
CON 14 Opera t iona l Error Descr ipt ion Incorrect database con t ro l a t t h e MCS due 
( Incorrect database t o men ta l e r ror , keystroke or so f tware 
cont ro l ) ma in tenance er ror 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Type 
Magn i t ude (Range rate) 0 -0 .3m / s 
Probabi l i ty 6.2e-9 
Detec t ion Responsibi l i ty Cont ro l 
Undetec ted Per iod 1 . 5 - 4 . 0 h r s 
CON 15 Bad Tracking Data Descr ipt ion Tracking data f r o m MS can j u m p by a z-
(Z-Count T ime count due t o t i m e code genera to r 
Jump) 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Type(Range) STEP 
Magn i tude 450000000m 
Probabi l i ty 1 . 0 / S V / y e a r 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty Contro l 
Unde tec ted Period 0.00 
CON 16 Bad Tracking Data Descr ipt ion MS t rack ing data can j u m p by one p-code 
(P-chip Time Jump) chip due t o MS DEMOD un i t 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Type(Range) STEP 
Magn i tude 30 .0m (2.0m - Post detect ion) 
Probabi l i ty 1 . 0 / S V / Y e a r 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty Contro l 
Undetec ted Per iod 0.00 
CON 17 Bad Tracking Data Descr ipt ion MS SV's t rack ing data reflects s imi lar SV 
(MS Clock Failure) fa i lure m o d e 
(RTCA, 1998) 
Type (Range rate) RAMP 
Magn i tude 10.0m / hr (2.0m - Post detec t ion) 
Probabi l i ty 0 . 3 / S V / y e a r 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty Cont ro l 
Undetec ted Period 0.00 
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C O N l l e Bad Tracking Data Descr ipt ion Erroneously decoded message due t o 
(Noisy 50Hz Data) noise in receiver c o m p o n e n t a t t he 
(RTCA, 1998) m o n i t o r i n g s ta t ion 
Type NOISE 
Magn i tude (Range) =10.0m 
Probabi l i ty 1 . 0 / S V / y e a r 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty Contro l 
Unde tec ted Per iod 1.5 - 4.0 hrs 
C0N12 Orb i t M is -mode l l i ng Descr ipt ion Errors in t he broadcast ephemer ides due 
(Ochieng etal, 2003 t o mis -mode l l ing (potent ia l ly f o l l ow ing an 
eclipse) 
Type STEP 
Magn i tude 5 .0m+ 
Probabi l i ty TBD 
Detec t ion Responsibi l i ty Cont ro l 
Undetec ted Period 1.5 - 4.0 hrs 
Table 6.3 Control Segment Failures 
6.4.2.3 Environment Failures 
Failure Fai lure M o d e N a m e Character is t ics 
Mode ID 
ENVl Ionospher ic Delay Descr ipt ion Ionosphere causes a delay t o t h e single 
f requency signal 
Type STEP, NOISE 
Magn i t ude (Range, Range sigma) 27 .4m, 13.7m (Post-correct ions) 
Probabi l i ty 1.00 (nomina l ly occur r ing and corrected) 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Unde tec ted Period N/A 
ENV2 Ionospher ic Descr ipt ion Tempora ry high e lec t ron densit ies a long 
Scint i l lat ion signal path cause signal d is turbance 
(Ochieng e t al, 
Angus, 2006; Bhat t i , 
2007) 
Type STEP, OFF 
Magn i tude 10-50 m 
Probabi l i ty U n k n o w n 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Undetec ted Per iod U n k n o w n 
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ENV3 Tropospher ic Delay Descr ipt ion Troposphere causes a delay due t o 
bend ing o f t he signal 
Type STEP, NOISE 
Magn i t ude (Range, Range sigma) 10.0m, 2 .0m (Post-correct ions) 
Probabi l i ty 1.00 (nomina l ly occurring and corrected) 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Undetec ted Period N/A 
ENV4 Lightening Strike Descr ipt ion Receiver Inoperab i l i ty due to l igh ten ing 
(Walsh and Daly, str ike 
2000) 
Type OFF 
Magn i tude N/A 
Probabi l i ty U n k n o w n 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Undetec ted Period U n k n o w n 
ENV5 Excessive M u l t i p a t h Descr ipt ion Errors resu l t ing f o r m the recept ion o f the 
(Bhatt i , 2007; GPS signal f o l l o w i n g re f lec t ion f r o m 
Ho f fman-We l l enho f su r round ing surfaces 
et a/, 2001) 
Type NOISE 
Magn i tude 10-20m 
Probabi l i ty U n k n o w n 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Undetec ted Period U n k n o w n 
Table 6.4 Environment Failures 
6.4.2.4 User Segment Failures 
Failure Fai lure M o d e N a m e Character is t ics 
Mode ID 
USEl Navigat ion Data Read Descr ipt ion Failure t o obta in requ i red 
Errors (Barker and navigat ion data f r o m t h e 
Huser, 1998; Niesner received message due t o data 
and Johannsen, 2000) errors, ha rdware fa i lure (e.g. 
( tempera tu re ) , e lect ronic noise 
Type OTHER 
Magn i tude N/A 
Probabi l i ty TBD 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Undetec ted Per iod Unknown 
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USE2 Badly f o r m a t t e d o u t p u t Descr ipt ion Bad data t h o u g h t he cer t i f ied 
(Walsh and Daly, 2000) o u t p u t por t 
Type OTHER 
Magn i tude N/A 
Probabi l i ty U n k n o w n 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Undetec ted Per iod U n k n o w n 
USE3 A lgor i thmic Errors Descr ipt ion Assumpt ions may lead t o over-
( loannldes et al, 2005; opt lmls t lc p ro tec t ion levels 
Brown and Chin, 1997) 
Type OTHER 
Magn i tude N/A 
Probabi l i ty U n k n o w n 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty User 
Undetec ted Period U n k n o w n 
USE4 Inadequate Tra in ing Descr ipt ion Inadequate t ra in ing In t h e use o f 
(CAA, 2007) GPS could cause incor rec t data 
input 
Type OTHER 
Magn i t ude N/A 
Probabi l i ty 1 . 0 / User / l i fe t ime 
Detect ion Responsibi l i ty State / User 
Undetec ted Period Varies 
Table 6.5 User Segment Failures 
6.5 Failure Models 
Once identification lias been completed to the highest degree possible, determining how the 
failures affect the navigation solution depends on the threat model. This has to some extent 
been decided by categorising failures by 'type'. The approach taken by Bhatti (2007) was to 
select on the basis of analysis and testing which type possessed the greatest threat to system 
integrity. This decision was taken for the integrated GPS and inertial systems and suggested 
slowly growing ramp errors posed the greatest threat. However, the goal of this thesis is to 
enable a complete FMEA process which accounts for all failure types and their impacts. The 
thesis restricts itself to snapshot RAIM assessment, which although simplifying analysis in 
some respects, actually runs against the techniques employed to assess temporally variant 
failures, such as ramp errors and random walks. A novel approach to modelling these failure 
types is needed. 
180 
181 
One approach which has been taken in modelling of GPS failures is that of the Wide Area 
Augmentation System (WAAS) model (Fernow, 2005). The resultant failure model is a series of 
step, ramp and ramp rate type failures of different probabilities. The relation of this model to 
the one presented here is discussed in §6.6. The approach taken in this thesis is to make use 
of as much information within the failure database as is feasible. This is used to derive a total 
failure model which accounts for all failures in each of the GPS segments and propagation 
environment. The goal is to derive a model which is applicable to standalone users and which 
may be used as the basis for a novel RAIM algorithm. The framework for this model is 
outlined in §6.5.1 before each failure type is formulated within this framework in §6.5.2. 
Finally, orbit modelling errors are investigated in §6.5.3 to account for the unquantified 
failures shaded green in Table 6.2-Table 6.5. 
6.5.1 A Total Failure Model 
Prior to this thesis, the definition of a failure for snapshot RAIM had been a binary one. There 
have been methodologies presented which extend the measurement noise concept to a more 
general distribution than the commonly assumed Gaussian. These have aimed to account for 
outliers and greater probability density mass in the tails. Pullen et al (2002) suggested the use 
of Gaussian and Gamma distributions as an alternative to modelling each failure mode 
separately. However, high realism and accuracy of this approach are not assured. 
Panagiotakopoulos (2009) proposed the use of Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to represent the 
tail of the measurement error distribution. However, utilisation of this approach in current 
RAIM algorithms is not a trivial task. The FMEA proposed in this thesis addresses these issues 
by conservatively yet realistically incorporating all failures into a total model. Furthermore, 
the methodology presented is useful for RAIM algorithm performance testing as well as 
implementation within a snapshot or Bayesian on-board integrity monitor. 
The majority of snapshot least squares RAIM algorithms which have been developed employ a 
linear measurement model (equation 3.43) which under the null hypothesis assumes 
measurement errors that are Gaussian. Under the alternative hypothesis it is commonly 
assumed a single measurement has a bias of size B whilst the remaining measurements have 
zero bias and noise identical to that of the null hypothesis. To interface with a snapshot RAIM 
algorithm a failure mode probability model is required to provide a distribution in terms of 
the bias value i.e. the instantaneous magnitude of that failure. The form of this distribution 
for the classical service failure definition given in the GPS SPS (DoD, 2008) is: 
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P(B>T)-p,3H,,, (6.1) 
P(B<T) = l - p , „ _ (6.2) 
where Pfaiiure is derived from the integrity failure rate (GPS SPS, 2008) and T is naturally set at 
4.42 times the LIRA (or 30m in the previous edition) as specified. 
The failure modelling phase of this research aims to overhaul the above definition by 
presenting a more realistic, yet practically applicable form. The primary use of the failure 
modes database presented in §6.4 is to provide probabilities over the range of possible 
measurement biases. The failure model should be used to generate a file which expresses the 
probability of the range error magnitude at a range of bias values: 
P(0<B<bJ = cdf, (6.3) 
P( b| < B < bi^i) = cdf, (6.4) 
b ^ ) = cdf^..i (6.5) 
P ( b _ < B ) = cd f_ (6.6) 
Equations 6.3-6.6 show a more general framework than the classic definition given in 6.1-6.2. 
It is clear that the choice of bi's is an important factor. In order to demonstrate the concept 
the following values were employed: 
Bias values between 0 and 200m are taken at Im intervals - 0:1:200. 
Bias values between 200m and 1000m are taken at 10m intervals - 200:1000m. 
This results in a set of 282 b values. A maximum value of 1000m was chosen as biases above 
this value will be detected by the user RAIM algorithm with a probability which far exceeds 
the required confidence level. The I m and 10m intervals are chosen as they are round 
numbers but could be altered easily if results from testing the model in a RAIM algorithm 
suggested a finer resolution is needed. 
Given this framework it is necessary to convert the probability of each relevant failure mode 
given in §6.4.2 to the format described above in equations 6.3-6.6. Observing the failure 
mode database, it is clear two complications make such a task challenging. Firstly, failure 
modes occur in a variety of ways and the categorisation of particular failure types may require 
that different methods are needed to convert the failure mode profile in the database to the 
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bias magnitude format required. Secondly, the probabilities of occurrence are not specified 
over a standardised time period. 
For certain failure types, it is simple to calculate these probabilities for a single independent 
epoch at the user location. For example, the step error type can be modelled as a step 
function. Figure 6.1 below shows the probability density function for a step type failure mode. 
Figure 6.2 Step Type Failure Mode Density Function 
Difficulty arises, for the temporarily dependent failure mode types - ramp error and random 
wander. A ramp error will have a very low detection probability at low bias values early in its 
manifestation. However, as the ramp error continues to grow, the detection of an error 
becomes more likely both by the user and control segment. This leads to a mitigation strategy 
being applied such as exclusion at the receiver or setting the SV to unhealthy for repair at the 
MCS. It would be more realistic to model the change in detection probability due to the 
impact of monitoring by the MCS including lieu times between detection and visibility to the 
user. 
The variation in time periods over which the failure mode probabilities are specified led to the 
decision to format the model in terms of the instantaneous probability of failure over a given 
bias range (b, to bi+i). From a practical user point of view, this is equivalent to answering the 
question - given the GPS constellation at epoch tnow, what are the probabilities that a latent 
failure is present now for each satellite at each bias? This diverges from the traditional 
approach within aviation performance analysis of specifying probabilities over an hour or a 
single approach (150s). This is possible due to the limits imposed by the undetected duration 
parameter and the implicit assumption that failures do not overlap for a single SV. This 
implies that the probability of failure is constant between neighbouring time points. This 
varies from the case of a number of sources of measurement noise, namely ionospheric 
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interference due to spatial and temporal correlation effects. A small number of failure modes 
share properties with noise-like errors and could be formulated differently within a model 
that does not match the snapshot magnitude based approach taken here. However, the 
majority of these errors have a negligible impact on the final model and in any case an 
instantaneous probability of failure computed without accounting for previous epochs is 
conservative. Similarly, for the computation of performance metrics, the decorrelation 
coefficient should refer to the measurement noise component only when determining the 
spacing of independent samples. At each of these samples the probabilities derived may be 
used. 
The notion of a failure model in terms of the instantaneous probability of failure as a function 
of bias has been proposed. In order to implement this framework for all failure modes, a 
mechanism for converting their database entries into this form is needed. For each failure 
type, this process is described in §6.5.2. 
6.5.2 Failure Type Models 
The following sections describe the methods employed to compute P( b, < B < b|^ ^ 11„^„ ) , the 
probability that a failure induced bias lies between biases biand bi+i at the current epoch tnow, 
for each failure type. 
6.5.2.1 Ramp Error Type 
The basis for computing P( b, < B < bj^ ^ | t „„„) for the ramp error failure type is to calculate 
the length of time the measurement error magnitude for a particular failure mode remains 
within the range b^  <B < bj^ ^ . Given any time period (e.g. 1 hour) over which the probability 
of failure mode occurrence is stated in the failure modes database, it is possible to determine 
the proportion of this time period which equates to the length of time the measurement 
error magnitude is within the relevant range. Consider the following example: 
A ramp error of O.OSms^ which occurs at 1x10'^ per hour. Computing the instantaneous 
probability of a range error magnitude between 36m and 37m. 
This failure would take 20s to increase by I m which is a 180*'^  (5.556x10'^) of one hour. 
Therefore, without considering the detection of such a failure: 
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P(36m <B< 37m | ) = ( lO")x(5.556x 10 ' )= 5.556x 10^ (6.7) 
However, consideration of the detection and mitigation of the failure is relevant for large bias 
magnitudes. The undetected duration parameter is used to determine if the probability an 
error of a given magnitude may have been detected and action taken to remedy the failure or 
switch the SV to unhealthy status. The effect of detection on the probability of particular bias 
values is clear from Figure 6.3 which shows the growth of an error and the reduction in 
probability that the failure remains undetected. 
a) 
bias 
magnitude 
tfail ^det time 
b) 
probability 
bin bias 
Figure 6.3 Ramp Error Type a) Magnitude vs. Time b) Probability vs. Bias Magnitude 
The undetected duration is specified as a range (denoted by dt^w and dthigh) by (RTCA, 1998) 
(e.g. 1.5 - 4.0 hours). Therefore, the following two conditions can be deduced for the 
probability of detection in terms of the current epoch tnow and epoch at which the failure 
occurs tfaii: 
P( detected |t„„^ - t^ „ < d t ^ ) =0.0 
P( detected |t„„„ - t ^ , >dt^,^) =1.0 
(6.8) 
(6.9) 
This leads to the determination of the maximum bias and the maximum undetectable bias of 
the particular failure mode (denoted bint and b^ ax respectively in Figure 6.3b) for range rate, r; 
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P(det|B<b,„,) =0.0 where =rdt,„„ 
P( det |B > ) -1 .0 where = rdt^;^ 
(6.10) 
(6.11) 
The remaining task is to determine the form of the probability model between the two bias 
values bint and bmax- There is a lack of information in the public domain on the performance of 
detection and repair procedures. Therefore, it is necessary to make a conservative 
assumption as to the form of probability distribution. The starting point for this assumption is 
a geometric series with probability q, which is used to describe the detection function applied 
at discrete time points, t^. 
P( det t^) = P(undet ) xp(det t^ |undet t^ _^) = ( l - q ) " ^ q (6.12) 
The probability of detection depends upon the background measurement noise and 
instantaneous magnitude of the failure bias. The correlation of measurement noise leads to a 
partially discretised system akin to the model described in equation 6.12 which combined 
with the assumption that the failure bias is not expected to decrease, results in the model 
being pessimistic. This assumption is valid for all failure modes specified in the failure modes 
database. Periodic type failures as described in Bhatti (2007) for the case of MEIVIS inertial 
navigation components would fail this mean condition. Under this condition, the use of a 
geometric series with constant probability of detection q is guaranteed to be conservative. 
The form taken by the probabilities of detection and no detection are shown in Figure 6.4. 
detection 
probability 
no detection 
probability 
time time 
Figure 6.4 Detection probability 
The form of this model is not to accurately determine the probability distribution of detection 
but to provide a basis for a further approximation and to substantiate the assumption of a 
linear form shown in Figure 6.5. 
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probability bound 
% 
model 
time 
Figure 6.5 Bound of theoretical geometric series approximation 
If the cumulative density function is defined to be linear over the range b,nt to b^x as shown 
in Figure 6.5 then this would bound the probability of no detection given by a geometric 
series model. This may be excessively conservative, yet it is a simple, valid and effective 
approximation for this function and bounds any cumulative density function with a shrinking 
negative gradient. Therefore, the use of a linear decrease in failure probability from the onset 
of the detection period is conservative but appropriate for the model. 
6.5.2.2 Step Error type 
A step error is the most simple of failure types in that it is temporally invariant as shown in 
Figure 6,6a. The magnitude of failure remains constant over the time between the failure 
onset and mitigation following detection. To compute the failure probability over a particular 
bias range, it is simply necessary to integrate the probability density function of occurrence 
with respect to time, equivalent to calculating the area under the graph shown in Figure 6.6b. 
This probability must then be multiplied by the maximum time before detection occurs to 
obtain the desired probability. Step type errors may be specified either at a single value 
Figure 6.6ci or over a range Figure 6.6cii. In each case the bias range is extended to the end of 
the bins defined in §6.5.1. 
a) 
bias 
magnitude 
tfail ^det time 
187 
188 
b) 
probability 
tfail idet ; ^det_high time 
C.i) 
probability 
c.ii) 
probability 
1 
Atep ^min ^max 
Figure 6.6 Step Error a) Failure mode magnitude vs. time b) Probability of failure present vs. 
time c.i) Single Value - probability vs. bias magnitude c.ii) Range of Values - probability vs. 
bias magnitude 
6.5.2.3 Noise Error type 
A failure mode which results in an increase in the ambient measurement noise is specified by 
a Sigma value relating to an assumed Gaussian model of the new noise component as shown 
in Figure 6.7. It is trivial to compute the probabilities at the range error magnitudes of 
relevance using the error function. 
Figure 6.7 Gaussian Noise 
6.5.2.4 Wander Error type 
The resultant effect of a random wander failure mode is similar to a random noise component 
but the expected mean square error grows as a function of time as opposed to being 
constant. The random wander parameter, k represents the growth in mean variation from a 
zero error magnitude over a particular time frame. The conservative assumption is made that 
detection only occurs at the end of the detection range specified in the failure mode 
188 
189 
database, which implies the mean square error deviation equates to kxdtdet- The deviation 
from the mean is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution with mean kxdtdet- Once again an 
error function is used to compute the probability of failure mode magnitudes under this 
conservative model. 
6.5.3 Orbit Modelling Errors 
6.5.3.1 Introduction 
Limitations were found in §6.4.2 with the comprehensiveness of the knowledge of failure 
modes relating to modelling of the orbital parameters which are broadcast in the navigation 
message. The probability and magnitude of gross orbit errors is not provided by the RTCA 
aberration document 034-01 (RTCA, 1998) which is the main source for the failure 
probabilities. Studies in the variation of orbit errors have been undertaken by Jefferson and 
Bar-Sever (2000) and Warren and Racquet (2003). Jefferson and Bar-Sever found that a high 
proportion of outliers occurred through receiver malfunction and can be excluded through 
comparison of orbital parameters between monitoring stations. In real time it is clear that the 
receiver may make anomalous interpretations of the orbit parameters but such excessive 
outliers are accounted for in the receiver specification (RTCA, 2004). The pre-processed data 
with outliers removed were found to be accurate to the 5-lOm level over the period of 1998-
2000. This thesis follows the same approach of removing such outliers to ensure the errors 
are not due to faults at the monitoring stations. The 3D position error between broadcast 
ephemerides and precise post-processed orbits were compared. In reality, the range error 
visible to the user is not directly related to the 3D satellite position error. The radial error 
component has a greater impact upon user range-error. Therefore, the metric introduced by 
Malys et al (1997) is used to represent the approximate range error at the user. The Signal-ln-
Space Range Error (SISRE) is a measure of the satellite clock phase errors and ephemeris 
errors which impact the user. 
SISRE = J(R - CLK)' |(A' + C ) (6.13) 
S 1 S R E „ , - J ( R n ^ V + C ^ ) (6.14) 
where 
R = radial ephemeris error 
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A = along track ephemeris error 
C = cross track ephemeris error 
CLK = SV clock phase error 
Equation 6.14 is an innovation of the SISRE concept used as a means to estimate the range 
error due to orbit errors only at the user. A study by Warren and Racquet (2003) using 
component errors and the SISRE metric found an improving trend over time in the 
performance of daily mean broadcast orbit position errors. Most notably and significant 
improvement occurred in 1997 which coincided with the Ephemeris Enhancement Endeavour 
(EEE) (Crum et al,1997) .The RMS of SISREorbit_onjy over all satellites since the EEE was 1.1m. 
These two studies have quantified the accuracy of orbit modelling errors but have not 
provided an analysis of the outliers of broadcast orbit errors in terms of the user impact 
described by SISREorbit_oniy Therefore, it was necessary to further investigate the rare events 
which constitute a failure of the orbit modelling sub-system and to extend the analysis of 
orbit error modelling to a more up-to-date data set. 
6.5.3.2 Data Processing 
Data were obtained via ftp download from the IGS Global Data Centre at the Crustal Dynamics 
Data Information System (CDDIS). The broadcast ephemerides are given in RINEX format 
(Noll, 1998), most commonly spaced at two hour intervals, although some satellite positions 
are given at varying epochs. These positions were converted to Earth-Centred-Earth-Fixed 
(ECEF) coordinates using the canonical conversion formulae (Hoffman-Wellenhof, 2001). This 
enables a comparison to the IGS precise orbits which were downloaded in sp3 format from 
the same ftp. Excessive outliers were rejected on the basis of not matching between stations 
or exceeding 2km (Jefferson and Bar-Sever, 2000). Data from the ten years from 1998 to 
2007 inclusive were analysed, the results are provided in the following section. 
6.5.3.3 Orbit Error Results 
Firstly, a time-series of the 3D orbit error data was performed over the entire 10 year period 
to assess any trends in the recent data. Table 6.7 shows an overview of the 3D errors in 
terms of the RMS error and significant errors with respect to the SPS definition of failure (GPS 
SPS, 2008). 
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Year RMS Error Count of 
Errors >30m 
1998 3.93 47 
1999 3.96 69 
2000 4.24 138 
2001 3.98 117 
2002 3.85 133 
2003 3.14 54 
2004 2.82 12 
2005 2.33 1 
2006 2.03 2 
2007 1.94 3 
Table 6.6 3D Errors 
Table 6.7 clearly shows a marked improvement in the mean 3D broadcast orbit error 
over the past decade. Similarly, the number of gross errors above 30m has significantly 
reduced over the previous 8 years. How/ever, it is difficult to be sure of this continuing trend 
due to the rarity of occurrences and new/ly launched spacecraft. 
Year RMS Error Count of 
Errors >30m 
1998 1.20 0 
1999 1.24 1 
2000 1.29 1 
2001 1.38 8 
2002 1.37 0 
2003 1.34 7 
2004 1.23 3 
2005 1.14 0 
2006 1.05 1 
2007 1.01 3 
Table 6.7 SISRE Errors 
As previously stated, the 3D error does not provide a user-oriented metric as to the accuracy 
of broadcast orbits and their impact on the user range error. A similar analysis was then 
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performed using the more appropriate SISREorbit_oniy Table 6.7 shows the results of the 
SiSREorbit_oniy over the ten year period. As with the 3D error data, a trend in the reduction of 
mean error is observed, albeit less comprehensive than the 3D case. This suggests that 
Improvements in orbit modelling have occurred in each component, radial, across track and 
along track but perhaps more significantly in the latter two. In terms of the gross errors above 
30m, there appears to be no noticeable temporal trend. It is these cases of gross error which 
will be significant when generating a model for orbit mis-modelling. Each of these data points 
were analysed in greater detail to understand the distribution of the rare events. Most of 
theses rare gross errors were found close to the 30m value. Figure 6.8 shows the distribution 
of SISREorbit_oniY magnitudes. 
frequency 
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Figure 6.8 Distribution of SISRE error magnitudes - variable scale and bin size 
The histogram in Figure 6.8 shows that two thirds of the gross errors occur in the range 30m-
150m and only one eighth exceeded 500m. Concluding, it appears reasonable that the 
probability of orbit modelling errors should be estimated over a number of separate 
magnitude ranges. These probabilities are included within the total failure model in §6.6. 
6.5.3.4 NANU Analysis 
The previous section isolated the gross errors of interest, a total of 24 over the ten year 
period of analysis. In reality, safety-critical users will have available a Notice To Airmen 
(NOTAM) service to inform them of planned SV outages due to repositioning manoeuvres and 
other maintenance. This NOTAM service uses information published by the U.S Coast Guard 
in their Notice Advisory to Navstar Users (NANUs). This information may be used as part of a 
RAIM availability prediction but should not be used to exclude a satellite from the navigation 
solution if it is set to healthy (RTCA, 2004) 
In order to investigate the conformance of the orbital errors to periods in which NANUs are 
active Table 6.8 lists each of the gross error cases found in §6.5.3.3 and any corresponding 
NANUs for the same period. 
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Year Day Time PRN Error NANU NANU 
(hh:mm) Magnitude 
(m) 
Prediction Period 
1999 30 Sep 22:00 25 45.82 Unknown N/A 
2000 28 Jul 06:00 04 83.10 Unknown N/A 
2001 14 Sep 12:00 21 262,74 No N/A 
2001 8 Oct 22:00 21 1578.65 No N/A 
2001 12 Oct 00:00-
10:00 
28 94.12-314.80 Partially 07:45-1945 
2003 12 May 14:00 18 60.68 Yes 13:45-0245 
2003 15 May 00:00 16 500:52 Yes 1915:0715 
2003 22 Oct 02:00-
22:00 
20 34.07-97.94 Partially 07:00-1900 
2004 30 Mar 00:00 19 41.69 No N/A 
2004 16 Jul 02:00 19 34.10 Yes 23:15-1115 
2004 13 Aug 04:00 28 73.62 Yes 02:08-07:14 
2006 19 Dec 10:00 08 298.21 Yes 07:00-19:00 
2007 10 Apr 18:00 18 991.75 Yes 13:30-01:30 
2007 24 May 10:00 04 32.01 Yes 07:30:21:30 
2007 18 Aug 14:00 19 12.53 Yes 11:30-01:00 
Table 6.8 SISRE Failures and NANUs 
The first comment of note is that each of the repositioning manoeuvres which led to 
excessive SISRE values over the previous 3 years were accounted for by a NANU issued to the 
user. Therefore, it appears that manoeuvres are the prime initial cause of orbit modelling 
errors. As the satellite must be set to healthy to be included in the orbit analysis presented, it 
appears there is a lack of conformance between the NANUs and the satellite health status. 
The health status is being set to unhealthy too early or reset to healthy too late. The 
probability and magnitude of this event should be included in failure modes CONIO and 
CONll, yet they are specified at much lower frequencies (RTCA, 1998). For this reason, the 
empirically derived orbit modelling error model will be added to the total failure model in 
addition to CONIO and CONl l remaining on the side of caution and accounting for other 
potential causes of the broadcast ephemeris errors. 
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Each of the entries in Table 6.8 refers to a repositioning manoeuvre and it may be the case 
that procedures have improved such that NANUs are more accurate and unscheduled outages 
due to failures in orbit modelling are extremely unlil<ely. However, the NANUs also appear to 
be more pessimistic, in advising users well before any significant orbit errors occur which is an 
unwanted reduction in SV availability. In addition to this temporal trend, there are a number 
of SV PRNs which repeat. There were a total of eight SVs which accounted for 14 failures over 
24 epochs. PRN SVs 4, 18,19 and 28 were the worst performing satellites though there is no 
correlation to their age. 
Given the improvement in mean error of both 3D and SISRE errors and a NANU capacity 
which appears to accurately account for large broadcast orbit errors it appears viable to 
predict future expected performance on the basis of the final 2-3 years. However, to 
maintain a level of safety and protect against possible problems introduced by new orbit 
modelling procedures, the total ten year period was used (1998-2007). 
Naturally, the frequency of gross error magnitudes was higher between 30m and 150m than 
150m to 500m and similarly to those between 500m and 2000m. The decision was taken to 
estimate the probability of occurrence over the ranges; 30-50m, 50-150m, lS0-500m, 500-
2000m. Although somewhat arbitrary given the small quantity of data. Figure 6.8 supports the 
suggestion that performance varies between these choices of ranges. The boundaries may 
have been slightly different, but the effects captured are likely indicative of performance, or 
in any case given the improvement in recent years, these values should certainly be 
conservative. Table 6.9 presents the final computed estimate of orbit error model 
probabilities. 
Orbit Error Range Probability per I m 
(i.e. equivalent to eqn. 4) 
30:50 3.21x10"' 
50:150 8.26x10"^ 
150:500 1.31x10"'' 
500:2000 1.84x10"" 
Table 6.9 Orbit error derived probabilities 
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6.6 Failure Mode Magnitude Model 
The failure modes database is not complete. The tables in §6.4 highlighted areas whereby 
knowledge of particular failure modes is lacking. Extension of the model to ensure greater 
realism by accurately capturing all failure modes is discussed in the following section. 
However, given the results of the orbit error analysis it is possible to compute a total failure 
mode probability model as a function of magnitude which accounts for the most probable 
failure types. This is achieved by summing the probabilities for each failure mode within the 
bias ranges selected. 
X P ( b i < B < b , 0 (6.15) 
failure 
Modes 
Equation 6.15 is valid due to the independence of failure modes. In order to compare this 
new model to the one currently adopted by the navigation community the probability was 
summed from 30m to 2000m. This comparison is made by computing the probability of a 
failure of magnitude 30m (assumed to be approximately equivalent to 4.42 times the URA) to 
2000m (cut-off for extreme outliers under the new model). The results are given below: 
New Model -
P(30<B<2000)^^^^^., = 2.81x10"^ (6.16) 
New Model (incl. Orbit Errors) -
P(30<B<2000)^^^.^ = 2.88x10"^ (6.17) 
SPS Model -
P(30 < B < 2000)_^ ^^ .^  = l.OxlO ^ (6.18) 
This comparison shows that the model does not deviate too excessively from the standard 
approach. Due to the comprehensive nature of the failure mode database, it is possible that 
the failure modes overlap in some cases, particularly with regard to human and software 
errors at the MCS. Ideally, the total failure model would be formed of an independent sum of 
failures. However, any overlapping only ensures further conservatism which substantiates the 
results shown in Chapter Nine to a greater extent. 
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Although this conformance goes some way to validate the model it is lacking on two points. 
Firstly, some failure mode probabilities are left excluded due to a lack of a probability 
estimate, though most of these are included in the orbit modelling error analysis. Secondly, 
this conformance is only for failures greater than 30m (4.42xURA). There is a significant 
problem with the existing SPS definition if it is to be applied to precision approach 
applications without a further level of protection. The failures which have not been given a 
probability estimate are mostly those which have smaller magnitude effects in the 0-30m 
range (e.g. ionospheric scintillations) or are expected to be very rare (e.g. meteor strike). 
To attempt to overcome this problem, the WAAS failure model was also considered (Fernow, 
2005) which specifies the following probabilities for step, ramp and ramp rate types: 
Step (3.6m+) 1 0 ^ / h o u r 
Ramp (0.001 m/s to 0.05 m/s) 10"^  / hour 
Ramp (0.05 m/s to 0.25 m/s) 10 ® / hour 
Ramp (0.25 m/s to 0.75 m/s) 10"® / hour 
Ramp (0.75 m/s to 2.5 m/s) 3.5x10""/ hour 
Ramp (0.75 m/s to 2.5 m/s) 3.5x10®/hour 
Ramp (2.5 m/s to 5 m/s) 4.1x10"®/ hour 
Ramp Rate (0.031 m/s'^+f) 1 0 ^ / h o u r 
Table 6.10 WAAS Threat Model 
This model is purposefully conservative in order to ensure the safety case for WAAS does not 
over-estimate the reliability of the raw GPS measurements. However, it may be of benefit to 
provide an estimate for biases over the range 3.6-30.0m. Following the procedures described 
in §6.5.2 for these failure types and subtracting the probability estimate for step errors 
greater than 30m, the following estimate is derived; 
P(3.6 < B < 30) = 2.97x10^ (6.19) 
This would avoid assuming a failure probability of 1.0 for biases less than 30m, which under 
the current SPS (DoD, 2008) definition is the only reasonable assumption which could be 
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made without a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This is discussed further in 
Chapter Nine when considering the application of the derived failure model. 
6.7 Conclusions and Future Work on Failure Modes 
This chapter has presented the first phase of an FMEA process which successfully links each 
failure mode to their worst case impacts on the snapshot RAIM system in a realistic fashion. 
This reduces the predicted probability of an integrity threat by greatly increasing the realism 
of the assessment. However the results of such an assessment are sensitive to the probability 
of a failure mode occurring. Existing methods have avoided a comprehensive assignment of 
likelihoods to each mode due to the difficulties in making such predictions and instead utilise 
the 10'^ per hour value stated in the GPS SPS standards when applying a threat model. The 
Integrity Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (IFMEA) (Van Dyke et al, 2004) project intends to 
determine comprehensively the GPS failure modes associated with the control and space 
segments. A number of failure modes are well understood and under the IFMEA project have 
been assigned well defined probability of failures. However the information has not been 
made public. A lack of measurement data has meant that assigning a failure probability is a 
significant challenge for the research community. 
A new framework for defining a GPS failure has been proposed which is based on the 
instantaneous (or latent) probability value and provides greater detail and realism by defining 
a probability model of failure with respect to the magnitude of error bias. This has been 
applied to each failure mode within the failure mode database presented in this thesis and 
allows any step, ramp, noise or wander type failure to be modelled. This approach is flexible 
and could incorporate any new failure modes associated with the evolving GPS constellation 
or future Galileo constellation. It is also possible to include empirically derived failure mode 
probability models as was needed for orbit modelling errors in §6.5.3. The notion of an 
instantaneous failure is also important and could be beneficial to the aviation requirements 
definition setting by avoiding the use of unnecessary assumptions. 
The four main failure modes for which data are absent from the total failure model shown in 
§6.6 are ionospheric effects, multipath, orbit modelling errors and meteor impacts. This 
project has looked to provide a highly conservative bound to the orbit modelling errors, which 
overt ime could be improved by accounting for a greater quantity of up-to-date data. Meteor 
impacts are expected to be rare (Maine, 1998), although it is unclear to what extent space-
debris may affect GNSS. Multipath effects are unlikely to have considerably gross errors in 
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excess of 30m without the user being at sufficiently low altitudes that terrain and obstacles 
are relevant (Collins et al, 1998). For very stringent phases of flight using the current single 
frequency signal for which multipath would be of greater importance, a differential navigation 
system is needed to meet the requirements (Schuster and Ochieng, 2006). Extreme 
ionospheric errors are rare and are expected to be the of the order of 20-40m (Angus, 2006). 
They are known to be more likely to occur during ionospheric storms. However, at present 
the ionosphere remains a difficult phenomenon to model and predict with a great deal of 
accuracy. A probabilistic model in terms of range error magnitudes has yet to be generated by 
the navigation community due to the temporal and unpredictable nature of the ionosphere 
(Filjar, 1998). It is hoped that knowledge of the ionosphere will allow improved modelling of 
ionospheric scintillations and their impact on range measurements to the user. Similarly, it is 
expected that meteor impacts will be better understood and that in the majority of failure 
modes, improved estimations of failure probabilities and their behaviour will be determined 
in the future. 
It is clear that with greater public access to the IFMEA and similar programmes for the 
forthcoming GNSS, a much more accurate and trustworthy model in-line with the concept 
presented here is possible. However, there are other ways to account for this lack of failure 
knowledge. One such approach would be to include a generic, miscellaneous failure mode to 
account for new undiscovered failures or to maintain conservative bounds around the 
probability of failures. 
The concept of a magnitude dependent probability model is applied to a snapshot RAIM 
algorithm in Chapter Nine. Although the total probability shown in §6.6 exceeds the standard 
model (DoD, 2008) it is expected that the resulting integrity risk is less using the proposed 
model as additional assumptions regarding the worst case bias are not needed at the receiver 
algorithm level. This testing procedure used both the raw model described by equation 6.17 
and the standard SPS model to assess the differences seen in the failure probabilities. In 
addition to the algorithms used in this testing process, it may be possible to formulate a 
greater number of RAIM algorithms which take account of the bias probabilities such as a 
Bayesian approach (Ober, 2003). 
In Chapter Seven, the basis for the second phase of research outlined in Chapter Five is 
presented. This chapter investigates the impact failures have on the positioning solution and 
associated RAIM algorithm. 
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Chapter 7 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF A 
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT SOFTWARE PLATFORM 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Five, the research problems introduced in Chapter One were analysed in greater 
theoretical detail, highlighting the crucial mechanisms which must be researched and 
developed to meet the need for a complete Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This 
was split into two phases, the failure modelling phase and the operational evaluation phase 
consisting of the research and development of a new software platform. In Chapter Six a new 
failure model was developed to account for all possible failures of standalone GPS. In this 
chapter, the software platform is described which will be used to generate performance 
parameters for an approach validation process and other potential operational 
implementations. These implementations may require the use of the model derived in 
Chapter Six or the traditional failure model specified in DoD (2008). Integrity monitoring is 
assumed to be provided on-board the receiver by a snapshot Receiver Autonomous Integrity 
Monitoring (RAIM) algorithm, as discussed in Chapter Four. 
The chapter begins in §7.2 by looking at the software requirements listed in §5.5 and the 
limitations of existing software with respect to these. The review of existing methods in 
Chapter Five concluded that the software platform must be fast, accurate and reliable in 
computing the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) Parameters and other operationally 
relevant information. The innovations developed to meet these demands are described in 
§7.3. In §7.4, the new and updated software platform is presented which satisfies the 
requirements of the FMEA process listed in §5.5. 
199 
200 
7.2 Assessment of Existing Methods 
7.2.1 Software Requirements 
As already noted, the important high level demands on the software platform intended to be 
used for operational evaluation purposes are that it be fast, accurate and reliable. The 
software must be fast to enable the entirety of space-time geometry to be captured. The 
software must be accurate to maintain relevance of the results to pilots and operators. 
Finally, the software must be reliable in establishing if the RNP level is met. This is particularly 
true in terms of determining when RAIM is shown to be conservative or optimistic so not to 
restrict or endanger operations. 
From these high level constraints and the more technical insights highlighted in Chapters Four 
and Five, the following goals relevant to the software capability were listed in §5.5: 
To determine a method for computing each of the RNP, most critically integrity, at a 
space-time point in a fast and efficient way 
To deal with the failure-induced bias ambiguity 
To incorporate the effects of nominal errors (noise) on performance 
To utilise an accelerated sampling strategy to maximise computational efficiency 
To facilitate the testing and validation at all relevant space-time points 
To disseminate operationally critical information such as outages and unsafe periods 
To enable an approach validation tool to be used in a certified hazard analysis 
These requirements lead to a natural structure of the software platform shown in Figure 7.1. 
Sampling Strategy (single point , grid, trajectory) 
At each Space-Time point 
• Compute True User Location 
• Compute Satellite Positions 
• Compute RNP Parameters — 
Figure 7.1 Software Control Flow 
• accuracy 
• integrity — 
continuity 
availability 
• for each satell i te 
- apply bias and noise model 
200 
201 
In the following subsection, the software platform used to determine whether existing 
techniques meet the requirements listed above is described, followed by some results and 
discussion in terms of the three high-level principles of speed, accuracy and reliability. 
7.2.2 Software Architecture 
The testing of existing techniques was performed using the GNSS Approach Validation and 
Testing (GAVaT) software platform. GAVaT required a number of minor enhancements from 
legacy software to test the existing methods. The core functionality of the software has been 
validated throughout a commercial software development cycle, with additional component 
and system level validation undertaken during this research. These legacy functions and 
modifications are listed in §7.2.2.1 followed by the GAVaT structure in §7.2.2.2. 
7.2.2.1 GAVaT Functionality 
The basic functionality contained within the GAVaT legacy software is listed below including in 
italics the applicable software module shown in Figure 7.2: 
• Computation of GPS satellite positions from almanacs, ephemeris (RINEX) and 
precise orbit (sp3) files - almanac 
• Computation of user location either in a point-based fashion, over a regional grid or 
an approach track - trajectory 
• Determination of satellite positions relative to the user thereby allowing a 
computation of the respective azimuths and elevations - sat select 
• Generation of the geometry matrix (H in equation 3.43) and other geometrical 
parameters such as the Dilution of Precision (DOP) (3.52-3.56) and slope (4.40-4.41) -
sat select 
• Simulation of measurement range errors using the Gaussian model - signals 
• Computation of a position solution and corresponding position error from simulated 
range measurements - all-in-view 
• Calculation of the Sum Squared Error (SSE) test statistic and associated detection 
threshold - all-in-view 
• Determination of a missed detection from simulated range measurements - all-in-
view 
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Modifications were naade to the GAVaT software to incorporate the following additional 
functions which would allow existing methods to be tested (GAVAT v2.1): 
• Computation of the Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB) - receiver 
' Computation of the three common protection levels selected in §4.3.3.2 - receiver 
• Sufficient flexibility to process biases within a range, the MDB or to compute a Worst 
Case Bias from a range - receiver 
• Ability to invoke routines relating to relevant approximations of the probabilities 
which constitute integrity risk (5.1-5.2) - receiver 
' Inclusion of the effects of masking, either from the inbuilt receiver functionality, 
terrain masking or masking due to banking when in approach mode - library 
• Power to process subset solutions by setting each visible satellite to unhealthy in 
order to assess the impact of critical satellites, exclusion and availability - receiver 
In the following subsection, the processing structure is shown which locates many of the 
important functions listed above. 
7.2.2.2 GAVaT v2.1 Structure 
GAVaT is coded in Delphi Pascal which allows for a partially object-oriented design structure. 
However, although GAVaT uses a number of internally defined data-types and has a vast 
library of modular functions, the primary thread of GAVaT processing is procedural and vast 
variable redundancy fails to provide the data encapsulation of a true class based software 
platform. An enhanced and fully object-oriented version of GAVAT is presented in §7.4. 
The high-level structure and control flow of GAVaT is shown in Figure 7.2. On executing 
GAVaT, the user is required to input a series of parameters relating to the almanac source, 
user location mode and associated parameters (e.g. point coordinates, grid boundaries and 
step size, approach trajectory file source) and relevant requirement parameters (e.g. alert 
limit, false alert rate, missed detection probability). The main control module 'GNSS_Sim' 
then executes the initialisation module which opens and parses the almanac and user location 
files before initialising the simulation variables. The main procedure utilises the 'Types' 
module which defines global constants, and formats for defined types relating to satellite 
information, user (aircraft) information and output data structures. 
Following initialisation, the simulation loops over all the user-defined samples within the 
GNSS_Sim module. This loop comprises of the almanac module which computes satellite 
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positions at the looped time, the trajectory module which performs the same task for the 
user location and the signals module which contains the routines able to generate random 
Gaussian errors on the satellite measurements. This module contains a large number of 
obsolete functions. 
The receiver module is then executed to determine the output of the receiver's navigation 
and integrity monitoring functions. This includes the routine to determine the probability of 
missed detection using Monte Carlo simulations and routines which approximate or model 
this probability. Therefore, this module is where the testing of different techniques is 
performed. Finally the output module is used to write the data which is analysed. In addition 
to the 'Types' module, there are other routines available within the 'Library' and 'Receiver 
functions' modules which are used throughout the simulation loop. 
Obsolete 
Modules 
I U s e r j n p u t I 
1 I 
I Receiver 1 
I Functions J 
r Obsolete 1 
I Modules J 
: Loop ;1 
'iimiiiV 
t " i 
I Trajectory I 
( 1 
I Signals I 
I Receiver ^ 
r = = < H . ( 
Sat Select 
All-ln-View 
Figure 7.2 High-level GAVaT structure 
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7.2.3 Demonstration of the Limitations of Existing Methods 
Integrity is by far the most complex of the RNP parameters computationally. The GAVaT 
platform introduced above enabled the testing of the existing techniques which may be used 
to estimate the integrity risk by dealing with the noise and biases in the measurements. In 
§7.2.3.1, the existing methods are assessed in terms of their speed, accuracy and reliability. 
The computation of integrity risk must include the effects of bias, either the Worst Case Bias 
(WCB) or an alternative approach which guarantees that all potential failures are accounted 
for. In §7.2.3.1 the results are assessed in terms of an arbitrary bias, whereas in §7.2.3.2 the 
role of bias is included, requiring that the solution is able to compute the worst case integrity 
risk at the space-time point in question. 
7.2.3.1 Existing Metliods for Computing Integrity Risk 
A requirement of the software platform is to compute integrity risk. However, it is assumed 
that the probability of failure, one component of the integrity risk, is known. In this 
subsection a value of 10"^ is used in conformance with aviation receiver standards (RTCA, 
2004) but the analysis would be almost identical if using an alternative failure model such as 
the one derived in Chapter Six. From equation 5.1, the probability of missed detection Pmd is 
the component which remains. The Pmd requirement is therefore commonly stated as 10"^ 
which under this assumption is equivalent to the 10"^  requirement on the operational 
integrity risk for NPA. The integrity risk may be computed for all satellites assuming a failure 
on each in turn. Alternatively, a failure may just be applied to the satellite with greatest slope, 
assuming it to present the greatest integrity threat, which although the norm, is not always 
the case (loannides et al, 2005). 
Recalling equation 5.1, the need to compute the probability of missed detection PMD remains. 
It was shown in Ober (1997; 2003) that the PMD may be separated into the probability of a 
positioning failure Ppp and the probability of no alert PNA for a particular bias magnitude: 
Pmd - PpF ^ PNA (7 1) 
PpF is a function of the position error (e) and fixed parameter, the Alert Limit (AL) whilst Pna is 
a function of the test statistic (SSE) and predetermined threshold (T) (4.24). 
One approach to compute the Pmd is to employ a Monte Carlo simulation which generates 
random variables as input to the system, the measurement noise in this case, and counts the 
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respective output states to derive an estimate of the output probability of the system as 
shown in Figure 7.3. In the RAIM system assessed, only one state is of interest here, the 
missed detection state defined as: 
| |e | |>AL)n(SSE<T) (7.2) 
The attributes of this method are investigated in §7.2.3.1.1-7.2.3.1.3. 
random variable 
generator 
- • state 1 count 
- • state 2 count 
-k state n count 
Figure 7.3 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Using the standard Weighted Least Squares (WLS) positioning solution employed in modern 
receivers (RTCA 2004; ICAO, 2006), the random vector e and random variable SSE have known 
distributions defined by equations 3.46 and 4.16. Consider first the SSE which follows a non-
central chi-squared distribution. This distribution may be approximated by an analytical 
function such as proposed by Hastings (1955) or by a rational approximiation as implemented 
within MATLAB (2009). There are numerous other approximations available from the 
literature with their respective merits with regard to simplicity and accuracy. The two cited 
here were selected for testing as they were suggested to be accurate at low percentiles 
(Abramowitz and Stegun, 1964). Low percentiles are critical as biases in the test statistic 
domain greater than the threshold are of interest. 
The complexity in the computation of PRF differs between the horizontal and vertical 
components. In the vertical domain, due to the distribution of e defined in 3.46, the PPF may 
be calculated from an error function. 
PpF = erf 
^ A L - n . ^ 
i3^  y 
(7.3) 
where is the projected bias in the vertical domain and Js the vertical element of the 
position error covariance matrix defined by equation 3.47. However, the horizontal 
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component is more complex as the covariance is represented by a 2D covariance matrix 
which in general is not aligned with the position bias as shown in Figure 7.4. 
position error proportion 
of percentiles 
percentiles of position 
covariance 
' position 
bias vector 
T 
true position 
Figure 7.4 Horizontal Position Error Probability 
This horizontal position error probability may be approximated. Three such methods have 
been proposed (Lee, 1996b; Ober, 1997; Kelly, 1997). Lee suggested that the probability 
density function of the position error (a bivariate Gaussian following projection of equation 
3.46) may be projected to the ID space along the direction of the position bias vector which 
corresponds to the relevant failed satellite. This is shown in Figure 7.5a. As shown in Figure 
7.5a this approximation ignores a portion of the relevant probability density. In an attempt to 
provide a more conservative solution to this problem, Kelly proposed to rotate the position 
covariance matrix such as to align its major eigenvector in the direction of the position bias as 
shown in Figure 7.5b. However, both of these methods were shown to be optimistic in Ober 
(1997) which advocated a conservative alternative. Ober's procedure is to expand the 
elliptical representation of the covariance matrix to a circular form. Essentially this degrades 
the assumed precision in position. Ober's approximation is shown in Figure 7.5c. 
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approximation 
error 
approximation 
projected 
distribution 
position 
bias vector 
projected 
distribution. 
position 
bias vector 
true position true position 
approximation 
error 
position 
bias vector 
true position 
Figure 7.5 Position Error Probability Approximations 
These methods were assessed in Ober (1997) and Kelly (1997) and the results of tests to 
confirm these results are presented in §7.2.3.1.1-7.2.3.1.3. 
The PpF could theoretically be computed by subtracting the result of an integration over the 
circular region from total probability 1. This approach is discussed in §7.3.1 and further in 
Chapter Eight. 
The final method considered to compute the probability of missed detection is to use a look-
up table. This table would store the PMD in terms of the number of satellites, bias magnitude, 
2D position covariance eigenvalues, angle between the major eigenvector and position bias 
direction and the slope parameter. This table could be populated through the results of 
Monte Carlo simulations as described above and intermediate values between cells 
determined through interpolation. 
207 
208 
7.2.3.1.1 Speed of the Integrity Risk Computation 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
Knowledge of the computational efficiency of the Monte Carlo method is crucial to determine 
the potential to use this approach and that of the look-up table to determine integrity risk. 
Furthermore, validation of any deterministic models require the Monte Carlo outputs as truth 
values. Table 7.1 shows typical values recorded from processing on a 2GHz microprocessor 
in the Windows XP operating system. 
Sample Size 10" 10® 10'^  lO' 10" 
Time (seconds) 6 63 508 4512 44177 
Table 7.1 Monte Carlo Computation Times 
Pm Approximations 
The computation times of the PNA approximations are also near instantaneous. 
Table 7.2 shows the computational efficiency of these methods over a large number of 
executions. 
Method Analytic Rational 
(Hastings, 1955) 
Frequency (Hz) 10® 10^ ' 
Table 7.2 Approximation Computational Efficiency 
PpF Approximations 
The computation times of the Ppp approximations are all near instantaneous on a desktop PC 
processor. Table 7.3 shows the computational efficiency of these methods over a large 
number of executions. 
Method Lee Kelly Ober 
(1996b) (1997) (1997) 
Frequency (Hz) 2x10^ 2x l0 ' 10^ 
Table 7.3 Approximation Computational Efficiency 
Summary 
As expected, the Monte Carlo simulations are time-consuming and are impractical for use in 
real time applications for all but the lowest sample size. The PNA and PRF approximation 
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methods all showed exceptional computation speed due to the relatively simple processes 
need to compute them. 
The interpolation method is left untested from the point of view of the look-up table access 
procedure. However, as the look-up table requires a large number of cells to be entered from 
the output of a Monte Carlo simulation, this approach would require excessive pre-processing 
as discussed in §8.3.2. 
7.2.3.1.2 Accuracy of the Integrity Risk Computation 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
In parallel with the computational efficiency of Monte Carlo methods listed in Table 7.4, the 
accuracy of each sample size is given in Table 7.4. The values presented are computed using a 
10® sample truth for the 10^ column and then 10^ for the remaining columns. These processes 
used independently seeded random number generators which employed a Mersenne twister 
algorithm for the uniform variable and Marsaglia's method for the Gaussian measurement 
errors (Mathworks, 2008). 
Method 10® 10* 10? 
Accuracy 
mean max mean max mean max 
(% error) 
0.42 1.05 0.13 1.01 0.04 0.37 
Table 7.4 Monte Carlo Accuracies 
Ppf Approximations 
In the descriptions of the Ppp approximations described above, each method was stated to be 
either conservative or optimistic in its estimation of the probability of positioning failure and 
thus probability of missed detection PMD- In the test presented here, the output from the 
respective Ppp approximation is multiplied by the PNA computed from the rational 
approximation to obtain an estimate for PMQ. TO determine the accuracy of these estimates 
they are compared to an 'exact' PMD estimate derived from the Monte Carlo method with 
sample size 10®. A total of 50,000 samples were assessed with Ppp over a range of 10"^  to 1. 
The results are shown in Table 7.5. The Kelly and Ober approximations are found to be 
generally pessimistic, in some cases excessively so. The high maximum values are at the lower 
probabilities but even within the range from 10 ^ and 10^. The Lee method underestimates 
the probability significantly, as previously shown in Ober (1997). 
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Method Lee (1996b) Kelly (1997) Ober (1997) 
PMD / metric min mean max min mean max min mean max 
P|VID, exact PpF 10"^: 1 0.00 0.28 2.77 0.24 1.54 7.14 1.00 2.08 9.35 
PpF 10"': 1 0.00 0.34 2.77 0.24 1.32 3.86 1.00 1.67 4.79 
PpF 10'^: 1 0.00 0.47 2.77 0.24 1.16 3.09 1.00 1.38 2.58 
PpF 10"': 1 0.01 0.90 2.77 0.76 1.14 3.09 1.00 1.07 1.42 
Table 7.5 Ppp Accuracies 
7.2.3.1.3 Reliability of Integrity Risk Computation 
Reliability of an integrity risk method refers to the robustness against incorrect integrity risk 
values which if used within an operational evaluation setting could provide information which 
is potentially unsafe. The results presented on the accuracy of the existing methods contain 
the relevant information to conclude on the reliability of each method. These conclusions are 
discussed below. 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
These methods are robust when employed with a sufficient sample size. Reliability of the 
integrity risk computation is concerned with the correct determination of PMD around the 
specified value of 10^ Therefore, sample sizes of 10*, icf, 10®, and 10^ have expected 
frequencies of missed detection of 10,100, 1000 and 10000 around the critical points^. Given 
that values for the accuracies of these estimations have been derived, an additional error 
term could be added to each estimation of PMD if reliability is required. However, the Monte 
Carlo method is used primarily for validation of other techniques and as such the best 
estimate Is preferred. 
PpF Approximations 
The results of the accuracy of the Ppp approximations shows that the Lee and Kelly approaches 
can lead to an under-estimation of the PMD (Lee, 1996b; Kelly, 1997). This Is expected from the 
Implicit errors associated with these methods as shown in Figure 7.5. These two methods are 
therefore unreliable. The final method of Ober Is designed to overbound the PMD and is thus 
by definition reliable. The results in Table 7.5 confirm this. 
5 Poinf here refers to the space-time point, the satellite PRN number of the failed satellite and the failure bias 
magnitude. Essentially it refers to the configuration elements of the system which determine the integrity 
performance. 
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7.2.3.2 Existing Approaclies to the Failure Bias Ambiguity 
In §7.2.3.1 different methods to estimate the PMD were assessed. However, these methods 
did not specify the size of bias used and in the tests presented biases of varying magnitudes 
were applied to capture the whole sample space. When a failure in the navigation system 
occurs, the magnitude of the range error in the absence of noise is not known to the user. 
This is known as the failure bias ambiguity. To overcome this problem, various techniques are 
used in receiver algorithms and test procedures to determine for which bias(es) the integrity 
computations described above are executed. These techniques are briefly introduced below, 
before each is assessed in terms their speed, accuracy and reliability. 
Threshold Method 
A common approach to deal with the bias ambiguity is to assume the bias equates to the 
detection threshold (Walter and Enge, 1995; Oehler, 2004). This follows the line of argument 
that biases greater than the threshold will be detected. 
Minimum Detectable Bias (IVIDB) 
The MDB was defined by equation 4.43 to account for biases greater than the threshold 
which may remain undetected. The probability of not detecting such a bias decreases as the 
bias grows. The MDB is the bias at which this probability equals 10"^ the required missed 
detection probability. 
Range of Biases 
loannides (2005) proposed to compute the integrity risk over a range of values to ensure all 
behaviour is captured. The maximum range bias of the range may be set to the IVIDB as larger 
biases are known not to present an unacceptable integrity risk. 
Traditional Worst Case Bias 
The integrity requirement for GNSS-based air navigation must account for all possible biases. 
It is desirable to compute the Worst Case Bias (WCB) and the integrity risk at that point. This 
approach has been taken using the range of biases method described above and determining 
an estimate for integrity risk at each of these values by Monte Carlo simulation (Chin et al, 
1993). 
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7.2.3.2.1 Speed of Bias Ambiguity IVIetliods 
Threshold and MDB 
Tlie threshold and IVIDB computations are both extremely fast and thus the total integrity 
computation time is approximately the same as that of the integrity risk computation 
employed. 
Range of Biases (RoB) 
The RoB method determines the integrity risk over an array of bias values tj^ "®. Clearly the 
speed of the computation decreases linearly with the number of biases (m) contained within 
the array. 
t r - m x t j - f (7.4) 
where t%*' is the time taken to compute the integrity risk for a single bias. 
Worst Case Bias 
Existing WCB estimation techniques have used a RoB and as such the computation time may 
also be derived from equation 7.4. 
Summary 
It is clear from the analysis that the bias ambiguity further differentiates the computation 
times of the approximations from the more comprehensive Monte Carlo approach. 
7.2.3.2.2 Accuracy of Bias Ambiguity Methods 
Threshold 
The accuracy of the threshold based approach may be derived by comparing the 'exact' 
integrity risk obtained from Monte Carlo data at both the WCB® and the threshold. 
MDB 
In the same manner as the threshold, the MDB may be compared to the worst case bias using 
Monte Carlo data. 
' The WCB is computed using the RoB method wi th 10^ bias steps 
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Method Threshold MDB 
PMD / PMD,exact 0.3750 0.5403 
Table 7.6 Accuracy of integrity Risk at the Tlireshold 
Range of Biases (RoB) and Worst Case Bias 
The accuracy of the RoB method is tested as a function of the number of biases (m) tested 
within the range. The resulting PMD at the worst case bias over the RoB is compared to the 
worst case over lO" values 
Number (m) 4 16 64 256 512 1024 2048 
PMD / min 0.3012 0.5012 0.7426 0.9054 0.9586 0.9871 0.9932 
n 4 ' 
RMD.IO mean 0.6914 0.6914 0.9981 0.9999 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Table 7.7 Accuracy of the Range of Biases 
Summary 
To conclude on the accuracy of these existing methods, it is clear that the approximations to 
the worst case bias are inaccurate. Furthermore the RoB method requires a high resolution to 
accurately locate the WCB. 
7.2.3.2.3 Reliability of Bias Ambiguity Methods 
Reiterating the results of the accuracy of the bias ambiguity methods, it is clear that to ensure 
a reliable estimate of the integrity risl< the worst case bias must be very accurately located. 
7.2.3.3 Existing Approaches to Sampling 
The existing spatial sampling methods employed to assess the navigation system performance 
were analysed from a design point of view in §5.4.1.1. Three basic sampling strategies were 
identified: point, grid and trajectory. These methods are difficult to quantitatively compare 
through analysis and simulation. This is because to measure to what extent the sampling 
strategy captures all the relevant performance levels, the RNP parameters, including integrity 
must be determined at each sample point. To systematically assess each strategy would 
require the same number of points to be used in the three different configurations. However 
given the subtleties of the effects of geometry in different parts of the world, using different 
constellations and at different times of day to reliably perform this test would require an 
unfeasible quantity of data. Significant differences in performance between grid sample 
points are known to occur (Feng et at, 2006a). 
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7.3 Development of Software Innovations 
In §7.2 existing techniques which may be used within the software platform were 
investigated. The three most pertinent problems were examined; the computation of 
integrity risk, the effects of bias and the sampling strategy. In this section, the innovations 
which have been made to address each of these issues and derive a fast, accurate and reliable 
software platform are described. This begins with a brief outline of the integrity risk 
computation in §7.3.1, the full details of which are found in Chapter Eight. A solution to the 
bias ambiguity in the form of a Worst Case Bias (WCB) search algorithm is presented in §7.3.2. 
Finally, a critique of sampling techniques is provided in §7.3.3 including the results of a series 
of test simulations which have led to the design of an accelerated sampling algorithm. 
7.3.1 Integrity Risk 
The conclusions of §7.2.3.1 were that existing methods are unable to meet each of the high-
level requirements in computing integrity risk for NPA. They are either computationally 
inefficient as shown for Monte Carlo simulations, inaccurate as shown for Cher's 
approximation or unreliable in the case of Lee's and Kelly's schemes (Lee, 1996b; Ober, 1997, 
Kelly, 1997). The problem lies in that the numerical methods are not optimised for speed. An 
alternative method is required which compromises between the benefits provided by 
numerical and analytic methods in order to meet all the requirements. In §7.2.3.1, the 
possibility of integrating the required position error probability distribution was briefly noted. 
Integration procedures are numerical methods and in much the same way as Monte Carlo 
simulations their accuracy and speed depend upon the number of evaluation points. In 
Chapter Eight an integration procedure is presented and tested to show that it meets the 
requirement of being fast, accurate and reliable. The primary innovation in this approach is to 
reduce the integration domain to the critical probability density region, thereby allowing the 
evaluation points to be used more efficiently and improving the computational efficiency. 
From this point onwards in the chapter, an efficient and accurate method for computing the 
integrity risk is assumed. A summary of the performance of this procedure for 128 evaluation 
points is shown in Table 7.8. 
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Order 
Frequency (Hz) 
128 
1700 
PMD (% error) PPP 10^: 1 max 0.292 
mean 0.197 
min 0.003 
PpF 10 ^ : 1 max 0.292 
mean 0.182 
min 0.003 
PPF 10"^: ; 1 max 0.292 
mean 0.163 
min 0.003 
PpF 10^ : 1 max 0.292 
mean 0.124 
min 0.003 
Table 7.8 Integration Procedure Performance 
7.3.2 The Effects of Bias 
In §7.2.3.2 the need to efficiently locate the WCB was highlighted. Alternative techniques 
such as the Minimum Detectable Bias (MDB) and the threshold based approach were shown 
to be inaccurate and unreliable. However, the rudimentary range of biases technique 
required a large number of evaluations of the integrity risk. 
Ultimately, the goal is to determine compliance of the navigation system with respect to the 
RNP parameters. Therefore, if this may be determined without the computation of integrity 
risk in some cases, the operational evaluation is still able to function. This contravenes the 
high-level demand for an accurate computation of the RNP parameters, but it maintains both 
reliability and ensures an accurate determination of compliance which is of greater 
importance. This notion is critical when in the following subsections (§7.3.2.1-§7.3.2.2) the 
task is to reduce the range of biases which must be evaluated to a smaller, more manageable 
interval. In §7.3.2.3 an accelerated search procedure for the WCB over this improved range is 
presented. 
7.3.2.1 Range of Hazardous Biases 
In §7.2.3.2 the range of biases is defined to be the interval [0, MDB]. Recall from equation 
4.44 that the Minimum Hazardous Bias (MHB) is the smallest bias which could cause a 
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positioning failure given the maximum allowable probability Ppp (Ober, 2003). The MHB may 
be defined relative to the Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL), or a Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) 
in which case a positioning failure is defined at the algorithmic level (|e|>HPL) instead of the 
operational level (|e|>HAL). The protection levels defined in §4.3.3.2 were computed using a 
specific procedure. However, the notion of an arbitrary protection level is introduced here 
which protects the user against position errors less than its value with a corresponding 
integrity level. This notion is crucial in deriving the ideal HPL/VPL in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
The MHB may be computed for satellite i as follows: 
HAL-
MHB^ = " ' " — or MHBj = (7.5) 
+ 4;,, 
where kp^Js the k-factor equating to 10"^  determines the mean absolute 
position error standard deviation and ^A|^. +A|^. maps the bias from the position domain to 
the range domain. 
The MHB has the result of reducing the range of biases which have the potential to cause an 
excessive integrity risk to the interval [MHB, MDB] and may be computed quickly. When the 
HAL or HPL is excessively large, the MHB exceeds the MDB. This leads to the natural 
conclusion that no bias exists under the HAL/HPL used to compute the MHB which may result 
in a PMD greater than the requirement. On reducing the HPL, the MHB decreases and at the 
point at which the MHB equals the MDB, this is the only bias which could cause the PMD to 
equate to the required level of 10'\ If the MDB is substituted for the MHB in equation 7.5 
above, a maximum protection level is derived as: 
HPL™. =MDB, x V 4 , , + H , , (7.6) 
This protection limit is exactly the Brown and Chin (1998) HPL with a buffer defined in 
equation 4.50. 
In reality of course the PMD at the MDB under this protection level falls below the required 
level of 10'^ it is simply an upper bound. If the protection level is reduced further, the MHB 
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continues to fall and the range of critical biases grows. The two cases are illustrated in Figure 
7.6. 
Case: MDB < MHB 
Case:MDB>MHB 
no hazardous biases 
P I 
PNO Detection ^ P M D 
I -
Positioning Failure ^ P M D 
potential excessive position error 
undetectable 
MDB MHB bias 
PpositioninE Failure ^ P M D 
undetectable P N O Detection > P M D 
hazardous 
I -
potential excessive position error Ppositioning Failure > PMD 
undetectable Pwo Detection > P|v - I 
— h -
MHB MDB 
— » 
bias 
Figure 7.6 Range of Hazardous Biases 
7.3.2.2 Existence of Hazardous Biases 
In §7.3.2.1 a condition was derived which determined whether a range of biases exists which 
could potentially exceed the required PMD of 10'^ following execution of the exact PMD 
connputation over the critical range. In another sense it answered the question - is the 
required integrity level met with certainty? In contrast to this, one could ask the question - is 
the required level failed with certainty? This would be the case if the HPL was set very low. 
In order to derive a condition to answer the outstanding question above and better 
understand the WCB the functional forms of the Ppp and PNA were investigated. Figure 7.7 
shows the possible cases in terms a new concept, represented by the and 
parameters. These parameters relate to the biases which equate to the square root of 10"^  in 
place of 10 ^ as in the case of MHB and MDB. It is clear from Figure 7.7 that if exceeds 
then the product of the two curves must exceed 10'^ and therefore the required 
integrity level is not met. In the event that is less than MOB^'^ the WCB search 
described in §7.3.2.3 below need only search over the two exterior domains as shown in 
Figure 7.7a and Figure 7.7c. 
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7.3.2.3 The Worst Case Bias Search 
The WCB was defined in Chapter Four and in Chapter Five it was noted that in order to assess 
the worst case integrity risl<, necessary to determine true compliance with requirements, the 
WCB must be used. In §7.3.2.1-7.3.2.2 two conditions were defined which allow the WCB to 
be avoided if only the question of compliance to the integrity requirement is desired. These 
conditions may also be used to restrict the range of biases to the interval [MHB, MDB] or 
further to [MHB, MDB^^^] and [MHB^^\ MDB]. In the following subsections, the range [MHB, 
MDB] is used so to restrict the analysis to a single interval. The concept is introduced in 
§7.3.2.3.1. A sensitivity analysis into the reliability of the procedure with respect to the step 
size is described in §7.2.3.2.2. 
7.3.2.3.1 Iterative Search Concept 
The crude methodology employed to test the range of biases concept in §7.2.3.2 was to 
determine the PMD at equally space biases. This approach is of benefit, if the PMD at each bias 
value is of interest or an a priori failure bias probabilities is to be used such as the one 
presented in Chapters Six and Nine. A more sophisticated technique is to employ an iterative 
search for the WCB, thereby greatly reducing the number of PMD evaluations and perhaps 
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leading to a higher resolution in WCB if afforded. Figure 7.8 shows how such a search evolves 
with progressive iterations. 
Iterative Step 
i=3 
i=2 
i=l + 
MHB 
Figure 7.8 Worst Case Bias search 
WCB 
probability curve 
mttjHI search resolution = 8 
I I I I l l j I I I 
4 l - i 1 1 h 
MDB 
An iterative search for the WCB relies on knowledge of the number of maxima of the P^D 
function which exist between MHB and MDB. Investigation into the number of maxima found 
that the vast majority had a single maximum near to the MHB. However, a small number 
were found to have two maxima. Due to this, a checking mechanism is used to determine at 
the first iteration step if multiple maxima are present as shown in Figure 7.9. This check 
proceeds to compare the PMD at each bias step to its neighbours and if it exceeds them, it is 
considered a maximum. Two procedural threads were developed which may be run 
depending upon the outcome of this check. The algorithm either runs a 576 step range of 
biases test for the integrity risk as this was shown to be highly accurate in §7.2.3.2.2 or the 
iterative search by reducing the WCB search interval around the previous maximum as 
depicted in Figure 7.8. 
single local maximum 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ . 
e 
+ + + 
multiple local maximum 
+ + ® + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
bias bias 
Figure 7.9 Local Maxima 
7.3.2.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to utilise an iterative search it is imperative that such a procedure is tested for 
sensitivity with respect to the search step size. This process is necessary to check that no 
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multiple maxima are missed at the first iteration when the multiple maxima check is 
performed. This process was undertaken for the scenario below. 
Test Scenario: Full & Nominal Constellation | Grid Steps 5° Lon / 5° Lat steps | 
Region {85°N, 45°E, 0°S, 0°W} | 5 minute resolution | HAL + HPL range 
The iterative step size was tested using the following values {4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512} 
each a factor of 512 which allowed the same steps to be used for comparison between the 
different step sizes. This resulted in approximately 1.2 million sample comparisons. 
Number of Number of Number of Search 
Steps Checking Errors Errors 
4 289623 8210 
8 74120 113 
16 33398 0 
32 24927 0 
64 14997 0 
128 9403 0 
256 8774 0 
512 8765 0 
1024 8812 0 
2048 8735 0 
— •• i 
The test described above looked at possible mistakes in determining the presence of multiple 
maxima of the PMD. These mistakes could lead to selection of a localised maximum distinct 
from the global maximum. Clearly a lower number of steps is beneficial from the point of view 
of computational efficiency. Table 7.9 shows the results. As expected more mistakes 
are made for a smaller number of steps. However, surprisingly, the results appear to suggest 
that even the procedures using the largest number of steps are susceptible to such errors. 
These cases were investigated further during the research and are found to occur due to 
computational error either around the maximum bias values or at shallow gradients. The 
result is a minor blip as shown in Figure 7.10. These cases may therefore be excluded from 
the analysis as they represent errors in the determination of multiple maxima in the large 
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step number process. This was verified by checl<ing that the WCB was correctly identified by 
the search algorithm. 
logfRwo) -13.5 
computation error 
15 20 25 30 35 
bias array index 
Figure 7.10 Multiple Local Maxima - Computation Error 
On the basis of the revised data column in Table 7.9 a step number of 16 is employed within 
four iterative steps. The results suggest that mistakes using 16 steps are extremely rare or do 
not occur. This results in 64 evaluations if multiple maxima are not found and a bias 
resolution of (iVIDB-MHB)/8192. The inaccuracy of this PMD computation due to just the WCB 
determination will then be less than the 0.7% worst case presented in Table 7.7 for 2048 
steps. 
The output of the research presented in this section is a validated Vt/CB search procedure 
which is highly computationally efficient and accurate. At each run of the algorithm, the PMDS 
are checked for multiple local maxima which if found are fol lowed by a full 2048 step 
computation. This ensures this technique is reliable and accurate whilst in the majority of 
cases is extremely quick. Given the computational efficiency of this method it may be 
extended to the interval [0, MDB] simply by adding an additional iterative step. 
221 
7.3.2.4 The Worst Case Bias Location 
In order to investigate further the Ppp and P^ A functions a series of geometifliigs 
which showed critical behaviour i.e. the HPLs defined In §4,3,3,2 are neaf flhig iHWl. 
Furthermore, to extend the number of critical sample points, arbitrary HPlLs were nged llmmr 
than the HAL. These samples show that the most common form of the two fiuimictiioim glWmw iim 
Figure 7.7 in §7.3.2.2 is such that neither inflection point is contained in the iregiW IMIH®-
MDB. In fact the mean values of Ppp at the MDB and PMA at the MHB were 0,2757 amiril 0.2303 
respectively for the case of six satellites-in-view and these values decreased for the saimiplte 
with more satellites in view. Of further interest was the relative location of the WCB. I t e 
commonly found close to the iVlHB. In fact, the WCB is found approximately at the MIHB iiirn a 
large proportion of geometries. The distribution of WCB locations is shown in Figure 7,11 foir 
the six satellites-in-view case. As the number of satellites increases the size of the MHIBto 
MDB range at the ideal HPL is found to decrease and a greater proportion of WCB close to the 
MHB are found. The peak around 0.5 shown in Figure 7.11 therefore becomes shallllower as 
the number of satellites rises. 
X l O ' 
0l9 10 
Figure 7.11 Distribution of WCB location within MHB-MDB range 
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7.3.3 Sampling 
The requirements for a complete FIVIEA process listed in Chapter Five emphasised the need 
for a comprehensive sampling method which ensures the total performance of the system is 
captured. The techniques developed in §7.3.1 and §7.3.2 enable a fast, accurate and reliable 
determination of the integrity risk or integrity level compliance at each sample point. The 
other RNP parameters may be computed using the simple steps outlined in §5.4.2. The next 
level up from the RNP computation in the software structure, as portrayed in Figure 7.1, lies 
the means to compute the space-time point at which the RNP parameters must be computed. 
The sampling method and sampling frequency determine the scale of the simulation and in 
partnership with the computational efficiency, the length of a simulation run. Consider first 
the use of a fixed sample step. Naturally, there is a trade-off in effect between the sampling 
frequency and accuracy in the output RNP parameters. The integrity risk computation 
outlined in §7.3.1 combined with the iterative WCB search described in §7.3.2 enable 
sufficient computational efficiency to test a nominal NPA with a 5 second time step in 
approximately 48 hours. This is sufficiently quick to perform an approach validation to be 
used within a hazard analysis. However, a much faster timeframe would be preferable 
(personal communication, 2008) and for a near real-time application such as that proposed in 
Chapter Ten for online implementation, even greater computational efficiency is needed. 
Therefore, this section introduces a series of techniques which may be used to capture the 
performance of the system in an intelligent and accelerated manner. The results from testing 
and validation of these techniques are shown which provide an insight into the variability of 
performance with constellation and aircraft dynamics. The breakdown of sampling methods 
begins with the recommended approach of the RTCA (1993) in §7.3.3.1. The notion of grid 
sampling is once again reiterated in §7.3.3.2 and in §7.3.3.3 the strategy employed in this 
thesis, sampling over a trajectory is summarised. These methods are the three spatial 
sampling techniques which may be utilised. Innovative temporal sampling techniques are 
then investigated in §7.3.3.4-7.3.3.6. 
7.3.3.1 Fixed Locations Sampling 
The simplest of spatial sampling is to use fixed locations around the globe and a fixed time 
step over which to determine the performance level. This technique is recommended by the 
RTCA (1993) for use in receiver and algorithm testing. This method is suitable for algorithmic 
testing and preliminary tests to determine performance capabilities. However, to assess 
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operational performance or global system availability this technique falls short of capturing 
the complete population of possible geometries. 
7.3.3.2 Grid-Based Sampling (Service Volume Simulation) 
Service volume assessments of the system have been undertaken (Van Dyke, 2001; Ochieng 
etal, 2003) to determine availability using conservative PLs. These computations remain time 
consuming even for the simple PLs due to the sheer scale and so require a coarse grid 
resolution to be used. Typical values are 5 degrees of longitude and latitude. At each of these 
points it is custom to assess performance over a sidereal day, at a time interval of 5 minutes, 
totalling 750,000 sample points. Nevertheless, RAIM holes and areas of lesser coverage may 
occur (Feng, 2006) in between these sample points, or periods of reduced performance which 
are not captured by this sampling strategy. In order to provide a viable service to users for 
specific aircraft approach trajectories, the service volume technique is inaccurate and 
unreliable but may be useful to highlight the benefits of certain PLs, signal structures or 
variation is performance at different latitudes. 
7.3.3.3 Approach Trajectory Sampling 
The operation-based alternative to the previous spatial sampling strategies is to use the 
approach trajectory as selected in Chapter Five (loannides et al, 2005). Approach flight phases 
are well defined by the approach procedure charts publications which may be pre-processed 
before input to the simulation platform. Due to the restriction of the assessment to an 
approach trajectory, the assessment space is essentially one dimensional as opposed to two 
dimensional in grid sampling. This is beneficial in that a high temporal sample rate may be 
used, of the order of a few seconds. However, such a technique is not applicable for 
determining global or regional performance levels as is the case for service volume 
assessments. 
As already noted, the sample size of 5 seconds may be achievable for approach procedures. 
This frequency is able to capture all but the rarest and insignificant drops in performance and 
is implicitly supported by the Time-To-Alert (TTA). Outages, or performance lapses which last 
for less than the TTA are not practically relevant to the system, assuming the algorithm is 
quick enough to process each epoch and hence return to the nominal state following such a 
short term outage. As stated above, the use of this sampling mechanism in partnership with 
the solution to the bias ambiguity described in §7.3.2 and integrity risk computation in §7.3.1 
(described in further detail in Chapter Eight) is able to determine performance in terms of the 
RNP parameters over a flight track for an entire geometry day in approximately 48 hours. 
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7.3.3.4 Satellite Coverage Sampling 
A method of using the satellite footprints to determine the existence of RAIiVI holes was 
Introduced in (Feng et al, 2006a) and then used as part of a proposed dynamic sampling 
scheme (Feng et al, 2006b). This dynamic sampling scheme proposed to use the coverage of 
satellites to determine the borders between space-time regions of k-satellites in view and 
those of k-1 and k+1 satellites in view. However, the algorithm was only developed for the 
point (single location) and trajectory cases as processing over a region requires excessive 
computation. Therefore, the coverage borders are simply the times at which satellites cross 
the visibility mask. These time were then added as sample points to ensure that all such 
sudden changes in satellite number were captured by the sampling strategy. Although the 
method may reduce the approximation error due to sampling, a gain in efficiency only occurs 
if the fixed sample step is increased when used in conjunction with the dynamically sampled 
points. In order to achieve this for the approach assessments, a time step of over 10 seconds 
would have to be used. However, this revised quicker strategy could allow small periods of 
unacceptable integrity risk. 
7.3.3.5 Performance Minima Sampling 
Of crucial importance to the notion of loosening the time step size, is the verification that all 
geometries of poor performance will be assessed. One potential solution is to search for the 
local performance minima between changes in satellite coverage and test only at these 
minima and coverage borders. This would ensure that a conservative estimate is found in a 
short t ime frame. This method is developed and tested below. 
7.3.3.5.1 Concept Development 
Initial theoretical considerations began with an attempt to characterise the satellite orbits by 
polynomial equations. These would have been used to form parameterised equations for the 
geometrical matrices and parameters (DOPs, slopes) which are critical in the computation of 
performance metrics and in many cases are closely correlated to the RNP parameters. The 
objective was to use optimisation techniques on these derived polynomials and thereby find a 
close estimate to the minimum performance. The location of the minimum of the slope 
parameter polynomial is likely to be very close to that of the maximum integrity risk and 
similarly, the maximum Horizontal DOR (HDOP) would be closely correlated to the minimum 
accuracy value. These relationships would naturally require further validation. 
However, in an initial feasibility study, it was found that using polynomials of order n to 
represent the satellite orbits would cause the relevant parameters to be approximated by 
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polynomials roughly of the order of lOn. It is unfeasible therefore, to use an approximation of 
the satellite orbits as the optimisation is unworkable. 
In light of the problems highlighted above, an alternative was explored, the possibility of 
finding the minima or maxima of parameters such as slope using an iterative search algorithm 
which may then be used to locate the worst case integrity risk. The existence of a simple 
iterative optimisation procedure able to find the slope maximum in a short time period is 
dependent upon the number of minima or maxima within the time period of interest. 
slope 
single local 
solution 
slope double local 
solution 
slope triple local 
solution 
missed 
solution 
time time time 
Figure 7.12 Number of Solutions vs. Number of Local Minima a) single b) double c) triple 
In the case of one or two local minima (including boundaries) it is possible to guarantee that 
the global minima may be found by starting an inward search from each end of the time 
period in question. In the case of at least three local minima (or three interior optima i.e. two 
maxima and one minima as shown in Figure 7.12c) a more sophisticated global optimisation 
procedure would be needed which may greatly increase the computational power needed to 
find the minimal performance point. 
The important issue is whether slope parameters are likely to vary between changes in the 
visible satellite set to such an extent that multiple local minima and maxima occur. Intuitively, 
it seems reasonable that the smooth steady satellite motion is unlikely to invoke such 
changes in the slope parameter. However, it is necessary to confirm and validate this 
assertion if such a minima search is to be proposed. The next subsection analyses this 
assertion for the integrity risk and associated slope. 
7.3.3.5.2 Slope Parameter Temporal Behaviour 
In order to determine the number of slope minima and maxima to be expected between 
changes in the visible satellites a comprehensive testing procedure was devised. It is known 
that the geometrical location of the user and the make-up of the constellation are the 
contributing factors to the behaviour of the slope value. Furthermore, it was expected that 
the likelihood of extra minima would decrease with the addition of more satellites and the 
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frequency at which they cross the horizon. To capture the possible nuances in the slope 
function behaviour, a series of five test sets were used and are listed below; 
Set 1: Full & Current Constellation | Grid Steps 10° Lon / 10° Lat steps | Region 
{85°N, 180°E, -85°S, -175°W} | 1 second resolution 
Set 2: Subset & Current Constellation | Grid Steps 5° Lon / 5° Lat steps | Region 
{85°N, 45°E, 0°S, 0°W} | 2 second resolution 
Set 3; Full & Nominal Constellation | Grid Steps 5° Lon / 5° Lat steps | Region 
{85°N, 45°E, crs, 0°W} | 2 second resolution 
Set 4: Subset & Nominal Constellation | Grid Steps 5° Lon / 5° Lat steps | Region 
{85°N, 15°E, 0°S, 0°W} | 5 second resolution 
Set 5: Full GPS + Galileo Constellation | Grid Steps 5° Lon / 5° Lat steps | Region 
{85°N, 60°E, -85°S, 60°W} | 2 second resolution 
This collection of testing sets captures the entire range of geometry (Set 1), the influence of a 
satellite outage (Set 2), the restriction to the nominal constellation (Set 3) and further severe 
limitations on satellite availability (Set 4) and the behaviour in the future multi-constellation 
environment (Set 5). Although it is never possible to entirely guarantee that all possible 
geometries are considered, the above sets are as comprehensive as is reasonable. 
After processing each of the above test scenarios, a total of 1,377,334 files were produced 
each cataloguing the slope parameters for a satellite between the available satellite changes. 
Table 7.10 below presents the results. 
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Scenario Interior 
Minima 
Interior 
Maxima 
Interior 
Optima 
0 1 2 + 0 1 2 + 0 1 2 + 
S e t l 300116 2 5 2 7 1 11 0 306465 18928 5 0 284954 39565 863 16 
Set 2 323115 32193 156 0 327961 27424 79 0 295780 56519 2990 175 
Set 3 223545 2 1 8 4 1 8 0 229964 15426 4 0 208874 35761 747 12 
Set 4 238493 35748 2 0 1 0 242726 31629 87 0 211244 58731 4186 2 8 1 
s e t s 168430 8 1 5 1 55 0 171164 5461 11 0 163684 12816 72 64 
Tota l 1253699 123204 4 3 1 0 1278280 98868 186 0 1164536 203392 8858 548 
Table 7.10 Slope Optimisation Results (Almanac) 
The results show that the vast majority of slope parameter trajectories do not have interior 
maxima or minima. However, there is a notable proportion that contains one or two peaks 
and troughs. In these cases an iterative search starting at each end of the time period in 
question is guaranteed to locate all optima, assuming the step size is small enough. However, 
an addition to the iterative search algorithm is needed to account for the rare cases of two 
maxima or minima in order to avoid a missed solution as shown in Figure 7.12c. 
Consider that the ends of the time period are used as starting points to search for the maxima 
and minima (the initial gradients can be estimated using two very close initial points). These 
can either be pointing upwards, downwards or two opposite directions (Figure 7.13 a, d & g). 
Given that there were no cases of two maxima and two minima. Figure 7.13 shows all the 
possible functional shapes which may result from these starting directions (of course an 
alternative negative gradient case exists in symmetry with Figure 7.13 g, h & i). it is clear that 
if iterative solutions are sought using each end as a starting point, then in all cases but Figure 
7.13e all maxima will be found (or all but Figure 7.13b for minima). Therefore, if the two 
minimum solutions derived from initial conditions are distinct (Figure 7.13d), an additional 
search is made using the minima as starting points in order to find the maximum which lies 
between them. 
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The analysis above leads to the conclusion that a simple algorithm may be developed which 
can find the maxima and minima of the slope parameter in all cases. The most common cases 
are Figure 7.13i and the corresponding negative function for which it is only necessary to 
check that no maxima or minima occur. 
An additional output from the generation of this slope data were the times between maxima 
and minima. The majority of recorded times were between 500 and 1000 seconds. However, 
some times were recorded as low as 90 seconds. This is critical for ensuring the iterative 
search time step is optimised but safe in the sense that it is unable to jump so far that maxima 
or minima are missed. A larger time step would lead to a quicker solution. However, it could 
result in a missed maximum if the step skipped over a maximum and minimum. Therefore the 
most suitable t ime step would appear to be around 180 seconds (twice the minimum of 90 
seconds) to ensure this does not occur. To maintain an extra level of safety 90 seconds is 
chosen. 
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In order to validate the above conclusions, real data were used in the form of broadcast 
ephemerides and processed in an identical manner. The results are shown in Table 7.11 and 
confirm the conclusions derived from the almanac data. 
Scenario Interior 
Minima 
Interior 
Maxima 
Interior 
Optima 
Comments 
0 1 2 + 0 1 2 + 0 1 2 + 
Real Data 104187 8830 2 0 99939 13080 0 0 86002 26834 181 2 
sl ight ly improved 
over a lmanac 
Table 7.11 Slope Optimisation Results (Ephemerides) 
7.3.3.5.3 Concept of Determining the Integrity Performance Temporal Behaviour 
It has been demonstrated above that a simple iterative solution can be found for locating the 
times of the maximum slope value over the range between satellites crossing the visibility 
mask. It should be noted nevertheless, that this does not confirm the selection of the worst 
case epoch in terms of the integrity risk (Chin et al, 1993) as this is a more complicated 
variable, dependent on noise and WCB. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the level of 
coordination in t ime between the worst case integrity point and the worst case slope point. 
However, a small detour is needed to define the ideal HPL which enables this analysis. 
7.3.3.5.4 Introduction of the Ideal HPL 
In §7.3.1 the performance of the Integrity Risk (IR) computation was presented. 
Unfortunately, for very low PMD the computation is susceptible to errors. In the research 
presented in this section, it is necessary to compute the gradient of integrity risk with respect 
to time by evaluating at two nearby points. Due to the errors at low P^o this would not be 
possible for the vast majority of space-time points for which performance is met easily. 
Alternatively a variable may be defined whose relationship to the integrity risk is known but is 
less susceptible to the errors described. To achieve this consider the notion of an arbitrary 
HPL introduced in §7.3.2.1. If the PMD and integrity risk are defined by a position error 
exceeding this arbitrary HPL instead of the HAL, then the relationship of PMD or IR to the HPL is 
as shown in Figure 7.14 
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Figure 7.14 IR and PMD in relation to a HPL 
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The integrity nsk computation described in §7.3.1 is used to determine IRAcruAL as shown in 
Figure 7.14 at the HAL. This process may be used to compute the ideal HPL (HPLIDEAL) which is 
shown in Figure 7.14 to equate exactly with the required integrity risk or PMD- The 
computation of HPLIDEAL is formulated in detail in Chapter Nine. The sensitivity of this 
parameter is much superior to the pure integrity risk and may be used as a direct indicator of 
performance in its place. 
7.3.3.5.5 Testing the Conformance of Integrity Performance to the Slope 
A ten second sample resolution was used as this is also the worst case resolution needed to 
meet the sampling requirements f rom a standard fixed step sampling procedure. The 
following subsets were tested: 
Set 6: Full & Current Constellation | Grid Steps 10° Lon | Region {80°N, 
0°E, 0°S, 0°W} I 10 second resolution 
Set 7: 1-Subset & Current Constellation | Grid Steps 10° Lat | Region {60°N, 
15°E, 0°S, 15°E} I 10 second resolution 
Set 8: Full & Nominal Constellation | Grid Steps 10° Lat steps | Region {60°N, 
30°E, 0°S, 30°E} I 10 second resolution 
Set 9; 1,2,3 -Subset & Nominal Constellation | Grid Steps 10° Lat steps | Region 
{80°N, 45°E, 0°S, 45°W} | 10 second resolution 
Set 10: Full GPS + Galileo Constellation | Grid Steps 5° Lon / 5° Lat steps | Region 
{85°N, 60°E, 85°S, 60°W} | 10 second resolution 
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The output data were analysed to connpare the form of the slope parameter graph with that 
of the HPL and determine any variation. The most critical check was not only to ensure that 
the majority of slope and HPL curves possessed the same features, but that the HPL curves 
did not possess any maxima and minima when the slope curves did not. Figure 7.15 shows an 
example of where this could have been a potential hazard. The presence of an additional HPL 
maximum and HPL minimum such that the slope maximum is on the side of the non-global 
maximum would make finding the global worst case HPL very challenging. This is because the 
proposed algorithm would start the search for the global HPL maximum from the slope 
maximum and use the gradient of HPL at that point. In the case shown in Figure 7.15 this 
would involve a search from left to right as shown by the small black arrow. A local maximum 
would be found which is lower than its globally optimised neighbour. 
slope 
/HPL 
search 
time 
Figure 7.15 Problematic Case 
Of all the sample curves processed none of these cases were found. Therefore, it is 
inductively assumed from this empirical data that such occurrences do not exist. In the event 
that this assumption is invalid, it should be noted that the global maximum would likely only 
be marginally more extreme than the local maximum as slope is decreasing in that direction. 
Therefore, the sheer weight of data in its favour and the relatively minor impact of an 
exceptional case occurring substantiate this assumption as valid. 
Although no cases of the above form were found, there were a fraction of the HPL 
performance curves (=3%) which showed a maximum or minimum near the period boundary 
which was not found in the slope curve. An example of such a case is shown below in Figure 
7.16. In order to capture these effects the ideal HPL gradients may be found at the end points, 
which would require an additional two computations of ideal HPL than the two needed for 
each end point. Therefore, in the majority of coverage periods with no interior performance 
maxima, a total of four ideal HPL are needed to guarantee no hidden performance holes exist. 
232 
233 
This is able to greatly reduce the computational load needed to assess performance over 
these periods. 
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Figure 7.16 Possible discrepancy between slope and HPL curves 
Further to the occurrence of such maxima described above, a number of the internal maxima 
and minima recorded were not synchronized in their times w/ith the slope maxima and 
minima. This leads to the need of an additional iterative search to determine the maximum of 
the ideal HPL from the corresponding point on the slope curve as alluded to in the discussion 
of Figure 7.15. The critical parameter here is the time betw/een the maximum of the slope 
parameter and that of the ideal HPL. These time differences were post processed from the 
data to provide an insight into the behaviour of the system and optimise the step parameter 
for this final iterative search. A histogram of the time differences is displayed in Figure 7.17. 
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Figure 7.17 Histogram of time differences between HPL and Slope maxima 
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The histogram shows that approximately half of the time differences are less than 80 seconds 
in length and the remaining differences mostly lie between 80 and 500 seconds. This 
information is helpful in selecting a viable t ime step to locate the maximum ideal HPL from 
the maximum slope point as discussed below in §7.3.3.5.6 
7.3.3.5.6 Practicalities of a Performance Optimisation Dynamic Sampling Procedure 
The discussion in §7.3.3.5.1-7.3.3.5.3 has laid the groundwork for an iterative search of the 
performance minima by detailing the issues associated with a blind search and the pitfalls of 
not capturing the globally worst case. The intended initial implementation of such a sampling 
scheme is within an NPA approach validation tool both for real-time accelerated performance 
prediction or an entirely offline certification process. An application of this scheme to NPA is 
beneficial because for the majority of space-time points, NPA meets the requirements. 
Therefore, concluding that the performance minimum is above the required level is sufficient 
to deem a temporal period between satellite changes as available. However, when this is not 
the case and the computed HPL is above that of the HAL it is necessary to find the local 
minima and times which performance crosses the required level to determine the exact 
period. This process is included within the entire optimisation-based dynamic sampling 
procedure. 
Figure 7.18 shows the high-level pseudo-code for the dynamic sampling algorithm and a 
conceptual graph of the result of using the algorithm. Step one is identical to the first step of 
Feng et al (2006b) method, locating the time points at which the number of satellites in view 
changes. Step two then finds the form of the slope parameter and records the times of the 
maxima and minima of each satellites slope within each period. Finally, the algorithm checks 
the end gradients of the ideal HPL and compares to the slope parameters end gradients. In 
the case of slope function forms 1, 2 and 4 shown in Figure 7.18, if the gradients match, the 
maximum HPL is found at an end point. Otherwise, the maximum must be found using an 
additional iterative search. An initial t ime step of 180s was found to offer the greatest 
efficiency following a sensitivity analysis. 
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Step 1: Find Temporal Coverage Borders 
for (t = 0,1,2...85400) 
Output: 
np - number of satellite horizon passes 
periods[np] - times and number of visible (n) satellites 
Step 2: Find Slope Parameter Behaviour 
for (i_np = 1,2,3...np) 
for (i_sat = l,2,3..periods[i_np].n) 
Iterate (time step(ts) = 30s) 
Checl< gradient 
If gradient changes ts=(ts/2) 
While (ts>ls) 
Output: 
Slope Function Form (1-8) 
time_maxs & time_mins 
Step 3: Check HPL Left & Right Gradient and 
compare to Slope gradients 
Select maximum point or perform 
deviated search from end points (if gradients don't match) 
or interior maximum if Slope form 3,5,6,7 or 8 
180s initial time step after computation time optimisation 
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Figure 7.18 Optimisation Based Dynamic Sampling Algorithm 
The benefit of using the dynamic sampling algorithm described may be quantified by the 
computation time gained in comparison to a fixed step procedure. A single point assessment 
of the ideal HPL at a fixed sampling rate of 10s was found to take 23 hours whereas using the 
dynamical sampling of the worst case points was completed in 24 minutes. The relative 
accuracy of the dynamically sampled ideal HPL to the fixed sampled ideal HPL was found to be 
less than I m in all cases and 0.12m at the 95% level. In conclusion, this dynamic samplimg 
approach of locating the worst case time point offers a significant reduction in the processing 
time needed to find the ideal HPL. 
7.3.3.6 Critical Sampling 
The previous dynamic sampling scheme probed the feasibility of locating the worst case 
geometry, or worst case time point at which performance may be estimated or predlr t td and 
hence be of practical use to the operator or user. This technique is partieulirtf useful wkw i 
performance predominantly exceeds the required level. However* if iis 
235 
236 
commonly around the level required of the system for the operation under analysis, the worst 
case performance may be of little benefit, as this would flag as unavailable large time periods 
in which perhaps only a short fraction of which performance dropped below the constraint. A 
step to locate the minima and critical points was added but has not been fully tested for 
critical applications such as APV-II. In this case, it is the critical behaviour which is important 
and a sampling strategy which accounts for this may be more appropriate. 
A sampling strategy which selects those periods in which performance is within a critical 
region relies on a rough performance predictor such as the slope as is required in the 
minimisation method above. For example, consider the relationship between integrity risk 
and slope. If these parameters were perfectly correlated, it would be possible to set a 
threshold on slope. All geometries in which the slope is below the threshold would result in 
an acceptable integrity risk and be accepted and all those above would be too hazardous and 
rejected. In reality of course, the situation is complicated by noise and the correlation 
between integrity risk and slope is blurred. This results in a range of slope parameters in 
which integrity risks are either side of the required value. This range could theoretically be the 
critical sampling range and such a strategy would only invoke a detailed assessment when the 
geometry produced a slope in this range. The practicality of this sampling method relies 
heavily on how well the intended performance measure (i.e. integrity risk) may be 
represented by a deterministic quickly calculated geometry parameter such as slope. 
Furthermore, if the population of geometries all lie within the slope critical range, the 
technique is of no discernable benefit. Further analysis and research of this strategy is left to 
future work. 
7.4 Enhanced Software Platform 
7.4.1 Software Developments 
§7.3 presented the core innovations which meet the software platform requirements 
specified in §7.2.1. These innovations are formed of three main elements: 
• A fast, accurate and reliable algorithm for computing the integrity risk 
• A reliable accelerated search for the Worst Case Bias employing the computation 
above 
• A single point, dynamic temporal sampling strategy 
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These innovations, in addition to other more elementary functions have been incrementally 
incorporated into an advanced version of GAVaT (GAVaT v3.1). GAVaT v3.1 has been 
subjected to a validation process including design, component and end-to-end (system level) 
test procedures (ICL, 2007b). Component testing included functional tests in comparison to 
the output of reliable MATLAB functions. These processes confirmed the correctness of 
integration procedures and base level mathematical routines. An end-to-end comparison was 
made to independent internal software possessing similar capabilities to the GAVaT legacy 
software (GAVAT v l . l ) . This concluded that the differences in results found were to be 
expected and due to the use of trajectory sampling and use of a 10^ sample Monte Carlo 
procedure in the control software. 
Further software development has been undertal<en to mal<e GAVaT a more efficient 
platform in terms of software architecture in addition to the accelerated algorithm design 
described in this thesis. This process has led to GAVaT v4.1 being developed in C# using 
Microsoft Visual C# Express and has been designed in a more object-oriented fashion than its 
predecessors. Of great importance in the design of GAVaT v4.1 was the ability to quickly 
develop new testing procedures and algorithms for use in future developments, with minimal 
coding and debugging. This is achieved through the use of functional encapsulation to allow 
maximum code reuse. One such example is the geometry class shown in Figure 7.19, which on 
construction of a geometry object, automates the generation of all geometrical matrices, H 
(3.43), A (3.45), P (4.20), S (4.17), DOPs (3.52-3.56) and slopes (4.40-4.41). 
GAVaT v4.1 was conceived as a solution to the processing inefficiencies of GAVaT v l . l - v3 .1 
and is designed in a completely modular object-oriented fashion. GAVaT v l . l - v3 .1 and other 
internal software have been used to validate the necessary basic functionality of GAVaT v4.1 
within the new software language such as the Keplerian orbit propagation, creation of the 
geometry matrix and algorithm outputs. Figure 7.19 shows the major classes and their 
relationships. 
In Chapter Eight which follows, the integrity risk computation included in GAVaT v3.1 and 
summarised in §7.3.1 is detailed. In Chapter Nine, GAVaT v4.1 is used to assess APV 
performance. Then in Chapter Ten the approach validation capability of GAVaT v3.1 is used to 
assess Durham Airport. 
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Figure 7.19 GAVaT v4.1 Classes 
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Chapter 8 
NPA INTEGRITY RISK COMPUTATION 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five identified the need to compute each of the Required Navigation Performance 
(RNP) parameters at each space-time point throughout a Non-Precision Approach (NPA) 
validation. In Chapter Seven the development of a simulation platform to perform this 
operational evaluation was described. This included a brief summary of the method used to 
compute the integrity risk at a space-time point. In this chapter the integrity risk computation 
for NPA is covered in detail. NPA operations are specified in terms of horizontal requirements 
only. Therefore, the crucial element of this process is the evaluation of the probability of a 
positioning failure in the horizontal domain. The Horizontal Position Error (HPE) must be 
considered in relation to a circular Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) or Horizontal Protection Level 
(HPL). In the presence of a failure induced bias and nominal noise, loss of integrity occurs 
when the HPE exceeds the HAL without the user being notified (§2.5.1.1.2). 
In §4.3.3.2 it was noted that of the three most popular Horizontal Protection Levels (HPLs) 
employed, two did not guarantee sufficient bounding of the integrity risk with the remaining 
one being overly conservative. This chapter proposes a method which accounts for these 
weaknesses and is able to ascertain whether the use of each HPL presents an integrity risk or 
unnecessarily restricts RAIM availability. 
The Integrity Risk (IR) per sample may be broken down into the probability of failure Pfan and 
the probability of missed detection PMD, defined by equation 5.1 (IR = Pfan x P^o) and 
discussed in §7.2.3.1 in relation to the operational evaluation. The Pfan is assumed to equate 
to 10"" for the approach validation process but could also be defined by the total failure 
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model derived in Chapter Six. To assess the performance in real operations, the role of the 
HPLs highlighted must be accounted for as they determine availability of the RAIM algorithm. 
This requires that the standard probability model is used for approach validation so to match 
receiver functionality. 
The challenge is to compute the PMD accurately whilst maintaining a viable speed of 
computation, as outlined in §5.5 and investigated further in §7.2.3.1. The algorithm must also 
be reliable by restricting any gross computational errors for probabilities around the critical 
region. 
This chapter recalls the relevant mathematical relationships from previous chapters in §8.2. 
Further analysis of potential solutions is given in §8.3 referring to the critical assessment of 
existing techniques in §7.2.3.1. The chosen methodology is then illustrated in detail in §8.4 
and results are shown which equate the performance procedure to the three requirements: 
speed, accuracy and reliability. An improved RAIM algorithm developed on the basis of this 
new technique is described in §8.5. Conclusions and a discussion of the future work is given in 
§8.6. 
8.2 System Model 
Recall f rom §3.3.3.1 that the relationship between the observed measurements and the 
position and clock bias vector may be expressed as a linear regression model following 
linearization of the system of pseudorange equations. Therefore, the system model is of the 
form (3.43) (4.13): 
Z = HX + E (8.1) 
where: 
2 = n-dimensional vector of measurements 
H = (nx4) geometry matrix defined in the local East-North-Up (END) frame, with the 
condition n>4 
X = 4-dimensional vector of unknowns (position and receiver clock bias) 
E = n-dimensional vector of measurement errors 
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Recall from §4.3.1.1.1 that the measurement errors may modelled as being composed of both 
biases and zero-mean Gaussian noise (4.15) (3.47): 
e ~ N ( n , , z J ( 8 . 2 ) 
where: 
Mg: n-dimensional vector of measurement biases 
Zg: nxn-dimensional covariance matrix 
The vector is unknown to the user and represents a bias vector in the measurements at 
the sample epoch under consideration. In this chapter only a single satellite failure at a t ime is 
considered as for NPA, the gross failures which have the potential to cause positioning 
failures are highly unlikely to occur simultaneously (Lee et al, 1996). The measurement bias 
vector is of the form (0,0,...,8,....,0,0)^ for a bias of magnitude B present on satellite /. In 
§4.3.1.1.2 a weighting matrix (Walter and Enge, 1995) was used to account for unequal 
variances. In this case, the weighting matrix is defined as the inverse of the measurement 
covariance W = . The linear system (8.1) may be normalised using the square roots of the 
diagonal elements of W, following which the measurement error covariance may be set to 
the identity matrix I„,„. 
The snapshot RAIM algorithm employed for NPA operation and assessed in this thesis uses a 
Least Squares positioning solution defined by equation 3.45 (ICAO, 2006): 
XLS = Az (8.3) 
Recall from equation 3.46 that the position error (e) under the model defined by 8.1 and 8.2 
is a projection of the measurement errors and follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution 
defined by the linear propagation of errors (3.45) (3.47) (Koch, 1988): 
e=(H^H)^H^e =Ae (8.4) 
e D N ( n ^ , z J (8.5) 
which in the horizontal domain is merely the projection of these two formulae: 
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Gh = 
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(8.6) 
(8.7) 
where 
|i and 1 = ^611,1 ^ e | i , 2 
.^«Li ^=L,2. 
The RAIM algorithm also uses a residuals (or parity) vector in order to determine the presence 
of a failure: 
r=z-Hx 
LS (8.8) 
The Sum-Squared Error (SSE) test statistic is used as described in §4.3.1.1.6 and is known to 
follow a chi-squared distribution with n-4 degrees of freedom (n the number of 
satellites/measurements): 
SSE = ||r|f =||(l-HA)zf 
In the presence of a failure, distribution of SSE is non-central (4.19) (Ober, 1998). 
(8.9) 
(8.10) 
(8.11) 
where the non-centrality parameter is related to the measurement bias by . In 
fact under the single failure assumption, recall from (4.39) that the bias magnitude may be 
simply projected to the residual (or parity) space. 
(8.12) 
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The detection threshold T is computed from the False Alert (FA) requirement derived as in 
§4.3.1.1.6 and §4.3.3.1 (3.33x10"^). Figure 8.1 show/s the relationship between the normalised 
threshold and the probability of false alert PFA as specified in the performance requirements 
(RTCA, 2004). 
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False Alarm 
Test Statistic (SSE) 
Figure 8.1 Diagram of Test Statistic Domain 
Recall that the Horizontal Position Error (HPE) vector et, is defined in the east-north frame and 
is thus composed of two elements. A positioning failure occurs when the magnitude of this 
vector exceeds the HAL. Recall from equation 4.37 that this magnitude may be expressed as a 
function of the single measurement bias on satellite i: 
- I hh II - ^2.1 (8.13) 
Furthermore the projection of the measurement bias to the test statistic domain may be 
achieved by using equation 4.39: 
(8.14) 
The ratio of these two parameter is known as the slope, defined in §4.3.3.2 for both the 
horizontal (4.40) and vertical components of error. This parameter represents the 
detectability of a positioning failure. However, the ratio of HPE and SSE is only strictly true in 
the absence of noise. In the presence of measurement noise, the instantaneous values of 
position error and the SSE test statistic may vary. The relationship is shown in Figure 8.2, 
termed the error-test statistic (E-T) diagram. The magnitude of bias can be viewed as the 
distance along the slope gradient. In the presence of noise, the position error values and test 
statistic instances are likely to be found near the projection of bias to the respective axes. 
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However, the stochastic variation in position error and test statistic leads to the possibility of 
Missed Detections (MD). These occur when the system state lies in the upper left region of 
the E-T diagram. For this to be the case, a positioning failure must occur without an alert 
being raised. 
MD = HPE>HAL & SSE<T (8.15) 
position error 
HAL 
position bias 
missed detection / 
liazardous misleading information 
correct detection 
slope 
/ n j 
nominal operation false alert 
bias test statistic 
Figure 8.2 Missed Detection Region 
In order to quantify integrity risk, the probability of the E-T state lying within this region must 
be computed. Although, these probabilities depend crucially on the measurement bias, the 
position error and test statistic are statistically independent for a fixed bias (Ober, 1997; 
Ober, 2003). in §7.3.2.3 a method for finding the Worst Case Bias (WCB) was found which 
required the determination of the PMD for a number of fixed bias values. Therefore, in the 
following assessment, the bias will be assumed to be an arbitrary but set value as part of 
either assessment over a range of biases or within the WCB search process described in 
§7.3.2.3. As a consequence to statistical independence, the PMD may be expressed as the 
product of the probability of a positioning failure (Ppp) and the probability of no alert (PNA): 
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P^PFX P.. = P(||eJ>HAL)XP(||r|f < T ) (8.16) 
The computation of PNA is relatively simple and may either use a standard non-central chi-
squared probability distribution such as the one used in MATLAB or a quicker Gaussian 
approximation (Hastings, 1955). For a given bias and known degrees of freedom (n-4), PNA can 
be computed at very little computational cost. The task remains to compute the Ppp over the 
horizontal plane. This problem and potential solutions are described below in §8.3. 
8.3 Potential Methodologies 
8.3.1 Problem Definition 
In §8.2, the positioning failure probability Ppp was isolated as the driver for a highly accurate 
assessment of integrity risk. In the vertical position error case, the task of computing Ppp is 
simple and requires merely the evaluation of the error function. In the 2D horizontal problem, 
the E-T diagram shown in Figure 8.2 does not capture the full dimensionality of the problem. 
It illustrates the slope relationship with respect to a bias magnitude and the independence of 
each error space. In order to calculate the probability of a positioning failure, consider the 
geometry of a position bias and position error covariance matrix within the 2D local 
horizontal plane. These elements are shown in Figure 8.3. 
north 
position error proportion 
of error percentiles percentiles pf position 
covariance 
true position 
Figure 8.3 Position Error Distribution 
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The probability of a positioning failure is represented by the region outside the circle bounded 
by the HAL and centred at the true position. In the presence of a failure and resulting bias, the 
distribution of position errors is centred at the projected position bias = An^ (the centre 
of the white crosshairs in Figure 8.3). The position error covariance matrix is !<nown and the 
Gaussian nature and independence of measurement errors ensures the stochastic variation in 
position error around the position bias may be represented by error ellipses. The axes of 
these ellipses may be determined from the position error covariance matrix by computing its 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors. 
The problem is to determine the likelihood of the resulting position error lying outside the 
HAL for each bias over a range. In the follow/ing subsection, the existing techniques of Monte 
Carlo simulation, approximation and interpolation which may be used to compute the Ppp and 
which were investigated in §7.2.3.1 are discussed. Integration is then reconsidered and tested 
in §8.3.3. 
8.3.2 Existing Techniques 
A Standard method for computing the probabilities of complex systems is to employ a Monte 
Carlo Simulation procedure (Robert and Casella, 2004; Rubinstein and Kroese, 2007). This 
approach was analysed in §7.2.3.1 and was found to lack the necessary combination of speed 
and accuracy to be used in a large scale operational evaluation. To sample sufficiently to gain 
meaningful statistics for an approach validation would require over a hundred billion samples 
which is unreasonable in practice. It is noted that by using a large sample size, the assessment 
accuracy may be increased to be used as a truth value for comparison. 
Due to the computational complexity of numerical methods, a number of analytical solutions 
have been sought which utilise approximations of the Ppp. These approximations were also 
assessed in §7.2.3.1 and found to be exceptionally quick. However, the three methods were 
found too be either inaccurate or unreliable (Lee, 1996b, Ober, 1997, Kelly, 1997). The 
approximation approaches appear to be either highly conservative or optimistic. Therefore, a 
lack of a viable approximation method presented in the literature for the goals set for the 
FMEA in this thesis. 
The process of interpolation is a general one and describes here a multitude of methodologies 
which may facilitate the computation of Ppp. One common approach is to use Monte Carlo 
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generated data to compute the desired output PRF as a function of the underlying parameter 
set. These outputs may be used to populate a look-up table which may be accessed in real-
time using the current parameters' values. An interpolation scheme is applied to determine 
the values between those specified in the look-up table's cells. The look-up table is in fact 
multi-dimensional, whose dimension equates to the number of parameters which are used to 
model the behaviour. An alternative approach is to use the generated data to model the 
probability density function by curve-fitting a function whose arguments are the model 
parameter set. This method is similar to interpolating between the look-up table cells except 
that a specific curve or function family is used to model the system behaviour and this is fitted 
to all the data as opposed to an interpolation function over a small region. 
Complex systems, for which a large number of parameters are known to govern the 
behaviour of the system, may only be approximated by these approaches. A fitted curve will 
naturally possess a level of inaccuracy and likewise, the error in interpolating between lookup 
table cells has an intrinsic error. Under the assumption of the system model described by 
equation 8.1, the integrity performance is governed by the number of visible satellites 
available to the user, the relative geometry of these satellites to the user, the magnitude of 
measurement bias and the assumed measurement noise variance. The relative geometry is 
described by matrix H, which contains n x 4 parameters. However, it would be unfeasible to 
generate data for a table of dimension (n x 4) + 3 because with just 5 cells per dimension this 
equates to 5 million entries. The Monte Carlo generator would also require in excess of 10'' 
samples leading to an unfeasible 5x10^° even with just 5 intervals. Therefore, a model would 
be needed in order to account for the effects of the geometry without the need for each H 
matrix element. One such approach could be to use the slope parameter (equation 8.17) 
which perfectly models performance in the absence of noise. However, in the presence of 
noise, it has been shown (loannides, 2005) that too great a variation in performance occurs 
for identical slopes composed of differing numerator and denominator. Let the numerator 
and denominator be defined separately as: 
PB = 7aJ,,+A^, (8.17) 
B T = ^ ( 8 . 1 8 ) 
therefore, 
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PR 
slope = — (8.19) 
Although these two parameters account for much of the variation in performance, changes in 
performance due to differences in the orientation of the error ellipses and the magnitude of 
position error covariance elements were also found to play a role in the determination of the 
probability of position error. The parameter set would therefore 
be{ N, a, PB, BT, B,, 0, Opi, } • The number of data points this equates to is 8x10® under the 
assumption of 10 intervals of each variable. The number of satellites would only 6 (i.e. 7 to 12 
satellites) but the bias would require a much greater number on the basis of the results 
shown in §7.2.3.2.2. Once again, to accurately model the Ppp using this approach is unfeasible. 
To summarise, each of the alternative methodologies for computing the integrity risk have 
undergone a feasibility study to determine whether they could be used in the software 
platform described in Chapter Seven. Limitations in terms of speed, accuracy or reliability 
were found for each. In §8.3.3 a standard integration procedure is described and assessed in 
terms of its computational efficiency and accuracy. 
8.3.3 Integration 
Integration, as a technique may be used to directly determine the probability of the system 
lying in the state of a position failure. This integration may be achieved numerically by 
integrating the probability distribution over the region in the horizontal position domain in 
which the position failure is within the HAL and subtracting from one. The domain of 
integration is shown in Figure 8.4 
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north: 
Integration 
Domain 
Figure 8.4 Position Error integration 
A pure integration of the region bounded by the HAL has one major shortfall in that the 
majority of probability density which is accounted for by the numerical integration lies in a 
very small proportion of the integration area. Figure 8.5 shows this concern, although in 
reality the problem far exceeds the scale shown. The important factor is the ratio between 
the position error covariance and the horizontal alert limit. Practically for non-precision 
approach and with stand-alone GPS, this is a ratio = 550/10=55/1. In fact, under the 
assumption of a circular covariance matrix of radius 10m, 0.001 of the probability density is 
contained within l/300"^ of the area. To demonstrate the impact of this problem, the results 
of a test integration procedure are shown in Table 8.1. The accuracy of a 2048 
evaluation point integration is less than 1% which when used to compute the integrity risk 
would be a maximum error of less than 10"®. This accuracy would be acceptable for the 
integrity risk computation. However, although the frequency of computation is 120Hz, due to 
the need to locate the Worst Case Bias (WCB) and for each satellite (as shown in Figure 7.1) 
this would lead to a process which is too slow for the extensive approach validation process. 
The lower order integrations are too inaccurate and also not fast enough to enable a full 
approach validation. 
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Order of Integration 64 512 2048 
Frequency (Hz) 1950 460 120 
PpF Accuracy max 167.2 4.948 0.453 
(% error) mean 2.540 0.231 0.115 
min 0.156 0.006 0.006 
Table 8.1 Integration Accuracy vs. Evaluation Points (Efficiency) 
8.4 Reduced-Bounds Integration Method 
8.4.1 Methodology 
In §8.3, a number of methodologies were discussed in light of the tests and analysis 
presented in §7.2.3 to determine the probability of positioning failure PPF in the navigation 
system. One method, the integration approach is limited in accuracy due to the size of the 
alert limit as shown in Table 8,1. In order to avoid this problem, it is possible to reduce 
the integration domain to a smaller area whilst invoking a very small error. The region must 
satisfy the requirement of keeping the implicit error of this approximation low whilst 
significantly reducing the area of integration. This may be achieved by using a simple shape 
and taking the intersection of this shape and the original circular integration domain. The 
three most obvious choices for the simple shape are a circle, an ellipse or a rectangle. 
The circle method would set the approximation error and using the major axis of the 
covariance ellipse, find a circle about the mean position which bounds the probability density 
such that the likelihood of lying outside the circle is less than the prescribed error. This is 
shown in Figure 8.6 for an error of 0.00001%. 
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North 
East 
Figure 8.5 Position error probability density 
The downfall of the circular region is that it does not maximise the accuracy of computation 
because it contains a greater area than necessary to match the desired approximation error. 
Instead an elliptical shape could be foreseen to provide a perfect fit and match the required 
accuracy. This is shown in Figure 8.7. However, the computation of the elliptical boundary, 
although not excessively time consuming is more intensive than a simple circle especially 
given the necessity to compute the boundary at each integration point. 
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Figure 8.6 Circular intersection shape 
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Figure 8.7 Elliptical intersection shape 
The final alternative is to utilise a rectangular domain (DiDonato and Jarnagin, 1960) as shown 
in Figure 8.8. The major advantage of this approach is that the bounds are known and need 
only be compared to the circular bound when determining the intersection. Although the 
approximation area does not perfectly match the variation in position error to maximise 
efficiency, the ability to vary each of the rectangle sides so they match the error ellipse axes 
ensure the technique Is preferable to the circular domain. 
Nor th 
99.9999% 
HAL 
Integrat ion 
< 0.0001% square 
Figure 8.8 Rectangular intersection shape 
The rectangular method may be used due to its efficiency and close fit to the underlying 
distribution. The relationship between the rectangle sides and the approximation error are 
given below. 
Erf 
V 2 
(8.20) 
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where 5 is the approximation error bound (or 1- 5 is the probability density contained within 
the rectangle) and a is the scale factor for the rectangle of sides laCg and 2aOb. 
In order to maximise the performance of this technique, this method was adapted further. 
Instead of the rectangle employed by DiDonato and Jarnagin (1961), an infinite interval was 
chosen (1-sided rectangle). The primary reason for this is that the integration in one 
dimension uses an approximated error function whose computation time does not depend 
upon its argument. The interval also allows for a better allocation of error, which may now be 
defined by the relation: 
(8.21) 
The size of the interval and therefore the accuracy can be varied through judicial choice of a 
subject to equation 8.21. A 6 value of 10"^  (0.1% of PMD requirement) provides sufficient 
accuracy whilst keeping the domain as small as possible. 
Before moving on to formulate the integration, it is worth noting that the error ellipse axes 
will not generally match the east-north directions under which the navigation solution and 
geometry matrices are defined. A rotation is required to decorrelate the system and define 
the principal axes as those formed by the covariance ellipse or precisely the eigenvectors of 
the covariance matrix. This is shown in Figure 8.9 which also shows the (a, b) coordinate 
system under which the integration is performed. 
North 
HAL Rotation to (a, b) 
coordinates 
i f : : 
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Figure 8.9 Coordinates transformation 
The integration may now be undertaken. To evaluate the probability of a positioning failure 
P( I e I >HAL), the function is expressed as an integral of the following form: 
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^ JJ e x p [ ~ 
3rde ^ 2 n a , a , 
a ' ^ b ' 
Ol 
]dadb (8.22) 
Here the region of integration is the circular domain before the intersection is applied. The 
integrand represents the 2D Gaussian as a function of the decorrelated variables a and b. The 
integral of a multivariate Gaussian distribution whose components are independent may be 
evaluated sequentially in each dimension. For the 2D case, this means one may compute a 
series of error functions along, say the 'b' axis and integrate these using conventional means 
along the 'a' axis, or vice-versa. Transforming equation 8.22 in light of this gives the following 
integral expression. 
f e x p [ - | h - R ( l - f ) ' ] + exp[ - - h + R ( l - f ) 
x[Erf(Si)-Erf(So)]tdt 
] (8.23) 
where 
Si = 
_ k + R t V ^ 
V 2 0 b 
k - R t ^ ^ ^ 
V 2 0 , 
and t is the transformed variable such that a = h + R 
(8.24) 
(8.25) 
The transformation is shown in Figure 8.10. The symmetry of the domain about t = l enables 
the integral to be evaluated over the range 0 ^ 1 and the integrand split into a negative and 
positive component as clear from 8.23. The position bias is expressed as coordinates (h, k) in 
the a-b coordinate system. The probability is invariant under reflections about the a and b 
axes so that h and k may be assumed to be positive. 
254 
Figure 8.10 Integration bounds 
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A ' 
2 ¥ The error function, Erf(n) = -= jexp( -p^)dpcan be approximated by an analytical function 
0 
(Bagby, 1995) accurate to 0.03% in order to accelerate the process. This essentially reduces 
the integration to a ID numerical integration problem. 
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Figure 8.11 Integration region cases 
All that remains for the algorithm is to determine the boundary of integration following 
intersection of the circular region and infinite interval. In the absence of the interval, t is 
bounded by 0 and 1 which relate to the exterior and centre of the circle (0 relates to both 
exterior points. The interval may shorten this domain. The following potential cases exist 
(where tLx,t;^,,,tLx &t|^ ,„ refer to the integration bounds for the left and right semicircles): 
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Case a (Figure 8.11a): 
If for the upper interval boundary0< ^ < 1 and for the lower interval boundary 
Case b (Figure 8.11b): 
As in case a yet with additional inequalities0< < l a n d t|^„ = i ^ " h - a o . 
Case c (Figure 8.11c): 
If for the upper interval boundary- i<^ and for the lower interval boundary 
h + a o , ^ , , i , „ „ 4.1 +1 _o „ .r _ jR + h - a o . 
^ - > l t h e n tL , = 1 , t L = 0 , t L = l and t L = ^  ^ — - - (Note: For the right 
semicircle tmax is to the left of tmm as the direction of t is opposite to a over this interval.) 
Case d (Figure 8 . l i d ) : 
As in case a yet with additional inequalities 0< < l t h e n t)^,, = 1 , 
Cn = y — — ( N o t e : For the right semicircle tmax is to the left of tmm as the direction o f t is 
opposite to a over this interval.) 
Case e (Figure 8 . l i e ) : 
If for the upper interval boundary ^ < 0 and for the lower interval boundary 
> l t h e n circle n interval = 0 . 
Once the integration regions have been determined, a numerical quadrature technique is 
applied to further maximise the computational accuracy. The result is then multiplied by the 
PNA to derive the PMD by equation 8.16 and the integrity risk per sample is then obtained from 
equation 5.1. The performance of the method presented is analysed in the following section. 
8.4.2 Performance Test of New Methodology 
The integration method advocated in §8.4.1 is based on the approach taken by DiDonato and 
Jarnegin (1961). However, beyond the changes in methodology which would require further 
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testing, the model parameters for their application differ greatly to the application presented 
here. This is because of the high percentile requirements imposed on integrity which ensure 
the circular integration domain's radius, the HAL far exceeds the size of covariance elements 
of the 2D position solution. It is this difference and the changes in methodology which 
maximise the speed of computation. 
In order to test the integration model presented in §8.4.1 it is necessary to generate truth 
values using the reliable yet much slower Monte Carlo method. A one million sample Monte 
Carlo method is used with a mean percentage accuracy of =0.1% as presented in Table 7.4. 
This mean error is added to the resulting error in the integration model to derive an estimate 
of the total error. The relationship between the 'true' PMD and the reduced bounds integration 
is shown in Figure 8.12 
Monte Carlo 
'Truth' 
M ^ 
Integration 
Model 
Figure 8.12 Testing relationships 
Ideally given a model and a reference, testing over the entire range of possible space-time 
geometry combinations and as such over the entire range of expected performance would be 
preferable. However, if this were possible within realistic time constraints, a model would not 
be required at all. Instead a subset of space time points must be chosen which reflect the 
variety in geometry and performance. Due to the extremely low probabilities of integrity risk 
found at most space-time points, the performance in accuracy of the PRF is assessed as 
opposed to the PMD total PMD in combination with the estimate for P^ A from the non-central 
chi-squared function. This does not impact on the conclusiveness of the test. 
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Figure 8.13 Test strategy 
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In order that the chosen points reflected performance evenly, a number of space-time points 
were chosen for each n, the number of visible satellites. The points were selected using an 
even spread of maximum slope values and ensuring that the resultant range in performance 
was over the entire probability range of output. This concept of ensuring the full range of 
geometries and performance outputs is shown in Figure 8.13 
At each of the space-time points chosen, the probabilities were computed over a range of 
biases between 0 and 1000m. However, instead of selecting the worst case as would be 
implemented in the approach validation software described in Chapter Seven, the 
probabilities were evaluated at each bias. 
Table 8.2 displays the accuracy in the computation of Ppp with respect to the exact Ppp derived 
from 10® sample Monte Carlo trials. Included also are the associated computation times. 
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Order 32 64 128 256 512 
Frequency 6500 3250 1700 850 450 
PMD (% error) PPP 10 1 max 83.74 4.769 0.292 0.196 0.180 
mean 1.911 0.311 0.197 0.181 0.108 
min 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
PPF 10" : 1 max 83.74 4.769 0.292 0.196 0.180 
mean 2.644 0.253 0.182 0.165 0.093 
min 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
PPF 10" : : 1 max 83.74 4.769 0.292 0.196 0.180 
mean 4.715 0.272 0.163 0.148 0.095 
min 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
PPF 10 ' ; : 1 max 83.74 4.769 0.292 0.196 0.180 
mean 12.21 0.703 0.124 0.113 0.091 
min 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
Table 8.2 Integration probability accuracy 
In conclusion, the adjusted integration technique is both accurate and computationally 
efficient. Reliability may be assured by adding the maximum observed error. The investigation 
of a potential mathematical upper bound on the integration error is left for future work. 
However, it appears that the 0.1% error imposed by the reduction in integration interval is 
the major contributor to inaccuracy. As this level of performance is acceptable in terms of 
accuracy, the method is able to meet the software platform requirements outlined in §7.2.1. 
The integration technique presented in this section has been successfully implemented and 
tested within GAVaT. This method is novel in that the exact integrity risk may be computed in 
real time from the modelled system dynamics. Therefore, there is added value in extending 
the algorithm to both a real-time implementation on-board an aircraft and within RAIM 
availability tools. This prospective application is discussed in §8.5. 
8.5 New Protection Level 
8.5.1 Protection Level Concept 
In §4.3.3 the integrity prediction step of RAIM algorithms was introduced. This process uses 
the assumed measurement error distribution, satellite-to-user geometry and detection 
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function properties to determine the level of integrity provided during nominal operation in 
the absence of an alert. It therefore predicts the performance of the system before the 
measurements are processed and residuals derived. This procedure is undertaken by the 
receiver during each RAIM algorithm cycle to ascertain if the detection function is available. 
The existing methods utilise one of the protection levels formulated in §4.3.3. As these 
protection levels determine if the RAIM algorithm is available for an operation and the 
geometry and error models are known in advance this process is also employed 15 minutes in 
advance of an NPA approach within the receiver or before a flight using an online RAIM 
prediction tool such as AUGUR (Ober, 1998). In each of these integrity prediction or RAIM 
availability check processes an approximation is employed to bound the integrity risk. 
However, as the method described in §8.4 has overcome the need to approximate the 
integrity risk a novel approach to integrity prediction is now possible. 
It was noted that only the Brown and Chin (1998) method with an additional safety buffer is 
able to guarantee conservatism (4.50) whereas the other methods may underestimate the 
integrity risk. In Chapter Nine, an alternative to the existing methods, the concept of an ideal 
PL is introduced for Approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV). An ideal PL is one which 
protects the user from measurement biases of all magnitudes with confidence exactly equal 
to the required integrity level. The algorithm is formulated for the ideal VPL in full in Chapter 
Nine and the ideal HPL proposed here follows an identical pattern. The ideal HPL procedure 
uses the reduced-bounds integration procedure described in this chapter and the worst case 
bias search of §7.3.2.3. The process takes just a fraction of a second thus is suitable for a real-
time application. 
The RAIM availability results from using the proposed ideal HPL are presented in the following 
subsection. 
8.5.2 Results 
Testing of the ideal HPL (HPLIDEAL) is required to determine the benefit of using the function in 
place of existing methods and also to capture any problems the method may have. This 
testing was undertaken using two scenarios both using the almanac of the nominal GPS 
constellation. The first scenario tested over a region of the British Isles with a fixed User 
Range Accuracy (URA) for all satellites, in essence the covariance matrix is assumed to be the 
product of the identity and the URA at 1-sigma. This URA was used for computing both the 
Brown and Chin (1998) HPL (HPLgc) and HPLIDEAL- The test was performed with a URA of 10m. 
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The results are shown graphically in Figure 8.14 which displays the gains in availability. Figure 
8.14a and Figure 8.14b show the respective availability of HPLBC screening function and the 
novel integration based approach given in §8.4. As these results are somewhat similar, Figure 
8.14c displays the difference in availability over a geometry day between the two methods, 
showing that for some points, a total of 2 minutes difference is observed. Finally Figure 8.14d 
shows the percentage change in the unavailability over the region 15°W to 5°E, 60°N to 50°N, 
an area which covers the British isles and surrounding waters. It is clear from this particular 
grid that the new screening function offers a significant reduction. Although the absolute 
changes may be small, it must be remembered that any operational changes due to the 
unavailability of the navigation system may be costly both financially and environmentally. 
Therefore, alleviation of this problem by improving availability is of great benefit. 
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Figure 8.14 a) RAIM Availability HPLBC b) RAIM Availability HPLIDEAL C) Difference in 
Availability between HPLBC and HPLIDEAL d) Percentage change in the time of unavailable 
RAIM 
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Figure 8.15 a) RAIM availability for HPLBC and HPLIDEAL b) Additional RAIM availability 
provided by HPLIDEAL C) RAIM unavailability under both HPLs d) Percentage of unavailable 
time reduced by use of HPLIDEAL e) Total available time improvement from use of HPLIDEAL 
In the second test, the normalised weighted RAIM is used for the region 0°W to 10°E, 46°N to 
36°N over southern France and the Mediterranean are presented in Figure 8.15. Figure 8.15b 
shows HPLIDEAL RAIM availability, Figure 8.15c shows the HPLGC availability and Figure 8.15d 
shows when both are unavailable. It is clear from Figure 8.15b that those space-points in 
which the advantage of weighting is apparent differ from those in which a more accurate 
263 
264 
estimation of integrity nsk based on the integration technique is of benefit. This is further 
substantiated by the reduction in unavailable samples by the use of the new screening 
function, shown in Figure 8.15e and the available time saved in Figure 8.15f. 
8.6 Summary 
The need for an accurate and efficient method to determine integrity risk for NPA was 
established in Chapter Five. In order to achieve accuracy and speed, a more sophisticated 
method is needed which goes beyond those currently published in the RAIM literature. A 
number of alternatives were assessed and an adaptation of an integration technique 
originally used in weapons accuracy testing was employed. This method uses a Gaussian 
quadrature scheme, but cleverly bounds the integration domain by accepting a small 0.1% 
maximum error, thereby greatly reducing the order of integration required. Through reducing 
the integration order, the method is able to maintain a high rate of computation. The 
accuracy of this technique is determined from to a 10® sample Monte Carlo method and is 
able to process the integrity risk for a single space-time point in a fraction of a second without 
software optimisation. Using this novel method, a full and efficient operational evaluation of 
an approach procedure is possible for NPA. Results generated following this procedure 
implemented within the software platform GAVaT developed in Chapter Seven are presented 
in Chapter Ten. 
In addition to the performance assessment application described above, which was the 
primary motivation for the development of the new method, an ideal HPL has been 
formulated which improves the availability of both weighted and unweighted RAIM 
algorithms. The algorithm removes the need for the conservative HPL in favour of a direct 
integrity risk computation. This ensures a greater number of samples pass the required 
conditions. 
In Chapter Nine, the ideal PL concept is extended to APV and assesses the added value of this 
concept for real-time application on-board a receiver. Future applications for RAIM in more 
stringent APV operations are desirable and the new ideal VPL is able to provide better RAIM 
availability whilst keeping the satellite constellation, error characteristics and failure 
detection capabilities constant. 
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Chapter 9 
THE IDEAL PROTECTION LEVEL FOR APV 
9.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Eight, a method for computing integrity risk in the horizontal domain for Non-
Precision Approach (NPA) operations was proposed. The focus was initially on the 
computation of an exact integrity level to determine compliance of the navigation system to 
requirements within an operational evaluation of airport approach trajectories. However, this 
calculation led to the development of an optimised protection level applicable to the Worst 
Case Bias (WCB) which has the potential for added value in an actual receiver implementation 
and online RAIM availability prediction tools. 
In this chapter, the ideal protection level concept introduced firstly in §7.3.3.5.4 and then 
further in §8.5 is used in the vertical domain. This is intended to demonstrate the potential 
for a RAIM algorithm based on an iterative solution and as a guide to achievable levels of 
performance for Approach with Vertical Guidance (APV) operations using the optimal 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimator. A full assessment of the performance of the ideal 
HPL and existing HPLs would require both horizontal and vertical components to be studied. 
However, due to the superior guidance provided by GPS (and GNSS) in the horizontal domain 
by a mean factor of approximately 1.5 (DoD, 2008), the vertical component is the more 
critical component in around 98% of cases (RTCA, 1999; Oehler et al, 2004). For APV-II 
operations, the integrity requirement is also more stringent (VAL=20m) in comparison to its 
horizontal counterpart (HAL=40m). 
In Chapter Six a failure model was formed which accounts for all known failure types as a 
function of the bias magnitude. The use of this model within a RAIM setting is presented, 
once again deriving an ideal protection level. In Chapter Five it was noted that integrity 
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performance may only be fully assessed through analytical means. However, real data may 
also be used to confirm no gross methodological errors are present and that the system 
behaviour is not too dissimilar to that expected of the theoretical models. 
The chapter begins in §9.2 with an overview of the protection level derived in Chapter Eight 
applied to the vertical domain. This includes an extension of the concept to the multiple 
failure case. In §9.3 results are shown which demonstrate the use of the total failure model of 
Chapter Six in comparison to the traditional method. In §9.4, real data from a static reference 
station is processed in order to compare the ideal Vertical Protection Level (VPL) with the 
Vertical Position Error (VPE) including a worst case simulated failure. Finally the results of the 
chapter are discussed and conclusions made on the potential application of RAIM to APV. 
9.2 An Iterative Protection Level 
In Chapter Eight, the problem of computing the probability of a horizontal positioning failure 
was investigated. In the vertical domain, determining the probability of a positioning failure 
PpF under the Gaussian errors assumption is trivial i.e. from a simple error function. However, 
the ambiguity in the failure-induced bias and magnitude of the worst case are problems still 
to be investigated. In the following subsection (§9.2.1) the algorithm for finding the ideal 
protection level for the guaranteed Worst Case Bias (WCB) is restated in the vertical domain. 
This method is then extended to the two-failure case in §9.2.2 to allow a more 
comprehensive study. This is particularly relevant for APV, as at this more stringent level of 
application multiple failures have a greater potential both to occur and impact the solution. 
The results of simulations to demonstrate the practical use of the ideal VPL are shown in 
§9.2.3 both to highlight the limitations of traditional methods and its potential as part of the 
on-board RAIM algorithm. 
9.2.1 Single-Failure Solution for Vertical Guidance 
This subsection outlines the search process for the ideal protection level using the principles 
developed in Chapters Seven and Eight. Firstly, the system model is introduced, followed by 
the search process and finally the bias maximisation. 
9.2.1.1 System Model 
Recall the linear model (eqn. 3.43) which relates the measurements received to the receiver 
position: 
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z = H x + e (9.1) 
where; 
z = n-vector of satellite measurements 
H' = (nx4) matrix defined in the local horizontal frame, wi th the condition n>4 
X = 4-vector of unknowns (position and clock bias) 
e' = n-vector of measurement errors 
Under the snapshot RAIM algorithm it is typical to represent a failure by an unknown bias . 
The measurement error vector may then be expressed as the sum of the bias vector and noise 
V. 
E ' = H V + V ( 9 .2 ) 
Given that the underlying measurement noise is normally distributed wi th covariance matrix 
Z, then E ' fo l lows; 
E '~N(IX.,,Z,) (9.3) 
To simplify the analysis, a normalisation of the linear system (9.1) is performed using weights 
w defined by the fol lowing equation; 
W^W = (9.4) 
This results in the fol lowing linear system with uniformly distributed errors: 
Z = HX + E (9.5) 
where z = w z ' , H=WH' ,N, and e = w e ' such that e~ N(N.,l„). The least squares position 
estimate, corresponding position error and covariance matrix are then as follows (3.45-3.47); 
)5^=(H^H)'H^Z (9.6) 
E = (H^H)'H^£ (9.7) 
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I =AZ.A^ (9.8) 
A sum-squared parity vector is used for the test statistic defined as in equation 4.14. 
p = Pz (9.9) 
It is known that in the optimally weighted system (9.5) the parity vector p and position error 
vector e are uncorrelated (Ober, 2003; Hwang and Brown, 2005) and as their joint distribution 
is multinormal, are therefore independent (Johnson, 1972). Therefore, the probability of 
missed detection PMD defined in §4.3.1.1.5 may be expressed as the product of the probability 
of position error PRE and the probability of no alert PNA as depicted in Figure 9.1. 
PMD = PPE X P.. = P (|e| > VAL) x P(|p| < VT) (9.10) 
These two probabilities may be expressed in an analytical form for a known bias n, which is 
assumed to contain just a single scalar bias on a single satellite measurement 
H: =(0...0,B„0...0): 
VAL-AnJ P(|e|>VAL) = erfc 
I "=13,3 J 
P(|p |</ r ) = xMT,n-4,PnJ 
(9.11) 
(9.12) 
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Figure 9.1 Position Error vs. Test Statistic 
9.2.1.2 VPL Search 
In §9.2.1.1 (9.10-9.12), the integrity nsk was derived for a given alert limit. However, a VPL 
may be substituted for the VAL to determine the integrity risk for that VPL. Therefore, the 
algorithm is able to determine if the VPL is conservative or optimistic with respect to the 
specified maximum integrity risk. This function enables an ideal protection level to be sought. 
The search for the ideal VPL follows a Bolzano-Weierstrass process by halving the search 
domain at each step. Figure 9.2 shows the search concept. The search starting point is chosen 
as 1000m as geometries with a greater value are both unlikely and may be set as unavailable. 
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Figure 9.2 VPL Search 
The search stopping point for the ideal VPL computation is set to a delta of 0.01m. In the case 
of the accelerated sampling method described in Chapter Seven, this resolution must be 
much higher to allow for an accurate computation of function gradients. In determining the 
ideal VPL for an operation, a resolution of 0.01m is sufficient. 
Chapter Seven contained a detailed analysis of the behaviour of PMD as a function of the 
unknown bias. Of particular benefit to the algorithm presented is the relationship of the 
Minimal Hazardous Bias (IVIHB) and Minimal Detectable Bias (MDB). It was stated in Chapter 
Seven that for a given protection level needed to determine the MHB, if the MHB is greater 
than the MDB then the P^o is sure to be less than the required 10'^. Each of these variables 
may be computed in simply which leads to the following rule to accelerate the search process. 
Rule 1: Continue to next VPL // MHB<MDB 
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A similar rule was developed in Chapter Seven for when the protection level was deduced 
with certainty to exceed its optimal value using two new parameters M H B ^ and This 
is expressed below. 
Rule 2: Continue 
If neither of these two rules are satisfied, the algorithm is left with the range [MHB, MDB] 
over which to derive the WCB and corresponding PMD- If PMD exceeds 10"^ then VPL is 
increased and vice versa. 
9.2.1.3 Worst Case Bias Search 
In the VPL search described above, when approaching the ideal VPL, it is necessary to 
compute the integrity risk over the [MHB, MDB] range. This WCB search over this range is 
used, composed of the standard processing loop and a back-up processing loop as described 
in §7.3.2.3. At the first step, the integrity risk is computed at s bias points between MHB and 
MDB. The analysis of Chapter Seven showed s=16 to be a good choice. The results of these 
evaluations are checked for multiple local maxima. If two or more maxima are found, the 
back-up processing loop is run, consisting of a detailed s=512 point evaluation over the entire 
range. Alternatively, the iterative WCB search zooms in on the range of the single maximum 
by restricting the search to an interval around the maximum. Four iterations of this process 
were chosen to ensure the WCB resolution is sufficient. Throughout this search process, if at 
any point an integrity risk is found to exceed the requirement, the algorithm moves to the 
next VPL iteration as it is known that the VPL lies below the ideal VPL. This process could lead 
to a slight under-estimation of the VPL if the ideal value lies exactly (within the bounds of 
computational accuracy) on one of the search boundaries, in which case, the last VPL at which 
the integrity risk was found to exceed the requirement is recorded and used as the estimate. 
9.2.2 Two-Failure Solution for Vertical Guidance 
In the search for an ideal VPL described above, the assumption of a single satellite failure is 
made. However, it was suggested in Angus (2006) that the potential for multiple failures due 
to the ionosphere is higher than is usually assumed, particularly in equatorial regions. This 
was of little interest to NPA operations with a 555m Horizontal Alert Limit but in the case of 
APV (VAL = 50m, 20m) further research is needed to determine the potential threat from 
multiple failures. For this reason, multiple failure RAIM protection levels have been devised 
(Brown, 1998; Angus, 2006). However, the extent to which these bounds protect the user 
from excessive integrity risk is still to be investigated. Furthermore, these protection levels 
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have for the most part been shown to be much higher than their single failure counterparts 
(Angus, 2006). This is to be expected given that the worst case combination of biases may 
mask each other. However, the maximum achievable performance is still to be determined. In 
this section, the ideal VPL algorithm is extended to the two failure case whilst still accounting 
for the WCB vector (in the 2-failure space). 
The key difference in the two (multiple) failure case, is that biases interact which may mask 
their respective effects in the test statistic domain (i.e. parity) but superimpose their effects in 
the position domain. Under the model (9.5) the position error and parity vector equations for 
a bias vector = (0...0,B|,0...0,Bj0... o) with two components may be derived by defining the 
usual geometrical matrices (3.45) (4.20) restricted to the two failure indices. 
sub 
A®"'' = [Agi Ajj] (3 is the vertical component index) 
.sub 
j^ n-4i ^n-4j 
_sub - s u b sub 
e =A u 
p 
(9.13) 
(9.14) 
(9.15) 
(9.16) 
(9.17) 
(9.18) 
The and P matrices contain the information of how a bias affects the measurement in 
the detection and position domain. However, to determine the 'seperabilit/ of two failures, 
the following quadratic forms are needed; 
AA = ( A " b y ( A " b ) = 
p p = ( p " ' y ( p " k ) = 
AsiAgi A^A^ 
AjjAs) 
" M l " 
fli-pl,. 
(9.19) 
(9.20) 
These matrices are essentially the dot products of the position and parity vectors relating to a 
bias on each faulty measurement (Brown, 1998). The matrix equivalent of the slope is as 
follows: 
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Q = (PP)"^AA (9.21) 
The worst case combination of biases leads to the maximum slope value which equates to the 
eigenvalues of matrix Q. In the horizontal space, Q has two eigenvalues and corresponding 
eigenvectors. The testing and analysis here will be restricted to the more critical vertical 
domain but may be extended to the horizontal case using the appropriate elements (Angus, 
2006). In the vertical domain the matrix Q is of rank 1, which implies that a single eigenvalue 
and corresponding eigenvector exist for the maximum slope and the minimum slope (which 
relates to the smaller eigenvalue in the horizontal case) is zero with corresponding 
eigenvector. As Q is a 2x2 matrix, the eigenvalue may be solved by the corresponding 
quadratic and the eigenvector determined by substitution. In computing the protection levels 
proposed in Brown (1998) and Angus (2006) all that is needed Is the eigenvalue relating to the 
worst case maximum slope. However, in the search for the ideal VPL, the integrity risk is 
computed directly from the bias. Therefore, the WCB direction obtained from the eigenvector 
is employed and the identical WCB search described in §9.2.3.1 is used with the WCB 
magnitude as argument. This resulting direction is shown in Figure 9.3 in the parity domain. 
sat I / 
vec tor 
/ bias on j 
bias on i 
e igenvector 
/ sat i \ 
Figure 9.3 Two-Failures in the Parity Space 
In the Bolzano-Weierstrass search formulated in §9.2.1.2, it is critical to compute the MDB 
and MHB to accelerate the process. In the two-failure case, these routines must be 
moderated to account for the WCB direction. The MDB magnitude in the test statistic domain 
is obtained from simple statistics as for the single failure case. This is then multiplied by the 
parameter which determines detectability in the WCB direction. 
MDB 
MDB, =ii ^ (9.22) 
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The MHB must also be computed by considering the WCB eigen-direction. 
VPL-Z, 
MHB. = ^ (9,23) 
Using these constructs, the algorithm may function in an identical manner in order to find the 
WCB magnitude in the WCB direction. The ideal two-failure VPL computed by this algorithm is 
compared to the traditional two-failure protection levels in §9.2.3.2 below. Following the 
derivation in Angus (2006) of maximum slopes for multiple failures beyond the two-failure 
case it would be possible to derive ideal VPLs in these more general worst case directions. 
9.2.3 Fixed Airport Location Tests 
The ideal VPL is designed to be marginally conservative in all cases. Therefore, it is the ideal 
protection level that is used to measure the performance of existing VPLS in terms of integrity 
risk and availability. When comparing the traditional protection level to the ideal protection 
level, only the following conclusions may be made; 
ideal VPL < traditional VPL -> conservative VPL 
ideal VPL > traditional VPL -> optimistic VPL 
However, when considering the performance of a protection level for a particular operation 
(e.g. APV-I & APV-II), the relative value of the alert limit is also relevant. Considering the 
vertical domain only, the following cases may occur: 
ideal VPL < traditional VPL < VAL -> (CI) safe + available 
ideal VPL < traditional VPL < VAL ^ (C2) misleading + safe + available 
ideal VPL < VAL < traditional VPL (C3) safe + unavailable + availability failure 
traditional VPL < VAL < ideal VPL -> (C4) unsafe + available + integrity failure 
VAL < traditional VPL < ideal VPL -> (C5) misleading + safe + unavailable 
VAL < ideal VPL < traditional VPL -> (C6) safe + unavailable 
Cases (3) and (4) are of particular interest as they show they benefit of the ideal VPL 
computation, to protect against overtly conservative or optimistic VPLs. In the following 
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§9.2.3.1-9.2.3.2, the Brown and Chin (1998) and Walter and Enge (1995) protection levels 
(4.51) (4.54) (4.59) are compared to the ideal VPL 
9.2.3.1 Single Failure 
In this subsection, results are presented for fixed airport locations throughout the globe. The 
locations chosen were; London Gatwick, JFK, Amsterdam Schipol, Chennai International and 
Sydney International. Protection levels were computed every minute for a complete 24 hours. 
Various signal combinations were processed including use of a simulated Galileo constellation 
(Mozo-Garcia et al, 2OOI2 Stasys, 2005). 
9.2.3.1.1 Single Frequency GPS (LI) 
The elevation dependent measurement error variances were used for the single frequency 
GPS full constellation (Stasys, 2005). Results for each airport are presented below for the 
Failure Detection (FD) function. Availability and integrity analyses are performed for APV-I 
operations with a 50m VAL shown as a purple line in each figure. APVI-II operations are 
unachievable using just the LI GPS signal (Van Dyke, 2004). 
Amsterdam 
Figure 9.4 shows the temporal behaviour of the protection levels relative to the APV-I VAL of 
50.0m. The Brown and Chin (1998) VPLBC without a buffer is found to present an integrity 
threat (C3) in 6.3% of the epochs. The Brown and Chin buffered VPLBC+ and Walter and Enge 
(1995) VPLWE fail to meet the maximum safe achievable availability by 38.5% and 13.1% 
respectively. 
Chennai International 
Figure 9.5 shows the equivalent relationships for Chennai International. VPLgc once again 
presents an integrity threat in 8.8% of cases whilst VPLBC+ and VPLWE are overtly conservative 
by 40.5% and 14.4% respectively. 
JFK 
Figure 9.6 shows the equivalent relationships for JFK. VPLgc presents an integrity threat in 
8.4% of cases whilst VPLBC+ and VPLWE are overtly conservative by 56.9% and 15.7% 
respectively. 
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London Gatwick 
Figure 9.7 shows the equivalent relationships for London Gatwick. VPLgc once again presents 
an integrity threat in 3.8% of cases whilst VPLBC+ and VPLWE are overtly conservative by 40.4% 
and 11.5% respectively. 
Sydney International 
Figure 9.8 shows the equivalent relationships for Sydney International. VPLgc once again 
presents an integrity threat in 4.8% of cases whilst VPLBC+ and VPLWE are overtly conservative 
44.7% and 11.4% respectively. 
Summary 
The five airport results show that the Brown and Chin VPLBC without the additional buffer is 
susceptible to the worst case integrity failures wi thout protecting at the required level i.e. C4 
in the cases listed above. As the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) must be 
interpreted in the worst case, this VPL is unacceptable for use in APV-I operations. The 
VPLIDEAL shows the best performance of the other protection levels by providing 
approximately 40-70% availability. This value is too low for primary means operations but 
could provide a viable back-up service or during restricted predictable t ime periods. The gains 
shown in the use of the VPLIDEAL over the traditional VPLs are significant, showing an 
improvement of 10-15% over VPLWE and 40-50% over VPLBC+. 
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9.2.3.1.2 Dual Frequency GPS (L1/L5) 
The ionosphere free L1/L5 combination intended for future dual-frequency aviation 
operations was tested for each of the aerodromes in terms of both FD and FDE RAIiV! 
availability. The use of multiple frequency observables greatly improves the user range 
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accuracy which inevitably leads to tighter VPL^. The performance relative to the APV-I VAL of 
50m and the APV-II VAL of 20m are both shown in the figures. 
Amsterdam 
Figure 9.9 shows the temporal behaviour of the protection levels relative to the APV-II VAL of 
20.0m and the APV-I VAL of 50.0m. At the APV-I level all protection levels provide 100% 
availability in the dual-frequency case. In the case of APV-II, the VPLgc without a buffer is 
found to present an integrity threat in 6.9% of the epochs. V P L I D E A L and V P L ^ E showed similar 
performance of around 94% availability for APV-II 
Figure 9.10 shows the respective performance for FDE RAIM at Amsterdam. In this case the 
V P L W E is found to pose an integrity threat in 2.8% of cases for A P V - I and 5.8% for A P V - I I . A P V - I 
availability for the ideal protection level was in the high nineties for FDE RAIM but dropped to 
approximately 50% for A P V - I I operations due to the stringency of requirements. 
Chennai International 
Figure 9.11 shows the equivalent relationships for Chennai International. Both V P L B C and 
V P L W E present an integrity threat in just over 1% of samples of cases whilst V P L B C + is overtly 
conservative by 15%. The ideal VPL achieves 94.7% availability for APV-II operations and FD 
RAIM using the L1/L5 signal. 
Figure 9.12 shows the respective performance for FDE RAIM at Chennai. In this case the V P L W E 
is found to pose an integrity threat in 1.0% of cases for APV-I and 5.6% for APV-II. The V P L B C 
also underestimates the optimal VPL for APV-II in 2.5% of cases. The VPLIDEAL availability of 
FDE RAIM is 97.7% and 51.0% for APV-I and APV-II respectively. 
JFK 
Figure 9.13 shows the equivalent relationships for JFK. V P L B C and V P L W E both present an 
integrity threat as with the other airports. The VPLIDEAL enables 97.5% availability for A P V - I I 
using LI and L5 frequencies. 
Figure 9.14 shows the availabilities for FDE RAIM. Similar results are found as for Amsterdam 
and Chennai. 
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London Gatwick 
Figure 9.15 shows the FD RAIM VPLs for London Gatwiclc. Availability of APV-I using FD RAIiVI 
is 100% except when using the VPLBC+. The other two traditional bounds both present a risk 
for APV-II operations. Figure 9.16 shows the equivalent results for FDE RAIM. 
Sydney International 
Figure 9.17 and Figure 9.18 show the VPLs for FD and FDE RAIM for Sydney International with 
comparable results. 
Summary 
The use of a dual frequency observable greatly improves performance. Availability of A P V - I is 
found to be almost 100%, even when using the most conservative bound, though small dips in 
availability do occur relative to the other VPLs. Both the VPLWE and VPLgcare shown to under-
estimate the correct V P L in some cases and as such only the VPLIDEAL may be considered a 
viable improvement over the VPLBC+. Under the more stringent A P V - I I V A L , availability is still 
found to be in the high 90s for the three lowest VPLs but reduces to around 50% when the 
exclusion function must be available. 
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9.2.3.1.3 GALILEO (E1/E5) 
The ionosphere free E1/E5 combination intended for future dual-frequency aviation 
operations using the GALILEO system was tested akin to GPS for both FD and FDE RAIM 
availability. The 27 SV proposed Walker constellation was employed whilst using expected 
ranging accuracies slightly better than the GPS L1/L5 observables (Stasys, 2005). Figure 9.19 
to Figure 9.27 show the expected performance at the five airports tested. For the majority of 
the time period tested, the availability exceeds those of the L1/L5 GPS results due to the 
better measurement error variances assumed. However, brief periods of extremely high or 
incalculable VPLs are found as a result of using the smaller nominal constellation compared to 
the full constellation for GPS. Except for the regular and predictable blips in availability at JFK, 
Gatwick and Sydney, GALILEO could provide the standalone capability with RAIM to meet 
APV-I even with the need for an exclusion function. 
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9.2.3.2 Double Failure 
In this subsection, results are presented for the same fixed airport locations as the single 
failure case but the possibility of two simultaneous failures is allowed with the identical 
probability of 10"''. Figure 9.28 to Figure 9.32 show the processed runs for the single LI 
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frequency GPS test., Protection levels were computed every minute for a complete 24 hours. 
Naturally, performance is much lower for each airport than is the case for the single 
frequency assumption. Notably, the ideal VPL provides better availability than all the 
traditional VPLs. This is perhaps due to the change in balance between the failure element 
and the noise element for which the ideal VPL provides the perfect balance whereas the 
V P L W E and VPLgc primarily aim to account for one of these. 
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9.2.4 Grid Assessment 
In order to extend the analysis of §9.2.3 to allow more general conclusions regarding the 
relative performance of protection levels, R A I M availability was derived over a spatial grid as 
described in §7.3.3.2. A ten degree of longitude by ten degree of latitude region was chosen 
{60°N, 1°E, 50°N, 9°W) which roughly covers the United Kingdom and east of Ireland. Figure 
9.33 and Figure 9.36 show the availability of A P V - I under each of the protection levels and 
Figure 9.37 shows the integrity risk percentage of the VPLWE- These results show that in terms 
of availability the V P L W E performs best over the tested region. However, there are a small 
proportion of samples (=0.25%) for which this protection level presents an integrity risk (C4). 
The VPLBC and VPLIDEAL provide a similar level of availability. 
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9.3 The Total Failure Model applied to RAIM 
Tine metlnodologies for computing tine integrity risk for NPA presented in Cliapter Eiglit and 
for APV thus far in §9.2 have utilised the GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS) failure model. 
In Chapter Six, the first phase of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis derived a failure 
model in terms of the instantaneous bias magnitude. This model was designed to interface 
with the snapshot RAIM algorithm. In this section a RAIM algorithm is formulated using much 
the same concept as traditional methods but without the assumption of a failure bias 
ambiguity. Instead the failure induced bias magnitude is assumed to have a known a priori 
probability density function which is conservative in that it overbounds the true density 
function. This density function is represented by the total failure model derived in Chapter 
Six. In §9.3.1 the results of the integrity prediction function of a RAIM algorithm based on this 
model are shown. Results of the corresponding protection level are then shown in §9.3.2. This 
method assumes a standard formulation of position estimate and test statistic. In §9.3.3 
alternative applications for the failure model are discussed. 
9.3.1 Bias-RAIM (BRAIM) 
In the standard RAIM model, the bias is assumed to be unknown, both before and after the 
measurements are observed. The Bayesian methods which have been developed (Ober, 2003; 
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Pullen et al, (2002) may be used to derive a posteriori estimates of tlie failed bias magnitude. 
In this section, an alternative approach is taken which postulates that knowledge of the bias 
probabilities is available in the form of a bias magnitude total failure model, such as the one 
derived in Chapter Six. The assumption that any of the biases present in the system remain 
unknown after measurement observation is retained. The discussion in §9.3.3 challenges this 
hypothesis by considering how the model may be used in tandem with the observed 
measurements. Figure 9.38 shows the form of the failure model on a logarithmic scale. Note 
the x-axis is not uniform, as the bias resolution becomes more coarse in the larger bias 
ranges. There is a marked increase in probabilities for biases less than 30m and once again for 
biases less than 4m. This is to due to the addition of the Wide Area Augmentation System 
(WAAS) step error model for biases 3.6-30.0m and the high probabilities for failures of small 
magnitudes. 
150 
bias vector entry 
Figure 9.38 Probability Failure iVIodel 
In the proposed model of Integrity Risk (IR) under the standard WLS RAIM algorithm, the 
integral of the integrity risk over all biases is required. This is the integral of the product of the 
probability density of failure occurrence at a particular bias value and the probability of 
missed detection at that bias. 
(9.24) 
In the standard model Pt, is set firstly to 10 ^  and then assumed to be 10 assuming the most 
difficult to detect satellite fails. Although the definition is specified over an indefinite integral, 
it is well-known that large biases are detected with a high level of certainty. A cut-off of 
1500m was used as the maximum bias. Similarly a minimum cut-off was used for biases less 
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than 4m as the failure information of very small biases is less reliable and not included under 
the WAAS model which was included in the model in §6.6. Biases less than 4m are accounted 
for by assuming a bias of 4m occurs with probability 1.0 and computing the integrity risk due 
to noise (fault-free case) at that value. The worst case integrity between this fault-free case 
and the failure case integral is selected as the integrity risk in a similar manner to the GBAS 
algorithm (ICAO, 2006). The integrity risk may then be computed simply by finding the worst 
case PMD over the small bias bins and multiplying by the corresponding P .^ 
9.3.2 BRAIM Results 
The algorithm presented in §9.3.1 is executed in this section along with the ideal VPL and 
Brown and Chin VPL (4.54). Results for the GPS LI frequency tests primarily intended to show 
APV-I availability are shown in Figure 9.39-9.48. The BRAIM method generally provides 
improved availability beyond the traditional and ideal VPL based on the Worst Case Bias 
(WCB). The gains made are perhaps unacceptable for primary means use but suggest that 
lower protection levels could be exercised as a back-up to the SBAS integrity bounds. What is 
certain is that under this conservative failure model, is that the true performance of the 
system exceeds the currently employed methods due to over-conservative assumptions. 
Figure 9.44-9.43 show the equivalent performance using the L1/L5 dual frequency signal, 
particularly with respect to the more stringent APV-II vertical requirement. Availabilities are 
generally increased from values around 10-20% to 70-80%. This is of particular importance 
given that the failure probabilities for biases less than 30m are accounted for using the WAAS 
model whilst the good performance shown by V P L i d e a l i n §9.2 could have ignored the threat 
from such smaller biases. 
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9.3.3 Bayesian BRAIM 
In the original BRAIM formulated in §9.3.1, the total failure model is only used during the 
integrity prediction process used to determine if the conditions for detection are met (§4,3.3). 
However, in theory the model could also be employed after the measurements have been 
303 
304 
received. This may take the form of modifying equation 4.28 by generalising the probability of 
failure to a probability density function of the bias magnitude. Alternatively, an ideal HULakin 
to 4.58 may be derived in which the a priori probability of bias can be taken from the 
standard model or the novel total failure model. In each case the probability of a position 
failure PRF must be computed. 
P P F = Z ] P M B P ; D B ( 9 . 2 5 ) 
i=0 0 
where , P* — a n d c, = e ^ ' ' ' [ ( 2 n f ' d e t ( l j ) ] ' [de t (z , ) ) ]^ f rom 
ZjP^c,db 
1=0 0 
§4.3.1.3 and P|J =f(.^g(b)orlO ^in which case the worst case value should be chosen as 
opposed the integral shown in equation 9.25. 
9.4 Real Data Test 
The results presented in §9.2-9.3 showed an ideal VPL derived from a design point of view to 
be the smallest safe protection level. To check that this protection level conforms to the real 
performance of the system, a day's real data was processed at a known reference station^ in 
order to compute position errors. Figure 9.49 shows the entire day's data whilst in Figure 9.50 
a seven hour period is shown. Unsurprisingly, in the absence of failures, the ideal VPL as well 
as each of the traditional VPLs far exceed the vertical position error. The protection levels are 
designed to protect against failures, not just the nominal error performance, so this is as 
expected. 
^ Single Frequency (L I ) data at No t t i ngham Universi ty re ference s ta t ion 
ECEF coord inates (3851172.94707, -80152.05472 5066648.40835) 
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To check that the protection levels behave typically, a simulated ramp failure of O.Olms'^ was 
applied to the most difficult to detect satellite (maximum slope). A total of 1734 failures were 
simulated, beginning at the epoch at which the previous failure is detected. Figure 9.51 shows 
a typical period and shows a number of resulting position error ramps relative to the 
protection levels. No occurrences of misleading information are observed in the tests i.e. 
early detection occurs before the position error may exceed the protection level. Under a 
missed detection probability of 10"^ , the expected frequency is approximately 2 late 
detections over the 1734 tests, assuming each test is an independent sample. However, this 
expected value is at the worst case bias for the ideal VPL, a bias greater than the Minimum 
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Detectable Bias for V P L B C + wli ich occurs after t l ie detection point. Furtlnermore, it may be that 
the assumed elevation dependent error variance over-bounds the true error variance 
observed in the data set. 
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Figure 9.51 Simulated Ramp Error VPL Overbounding 
The ramp error test suggested that the protection levels worked as expected by protecting 
the user against failures as well as nominal performance. To expand the statistical significance 
of the test and to make use of all the data, a further test was undertaken using the worst case 
failure which could occur at each epoch. This was achieved by computing the marginally 
detectable bias i.e. the bias which generates a test statistic equal to the threshold, from the 
measurement data and once again on the most difficult to detect satellite. The Vertical 
Position Error (VPE) of the solution in the presence of this bias was then computed and 
compared to each of the VPLs. The results for the 24 hour data set are shown in Figure 9.52. 
The VPE graph follows the same pattern as the VPLs as they are all critically a function of the 
slope parameter when the worst case failure is introduced. To check in detail that the VPE is 
overbounded by the VPLs the differences were also analysed and plotted. Only the Brown and 
Chin bound wi thout the additional position error buffer fails the test as shown in Figure 9.53. 
The ideal VPL is shown in Figure 9.54 and overbounds the VPE throughout the 24hours. The 
expected performance of the VPL with respect to the VPE in this real data test is dependent 
upon the independence between samples. A nominal value for the decorrelation t ime is 120 
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seconds (Ober, 1998). Over a full day (86400s) this results in 720 independent samples. At the 
WCB, the algorithm should fail to protect the user in no more than once per 1 thousand 
samples. Therefore, the expected performance would be 0.72 failures over the period tested. 
This matches the results shown in Figure 9.53 and Figure 9.54 which have a single failed 
detected for V P L B C whilst the other less conservative VPLs closely overbound the VPE. Of 
course, given only a finite data set such testing is unable to prove the statistical properties of 
the protection levels, but the conformance to expected results goes some way to validating 
the ideal protection level in a real setting. 
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9.5 Discussion of RAIM for APV 
This chapter has provided a unique insight into the primary protection levels employed today 
under the optimal WLS estimator. There is the potential for modern algorithms such as 
NIORAIIVl to be used in place of the current protection levels when extending RAIM to more 
stringent applications such as APV (Hwang and Brown, 2005). However, the method 
presented here has two advantages over NIORAIM. Firstly, the accuracy of the position 
solution is not degraded by suboptimal weighting and secondly, the proposals fit within the 
confines of the current regulatory structure. 
Under the optimal WLS estimator, the maximum achievable performance has been 
demonstrated. In the current single frequency GPS environment, APV-II was found to be 
unachievable, confirming previous studies (Van Dyke, 2004; Ochieng et al, 2003). However, 
APV-I operations may be completed safely approximately 40-75% of the time using the ideal 
VPL offering a considerable gain over traditional VPLs. This level of availability is not sufficient 
for a primary means navigation service for high-frequency commercial aviation. However, 
flexible operations of the General Aviation (GA) community could benefit from the option of a 
vertically guided GPS approach. Furthermore, in regions without SBAS coverage, this 
algorithm could help to provide vertically guided GPS approaches in the near to medium term 
before dual-frequency services are available or a second constellation is operational. The 
method, although more computationally intensive than the traditional VPLs is well within the 
means of current receiver processing capabilities and requires very little memory storage. 
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Due to the limitations of the current single frequency signal in providing near 100% APV-I 
availability and negligible APV-I I availability, the future dual-frequency environment was 
considered, both for GPS and the proposed GALILEO constellation. For the full GPS 
constellation availability of APV-I is found to be almost 100%, even when using the most 
conservative bound, though small dips in availability do occur relative to the other VPLs. Both 
the V P L W E and V P L B C are shown to under-estimate the correct VPL in some cases and as such 
only the VPLioEAi may be considered a viable improvement over the V P L B C + . In the dual 
frequency environment, the role of the ideal VPL is more critical as it is able to push 
availability to near 100% availability in the locations tested and both the alternative VPLs 
were found to be optimistic and potentially unsafe. Using the GALILEO constellation used 
assumed to have better ranging accuracies, as per the system specification, APV-I availabilities 
were very high even for exclusion availability (Stasys, 2005). 
Currently RAIM is required by ICAO and the RTCA as the primary integrity monitor for En-
Route, Terminal and NPA operations when using GPS to provide air navigation (ICAO, 2006; 
RTCA, 2006). As the more stringent operational requirement levels the potential for smaller 
multiple failures becomes more real. RAIM algorithms which protect against multiple failures 
may then be required and naturally much larger protection levels will be computed. The ideal 
VPL is designed to meet the integrity risk requirement but it was also found in §9.2.3.2 that is 
allows the greatest proportion of availability. This suggests that the degradation in 
performance from accounting for multiple failures by the MaxMax slope (Brown, 1998; 
Angus, 2006) parameter is excessive. 
The results shown in §9.3.2 have been derived using a conservative failure model whose total 
failure probability exceeds the one defined by the GPS SPS (DoD, 2008). However, due to the 
superior detail and sophistication, the resulting RAliVl performance achievable is found to 
surpass traditional methods. Certification of such an approach within receivers would be 
extremely challenging, but the results do suggest that in the assumptions regarding the 
failure, a significant safety buffer exists. 
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Chapter 10 
APPROACH VALIDATION AND IMPLEMENTATIONS 
10.1 Introduction 
In the introductory chapter, the objectives of this PhD research programme were 
summarised. Amongst these objectives was the development of a simulation platform 
capable of assessing Non-Precision Approaches (NPA) performed by an aircraft utilising GNSS 
and an on-board RAIM capability. The GAVaT v3.1 software platform was developed in 
Chapters Seven and Eight to meet this need. Beyond the design and testing of such a 
platform, there is the need to show its worth in a practical setting. §10.2 addresses the 
application of the software platform to be used as part of an approach validation process. The 
results of such a process may be used within a Hazard and Operability (HazOp) study. 
Besides NPA validation, the software and its algorithms may form the basis for a number of 
other practical implementations. The role of some tested algorithms presented within earlier 
chapters has already been discussed with regard to on-board receiver installations. However, 
there lies the possibility of other more novel implementations to improve the operational 
environment and ease of use for pilots, operators and service providers. These auxiliary 
implementations are discussed in §10.3. 
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10.2 Approach Validation 
10.2.1 Scenarios 
In order to assess the NPA validation capability, a UK aerodrome was selected which was also 
used within the C M approach trials for the effects of human factors on GPS aviation (CAA, 
2007). Durham Tees Valley was assessed using both the nominal constellation and the full 
constellation. The former was used in order to assess the minimum performance guaranteed 
by the U.S Department of Defence (DoD) and the latter to assess the performance at the time 
of writing the thesis. In order to capture any operational variations associated with the 
various initial approaches, each of the Initial Approach Fixes (lAF) were used in successive 
simulation runs. 
The trial approach procedure chart published for use in the human factors trials (CAA, 2007) is 
shown in Figures 10.1. The published waypoints are used to establish an approach trajectory 
input file, including the holding procedure which GAVaT v3.1 uses to generate the aircraft 
position and bank angle throughout the simulation. The option is available within the 
software to plug in a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) which makes use of an accelerated 
algorithm to detect satellite masking by terrain. However, due to the complexity of DEM 
formats this option is not included in these simulation results. It is unlikely that such masking 
would occur at these airports due to the low terrain and coastal location surrounding each 
aerodrome. 
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Figure 10.1 Approach Plate (DO NOT USE FOR NAVIGATION) 
The NPA procedures are assessed terms of the four key RNP parameters; accuracy, integrity, 
continuity and availability. The international specifications (ICAO, 2006) for these parameters 
are then compared to the outputs and presented within a custom formatted document 
shown in Figure 10.3. The accelerated integrity risk computation presented in Chapter Eight 
and implemented in the GAVaT vS.l software described in Chapter Seven is used to 
determine the integrity and availability of the system. 
10.2.2 Test Setup 
The test simulations presented in this section were undertaken using an as far as is possible, 
standard parameter set to aid repeatability of the results and comparability to other studies 
both externally within the research community and internally for verification. Listed below 
are the critical input parameters for the simulation runs taken from the relevant standards or 
through discussions with the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) (personal communication, 
2005); 
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Measurement Standard Deviation (sigma) (RTCA, 2006) 
(Space) Time Resolution 
Failure Detection RAIM 
Mask Angle (RTCA, 2006) 
Descent Gradient 
Aircraft Speed 
Reference System 
Alert Limit (ICAO, 2006) 
Probability of Missed Detection (RTCA, 2006) 
Probability of False Alarm (RTCA, 2006) 
12.5m 
5s 
(No FDE) 
7.5° 
Constant 
160-190Kts 
WGS-84 
555.5m 
10^ 
3.33x10'^ 
In order to assess the continuity performance, the simulation is run throughout a single 
approach and then repeats the approach in a loop until the end of a geometry day (the 
constellation returns to approximately its original state). How/ever, to capture the total 
variation in performance from the relative geometry betw/een aircraft and satellites, this 
process is also looped over multiple geometry days, w/ith an offset of a few seconds to the 
start time. This is portrayed in Figure 10.2. The number of approach loops or geometry days 
should be computed such that the simulation ends when the cumulative effect of the offset 
equates to a complete loop. A nominal value for the offset is 5s. 
repeat approach loop 
repeat 
g e o m e t r y 
day 
loop 
of fset 
Figure 10.2 Simulation Time Loops 
geomet r y day 
For the approach processed the following input t ime parameters are relevant; 
Durham Approach Time 
Number of Geometry Days 
Number of Approach Loops 
Time Resolution 
13mins 
156 
17,280 
5s 
313 
314 
Start Time Offset 5s 
These t ime parameters are the result of the 5 second t ime step and the length of the 
approach plate. A fixed temporal sampling technique is used which requires at least one 
epoch within each Time-to-Alert period, as discussed in §5.4.1.2. 
10.2.3 Approach Validation Template 
The display of the simulation results is an important aspect of presenting a clear case for 
GNSS approaches, whether as part of an approval process as was undertaken by the UK CAA 
for NPA, or for use by approach designers to optimise prospective waypoint locations. 
Information on the times and locations of outages could also be of benefit to operators. For 
this reason an output template was devised which presents the relevant assumptions, input 
parameters, SIS performance parameters and a graphical representation of outages. 
The first page of this template shown in Figure 10.3 introduces the document. The 
specification of the test setup is given to maintain traceability of the results. A number of 
operational assumptions have been made which were agreed upon through discussions with 
regulators, pilots and operators from the UK CAA and ASS I. In some cases, such as airspeed, 
small sensitivity analyses were carried out to ensure performance was not unduly affected by 
the choice of parameter. A range of values adopted for this parameter due to changes in 
speed throughout banking manoeuvres. Similarly it was agreed that a constant descent 
gradient would be the average approach profile, although not universally the case. In the 
absence of terrain masking, any change in performance from a varying profile would be 
insignificant. Furthermore, any satellite masking effects would only likely change the times of 
a RAIM outage slightly but be unlikely to affect other results. In the final section, the relevant 
performance requirements for the operation and receiver are given which are presented for 
comparison on page two of the document. 
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A E R O D R O M E R W Y '* 
DD/MM/YYYY Almano'- Constollntlon 
N A M E AIRPORT, ^  • to RWY** with M A P and HOLDS (P-RNAV) 
1. Technical Description 
1 . 1 D o c u m e n t D e s c r i p t i o n a n d P u r p o s e 
This document contains t he simulated performance statistics for the Non-Precision Approach to RWY** including holding patterns and missed 
approaches t o Name Airport . The performance statistics for relate t o on-board RAIM for use w i th GPS under condit ions specified 
in the fo l lowing sections 1.2,1.3 & 1.4 and reflect Signal-in-Space (SIS) Error The results are presented for accuracy, Integrity, cont inui ty and 
availability in section 2 . Simulations were per formed in the presence of a single failing satell ite for all possible geometr ic configurations and 
range bias errors. Accuracy is displayed in across track, along track and composite form. Section 3 presents the locations of unavailable 
samples. Section 4 shows the approach plate for the tested operations and section 5 the simulat ion input parameters to provide repeatabil i ty 
of results in so far as is possible. A glossary is provided for easy reference in section 6 along w i th references. 
1.2 Technical Specification 
Bias Appl ied: 
a) A generic range bias error appl ied to fai l ing satell ite 
b) Worst Case bias (WCB) i terat ive search per formed 
c) Bias applied to each satell ite at all space-time points 
Constellation: 
d) Almanac Type Constellation lU.S.C.G] 
e) Standard Deviation of Nominal Range Errors (sigma) = 12.5m (RTCA DO - 2290] 
f) 5 second geometry resolut ion for satellite constellation and aircraft posit ion. 
RAIM: 
g) Failure Detect ion RAIM (FD RAIM) 
h) Various Horizontal Protect ion Levels (HPL) processed [Brown & Chin, 1998; Walter & Enge, 1995] 
MIsc: 
i) Mask Angle of 7.5 degrees |RTCA DO - 2290] 
j) A single Period of Operat ion (POP) includes holds and missed approach 
1 .3 O p e r a t i o n a l A s s u m p t i o n s 
a) Trial procedure available t o approved part ic ipat ing aircraft w i th RNAV systems funct ional i ty or better than t h a t specified In [JAATGL-10] 
or [FAA AC90 - 96A] for P-RNAV operations 
b) Landing approach 
c) Max imum Decent Gradient I) 2.2 deg to 1600 AAL II) 3.1 deg to 120 AAL 
d) Constant descent gradient used (Variation w i th other vert ical profi les considered negligible) 
e) Aircraft Speed Range 160-190KT 
f) Approach waypoints are fly-b% FAF and MAPt are fly-over 
g) All posit ions reference to WGS84 datum 
h) No banking appl ied at intermediate waypoints (The mask angle is assumed to cover any minor banking ini t iated by the pilot) 
1 . 4 R e q u i r e m e n t s 
1.4a SIS Requirements [ICAO SARPS 2006] 
220m 
/nfegnfy; 1 -10'^ / hour 
Conf/nu/fy; 1 - IC^/hour 
(1 -10'^/hour fo I - J O ' ® / h o u r ) 
039 - 0.99999 
WerOcof; W/A 
1.4b Addi t ional SIS Requirements [ICAO SARPS 2006] 
Alert Limit: 555.5 m (0.3 NM) 
Time-to-alert : 10 seconds 
1.4c Receiver Requirements [TSO-C129] 
Probabil ity of Missed Detection: 10'^ 
ProbabURy of False Alarm: 3.33% 
The calculation of the probabilities of missed detection and false alerts, which constitute the statistics of integrity, Continuity and Availability, are subject to the time between 
independent samples. It is conservatively assumed there are 10 independent samples per hour, as recommended on behalf of the FAA by JHU/APL (GPS Risk Assessment] 
Figure 10.3 Output template - page 1 
On the second page shown in Figure 10.4 the simulation output for the performance 
requirements is given. Firstly, the accuracy performance is presented for along-tracl<, across-
tracl< and composite circular accuracy components. The integrity performance is also 
presented for the three protection levels introduced in Chapter Three, although for NPA it 
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seems reasonable to assume one of the Brown and Chin (1998) methods would be 
implemented as the Walter and Enge (1995) bound was introduced primarily for use in 
vertical navigation. Integrity values are given as worst-case over all samples tested, the worst 
case approach period (POP) and as a mean value. 
The continuity performance is then presented in accordance with the interpretation 
described in Chapter Four. This subsection lists firstly the best estimate for an unscheduled 
outage which was derived from analysis of NANU data. An unscheduled satellite outage is 
defined to be an unscheduled interruption of the SIS for which users were not notified more 
than 48 hours in advance. The worst case continuity risks are then presented both on a per 
sample basis to assess whether the requirements are met for all samples and on a per POP 
basis which is the worst case average. The percentages of POPs which meet the condition are 
then recorded. 
316 
317 
AERODROME RWY • 
DD/MM/YYYV Almanac Constellation 
2 SIS Performance Parameters 
2.1 Accuracy Performance 
Requirement 220m 
)4/ong Trock, 
Avewge /Uong T/oct; 
Wbrsf Cd$e Compos/fe fwrnp/e^; * * m 
Compoi/te; * * m 
along track across track 
projection y ' ' project ion 
HDOP ellipse 
/urcu lar 
. track 
Accuracy 
2.3 Continuity Performance 
Requ/remenf <10^/ hour 
of on l//isc/*du/g(y Ot/foge; /hour 
Worgf COif Conf/nu/fy R/sAr omp/ej: *.* IC' /hour 
Wgrsf Cofg Cbnffnu/fy 10''/hour 
Percenfoge of Compffont Ap^^ooches fPWj: * * * 
2.5 Compliance 
Accuracy: n • • 
Integrity (HPLBC*): • • • 
Cbnf/nu/fy; • • • 
• • • 
Caveat': 
2.2 Integrity Performance 
Requirement (Risk) <10'^/hour 
WtfSf CMg - HPigc (!:omp/gj /Aouf 
Worst Case - HPLBC (POP) *.*xlO'' /hour 
Aygroge - WPlK /hour 
IWarsf Gosg - HPigc- ^ m p / e j /hour 
Worst Case - HPLBC* (POP) *.'xlO'' /hour 
Avffoge - HPLgc, '.*xlO' /hour 
Warsf Cdfe - ^ m p k j /hour 
Worst Case - HPLWE (POP) /hour 
Averoge - HPI#f * * X10" /hour 
HPl*: « Sl0pem# XMDB|kwn&Chlm.l99«| 
HPl*c+ " dopem* MDB + k#Mo x DOP^^ imfowu&chim.»w] 
HPl* [ = slopemm: x T + kpwo xDOP^|Wm*#r&Em#.%#%Amm:.M0q 
2 . 4 A v a i l a b i l i t y P e r f o r m a n c e 
99-99.999% 
Ayo//ob^/(y ^perfomp/ej 
Commence Avo/fo6///(y f~per POP^  **.**% 
Unavailable Samples - Breakdown; 
RAIM Hole (<5 sats): V 
Screened: V* 
Accuracy Threat: */• 
Integrity Threat- V* 
Continuity Threat: V • 
Unavailable POPs - Breakdown: 
RAIM Hole (<5 sats): '/' 
Screened: V 
Accuracy Threat: v 
Integrity Threat: '/• 
Continuity Threat: ' / • 
Figure 10.4 Output Template - page 2 
The availability performance is presented on a per sample basis in the traditional sense and 
using the new commence availability definition given in Chapter Four which accounts for the 
operation time. The various types of availability outage are then listed to provide greater 
detail in the reduction to the service. Finally, the compliance of the approach in terms of the 
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four key SIS RNP parameters is determined. As well as the obvious compliant and not 
compliant, a middle 'caveat' option is given for cases when there are a small number of 
predictable outages, or when performance is met on a per operation basis though falls below 
the requirement at the worst case sample. 
10.2.4 Aerodrome Results 
The simulation output template for the main approach procedure for Durham Tees Valley 
Airport (DTVA) is included in the appendix. The results presented in sections 2 of each 
document show the respective RNP parameters for the approaches using the nominal 
constellation. Although not included, the results are naturally superior when using the current 
full constellation of 31 satellites. Similar performance is found at other airport locations 
tested. The major differences being due to the locations of aircraft banking which restricts the 
number of visible satellites and therefore causes unavailability of RAIM. 
Analysing of the DTVA results in greater detail, the accuracies expectedly are well within the 
required bound of 220m. The integrity values are presented for each of the protection levels 
defined in Chapter Three. The entries are given for the cases in which RAIM is determined to 
be available and therefore presents a real risk to the user. The integrity risk results for the 
Brown and Chin (1998) protection levels are below the required level of 10"^. The Walter and 
Enge (1995) protection level is found to drop below the required level on rare occasions. 
However, the Walter and Enge bound is included primarily for completeness and is not 
understood to be used for NPA (Ober, 1998). The good performance of the lower Brown and 
Chin bound is due to the geometry provided using the full set solution for FD RAIM. As was 
shown in Chapter Nine in the case of Approaches with Vertical Guidance, this may not always 
be the case and performance may dip below the required level as is seen in the results. 
The continuity statistics include the impact of critical satellites, which if removed from the 
solution will mean the conditions necessary to perform fault detection are no longer present 
(§5.4.2.3). Using the current estimate for an unscheduled interruption, if the number of 
critical satellites visible to the user exceeds four, then the continuity risk requirement is not 
met for NPA. A high number of visible critical satellites may occur when the total number of 
visible satellites is low. The worst case continuity risks per sample are found to occur for four 
critical satellites in the case of the nominal constellation. It is common for the number of 
critical satellites to persist for most of an approach procedure and for this reason the worst 
case continuity risks for a POP are almost equivalent. In fact, these values would be identical 
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without the exclusion of some POPs deemed unavailable due to screening. The reduction in 
compliant POPs under the nominal constellation is a concern but is perhaps exaggerated 
given that the unscheduled outages used to generate the probability of an outage were borne 
of all 31 satellites including less reliable older vehicles. This compliance is compared to the 
minimum requirement of 10"^ within the range specified by ICAO (2006). However, for a 
continuity risk set at 10"^  or below, the existence of one critical satellite would be sufficient to 
exceed the requirement. 
The navigational availability of these approaches is determined firstly by the geometrical 
conditions. Screened samples are removed as unavailable, either firstly due to the existence 
of a RAIM hole (less than five visible satellites available to the user) or more likely because the 
HPL exceeds the required alert limit (HAL). The remaining samples are checked for their 
accuracy, integrity (using the Brown and Chin method) and continuity risk. There were no 
risks posed by the accuracy and integrity for the DTVA simulations. Each of the approaches 
found a small number of samples were screened and similarly did not meet the continuity 
requirements under the estimate for an unscheduled interruption used. Compliance was 
deemed to be met for each approach given that the continuity risk is set for low traffic values 
and an availability prediction is undertaken. For the nominal constellation it would be 
necessary to perform a continuity risk prediction to ensure each requirement is met. 
The locations of RAIM outages for either of the unavailable cases listed above are shown in 
section 3 of the output template. This approach trajectory shows that most of the outages 
occur at banking locations because the number of satellites is reduced, thereby leading to an 
unfavourable geometrical configuration. 
In summary, the results show clearly and concisely the relevant simulation output information 
in a manner which eases understanding and interpretation by operators, service provider 
personnel and regulators who may not have specific technical knowledge concerning RAIM. 
The DTVA approach specifically highlights that availability of RAIM is critical but also that 
continuity risks are present which are not presently considered by prediction tools (Ober, 
1998). The approach is safe and viable given sufficient prediction of RAIM availability and low 
traffic levels. Furthermore, the protection levels employed on-board the receiver should 
perform at least as well as the Brown and Chin method. 
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10.3 Further Practical Implementations 
Included within the objectives of this thesis is the requirement to exploit the research in two 
ways. Firstly, to use the developed software platform to assess actual GPS navigable approach 
procedures on the basis of the four fundamental RNP parameters. This has been described 
above, with the Durham approach trajectory. Secondly though, it is crucial to develop the 
idea of online applications of the algorithms developed to improve upon existing services 
(DFS, 1998; Ober et al, 1998; lATA, 2008). In Chapters Eight and Nine, results showed that 
availability may be improved by use of the novel algorithms whose introduction within a 
receiver would be relatively simple. Minor changes to the processing and memory capability 
may be required, but do not excessively exceed similar such changes associated with other 
interpolation based mechanisms and iterative searches proposed (Hwang and Brown, 2005). 
In this section, consideration is given to the design of additional services which could be 
provided to aid operations, both from the point of view of the operator (ANSP) and the user 
(pilot). 
10.3.1 Aerodrome Operational Aid 
The current role of the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) with respect to GPS (or GNSS) 
approaches and in terms of requirements definition remains fuzzy. The requirements for both 
continuity and availability are given as ranges, with advice stated in the ICAO SARPs 
Attachment D on which value within the range should be adhered to under varying conditions 
(ICAO, 2006). Firstly, as pointed out in Chapter Two, this advice is ambiguous in nature, 
although perhaps figures for high, low and intermediate traffic densities could be derived. 
However, more importantly is the lack of flexibility or recommended decision making chain 
on which value to implement for an airspace at a given time. It is feasible that ANSPs or state 
regulators in approving GPS approaches have concluded that the lower bounds are sufficient 
for the approved approaches given perhaps low nominal traffic volumes. However, it is, 
equally likely that more demanding conditions will occur, hence the introduction of the range 
by ICAO in the first place. At these times, it may be that GPS approaches (or indeed is the case 
for En-Route operations) do not meet the level of service envisaged by ICAO in introducing 
the range, due to high traffic levels which in the event of an unscheduled outage on a critical 
satellite could be potentially demanding for air traffic controllers. 
The results shown for the nominal operations at Durham show a considerable number of 
samples and to a greater extent POPs which do not meet the continuity risk requirement of 
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10" . This number would greatly increase for higher continuity risks as mentioned above, 
because then only one critical satellite need be present for the sample to fail to meet the 
requirement. 
The proposed solution to this ambiguity in continuity risk is to implement an operational aid 
at the aerodrome as shown in Figure 10.5. This aid will take the form of a software-based 
performance prediction tool. The tool would predict performance based on the current 
constellation obtained initially through an internet server. The current almanac would then be 
used to predict the SIS availability and with the aid of a NANU information service should 
ensure the most up-to-date constellation is being used. The tool would enable greater 
flexibility by allowing the ANSP to set the conditions for 'high', high-intermediate', 
'intermediate', 'low-intermediate' and 'low' traffic density which could equate to 10"®, 10'^, 
10"®, 10'^ and 10"^ respectively. The aerodrome operations team could then manually 
determine the status as traffic levels vary, in turn affecting the compliance of approaches. 
Clearly, if no alternative means of navigation is possible it may be necessary to permit that 
approaches are completed. 
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Figure 10.5 Aerodrome Operational Aid 
In addition to the continuity risk capability described above, the optimal operational aid 
would include, in parallel with the receiver design, the novel integrity risk and ideal protection 
level computation mechanisms presented in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine for NPA and APV. 
This would perhaps require the use of dynamic sampling techniques, as described in Chapter 
Five in order to ensure the sufficient predictive capability is met. 
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The resulting operational tool would enable accuracy, integrity, continuity and hence 
availability to be determined on the basis of a flexible requirements definition subject to 
operational status set by operators or the ANSP. Most importantly it would enable operators 
to respond more knowledgeably to approach requests and predefined flight plans. A simple 
schematic representation of the tool is shown in Figure 10.5. 
10.3.2 Internet-Based Pilot Aid 
Naturally, as well as the operator's need for better prediction of requirements compliance, 
the user or pilot of the intended operation is also an interested party. A similar tool may be 
devised which provides guidance on the available times of approach at a chosen aerodrome, 
thereby allowing a GA pilot the option of requesting a suitable approach time as part of their 
flight plan. This service could be provided by a central server which includes a database of 
GPS approaches to be selected by the user. 
The greatest benefit of the pilot aid and indeed the aerodrome aid could be garnered through 
implementation of the same protection levels on-board receivers. Even under these 
conditions, a lack of standardisation of the protection level forces prediction tools to make 
assumptions with regards to the achievable performance. 
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Chapter 11 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
11.1 Conclusions 
The drive towards gate-to-gate air navigation operations using GPS (and GNSS) will continue 
over the next decade and beyond. Ever more demanding user expectations on safety and 
efficiency of air navigation require more sophisticated techniques to be used, particularly with 
regard to system integrity and availability. A critical element in meeting this demand is the 
use of Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) which accounts for localised errors 
and relies only on GPS (or GNSS). 
The central component of this thesis has been the development of an enhanced software 
platform capable of assessing the performance of GPS and RAIM in a unique and powerful 
manner. This software incorporates novel techniques for the computation of integrity risk, 
resolution of the worst case bias ambiguity and sampling strategy. The integrity risk 
computation is shown to outperform existing methods and is presented in Milner e to / (2009: 
in press). The software platform created has been used to assess the performance of Non-
Precision Approaches in the most comprehensive manner possible with today's technology. 
This process succeeds in maintaining the link between the operational requirements, 
operational environment and the technological capabilities of the system. 
The basis for the operational evaluation capability is a thorough and novel study of GPS 
failure modes. The notion of a total failure model has been explored and a framework 
formulated which incorporates the likelihood and impact of all known failures in a realistic 
and reliable fashion. OF particular note is the definition of failure at an epoch as opposed to 
over a temporal period which may be relevant to performance specification. The failure mode 
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Study included a contribution to the issue of orbit mis-modelling. It concluded that a 
mismatch between actual satellite health and broadcast satellite health before and after 
orbital repositioning is mostly the root cause of such errors. An analysis of the associated 
Notice Advisories to Navstar Users (NANUs) which inform users of repositioning outages 
found them to have improved over the past decade. Furthermore, it found that contrary to 
the recommendations provided by the RTCA (2006) it may be prudent in some cases to 
exclude satellites on the basis of NANUs, overriding the broadcast health status. 
The first part of this thesis reviewed the state-of-the-art user level integrity monitoring 
algorithms and their limitations. It identified snapshot algorithms that have been approved 
for air navigation approach procedures and the relevant techniques to be explored. Of 
particular interest is the performance of the Protection Levels (PL) employed in these 
algorithms which are designed to guard against excessive integrity risk. Unfortunately, this 
leads to a reduction in service availability. To maximise service availability whilst meeting the 
integrity requirements, a new PL has been derived f rom the integrity nsk computation 
procedure in the latter part of the thesis. This ideal PL may be used within the performance 
assessment setting or in an online implementation on-board aircraft receivers and internet 
based prediction tools. Application of the ideal VPL (Vertical Protection Level) to a study of 
Approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV) found that existing methods are either excessively 
conservative or allow an unacceptable level of integrity risk to be present. Over the UK an 
increase in availability of approximately 40% was found for APV-I operations using current 
single-frequency measurements. Similarly, an increase of 35% has been presented for APV-I I 
operations using forthcoming dual-frequency measurements. These innovations and results 
are to be presented at ION-GNSS-2009 following selection for the ION student scholarship by 
peer review. The computational efficiency of the ideal VPL is such that a real-time 
implementation within a receiver is feasible and has the potential to provide an improved 
level of service for APV within the current regulatory setting. The performance of the ideal 
VPL and other protection levels were also assessed using 24 hours of real data. The results 
showed a single missed detection in the worst case for one of the existing methods and none 
for the ideal PL and other existing methods. This was in conformance with an expected 
frequency of a single missed detection over the data set. 
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11.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
This thesis has contributed to the performance assessment of NPA procedures, the GPS 
failure modes knowledge base, RAIM availability and integrity analysis and proposed a novel 
RAIM algorithm which enables safer and more accessible operations. Within these 
applications, further studies are proposed below in order to extend and enhance the software 
capability for a real-time application and to incorporate future GIMSS developments. A study 
of the weaknesses of RAIM exclusion functions and appropriate standards is also suggested. 
Finally, a comparison and potential combination is suggested between the innovations in 
algorithm design presented in this thesis and other recent interesting developments: 
• Development of the case for Precision Approach (APV / LPV200) - This thesis has 
focused on NPA yet the focus of civil aviation is moving towards precision approach 
operations in order to replace Cat I. 
• Extrapolation to the multiple frequency and multiple constellation environment -
The results obtained in this thesis have primarily been for the current single 
frequency GPS constellation. However, developments being made at present ensure 
the future signal environment will comprise of multiple signals such as GPS L1/L2/L5 
and Galileo E1/E5/E6. Extension of the methodology to this future environment is 
suggested, including an assessment of the reliability of CRAIM and the role of the 
ground segment to monitor the inter-system biases. 
• Development of a combined Galileo/RAIM integrity solution - Current design of 
integrity monitoring provisions utilise either measurements received at ground level 
or on-board but only limited suggestions for combining the system and sensor level 
approaches have been made. Optimisation of detection and exclusion performances 
may be achievable by combining these techniques to widen the capture of failures. 
• Extension of Failure Mode Analysis - To complete the analysis of failure modes by 
incorporating the Evil Waveform anomaly which occurred in 2000 on SVN19 and 
recently in 2009 on SVN45 and determining the impact at the user level based on the 
receiver technology. 
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Compare the advances in EVT solutions - This thesis has concentrated on a failure 
model derived empirically under the assumption of Gaussian noise in the nominal 
case. An alternative model has been proposed to the Gaussian approach by using the 
more general EVT. A comparison and analysis of combining EVT with the methods 
presented in this thesis is proposed. 
Investigation of the Integrity Risk posed by Wrong Exclusions - This thesis has 
focused on the integrity risk associated with the RAIIVI detection function. The RAIiVI 
exclusion function may be assessed using the software developed by analysing the 
results of the subset solutions. This should lead to the determination of the 
probability that the incorrect satellite is excluded from the solution following failure 
detection. 
Combination of the Dynamic Temporal Sampling Method and the Trajectory Spatial 
Sampling Strategy - An accelerated means to assess the performance of the system 
in terms of the key RNP parameters has been devised for a single point location. 
Incorporation of this technique within the approach validation process would likely 
reduce the computation time from around 48 hours to less than 6 hours. This added 
computational efficiency would aid the development of a near real-time 
performance monitor for use at airports and online. 
Full Comparative testing of the Proposed Ideal PL Concept and NIORAIM in terms 
of RAIM Availability, Integrity, Accuracy and Computational Load - The proposed 
ideal PL RAIM algorithm has been shown to provide improved RAIM availability at an 
algorithmic level whilst all other factors, constellation, error characteristics and 
detection capability remain equal. NIORAIM has also been shown to improve RAIM 
availability but with varying performance from the proposed method in terms of 
accuracy and computation time. The NIORAIM algorithm must be implemented 
within the software to allow protection levels to be computed and thus compared 
with the proposed ideal PL. In parallel, an expected accuracy measure would be 
needed to contrast with the expected accuracy of the optimal weighted least squares 
estimator. 
Application of the Integrity Risk Computation, Worst Case Bias Search and Ideal PL 
to NIORAIM - NIORAIM uses a sub-optimal weighting of the measurements which 
introduces correlations between the parity vector and position error. In order to 
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extend the concepts developed in this thesis, further innovations are needed to 
account for these correlations. The combined merits of NIORAIM and the concepts 
presented in this thesis could bring a truly optimal level of performance to snapshot 
RAIM algorithm design. 
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Appendix 
APPROACH VALIDATION SIMULATION RESULTS 
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DTVA RWY 23 
02/12/2008 Nominal Constellation 
DURHAM TEES VALLEY AIRPORT, TEVMO to RWY23 with MAP and HOLDS (P-RNAV) 
1. Technical Description 
1 . 1 D o c u m e n t D e s c r i p t i o n a n d P u r p o s e 
This documen t contains the s imulated per formance statistics for t he Non-Precision Approach t o RWY23 Including hold ing pat terns and missed 
approaches t o Durham Tees Valley A i rpor t . The per fo rmance statistics for relate t o on-board RAIM for use w i t h GPS under condi t ions specif ied 
in t h e fo l l ow ing sections 1.2,1.3 & 1.4 and ref lect Signal-in-Space (SIS) Error The results are presented fo r accuracy, integr i ty , con t inu i t y and 
avai labi l i ty in sect ion 2 . Simulat ions were pe r fo rmed in the presence o f a single fai l ing satel l i te for all possible geomet r ic conf igurat ions and 
range bias errors. Accuracy is displayed in across track, a long track and composi te fo rm. Sect ion 3 presents t he locat ions o f system unavailable 
per iods over t h e approach track. Section 4 shows t h e approach plate for the tested operat ions and sect ion 5 t he s imula t ion input parameters 
t o provide repeatabi l i ty o f results in so far as is possible. A glossary is prov ided for easy reference in sect ion 6 a long w i t h references. 
1 . 2 T e c h n i c a l S p e c i f i c a t i o n 
Bias Appl ied: 
a) A gener ic range bias er ror appl ied t o fai l ing satel l i te 
b) Worst Case bias (WCB) i terat ive search pe r fo rmed 
c) Bias appl ied t o each satel l i te at all space-t ime points 
Constel lat ion: 
d) Nomina l Constel lat ion [GPS SPS 2008] 
e) Standard Deviat ion o f Nomina l Range Errors (sigma) = 12.5m [RTCA DO - 229Dj 
f ) 5 second geomet ry resolut ion for satel l i te conste l la t ion and aircraft posi t ion. 
RAIM: 
g) Failure Detect ion RAIM (FD RAIM) 
h) Various Hor izontal Protect ion Levels (HPL) processed [Brown & Chin, 1998; Wal ter & Enge, 1995] 
Misc: 
i) Mask Angle o f 7.5 degrees [RTCA DO - 229D] 
j) A single Period o f Operat ion (POP) includes holds and missed approach 
1 . 3 O p e r a t i o n a l A s s u m p t i o n s 
a) Trial p rocedure available t o approved par t ic ipat ing aircraft w i t h RNAV systems funct iona l i ty o r be t te r t han t h a t specif ied in ( JAATGL-10 ] 
or [F/\A AC90 - 95A] for P-RNAV operat ions 
b) Landing approach 
c) M a x i m u m Decent Gradient 1) 2.2 deg to 1600 AALII ) 3 .1 deg t o 120 AAL 
d) Constant descent gradient used (Variat ion w i t h o the r vert ical prof i les considered negligible) 
e) Aircraf t Speed Range 160-190KT 
f ) Approach v/aypolnts are flY-by, FAF and MAPt are f lY-wer 
g) All posi t ions reference to WGS84 da tum 
h) No banking appl ied at In te rmed ia te waypoin ts (The mask angle Is assumed to cover any m ino r banking in i t ia ted by t he pi lot) 
1 . 4 R e q u i r e m e n t s 
1.4a SIS Requirements [ICAO SARPS 2006] 
Accuracy; 220m 
J - 1 0 ' ^ / hour 
ConWnu/fy; 1'10'"/hour 
(1 -IC^/hour to 1 /hour) 
Availability: 0.99 - 0.99999 
WprtKo/; N/A 
1.4b Add i t iona l SIS Requirements [ICAO SARPS 2006] 
A ler t L imit : 555.5 m (0.3 NM) 
Time- to-a ler t : 10 seconds 
1.4c Receiver Requirements [TSO-C129] 
Probabi l i ty o f Missed Detect ion: 10'^ 
Probability of False Alarm: 3.33% 
The calculation of the probabilities of missed detection and false alerts, which constitute the statistics of Integrity, Continuity and Availability, are subject to the lime between 
independent samples. It is conservatively assumed there are 10 independent samples per hour, as recommended on behalf of the FAA byJHU/APL [GPS Risk Assessment! 
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2 SIS Performance Parameters 
2 . 1 Accuracy P e r f o r m a n c e 
220m 
Worsf Cose A)ong Trodc fsompfg); 39m 
/^yeroge ;4/ong Thzck; 25m 
Worsf CoK /Across TrocAr 45m 
/Ayefoge )4/ong Troc^; 27m 
Wwsf Cose Compog/fe ^omp/e^; 63m 
^yeroge Compos/fe; 34m 
along track across track 
projection y projection 
HDOP ellipse 
/ b r c u l a r 
' " . track 
Accuracy 
2 .2 I n t e g r i t y P e r f o r m a n c e 
Requirement (Risk) <10''/hour 
Worst Case - HPLsc (sample) 
Worst Case - HPLBC (POP) 
Average - HPL^C 
2.2x10'"/hour 
6.4x10^^ / hour 
1.2x10'"/hour 
Worst Case - HPLBC* (sample) 
Worst Case - HPLsc-, (POP) 
Average - HPLgct 
2.1x10'"/hour 
6.2 X 1 0 ' " / hour 
1.2xlo"/hour 
Worst Case - HPLM (sample) 
Worst Cose - HPLwc (POP) 
Average - HPLWE 
1.4x10''/hour 
9.3 X10"^ / hour 
3.5x10''"/hour 
H P L B C = S L O P E „ „ X MDBlBrDwnSChln.lMSI 
HPLBC. = S L O P E M A X ^ M D B + kpwo x D O P ' " IBro™&aio, ISSS} 
H P L I V E = Slope„„ xT + kpwp X DOP"'|WalterSEin<i,1995;Aiig>iS,200T| 
2 .3 C o n t i n u i t y P e r f o r m a n c e 
Requirement <10"' /hour 
Probability of on Unscheduled Outage: 2.6x10'^/hour 
Worst Case Continuity Risk (sample): 1.4 xio'/hour 
Worst Case Continuity Risk (POP): 1.3x10'^ / hour 
Percentage of Compliant Approaches (POP): 93.70% 
2.5 C o m p l i a n c e 
Accuracy: • • • 
Integrity (HPLBC.,): • • • 
Continuity': • • • 
Availability': • • • 
100%comp%of/(KjowtM^|^demMtyom(foATpocecompk*^ 
(variable requirement ICAO SARP5 ATT D3.4) 
Caveat': predictable availability iuff dent 
2 .4 Ava i lab i l i t y P e r f o r m a n c e 
Requ/remenf 99-99.999% 
fomp/ej 99.18% 
Commence Availability ("per POP) 92.55% 
Unavailable Samples - Breakdown: 
RAIM Hole(<5 sats): 0 / 2,695,680 
Screened: 3,235 / 2,695,680 
Accuracy Threat: 0 / 2,695,680 
Integrity Threat: 0/2,695,680 
ContlnultY Threat: 21,567/ 2,695,680 
Unavailable POPs - Breakdown: 
RAIM Hole (<5 sats): 0/17,280 
Screened: 941/17,280 
Accuracy Threat: 0/17,280 
Integrity Threat: 0/17.280 
Continuity Threat: 1089/17,280 
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54.65 
54.60 
5445 
1 
i 
I 
1 
1 
- J 
. V * 
. 
; . . - r • 
] 
1 
i 
-0145 -0140 -01.30 -0125 -01.20 
Longitude (degrees) 
-0115 -0110 
Red -
Sample Points 
Green -
Outage Start 
Blue -
Outage End 
Figure : S i m u l a t e d A p p r o a c h Track Unava i l ab l e Per iods (Ou tage ) Loca t i ons 
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4 Approach Plate 
P4 DVTA R W Y 23 02/12/2008 Nominal Constetlalion 
I N S T R U M E N T A P P R O A C H C H A R T - * C A O D U R H A M T E E S V A L L E Y 
R N A V (ON**) 
R W Y 2 3 
(ACFT CAT A.B.C.D) 
AD ELEV 
reessiDc Towcm T M R ELEV 
AAO 1 l&aeo. 126.850 TEESaoE RADAR HElOMTS Amove THA ARC SHOWN IN BRACKETS BEAAINOS ARE MACMETtC TRANSmON ALTIfUOe AOOO TCCSSf D £ INFORMATION 
WAVPOIWT» 
ROVNI : 54MM.74N 
revMo : &44T 14 saN 
TUPLA : &441S4 44.M 
NV33t : S4aS1333N 
Hvnr • MM 
RW23M . 
MVMA1 : 
0M05*L7eW 
OtMITOft-ftlW 
lyw 
001»r«t.25W 
CXM245S«SW QOl5at467W 
1% 
MM, 
TRIAL RNAV OM8S PROCE DURE TO Be fLOWN VUC ONLY 
eOCKBERRV Fm 
R£COMMENOCO PROFILE On>di«nt 5,24%. 373FT/MU 
1760(1044) ALT<HGT) 
TCM SO I 
1440(1324) 1130(1014) 
N D B « L ) T I > 
M A P T R W 2 9 M (TMR R W Y 23) 
(Se® Not® 2) 
MOOflW) Climb to zSOO.rtCiall^McwraMs N V M A 1 . At lOOOor 
wtidchovaroccunilator, revet 
fo CO nvontiooa f novi 
and turn (tght toNOG<L) TO at 
2900 or as diroctod 
030(814) 
MO (424) 
Alrcrott Category O/SKT 
descont FT/MiN 
(OCH) 540(424) 540(434) 540(424) 540(424> 
VM(C)OCA 
( O C H A A L ) Total Ar«a 500(470) ®2 0(300) 000(680) # 10*000) 
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5 GAVaT Input Parameters 
Trajectory Sampl ing The t ype o f space t i m e point sampl ing used fo r t h e s imulat ion 
Opt ions: Point Region Grid loop-track FW-Approach Heli-Approach 
Select Loop Track 
Time Step Size The sampl ing resolut ion in t i m e 
Select S.OOseconds 
Almanac File Name Select GPS_NOIV1.676 
Simulat ion Type Legecy Opt ion 
Select M o d e l S imu la t i on 
GPS Linear Range Errors Legecy Opt ion 
Select GPS Predef ined Linear Range Errors 
Receiver Selection Legecy Opt ion 
Select A l l - l n -V iew HDOP 
Probabi l i ty of False A la rm 3.33 X 10 ^ 
Probabi l i ty of Missed Detect ion 0 .001 
Measu remen t Error Sigma 12.5 
Mask Angle 7.5 
Cont inu i ty Analysis Select Enabled 
Number o f POPs 1 
POP Start Waypo in t Indices 1 
POP End Waypo in t Indices 8 
GPS Week Number 676 
Day o f Week 0 
Start T ime 00:00.00 
Simulat ion Length Parameter The parameter used fo r de te rm in ing the length of t he s imula t ion 
Opt ions: Samples Loops Geometry-Days 
Select G e o m e t r y Days 
Parameter Number 156 
Geomet ry Day Offset S.OOseconds 
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6 Glossary + References 
6 . 1 G l o s s a r y 
AAL Above Aerodrome Level 
AC Aircraf t 
DOP Di lu t ion o f Precision 
FAF Final Approach Fix 
FD Failure Detect ion 
FDE Failure Detect ion and Exclusion 
GPS Global Posit ioning System 
HDOP Horizontal Di lut ion of Precision 
IAS Indicated Air Speed 
ICAO Internat ional Civil Av iat ion Organisation 
JAA Joint Aviat ion Author i t ies 
JHU/APL John Hopkins University Appl ied Physics Laboratory 
MAPt Missed Approach Point 
M D Missed Detect ion 
NPA Non-Precision Approach 
PFA Probabi l i ty of False Alarm. 
PMD Probabi l i ty o f Missed Detect ion 
POP Period of Operat ion (For this case includes Init ial hold, approach, missed approach and re tu rn to hold). 
P-RNAV Precision Area Navigation 
PRN Pseudo Random Noise {Unique Satel l i te Ident i f ier Code) 
RAIM Receiver A u t o n o m o u s Integr i ty M o n i t o r 
RNP-RNAV Required Navigation Performance for Area Navigation 
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronaut ics 
RWY Runway 
SARPS Standard and Recommended Practices 
SIS Signal-in-Space 
SPS Standard Posit ioning Service 
TGL Temporary Guidance Leaflet 
WQG84 Wor ld Geodet ic System of 1984 
Range Bias Error Error t ype appl ied to a satel l i te measurement result ing in a l inear measurement bias In t he d i rect ion o f t h e signal path 
Nomina l Range Errors Random errors appl ied to all o ther satel l i tes wh ich have no t been set t o fail or unhealthy. Errors chosen f r om a series 
o f zero-mean normal d is t r ibut ions 
RAIM Alarm A larm raised by RAIM a lgor i thm t o user if RAIM unavai lable or measurement error de tec ted 
Screening RAIM a lgor i thmic process by wh ich availabil i ty o f the statist ical test is de te rm ined onl ine th rough the use o f satel l i te 
geomet ry parameters 
Slope A geomet ry parameter represent ing geomet ry quali ty. The rat io o f posi t ion error t o test statist ic in t he presence o f 
no noise. Lower slope provides greater detectabi l i ty of errors 
6.2 References 
Global Posi t ioning System - Standard Posi t ioning Service Performance Specif icat ion (2008) 
U.S Depar tmen t o f Defense, 2008. 
RTCA DO-229D (2006) M i n i m u m Operat ional Performance Standards for Global Posit ioning Sys tem/Wide Area Augmenta t ion System 
A i rborne Equipment . RTCA 
JAA TGL-10 (2001) A i rwor th iness and operat iona l approval for precision RNAV operat ions in designated European airspace 
Joint Aviat ion Author i ty , 1st November 2001. 
FAA AC90-96A (2005) Approval o f U.S. Operators and Aircraf t t o Operate Under Ins t rument Flight Rules (IFR) in European Airspace 
Designated for Basic Area Navigat ion (B-RNAV) and Precision Area Navigat ion (P-RNAV). Federal Aviat ion Author i ty , 13th January 2005. 
FAA TSO-C129a () A i rborne Supplementa l Navigat ion Equipment Using t h e Global Posit ioning System (GPS). 
ICAO (2006) - In ternat iona l Standards and Recommended Practices: Aeronaut ical Telecommunicat ions - Annex 10 
In ternat iona l Civil Av iat ion Organisation. 25 th November 2004. 
JHU/APL (1999) GPS Risk Assessment. John Hopkins Universi ty Appl ied Physics Laboratory. 1999. 
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